{ "id": 3272389, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GORDON GOODMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Goodman", "decision_date": "1979-08-09", "docket_number": "No. 78-526", "first_page": "369", "last_page": "376", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 369" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5310375 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2866766 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1585444 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/118/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5407719 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2488896 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 N.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2581682 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/74/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.E.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2803753 ], "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. 2d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5357189 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 1141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971650 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. App. 3d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2726938 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/43/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 N.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2806412 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 975", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 1018", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5638677 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767670 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5637152 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.E. 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5279263 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/358/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 F.2d 155", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10589625 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/532/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525264 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S. Ct. 1602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861989 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767670 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0123-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 926, "char_count": 19187, "ocr_confidence": 0.89, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.024289277058905e-08, "percentile": 0.5038699167403196 }, "sha256": "19062b56fb298f00f257e747fedb700a8178663ca58e2a26103dd6a9f5d218f8", "simhash": "1:f72a35943fb63e7e", "word_count": 3155 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:33:33.109776+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GORDON GOODMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KARNS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a joint trial before a jury in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, defendant and his co-defendant, Michael Bury, were convicted of delivering more than 30 grams of a substance containing cocaine in violation of section 401(a) (2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(a)(2)). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a separate trial; that his motion in limine requesting suppression of evidence of cocaine seized from him following his arrest should have been granted; that the evidence failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s closing argument was prejudicial.\nThe evidence showed that co-defendant Bury had sold cocaine to an undercover agent of the Division of Investigation, Department of Law Enforcement. According to the agent\u2019s testimony, Bury conditioned the sale on his ability to obtain narcotics and consent from his \u201ccontact.\u201d During negotiations, Bury referred to his contact as a man living in a trailer in Okawville who had voluntarily terminated his telephone service out of fear of being \u201cbugged\u201d and who was involved in the drug business. Defendant\u2019s name was never mentioned.\nThe case against defendant was premised on his accountability for the offense and was based largely on circumstantial evidence. On the day of the transaction, Bury and the agent agreed to meet in a restaurant in St. Clair County. The agent arrived at 7 p.m. Two other undercover officers sat at a neighboring table approximately three to four feet away. Additional agents were stationed in unmarked cars in the restaurant\u2019s parking lot. The officers observed defendant drive into the parking lot and wait in his car until Bury and a third person arrived in a separate vehicle. Defendant, Bury, and their companion entered the restaurant together and sat down at the agent\u2019s table. Defendant sat directly across from the agent but was never introduced to him and did not speak to him. Bury sat to the agent\u2019s immediate left.\nAfter some casual conversation, Bury and the agent left the restaurant to confer about the delivery. The agent suggested that the cocaine\u2019s purity be tested before the sale was consummated and offered to drive Bury to meet one of the agent\u2019s friends who could analyze it. Bury stated that he could not leave the premises because \u201cmy man would freak if I left with his cocaine.\u201d The agent then gave Bury 10 marked $100 bills as security and showed him the balance of the agreed upon purchase price. Bury offered to go back into the restaurant to see whether he could make satisfactory arrangements.\nThe surveilling agents indoors testified that they observed Bury come back to defendant\u2019s table and converse with him for three to four minutes. The agents testified that although they could not hear the entire discussion, they heard Bury inform defendant that he was going with the buyer to get more money and would be back shortly. The agents saw Bury lay some money on the table and slide it toward defendant. They saw defendant cover the money with his palm, slide it off the table and put it into his pants pocket, nodding his head affirmatively. After defendant nodded, Bury left the restaurant and went back to the agent\u2019s car. The agent drove to a State police office in St. Clair County where Bury was arrested and the cocaine was seized.\nAfter approximately 20 minutes elapsed without Bury\u2019s return, defendant and the third man paid their bill and left the restaurant. Defendant was arrested in the parking lot and taken to State police headquarters. A search of defendant at headquarters uncovered the marked money that had been given to Bury and a plastic bag containing some cocaine and a rolled dollar bill.\nNeither defendant nor Bury made any written statement to the police. At trial, defendant testified in his own behalf. Bury did not testify and no further defense evidence was produced.\nAs grounds for severance, defendant argues that Bury\u2019s statements to the agent concerning his contact and his place of residence, admitted in evidence, prejudiced him before the jury and that Bury\u2019s defense conflicted with his own. The agent\u2019s testimony contained some of Bury\u2019s references to a \u201ccontact\u201d but did not identify defendant by name or conclude that defendant was the person to whom Bury referred. The court admonished the jury that Bury\u2019s statements were not admissible against defendant and instructed them in accordance with Illinois Pattern Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.05 (1968), that \u201cany evidence which was limited to one defendant should not be considered by you as to any other defendant.\u201d\nThe statements of Bury made to the agent about his contact and place of residence inferentially implicated Goodman and could be considered hearsay as to defendant. Bury did not testify and was, therefore, not subject to cross-examination by Goodman. Defendant argues that the rule of Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620, governs and that defendant was denied his constitutional right of confrontation. Bruton, however, applies only to the confession or statement of a co-defendant implicating another defendant. In Bruton the court was careful to point out that it was not dealing with other recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. 391 U.S. 123, 128 n.3, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 480 n.3, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 n.3.\nWe agree with the State that Bury\u2019s references to his \u201ccontact\u201d were admissible against defendant under the well recognized rule that admissions of a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy may be used as proof against other conspirators. (See generally 4 Wigmore, Evidence \u00a71079 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).) We believe the court should not have limited the jury\u2019s consideration of Bury\u2019s admissions.\nBefore such statements are admissible, however, the evidence must establish a prima facie case of conspiracy independent of the hearsay evidence. (People v. Jackson (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 364 N.E.2d 975.) This is largely a matter of order of proof, however. The transaction between Bury and Goodman in the restaurant involving the money and the conversation overheard by the agents was ample proof to make out a prima facie case. Other circumstantial evidence tended to prove that defendant was Bury\u2019s contact. He lived near Okawville and once had his telephone removed over fear of eavesdropping.\nBury and Goodman were not charged with the offense of conspiracy; however, it is established that it is not necessary that conspiracy be charged in the indictment or information. (People v. Thomas (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 689, 348 N.E.2d 285.) As to the first basis of defendant\u2019s motion for severance, prejudice because of Bury\u2019s statements, we believe the motion ill-founded as Bury\u2019s statements were properly admissible against Goodman.\nThe second reason advanced in support of defendant\u2019s motion for separate trials was that Bury\u2019s defense would conflict with defendant\u2019s. Bury, however, advanced no defense; there was no conflict. Goodman\u2019s defense was to disassociate himself from Bury\u2019s activities. (People v. Davis (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 603, 357 N.E.2d 96.) The mere apprehension or suggestion of conflicting defenses is insufficient to warrant separate trials. (People v. Miner (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 273, 360 N.E.2d 1141.) In short, the record demonstrates that there was no antagonist defense, and the denial of a severance by the trial court was not an abuse of discretion.\nDefendant argues that reversible error was committed by the admission of evidence that he possessed a small quantity of cocaine when arrested. While it is often said that evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant are inadmissible at an unrelated trial, perhaps a more accurate statement is that such evidence is properly admitted if relevant for any purpose other than to show a general propensity of the defendant to commit a crime. Thus evidence of related offenses is competent to prove design, motive, intent or knowledge when the mental state of the accused is an issue at trial. (People v. Brown (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 308, 186 N.E.2d 321; People v. Lewerenz (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 295, 181 N.E.2d 99; 2 Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7300 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).) Goodman denied any knowledge of the delivery of the cocaine, knowledge being the requisite mental state accompanying the act defining the offense. He testified that he took the ten 100 bills and placed them in his pocket without any knowledge of Bury\u2019s activities. At defendant\u2019s request the court instructed the jury that evidence of defendant\u2019s possession of cocaine was admitted solely on the issue of defendant\u2019s knowledge and was to be considered by them for that limited purpose only.\nDefendant argues that evidence of possession has no relevance to defendant\u2019s knowledge of the delivery of a large quantity of cocaine, a Class X felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978 Supp., ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(a)(2)), and cites in support of this argument People v. Baxter (1966), 74 Ill. App. 2d 437, 221 N.E.2d 16. However, in Baxter, the court held it was improper to admit evidence of unrelated sales of narcotics where design, motive or guilty knowledge were not in issue. Defendant\u2019s knowledge of the sale of cocaine was in issue. We believe his possession of cocaine was relevant to his knowledge and participation of the sale of cocaine by his confederate. People v. Kline (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 261, 354 N.E.2d 46.\nFurthermore, the circumstances surrounding an arrest are admissible where they connect the defendant to the offense charged, even though they may reveal the commission of another crime. People v. Schubert (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 599, 329 N.E.2d 23; People v. Tucker (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 136, 255 N.E.2d 31.\nDefendant next argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We have recounted the facts as developed at trial and believe it is apparent that the defendant was proved guilty of the offense charged. There was both direct and circumstantial evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient standing alone to support a conviction. (People v. Mourning (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 414, 327 N.E.2d 279.) The jury was properly instructed on the law of accountability and could reasonably conclude that defendant\u2019s presence at the restaurant was more than mere coincidence; that he was the \u201ccontact\u201d to whom Bury referred and not an innocent bystander; and that he was an active party in the planning and commission of the crime. Cf. People v. Marquis (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 653, 321 N.E.2d 480.\nLastly, defendant complains that the State\u2019s closing argument was improper in three instances. No objection was made to any part of the argument nor was the allegedly improper argument set out in the post-trial motion. In any event, we have examined the argument complained of and do not find it objectionable.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJONES, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KARNS" }, { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN,\ndissenting:\nI believe the majority opinion conflicts with the decision of our supreme court in People v. Smith (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 13, 230 N.E.2d 188, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1602, and Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 85 S. Ct. 1065.\nIn a case remarkably similar to the present one, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically held Bruton applicable in a conspiracy situation. In United States v. Sanchez (9th Cir. 1966), 532 F.2d 155, three persons were indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute opium and heroin. One of the defendants pleaded guilty and the other two went on to trial. One co-defendant did not take the stand, but asserted a defense of entrapment. His attorney advised the jury that had he testified, he would have admitted the allegations in the indictment. The court stated that the incriminatory admissions of the one co-defendant were extremely damaging to the appealing defendant and impaired his right to a fair trial. The entrapment instruction contained no protective language restricting the admissions to the nontestifying defendant, nor was any objection or request made to include such by the appealing defendant. Nevertheless, relying on Bruton, the court implied that a limiting instruction under the circumstances would not have cured the constitutional defect. The major factor in the court\u2019s decision was the fact that the case against the appealing defendant was extremely slender and therefore the use of the statements against him was manifest injustice resulting in plain error. In comparison to this case, it should be noted that the trial judge himself admitted on the record that the case against Goodman was very weak.\nHowever, assuming that the statement of a co-conspirator is an exception to the rule laid down in Bruton, I still disagree with the majority because no conspiracy was ever proved between defendant Goodman and defendant Bury, independent of Bury\u2019s hearsay statements.\nConspiracy is generally defined as an agreement, tacit or express, to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. The essence of the offense is a concern of will and endeavor between two or more people. (People v. Bain (1934), 358 Ill. 177, 193 N.E. 137.) When this record is viewed without consideration of Bury\u2019s statements, there is no evidence that any such agreement existed between the defendant and Bury.\nAgent Inlow met Bury in a public restaurant. Bury was accompanied by defendant and a second man, in whose presence he stated that he had cocaine. Defendant was not a party to any discussion between Inlow and Bury at this meeting or at any other time, and no evidence was presented showing that any conversation between defendant and Bury which specifically referred to the cocaine ever occurred. The actual exchange of drugs and money occurred out of defendant\u2019s presence. Bury subsequently gave defendant a large sum of money in a public place. The most incriminating conclusion that can be drawn from this sequence of events is that defendant had knowledge of and acquiesced to the illegal transaction. This certainly does not constitute participation in a conspiracy. The only agreement shown in this case was the agreement between Inlow and Bury for the transfer of the cocaine, which agreement began when Inlow contacted Bury to attempt a purchase and Bury agreed to arrange a sale.\nThe majority opinion rests its finding of a conspiracy between Goodman and Bury on two grounds. The first of these is circumstantial evidence which indicated that Goodman was the contact. This evidence consisted of the facts that Goodman lived near Okawville and once had his telephone disconnected. These facts standing alone are irrelevant\u2014 they have significance only when tied to the hearsay statements of Bury that his contact lived in Okawville and once had his telephone removed for fear of eavesdropping. How can it be said that these facts independently help to establish the existence of a conspiracy? Second, the majority relies on the money transaction and overheard conversation between Bury and Goodman in the restaurant to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy. As stated above, the most that can be said of this is that Goodman knew of and acquiesced to Bury\u2019s illegal dealings. Where is the evidence of any agreement to further Bury\u2019s criminal intent? The fact that a party commits illegal acts that further the object of a conspiracy does not make him a conspirator unless he had knowledge of the conspiracy. (16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy \u00a710 (1964).) Taking the money, therefore, is not sufficient in itself.\nThe circumstantial evidence used to establish a conspiracy must afford a reasonable inference as to the ultimate facts to be proved and must not be based on mere speculation or suspicion. (16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy \u00a736 (1964).) A conspiracy cannot be established by evidence of a mere relationship or transaction between the parties. (People v. Persinger (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 116, 363 N.E.2d 897.) Demonstrating knowledge is not enough; it is the finding of intent and agreement that makes a conspiracy. (People v. Persinger.) In Persinger the circumstantial evidence used to inferentially establish an agreement to unlawfully deliver a controlled substance was much stronger than in this case. There was cumulative evidence as to the quantity, frequency and duration of sales to the State\u2019s key witness over the period of a year and of the defendant\u2019s presence at numerous drug sales, although he never made any of them directly. In addition, on one occasion he actively facilitated the transaction by lending his pocket knife to the seller to scrape off a prescription label. In comparison to this case, the State\u2019s key witness had never seen Goodman before, Goodman was not present nor did he actively participate in the actual exchange, and there were no prior dealings between Bury and the agent which could have linked Goodman to them. The circumstantial evidence as a whole just does not reach the level it did in Persinger and really amounts to nothing more than suspicion.\nIf it can be said that there was any conspiracy at all betwen Bury and Goodman, it must be viewed as commencing with the conversation between them in the restaurant whereby Bury told Goodman that he was going with the buyer to get more money. This could possibly be viewed as putting Goodman on notice of the pre-existing conspiracy between Inlow, Bury and conceivably Malee and constituting a tacit agreement to join. However, it is standard hornbook law that declarations or acts of one conspirator made prior to the beginning of the conspiracy are not admissible against other members of the conspiracy. (16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy \u00a739 (1964).) In other words, subsequent membership in a conspiracy renders the new member criminally liable for the deeds of the conspiracy but does not relate back to impute co-conspirator statements to him on an agency theory. Therefore, Bury\u2019s statements regarding the need to verify transactions with his \u201ccontact\u201d and the whereabouts of his contact are inadmissible under the conspiracy exception because they were made prior to the formation of the conspiracy between Goodman and himself.\nThe admission of the hearsay statements into evidence cannot be justified on the basis of the existence of a conspiracy, because the evidence failed to establish one, or if it did, the statements were made prior to its formation.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald L. Pallman, of East St. Louis, for appellant.", "Clyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Martin N. Ashley, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GORDON GOODMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 78-526\nOpinion filed August 9, 1979.\nG. MORAN, J., dissenting.\nRonald L. Pallman, of East St. Louis, for appellant.\nClyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Martin N. Ashley, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0369-01", "first_page_order": 391, "last_page_order": 398 }