{ "id": 3268300, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEBRA BACH, a/k/a Debra A. Brown, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bach", "decision_date": "1979-07-16", "docket_number": "No. 78-128", "first_page": "893", "last_page": "901", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 893" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990788 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937164 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2486516 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933860 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443843 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" }, { "page": "437" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812613 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 N.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426040 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2993707 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.E. 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5241169 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/339/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3391245 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2473137 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/127/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S. Ct. 1881", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 L. Ed. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 U.S. 954", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6258725, 6257766, 6258409, 6259722, 6259345, 6257393, 6256981, 6258105, 6259034 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0954-06", "/us/398/0954-03", "/us/398/0954-05", "/us/398/0954-09", "/us/398/0954-08", "/us/398/0954-02", "/us/398/0954-01", "/us/398/0954-04", "/us/398/0954-07" ] }, { "cite": "255 N.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2890771 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2799860 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394202 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 N.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395924 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 273", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 894", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6405124, 6405222, 6405325, 6406317, 6405935, 6405421, 6405041, 6405555, 6404951, 6405786, 6405661, 6406111 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0894-03", "/us/434/0894-04", "/us/434/0894-05", "/us/434/0894-12", "/us/434/0894-10", "/us/434/0894-06", "/us/434/0894-02", "/us/434/0894-07", "/us/434/0894-01", "/us/434/0894-09", "/us/434/0894-08", "/us/434/0894-11" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441461 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414856 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3407169 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2836587 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 N.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856262 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0344-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 874, "char_count": 17159, "ocr_confidence": 0.897, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8679902260087194e-07, "percentile": 0.7258038982195487 }, "sha256": "0f5aa9b4a2a04ad5745c249421cd3134ae05e65023c98ccb4848b70c75404b23", "simhash": "1:254714bcf3ff1e97", "word_count": 2866 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:44.225302+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEBRA BACH, a/k/a Debra A. Brown, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, Debra Bach (defendant) was found guilty of delivery of a controlled substance. (111. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 56Ja, par. 1401(b).) She was sentenced to imprisonment for 3 to 9 years. Defendant appeals.\nAt trial, Officer Ricardo Abreu testified he approached defendant on March 3,1977, at approximately 6 p.m., at the intersection of two Chicago streets. He told her he wished to buy some heroin. He gave the defendant $20 and he received from her a blue balloon about one-eighth of an inch in diameter containing a brown powder. This powder was identified by testimony of a forensic chemist as .11 grams of heroin.\nOfficers George Karl and Lawrence Evans testified they had worked on an undercover team with Officer Abreu. On the day in question they served as \u201csurveillance officers\u201d and observed Officer Abreu talking with defendant. From about 40 feet away, they saw the officer hand something to the defendant and the defendant hand something to the officer. Shortly thereafter Officer Abreu met with the other officers at a prearranged spot. He gave Officer Karl a blue balloon which contained a plastic package filled with a brown powder. The balloon was inventoried and was taken by Officer Karl to the crime laboratory.\nDefendant testified in her own behalf. She stated she had engaged in prostitution on the date and in the area in question. She could not remember if she had been in that area at 6 p.m. but said this was \u201cvery doubtful\u201d. She testified she had never seen Officer Abreu before her arrest and denied selling heroin to him. She had never delivered the blue balloon to any one and she had never seen it before. Defendant testified she had never sold heroin. Defendant admitted to having a prior felony conviction.\nNo point is raised by the defendant in this court concerning proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In our opinion, the evidence of guilt supports the verdict to the point of being overwhelming.\nI.\nDefendant was arraigned on May 26,1976. She made an oral motion for substitution of judges naming Judges Epton and Massey. In August of 1976 the case was assigned to Judge Massey. After nine postponements before him, the case was tried by Judge Massey commencing July 7,1977. No objection to trial before Judge Massey was raised by defendant.\nDefendant contends the oral motion for substitution of judges rendered Judge Massey without power to preside over her trial. Defendant relies on several cases such as Hoffmann v. Hoffmann (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 344, 239 N.E.2d 792. In Hoffmann, the court stated that \u201cif the petition for change of venue complies with the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, chap. 146, par. 1 et seq.), the right to a change of venue, in both criminal and civil cases is absolute.\u201d (Hoffmann, 40 Ill. 2d 344, 347.) However, Hoffmann and the remaining cases relied upon by defendant are distinguishable from the case at bar. In all of these other cases, the motions for substitution of judges were in writing as required by statute. The statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 114\u20145(a)) states:\n\u201cWithin 10 days after a cause involving only one defendant has been placed on the trial call of a judge the defendant may move the court in writing for a substitution of judge or any 2 judges * * *. Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the cause but shall transfer it to another court or judge not named in the motion.\u201d\nIn the instant case, defendant\u2019s motion did not comply with the statute because it was not \u201cin writing.\u201d This requirement of the statute is clear and unmistakable. In People v. Tucker (1971), 3 Ill. App. 3d 273, 277, 278 N.E.2d 141, this court noted that where a defendant named four judges (under section 114 \u2014 5(c) of the criminal code providing for substitution of one judge) the motion failed to comply with the statute. In People v. Pinchott (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 601, 370 N.E.2d 1294, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 600, the trial court permitted defendant to argue an oral motion for substitution prior to filing a formal petition under section 114\u20145(c). This court held that \u201cthe failure to follow-up by filing the written matter, in effect, waives any alleged error.\u201d Pinchott, 55 Ill. App. 3d 601, 603.\nThis court finds defendant\u2019s willingness to proceed to trial before a judge named in the motion for substitution constitutes a waiver. Defendant was aware of the motion made at the arraignment. She had every opportunity to object to continuing before Judge Massey as the case appeared before him on nine occasions prior to trial. No objection was made. (People v. Howell (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 117, 120, 324 N.E.2d 403.) Also, the point was not raised in defendant\u2019s motion for new trial and is therefore waived. (People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16, 382 N.E.2d 227.) Defendant cannot now seek relief from this court upon that basis. We will add that the trial judge, in our opinion, gave defendant a fair and impartial trial.\nII.\nDefendant contends the trial court failed to give the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal No. 3.13 (2d ed. 1968) (hereinafter cited as IPI Criminal). This instruction limits the evidence of the prior conviction of defendant to credibility. Upon motion of the State, an order was entered by this court on February 20,1979, directing the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County to prepare, certify and transmit to the Clerk of this court the complete set of instructions submitted to the jury at the trial. Upon examination of these instructions, filed herein on June 15, 1979, as a supplemental record, we find IPI Criminal No. 3.13 was in fact submitted to the jury by the trial court.\nIII.\nDefendant contends she was denied a fair trial as a result of prejudicial statements made by the State in closing arguments:\n(1) The prosecution stated its personal opinion that the defendant had a great deal to gain by lying.\n(2) The State\u2019s Attorney made assumptions not based on the evidence by stating:\n\u201cI would submit that she\u2019s also supporting herself by selling narcotics, including heroin. Now, ladies and gentlemen, I would submit to you it is a short step from prostitution to the sale of heroin. And she testified that she didn\u2019t remember Officer Abreu. We would submit that the reason she didn\u2019t remember Officer Abreu was because she was selling to so many different people that she wouldn\u2019t be able to remember one specific instance. This is a quick thing.\u201d\n(3) During rebuttal the State argued that defendant \u201clied with her body twice a day\u201d and would not hesitate to lie on the witness stand.\n(4) The State improperly attempted to shift the burden of proof and destroy the presumption of defendant\u2019s innocence by stating the defendant \u201coffered only her own self-serving wholly uncorroborated testimony.\u201d\n(5) The State\u2019s Attorney improperly argued to the jury by the use of such language as \u201cI urge you, I implore you don\u2019t let her get away with her crime.\u201d\n(6) After defense counsel\u2019s objection was sustained by the trial court, the State persisted in stating the procedure that would be necessary for a police officer to falsify evidence of a drug sale.\nAs regards (1), (2) and (6) above, defendant \u201cfailed to object to these remarks during argument, and the error is, therefore, deemed waived. [Citation.]\u201d People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 559, 363 N.E.2d 838, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273.\nAs to (4) above, reference that a defendant\u2019s testimony may be self-serving and uncorroborated is not inappropriate. The State may direct attention to matters which appear from the record. (See People v. Hopkins (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 284 N.E.2d 283.) The record reveals defendant did testify in her own behalf and this testimony was uncorroborated. The State\u2019s argument appropriately called into question the credibility of defendant\u2019s testimony.\nAs to the remainder of the points raised, we have read and considered all of the final arguments. We conclude that there was no prejudicial error here. The final argument of the State did not constitute \u201ca material factor in the conviction * # (People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, 390, 288 N.E.2d 363, quoting People v. Swets (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 418, 423, 182 N.E.2d 150); did not result in \u201csubstantial prejudice to the accused\u201d (People v. Nilsson (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 244, 248, 255 N.E.2d 432, cert. denied (1970), 398 U.S. 954, 26 L. Ed. 2d 296, 90 S. Ct. 1881); and the verdict would not have been \u201cdifferent had the improper closing argument not been made \u00b0 (People v. Trice (1970), 127 Ill. App. 2d 310, 319, 262 N.E.2d 276). Also we must consider the fact that \u201cboth the court and counsel admonished the jury that counsel\u2019s remarks did not constitute evidence.\u201d People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 559, 363 N.E.2d 838; see People v. Smith (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 395, 403-04, 368 N.E.2d 561.\nIV.\nOn cross-examination of defendant the prosecution elicited details about the time during which defendant had engaged in prostitution. Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning. In conference the judge stated the questioning was proper on the issue of credibility. Defense counsel informed the court that he had not advised defendant of her fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. He stated he wished the court to advise defendant of her rights in the presence of the jury. After being so advised, defendant refused to answer any further questions relating to prostitution. She conferred with her counsel and then consented to answer similar questions. Defense counsel continued to object to that line of questioning.\nOver defense counsel\u2019s objection, the court allowed the State to question defendant regarding a prior felony conviction. Defendant admitted she had been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery under the name Debra A. Brown. A certified copy of the felony conviction was admitted into evidence.\nDefendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in allowing cross-examination of the defendant on the issues of prostitution and her prior felony conviction.\nWe need not consider the latter point. The defendant has failed to raise this issue in the written motion for a new trial. This constitutes a waiver and the issue cannot be urged as a ground for reversal on review. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16.\nIn addition, defendant herself opened the door on both of these issues. On direct examination defendant admitted she had been a prostitute and admitted her previous conviction. The ensuing cross-examination by the State was therefore appropriate. This cross-examination was not \u201cforeign to the direct examination\u201d as was the situation in People v. Fiorita (1930), 339 Ill. 78, 88, 170 N.E. 690, cited and relied on by defendant here.\nThe scope of cross-examination generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of this discretion, coupled with a showing of manifest prejudice, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed. People v. Coles (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 393, 396, 385 N.E.2d 694. See also People v. Blokes (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 354, 358, 348 N.E.2d 170.\nV.\nAfter the defense rested, the State called Officer Hugh Carroll. The officer testified defendant was taken into custody on March 26,1977, and was searched for drugs. No drugs were discovered and defendant was released. He testified he had not spoken to Officers Abreu, Evans or Karl concerning the defendant prior to March 26. Defense counsel objected to the entire testimony because it did not rebut any portion of defendant\u2019s direct examination. Defendant\u2019s motions for directed verdict and mistrial were denied.\nDefendant contends this testimony of Officer Hugh Carroll was tantamount to rebuttal testimony on an undisputed issue advanced only in the opening statement by the defense and that this resulted in manifest prejudice. The officer\u2019s testimony was in response to defense counsel\u2019s opening statement that he would prove that defendant was the victim of a police conspiracy. Accordingly, in our opinion, the testimony was proper.\nThe rebuttal by the State was also directed to the testimony of defendant on direct examination. She testified that she had never seen the blue balloon before trial. Also she stated that she never saw Officer Abreu until March 8 (some days after her arrest in connection with this case), when she was arrested without a warrant and without reason. She also stated that on March 19 she was \u201cabducted by four officers\u201d and arrested without a warrant. In our opinion, the State had the right to rebut the inference thus raised that defendant was a victim of an illegal arrest without cause. The order of proof and the time for use of rebuttal evidence rest \u201c \u2018largely within the discretion of the trial court and such rulings will ordinarily not be set aside upon review.\u2019 \u2019\u2019People v. Waller (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 381, 387, 367 N.E.2d 1283.\nVI.\nDefendant also contends she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Defendant cites the opening statement by defense counsel that the evidence would show a police frameup and that defendant was not a \u201cvirgin princess.\u201d Also, failure of defense counsel to raise the issue of identification after Officer Abreu testified the defendant was 30 pounds heavier at the time of the alleged sale than she was at trial, failure to advise defendant of her fifth amendment rights and allowing the trial to proceed before Judge Massey.\nIn People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421, 436, 381 N.E.2d 677, the supreme court reiterated the principle that a conviction will not be reversed on the basis of incompetency of counsel \u201c unless the representation is of such a low caliber as to amount to no representation at all or reduces the court proceedings to a farce or sham.\u2019 People v. Torres (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 384, 391.\u201d The court held competency of counsel \u201cis determined from the totality of counsel\u2019s conduct at trial. [Citations.]\u201d (Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d 421, 437.) The court further noted that \u201cerrors in judgment or trial strategy do not establish incompetency. [Citations.]\u201d Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d 421, 437.\nThis court cannot say the alleged indicia of incompetency cited by plaintiff were not mere \u201cerrors in judgment or trial strategy.\u201d Trial counsel may well differ in the tactics they employ in any contested case. All of the matters cited by defendant in this court present the type of situation in which a difference of opinion regarding procedure might readily occur among able attorneys. Examining the \u201ctotality of counsel\u2019s conduct\u201d in the instant case, we do not find that defendant was denied competent assistance of counsel as contemplated in Murphy.\nIt must be remembered that we are required'to examine this situation in view of the presumption that counsel was competent and this presumption can be overcome only by strong and convincing proof of incompetency. (People v. Jackson (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 816, 820, 354 N.E.2d 643, appeal denied (1977), 65 Ill. 2d 579.) In addition to establishing actual incompetence of the defense attorney, it was necessary for defendant here to show \u201csubstantial prejudice resulting therefrom.\u201d (People v. Witherspoon (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 18, 21, 302 N.E.2d 3.) In view of the evidence in the case before us, we cannot say that defendant was prejudiced in any manner by the legal representation she received at trial.\nVII.\nThe information here was filed as to \u201cDebra Bach otherwise called Debra A. Brown.\u201d Officer Karl knew the defendant under the name of \u201cBrown.\u201d On cross-examination the prosecutor asked defendant if she was also known as Debra A. Brown. She answered affirmatively. Defendant contends this was severely prejudicial and warrants reversal.\nIn People v. Berlin (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 266, 388 N.E.2d 412, the supreme court held that a direct suggestion by the prosecution \u201cthat defendant used an alias for the purpose of concealing his identity because of a prior record of crime\u201d would be improper and prejudicial. However, in the absence of such a suggestion when used to \u201cclarify defendant\u2019s true identity\u201d questioning concerning an alias is \u201crelevant and nonprejudicial.\u201d Berlin, 75 Ill. 2d 266, 268-69.\nIn the instant case, there was no suggestion by the prosecution that defendant utilized an alias to conceal a criminal record. Defendant admitted both use of the alias and the conviction. This reference by the prosecution to the use of an alias was nonprejudicial and served simply to \u201cclarify defendant\u2019s true identity.\u201d\nFor the above reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMcGLOON and O\u2019CONNOR, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Geraldine V. Biggs and Aaron L. Meyers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Paul C. Gridelli, and Christopher Cronson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEBRA BACH, a/k/a Debra A. Brown, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-128\nOpinion filed July 16, 1979.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Geraldine V. Biggs and Aaron L. Meyers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Paul C. Gridelli, and Christopher Cronson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0893-01", "first_page_order": 915, "last_page_order": 923 }