{
  "id": 3272346,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS KRYGSHELD, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Krygsheld",
  "decision_date": "1979-09-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 78-162",
  "first_page": "1028",
  "last_page": "1030",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:33:33.109776+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS KRYGSHELD, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Thomas Krygsheld, was charged with driving a motor vehicle with no operating taillights and for knowingly driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license. After a jury trial in the circuit court of Will County, the defendant was found guilty of both offenses and was sentenced to two years court supervision, in addition to being fined $250 plus costs for driving with a suspended license and $25 plus costs for driving without taillights. The payment of the fines and costs were made conditions of his supervision.\nInitially, a public defender was appointed to represent the defendant at the trial level, but the appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw after the defendant filed a pro se motion for \u201cchoice of counsel or/and co-counsel.\u201d Subsequently, the defendant proceeded pro se.\nWhen the cause was called for trial, before proceeding further, the trial court advised the defendant that his interest would be better served if he was represented by an attorney, and asked the defendant if he would like to continue the matter for purposes of securing an attorney. Indicating that, because the appointed attorneys withdrew, he felt he must continue to defend himself, the defendant informed the trial court that he was indigent and unemployed. However, to a direct question by the trial court as to whether he wanted to proceed as his own counsel the defendant replied, \u201cYes, your Honor.\u201d\nYet, in both pretrial and post-trial motions, the defendant objected to his lack of representation. In a pretrial motion which the trial court considered a motion to dismiss, the defendant stated he was \u201cbeing forced to defend himself\u201d but declared he was not waiving any of his constitutional rights. In the defendant\u2019s post-trial motion he maintained that he did not dismiss the appointed counsel and that he believed he was being denied the effective assistance of counsel.\nThe issue in this appeal, as framed by the defendant, is whether he effectively waived his right to counsel. Initially, however, it must be determined whether the defendant had a right to have counsel appointed.\nThe United States Supreme Court, in upholding a recent Illinois Supreme Court decision, has stated that, under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States, an indigent criminal defendant cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless that defendant has been afforded the right to assistance of appointed counsel. (Scott v. Illinois (1979), 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158.) In so holding, the United States Supreme Court refused to apply the sixth and fourteenth amendments in favor of a defendant who merely received a fine upon conviction.\nThe defendant in his brief concedes that under the authority of the Scott case appointment of counsel was not required. However, the defendant argues that once counsel was provided, the defendant had a right to rely on appointed counsel. Neither of the cases cited by the defendant to support this conclusion are applicable. Douglas v. California (1963), 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814, involves the right of indigent defendants sentenced to imprisonment for 13 felony convictions to have appointed appellate counsel. In Mayer v. Chicago (1971), 404 U.S. 189, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372, 92 S. Ct. 410, the indigent defendant was wrongly denied a free transcript of proceedings for purposes of appeal merely because he was found guilty of an ordinance violation rather than a felony.\nAccording to Scott v. Illinois (1979), 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158, where appointment of counsel was not required, the question of waiver does not arise and this is true even where as in Scott the question of the right to counsel depended on the nature of a subsequent act, i.e., the imposition of a penalty. Under these circumstances we believe it is immaterial whether counsel was initially appointed and no subsequent counsel appointed upon withdrawal, or whether there was a failure to appoint counsel in the first instance. In either case since no penalty of imprisonment was imposed this circumstance negated the existence of any right to the appointment of counsel.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nALLOY and STENGEL, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert Agostinelli and Peter A. Carusona, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "Edward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS KRYGSHELD, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 78-162\nOpinion filed September 7, 1979.\nRobert Agostinelli and Peter A. Carusona, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nEdward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "1028-01",
  "first_page_order": 1050,
  "last_page_order": 1052
}