{ "id": 3278301, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL RUBERG, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ruberg", "decision_date": "1979-09-28", "docket_number": "No. 78-404", "first_page": "671", "last_page": "675", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 671" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "152 N.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5187045 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/18/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579315 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2611824 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 1305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 981", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3325315 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0981-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3338012 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 767", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 782", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 1034", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6509666, 6509924, 6510405, 6510151, 6510216, 6510025, 6510317, 6509745, 6510514, 6510621, 6510719 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/1034-01", "/us/434/1034-03", "/us/434/1034-08", "/us/434/1034-05", "/us/434/1034-06", "/us/434/1034-04", "/us/434/1034-07", "/us/434/1034-02", "/us/434/1034-09", "/us/434/1034-10", "/us/434/1034-11" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5636393 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2732931 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 N.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5209119 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/24/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 N.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5342287 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428859 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 N.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594840 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/109/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 N.E. 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5155404 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/319/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.E. 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1925, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4935051 ], "year": 1925, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/286/0627-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 542, "char_count": 9051, "ocr_confidence": 0.892, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.151682818523358e-08, "percentile": 0.5082286650688901 }, "sha256": "c99c3b3b85badbd322f17f0e365b574efbcb747984a4dfe8754b2052ea2d1e9e", "simhash": "1:21211edd06798fa4", "word_count": 1529 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:19:59.772889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL RUBERG, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State here appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Henderson County dismissing a complaint for failure to allege defendant\u2019s mental state in charging unlawful entry into a motor vehicle in violation of section 4 \u2014 102(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95*2, par. 4 \u2014 102(b)). The sole issue on appeal is whether mental state is a required element of the offense. Section 4 \u2014 102 provides as follows:\n\u201cIt is a violation of this Chapter for:\n(a) e * e\n(b) A person, without authority to do so, to tamper with a vehicle or go in it, on it, or work or attempt to work any of its parts or components, or set or attempt to set it in motion.\u201d\nA person found guilty of that offense commits a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year imprisonment and/or a $1,000 fine.\nThe complaint alleged that on November 15, 1977, defendant \u201cwithout authority to do so went into a motor vehicle of the Village of Oquawka, being a 1975 Plymouth Grand Fury bearing 1977 Illinois Registration No. M \u2014 730 without the consent of the Village of Oquawka.\u201d Defendant pleaded not guilty and later filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state an offense by not alleging a mental state. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and upon the State\u2019s motion for reconsideration, the dismissal was affirmed. The court granted leave to file an amended complaint, but instead the State perfected this appeal.\nThe State contends that the violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code charged here is an offense for which the legislature has imposed absolute liability. In order to protect the public effectively, the government may, in the exercise of its police power, make the performance of a specific act a crime regardless of either knowledge or intent. People v. Fernow (1919), 286 Ill. 627, 122 N.E. 155; People v. Billardello (1925), 319 Ill. 124, 149 N.E. 781.\nIn numerous cases the courts have construed violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code to be absolute liability offenses. For example, the cases of Fernow and Billardello involved violations of the statute prohibiting possession of a motor vehicle from which the manufacturer\u2019s serial number has been removed, defaced, or destroyed. (1917 Ill. Laws, \u00a7156, at 685.) The supreme court ruled that the statute created a crime which did not require criminal intent or knowledge and that section 15b was a constitutional exercise of the police power. In People v. Espenscheid (1969), 109 Ill. App. 2d 107, 249 N.E.2d 866, Justice Ryan, speaking for the court, stated the general rule as follows:\n\u201cThe only intention necessary to render a person liable to a penalty for a violation of the automobile law is the doing of the act prohibited.\u201d (109 Ill. App. 2d 107, 111, 249 N.E.2d 866, 868.)\nA defendant\u2019s intent or knowledge has been held immaterial on the question of guilt where the offense is driving while operator\u2019s license is suspended or revoked (People v. Turner (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 183, 354 N.E.2d 897; People v. Strode (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 697, 300 N.E.2d 323; People v. Espenscheid; People v. Jensen (1960), 24 Ill. App. 2d 302, 164 N.E.2d 228, aff'd (1960), 21 Ill. 2d 52, 171 N.E.2d 16); where the offense is unlawful use of driver\u2019s license (People v. Van Cura (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 157, 364 N.E.2d 564, cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1034, 54 L. Ed. 2d 782, 98 S. Ct. 767); and where the offense is operating a vehicle under a fraudulent permit (People v. White Brothers Equipment Co. (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 445, 380 N.E.2d 396). In the latter case the court stated:\n\u201cStatutes concerned with the registration and identification of motor vehicles and the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways are generally construed as imposing liability without fault or absolute liability. In other words, being malum prohibitum, no element of scienter or intent is involved in the violation of such statutes. (See generally Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 9, Committee Comments, at 281 (Smith-Hurd 1972).) This principle has been applied in numerous Illinois cases and is so well established as to require no discussion.\u201d 63 Ill. App. 3d 445, 450, 380 N.E.2d 396, 400.\nDefendant cites one case, People v. Nunn (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 981, 328 N.E.2d 1305, appeal allowed (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 588, where a divided court held that knowledge is a required element of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95M, par. 11 \u2014 401(a)). The contrary result was reached in People v. Walker (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 351, 309 N.E.2d 716.\nThe test for determining when a mental state is an element of a crime is set out in section 4 \u2014 9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 -9), which provides:\n\u201cA person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4 \u2014 4 through 4\u2022 \u2014 7 [i.e., intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence], if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $500, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe question then is whether the Illinois Vehicle Code clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose absolute liability for entering a motor vehicle without authority.\nSection 21 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code defines a similar offense as follows:\n\u201cWhoever knowingly and without authority enters any vehicle, aircraft or watercraft or any part thereof of another without his consent commits a Class A misdemeanor.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 21 \u2014 2.)\nSince the Criminal Code specifically requires knowledge as an element of the offense, and the Illinois Vehicle Code does not, we think it logical to assume that the legislature intended to provide a meaningful distinction between the two provisions. The obvious distinction is that the Criminal Code offense requires knowledge that the offender is entering a vehicle without the owner\u2019s consent while the Illinois Vehicle Code requires only entry without authority.\nIn People v. Delay (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 712, 388 N.E.2d 1316, the question on appeal was whether the offense of using a false name on a salvage certificate application was an absolute liability offense under the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 95%, par. 4 \u2014 105(e)). The court first observed that, as a general rule, motor vehicle violations are regarded as absolute liability offenses, even those that involve a felony penalty, and then examined the legislative history of section 4 \u2014 105(e). In 1967, the predecessor section, section 4 \u2014 103(d), was amended by deleting the phrase \u201cwith fraudulent intent.\u201d The court stated:\n\u201cWhere, as a result of an amendment or revision, words are stricken from the statute, it must be concluded that the legislature deliberately intended to change the law. (Town of City of Champaign v. Overmeyer's, Inc. (1958), 18 Ill. App. 2d 523, 152 N.E.2d 752.) The inherent implication of the legislature\u2019s deletion of the specific mental state requirement is that neither intent nor any other criminal mental state is needed to impose liability under the present section 4 \u2014 105(e).\u201d (70 Ill. App. 3d 712, 715, 388 N.E.2d 1316, 1319.)\nThe court went on to observe that section 4 \u2014 105(f) provides that it is a violation for any person to commit a fraud in connection with any application under the Act, and consequently if section 4 \u2014 105(e) were construed as requiring an intent to defraud, then section 105(f) would be rendered superfluous. In the case at bar, if section 4 \u2014 102(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code is construed as requiring criminal knowledge, then section 21 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code would be superfluous.\nBefore 1967, section 4 \u2014 102(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the provision which preceded section 4 \u2014 102(b)) specifically included \u201cwith intent to commit a crime\u201d as an element of the crime, but criminal intent was deleted by the legislature in 1967 when the section was amended. (Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 95)2, par. 4 \u2014 102(d), with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 95M, par. 4 \u2014 102(b).) Just as in People v. Delay, the clear implication of the legislative action is to impose absolute liability for the violation of the present section 4 \u2014 102(b) without requiring proof of criminal knowledge or intent.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the order of the Circuit Court of Henderson County and remand this cause for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTOUDER, P. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen Landuyt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oquawka (John X. Breslin, of State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.", "Greg McClintock, of Kritzer, Stansell, Critser & Whitman, of Monmouth, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL RUBERG, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 78-404\nOpinion filed September 28, 1979.\nStephen Landuyt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oquawka (John X. Breslin, of State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.\nGreg McClintock, of Kritzer, Stansell, Critser & Whitman, of Monmouth, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0671-01", "first_page_order": 693, "last_page_order": 697 }