{ "id": 3274222, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT E. GEORGE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. George", "decision_date": "1979-08-07", "docket_number": "No. 78-27", "first_page": "140", "last_page": "145", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 140" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "152 N.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2768709 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194, 195" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1585459 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/118/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 N.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2860072 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2932686 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0401-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 11229, "ocr_confidence": 0.892, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.861040583119093e-08, "percentile": 0.49885919989929917 }, "sha256": "33bc47a23d45c6d0a6d2baa57e59c7fd818e9ae7d75bdf58fce2dac43a49aa5b", "simhash": "1:837b306d72b68525", "word_count": 1922 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:33:33.109776+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT E. GEORGE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant brings this appeal from his conviction of aggravated assault after a jury trial. The trial court imposed a sentence of 364 days imprisonment \u201cto run consecutive with any now pending sentence or any such further sentence received by virtue of a parole violation.\u201d Defendant has raised two issues on this appeal. He first contends that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury when the trial court overruled a challenge for cause to a juror who was acquainted with one of the prosecution witnesses. He next contends that a new sentencing hearing is required because the trial court imposed an improper consecutive sentence.\nThe evidence showed that on August 23,1977, Mary Vohlken arrived at the Greenville, Illinois, I.G.A. store at about 1:15 p.m. Defendant Robert George was in the parking lot. Mrs. Vohlken parked her car and then George walked over to her car. She opened her car door and stood up to get out when the man asked for the time of day, and she told him.. She testified that then he said \u201cDon\u2019t say a word\u201d and she looked down and saw that he had a knife. She then started screaming and he repeated, \u201cDon\u2019t say a word.\u201d When she continued screaming, he ran to his car and left the parking lot. He did not ask for money. George\u2019s testimony was the same up to the point about asking her the time. He testified that she told him the time, and then started screaming, apparently because she had seen the knife. He denied saying anything to her except to ask for the time. He said he had been sitting in his car using the knife to cut leather on a boot strap and had carried it with him when he went over to ask the time. He testified that he had no intention of harming Mrs. Vohlken and had never pointed the knife at her. He left when she began screaming because he was on parole from Menard Penitentiary, and did not want to be in a situation where he would be sent back. The jury apparently believed Mrs. Vohlken\u2019s testimony. In any event, the sufficiency of the evidence is not an issue on appeal.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention is that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury when the trial court overruled a challenge for cause to a juror who was a friend of a prosecution witness. During voir dire, a potential juror, Mrs. Schneider, indicated in response to the court\u2019s questioning that she knew one of the State witnesses, Steve Dothager. The following exchange occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: I mean what we\u2019re wanting to know, will you treat his testimony if he testifies just like anybody else?\nJUROR SCHNEIDER: Well, it may make a little difference come to think of it.\nTHE COURT: In other words, you think that maybe you might show some partiality if he testifies?\nJUROR SCHNEIDER: Yes. He was a great buddy of my deceased son.\u201d\nThe trial court then permitted further questioning of Mrs. Schneider by both counsel. Mrs. Schneider indicated during that questioning that she had known Steve Dothager for about five or six years. On further questioning by the State\u2019s Attorney, Mrs. Schneider indicated that she did not think that she would give greater weight to Steve Dothager\u2019s testimony than to that of anyone else. Defense counsel challenged Mrs. Schneider for cause. The defense had exhausted its peremptory challenges. On further examination by the court, Mrs. Schneider indicated that she could be fair and impartial to both sides. The court asked her to explain the discrepancy between her earlier and later statements. She responded:\n\u201cWell, I thought you should know that my son was a big friend of his. I didn\u2019t want to skip that; and I really think it wouldn\u2019t make no difference though.\u201d\nThe court denied the challenge for cause, indicating that the questioning had been intensive and her response had been satisfactory.\nThe party seeking to challenge a juror for cause bears the burden of demonstrating that the juror possesses a disqualifying state of mind. (People v. Cole (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 401, 298 N.E.2d 705.) The determination of whether or not the prospective juror possesses the state of mind which will enable him to give to an accused a fair and impartial trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. His determination should not be set aside unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Harris (1968), 38 Ill. 2d 552, 556, 232 N.E.2d 721, 723.\nWe disagree with defendant that the trial judge\u2019s denial of the challenge for cause was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record shows that the prospective juror gave frank and candid answers to the voir dire questions. She felt that the court should know that the witness had been a good friend of her deceased son, but ' I really think it wouldn\u2019t make no difference though.\u201d She testified that she would not favor his testimony over other witnesses, that her relationship to the witness would not affect her deliberations, and that she could be impartial to both sides. In People v. Cole, our supreme court affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of a challenge for cause. In Cole, the prospective juror had heard about the case through the news media, had known the State\u2019s Attorney and his assistant for a number of years, had worked for the State\u2019s Attorney in his campaign, was personally acquainted with a material witness, was related to another witness, and had a son who was married to the sister of a witness. The prospective juror there stated that he had no opinion as to the defendant\u2019s guilt, that he would disregard anything he had heard about the case outside the courtroom, that his prior contacts with the State\u2019s Attorney and his assistant and the witnesses would not influence him, and that he would give the testimony of these witnesses no greater weight than he would give the testimony of others. The supreme court concluded that the trial court\u2019s denial of the challenge for cause was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn this case the prospective juror\u2019s association with one witness exhibited less potential for prejudice than the contacts of the prospective juror in Cole. We also observe that the testimony of Mr. Dothager supported that of the complaining witness on collateral matters only. He did not know what had actually transpired during the time of the alleged offense. He testified that he saw the complaining witness and the defendant at the car; that it looked like they were having a conversation or argument; that the woman then tried to close her car door and that the man ran to his car and drove away. In light of the defendant\u2019s admissions, these facts were not in controversy. The issue before the jury was essentially one of credibility between the complaining witness and the defendant as to what was transpired near the car.\nThe testimony of Mrs. Schneider during voir, dire that she knew Mr. Dothager but would not favor his testimony, that her relationship to him would not affect her deliberations and that she could be impartial to both sides is a sufficient basis for the trial court\u2019s denial of the challenge for cause. We hold that this determination was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and therefore was not error.\nDefendant next contends that a new sentencing hearing is required because the trial court imposed an improper consecutive sentence. The trial court imposed a sentence of 364 days \u201cto run consecutive with any now pending sentence or any such further sentence received by virtue of a parole violation. * *\nIn People v. Walton (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 324, 254 N.E.2d 190, the court in imposing sentence used the following language: \u201cThis sentence is to be served consecutively to any other sentence which may have been imposed.\u201d On appeal, the court stated:\n\u201cSuch language is so broad that it may be said to make this sentence consecutive to other sentences not in the present record. A sentence should be so complete as not to require construction by the court to ascertain its import, and so complete that it will not be necessary for a nonjudicial or ministerial officer to supplement the written words to ascertain its meaning.\u201d 118 Ill. App. 2d 324, 333, 254 N.E.2d 190, 194, 195.\nThe State concedes that the sentence was improper under Walton, and agrees that the cause must be remanded for resentencing. However, the State contends that the resentencing hearing should be for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to state with particularity the sentence or sentences to which the sentence in this cause is to be consecutive. The court in People v. Toomer (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 385, 152 N.E.2d 845, held that a sentence of imprisonment to take effect in the future as cumulative punishment upon the termination of another sentence must be of such certainty that the commencement of the second and the termination of the first sentence may be ascertained from the record.\nDefendant urges that the remand should not be limited solely to the mechanics of supplying the omitted information but should include a full evidentiary hearing and then imposition of sentence. He contends that this issue is controlled by section 5\u20145\u20143(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20145\u20143(c)) and that this cause should be remanded to the trial court for a sentencing hearing under section 5\u20144\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20144\u20141), including the taking of evidence of the defendant\u2019s life, moral character and occupation since the original sentence was imposed. We do not agree.\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:\n\u201cIn any case in which a sentence originally imposed or recommended by a jury is vacated, the case shall be remanded to the trial court. The trial court shall hold a hearing under Section 5\u20144\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections which may include evidence of the defendant\u2019s life, moral character and occupation during the time since the original sentence was passed. (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20145\u20143(c).)\nAn amendment to this section, which became effective February 1, 1978, does not limit its applicability to cases in which the original sentence was imposed or recommended by a jury. We note, however, that the trial court is not obliged in either event to receive evidence of defendant\u2019s life, moral character and occupation during the time since the original sentence was imposed under either section 5\u20145\u20143(c) or the amendatory section (section 5\u20145\u20143(d)).\nFor the foregoing reasons, the conviction herein is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a sentencing hearing and subsequent imposition of sentence.\nAffirmed; remanded for resentencing.\nJONES and KUNCE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard J. Wilson and Donald T. McDougall, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Charles V. Romani, State\u2019s Attorney, of Greenville (Robert C. Perry and Larry Wechter, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT E. GEORGE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 78-27\nOpinion filed August 7, 1979.\nRichard J. Wilson and Donald T. McDougall, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles V. Romani, State\u2019s Attorney, of Greenville (Robert C. Perry and Larry Wechter, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0140-01", "first_page_order": 162, "last_page_order": 167 }