{ "id": 3291203, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HECTOR ESCOBAR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Escobar", "decision_date": "1979-09-26", "docket_number": "No. 78-569", "first_page": "169", "last_page": "179", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 169" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 1148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3346980 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 N.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395924 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857846 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 N.E. 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5404663 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/126/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1888, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2888258 ], "year": 1888, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3309244 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3315458 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 N.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2912294 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0104-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1070, "char_count": 24773, "ocr_confidence": 0.91, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5334603399184126e-07, "percentile": 0.8127126330531239 }, "sha256": "8dd99d8092b149bdf775f62812fe30ec4180bf294ae092ba058483f7195f26dd", "simhash": "1:9e13c4d8e06b14e9", "word_count": 4213 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:13.635442+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HECTOR ESCOBAR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State maintains that Hector Escobar drove a car which carried a gunman who fired upon and killed Bryan Wagner. Escobar denies being the driver. The State\u2019s single occurrence witness recognized the driver as an old high school acquaintance whom he knew only as \u201cNew York.\u201d Escobar also denied being that acquaintance. He was tried before a jury, convicted of murder, and sentenced to 14 to 30 years in prison. He appeals.\nBefore trial, the court denied motions to quash arrest, to suppress statements, and to suppress identification.\nThe State\u2019s only occurrence witness, Joseph Bradtke, was 18 years old when he testified, 17 at the time of the murder. He had known Bryan Wagner \u201cfor many, many years,\u201d and was a good friend of Bryan. Bradtke had attended Lakeview High School, but had left school several years earlier.\nThe resolution of this appeal requires that Bradtke\u2019s testimony be set forth at some length. At 12:30 a.m. on August 19, 1976, Bradtke and six friends, including Bryan, were drinking beer on or near his front porch at 1623 West Byron Street in Chicago. Bryan and Ronnie Yukawa were riding bicycles in front of the porch near the curb.\nA blue Chevrolet automobile turned onto Byron Street, almost hitting Bryan. The witness, who did not observe anyone else in the car, yelled out \u201cslow down\u201d to the driver. The driver responded by gesturing with his middle finger and yelling something in Spanish.\nMeanwhile, Ronnie Yukawa, who had ridden to the comer on his bicycle, was heading back to his companions. The car pulled alongside and the driver asked Ronnie, \u201cWhat did you say?\u201d Ronnie replied, \u201cI didn\u2019t say anything.\u201d The witness approached the car and told the driver that he, not Ronnie, had said, \u201cSlow down.\u201d The driver began cursing and Ronnie punched him in the face. The witness said, \u201cWhy don\u2019t you just be cool and leave this neighborhood. Don\u2019t start no trouble here.\u201d The driver told the witness he was crazy and began cursing again, and Ronnie punched him again. The witness then told the driver, \u201cPlease, just leave before any more trouble starts,\u201d to which the driver replied, \u201cYes, I\u2019m leaving, but I\u2019ll be back.\u201d\nWhen later cross-examined about this portion of the evening, Bradtke admitted, after being shown a copy of his statement to the police, that he had not told the police he and the other boys had been drinking that night. Bradtke also admitted that during two interviews with the police on August 19, he had not told them that Ronnie hit the driver with a belt wrapped around his fist. He did not tell them of any physical acts against the driver. Bradtke explained that he had not forgotten, but had \u201cdecided to cover for my friends.\u201d Not until 3 days later, when Ronnie told Bradtke \u201cnot to cover for him\u201d but to tell the police the whole truth, did Bradtke reveal these facts to the police.\nHaving ran out of beer, Bradtke and his companions headed down Marshfield north toward Irving Park Road to buy some more. Ronnie and Bryan rode their bikes while the rest walked. Bradtke testified that during this walk, he observed a car coming about 35 m.p.h. southbound on Marshfield; the car, either a Vega or a Pinto, then slowed to about 3 m.p.h. Bradtke was \u201cface to face\u201d with the driver. At that point, the witness saw a man who had been hiding in the back seat raise his head. The driver appeared to have a conversation with his passenger, as the witness and his friends continued on their way, some of them throwing bricks after the car.\nOn cross-examination about this episode, Bradtke testified that, during his contacts with the police on August 19, he did not tell the police that there were bricks and stones thrown at the car, because he wanted to \u201ccover for\u201d somebody. Although he had told the police that it was about 20 minutes between the blue Chevy driving away and the second car appearing, on cross-examination he was only able to set the time interval as somewhere between 20 minutes and an hour and a half. He further testified that the four other boys (excluding Bryan and Yukawa) were standing around him, within 4 or 5 feet from one another as the car passed; he also said that it was dark.\nAs they approached Irving Park Road, Bryan, who was still riding his bike, said, \u201cThere is that car again.\u201d The car, now on Irving Park eastbound, slowed as it approached the corner of Marshfield. Bryan, who was ahead of those on foot, made a U-turn with his bike and came toward the witness and the others. As the passenger side of the car came alongside where the witness and his friends were standing, the car stopped, and a person in the rear right seat fired a gun. Bryan, who was about 5 feet from Bradtke, began pedalling away from the car. The witness heard six shots.\nWhen Bradtke realized that he was being fired at, he took cover near a wall. Then, as the car began to pull away, he saw Bryan fall over the handlebars of his bike, get back up, and walk over to him. The witness, observing blood over Bryan\u2019s lips and nose, asked if he was all right. Bryan replied, \u201cI don\u2019t know,\u201d and then, \u201cLet\u2019s get \u2019em, Joe.\u201d As Bryan spoke those words, he vomited blood and fell into a nearby store doorway.\nOn cross-examination, Bradtke testified that, before the gunman began to fire, he was able to see the entire side of the car. It was a two-door, and the rear right side window was rolled down, with an inch of glass showing in the window frame. He saw only the first two letters on the license plate, and these letters were \u201cNY.\u201d He told the police that the car was either a Vega or Pinto. The police report he signed described the car as a red Vega. Several of the other boys were standing around Bradtke when the shooting began.\nBradtke made an in-court identification of the defendant as the driver of the second car. He testified that he had first met the defendant 2 or 3 years before the shooting, when Bradtke was attending Lakeview High School. He had also seen him occasionally since then. At school he knew the defendant only by the name of \u201cNew York.\u201d On the night of the shooting, he described the driver to police as 19 to 20 years old with a little goatee and very curly hair which was frequently slicked down. He added that the driver was about 6 feet tall, and always wearing high-heeled shoes. Bradtke further testified that, on the night of the shooting, he would have been unable to determine the driver\u2019s height, and that the description he had given the police did not reflect the driver\u2019s appearance, but the appearance of the man whom he had known in high school.\nBradtke also testified that on August 19, 1976, he was taken to the police station, where he looked through high school yearbooks and chose a picture of the defendant, Escobar. Later that day, he and three of his companions at the murder scene viewed a lineup. Bradtke identified the man he had known as \u201cNew York.\u201d After the lineup he was told that the man he had identified was Hector Escobar. After this lineup, the police left the viewing room unattended, at which time, Bradtke testified, the defendant told him that \u201cI was going to be dead before Bryan was buried.\u201d\nAt this point, the defense moved for a mistrial, based on the State\u2019s failure to comply with a discovery motion requesting the contents of all statements made by the defendant and a list of witnesses to the making of the statements. The defense maintained that Bradtke\u2019s testimony about Escobar\u2019s threats fell within the scope of the discovery request, yet no information about the statement had been given to the defense. This motion was denied.\nBradtke testified that when his friends told him they had not identified anyone in the lineup, he \u201cmight have been\u201d pretty upset. When he contacted police to determine what had happened, he learned that Escobar had been released. Bradtke, however, was convinced that Hector Escobar had driven the car, and he wanted the guilty person \u201cto pay for it.\u201d\nOn August 23, 1976, Bradtke returned to the police station. He gave the police one of several shell casings that he said were used to shoot Bryan Wagner. On redirect examination, Bradtke was asked if he knew or had heard where the shell casings came from. The defendant\u2019s hearsay objection was overruled, and Bradtke testified that he was told they were found in the back seat of New York\u2019s car. He had the casings for a day or two before turning one of them over to the police; he did not give the casings to the police when he received them on August 21 because he might have wanted to settle the matter himself.\nAlso on redirect examination, Bradtke agreed that \u201ceverybody\u201d knew the defendant as New York. The trial judge termed the question \u201cpreliminary\u201d and overruled a defense objection. The witness was then asked whether Bryan Wagner knew the defendant as New York. After he answered yes, another defense objection was made, but this one was sustained; the court, though, did not rule on a motion to strike.\nFollowing Bradtke\u2019s testimony, the defense moved for a mistrial, citing the State\u2019s failure to comply with a defense discovery motion requesting photographs shown to any witness making an identification. The State had never informed the defense of Bradtke\u2019s use of the yearbooks, and the defense had no prior opportunity to examine them. Counsel also renewed the motion to suppress identification, on the same grounds. These motions were denied. The yearbooks were given to the defense later in the trial.\nInvestigator Nicholas Schuler testified that on August 30, as a result of a phone call from a suspect in the shooting, he proceeded to 2018 West Giddings, where he observed a car double-parked, its motor running and its back seat loaded with clothes. With other officers, the witness entered the building and proceeded to the attic apartment. People could be heard moving about the apartment, but no one responded to the officer\u2019s knocks. After a third knock, someone asked who was there; the police announced their office, and the door opened. Schuler asked the man who opened the door where New York was. The man pointed to the back door. A defense objection on hearsay grounds to this question and answer was overruled. Schuler then said that he found Escobar crouched in a storage area near the back door.\nEdward Adorjan, a Chicago police officer, the first witness for the defense, testified that on August 19, he conducted a lineup in which the defendant was one of the subjects. The officer stated that the lineup is conducted through a one-way mirror; both rooms emptied into the main squad room. The witness stayed behind the one-way mirror with the subjects of the lineup until the identification process was complete, then left the room. At this time, the people who had viewed the lineup were not in the area. It was never reported to Adorjan that Escobar had any contact with anyone who viewed the lineup.\nRoss Vetrano, another Chicago police officer, testified to the description of the driver that Joseph Bradtke gave him at the murder scene; a male Puerto Rican named New York with whom he had attended Lakeview High School. Bradtke was the only person at the scene who said he knew the driver. There was some disagreement between those who witnessed the murder about the make of the car, but it was said to be either a Vega or Pinto. There was also disagreement about whether the license number was MY 6901 or NY 6901. There was no further evidence regarding the car except for the testimony of John Sims.\nSims, general manager of Division Chevrolet Co., testified as to the various body styles of Vegas; in particular, he stated that the rear windows on those cars do not roll down but rather pop out. Pinto rear windows also pop out.\nOfficer William Savage gave testimony similar to that of Officer Vetrano.\nIt was stipulated that, according to expert tests, the shell casing Bradtke gave the police was fired from a rifle that one George Lund, not elsewhere mentioned in the record, voluntarily surrendered to the police, and that a pellet recovered from the wall of a building where Bryan was shot was not fired from the rifle.\nDuring the State\u2019s closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Hector Escobar was also known as New York. To support his point, the prosecutor asked Escobar to place his hands on the table. The defense objected; the objection was overruled. The prosecutor asked the defendant a second time. Another objection was overruled. The prosecution then asked the court to instruct the defendant to place his hands on the table; but the court replied, \u201cIf he doesn\u2019t want to, he doesn\u2019t want to.\u201d Thereupon, the prosecutor said, \u201cNow Ladies and Gentlemen, from my vantage point tattoo on his right hand is N.Y., New York.\u201d The defense then moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied.\nThe prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal argument began with the following statement (objections omitted):\n\u201cFrom the day this trial began I suggest to you that the Defense in this case was a sham and a fraud * * *. I suggest to you that Counsel \u00b0 # # has misled you as to the facts and as to the law. * * * I am not saying he isn\u2019t entitled to adequate defense, et cetera. But in defense of Hector Escobar he has misled you as to what the issues are in this case. Why is he so damn afraid to get to the issue?\u201d\nLater in the argument, he told the jury: \u201cMisled, that\u2019s what you were,\u201d and \u201cHe [defense counsel] was trying to trick him [the witness] * * That\u2019s a fraud.\u201d\nThe prosecutor also repeatedly referred to the State\u2019s case as \u201cuncontradicted and undenied,\u201d using this phrase six times; and he followed up by asserting that \u201cthere was no defense in this case. No real defense.\u201d\nThe defendant first asserts that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But it is well established that a positive identification by one witness with ample opportunity to observe is enough. (People v. Clarke (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 104, 110, 277 N.E.2d 866.) Bradtke\u2019s testimony, if believed, proves the defendant guilty. Although his testimony was impeached on other issues, its thrust was not destroyed. If Bradtke was acquainted with the person he claimed to know as New York, his recognition of that person was entirely plausible. His identification of the defendant as New York is supported by the description of the arrest scene, the threat at the lineup, and perhaps the letters on the license plate. He had no clear motive for wanting Escobar convicted. Thus, the State\u2019s evidence, while to some extent questionable, was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Smith (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 672, 385 N.E.2d 44.) The jury, observing Bradtke, could reasonably have believed the crucial parts of his testimony, and convicted the defendant; our judgment should not be substituted for theirs.\nHowever, the State\u2019s case was marginal, because only one out of five occurrence witnesses identified the defendant and Bradtke was impeached on several matters. Therefore, any impropriety may well have swayed the verdict, and error cannot easily be dismissed as harmless. As the conviction is tainted by several errors, whose effect, at least cumulatively, seems substantial, we reverse and remand.\nThe defendant points out two incidents of improper admission of hearsay evidence. The first concerns Bradtke\u2019s testimony on redirect examination that everybody knew the defendant as New York. His first testimony along these lines came on cross-examination by defense counsel. The witness volunteered that \u201ceverybody\u201d in the group at the murder scene knew New York; he elaborated with the following statement: \u201cWhen the car went on Marshfield and Bryan, he pointed out and somebody else had stated \u2018That\u2019s New York.\u2019 \u201d Defense counsel did not move to strike this response. The defendant complains, rather, of the redirect examination, when the witness stated he had already testified that everybody knew the defendant as New York, and that Bryan knew him as New York.\nBradtke\u2019s testimony that \u201ceverybody\u201d knew the defendant as New York, presumably meaning that his friends had been able to identify the suspect Escobar as \u201cNew York,\u201d if not as the driver, is hearsay. Also, it is obvious that any identification of the driver attributed to Bryan, who was dead, is hearsay. Bradtke\u2019s testimony was damaging to the defendant, for the main issue in the case was identity, and any identification of the defendant as New York or of the driver as New York substantially advanced the State\u2019s cause. True, the jury had before it evidence that nobody except Bradtke had picked the defendant Escobar out of a lineup or otherwise identified the driver to the police; the jury also knew that no one else who was at the murder scene testified in court. Bradtke\u2019s testimony that \u201ceverybody\u201d knew might therefore seem evidence less of the truth of that fact than of Bradtke\u2019s untrustworthiness. But the jury might instead have believed Bradtke and assumed the other witnesses to the crime kept silent out of fear, as the prosecution hinted. We should not speculate about how the jury reacted; we must assume the statement was prejudicial.\nThe second hearsay dispute concerns Bradtke\u2019s testimony that he gave a shell to the police because he had been told it was found with other shells in the back seat of New York\u2019s car. For the purpose of showing that the shells did come from the car, this is inadmissible hearsay. The State protests that the evidence was introduced, not as hearsay, but to explain why Bradtke brought the shell to the police. However, the danger that the jury would misuse the evidence is so much greater than the value of detailing why Bradtke thought the shells were important that the evidence should have been excluded. (People v. Johnson (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 836, 386 N.E.2d 642.) True, the physical evidence tended to show that the shell Bradtke gave the police was not the murder shell; but the inference that people fired guns from the back seat of the defendant\u2019s car is prejudicial enough.\nIf there was any doubt about the likely hearsay use of this testimony, it disappeared when the prosecutor in closing argument declared that the only thing we know about the shells is that they came from the defendant\u2019s car. This both recalled the forbidden use of this testimony and revealed that the State thought the testimony was useful to its case. The combination of the introduction of the evidence itself and the argument about it requires reversal.\nThis brings us to the State\u2019s closing argument; Escobar advances two valid complaints. First, there is the tattoo incident. The defendant raises two arguments against the prosecutor\u2019s avowal that the defendant had a tattoo \u201cNY\u201d: that it was unsworn testimony, and that it came at the wrong time. The first point does not impress us, the second does.\nThe prosecutor\u2019s observation, though technically unsworn testimony, has none of the weaknesses that normally infect such evidence. A description of a permanent visible characteristic of the defendant could hardly be false, for the defendant could instantly prove any mistake. Indeed, the record of the pretrial hearing establishes that Escobar\u2019s hand bore a small tattoo, \u201cNY,\u201d though this fact was inexplicably not given in evidence to the jury. The State could have introduced it properly; the maneuver used was more dramatic, but hardly less reliable. Thus, the unsworn status of the evidence was harmless, if not actually proper.\nThe prosecutor\u2019s statement, however, came in closing argument. No new evidence may be introduced during arguments, when it is too late for the other side to present evidence to counter or explain it. By saving the matter for his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor even precluded defense counsel from arguing in response. This was reversible error.\nOne more ground for reversal is another thread of the State\u2019s closing argument. The prosecutor described the State\u2019s case as \u201cuncontradicted and undenied,\u201d using this phrase six times. The defendant contends that this impermissibly drew attention to the defendant\u2019s not testifying. The State must not make arguments intended or calculated to draw the jury\u2019s atttention to the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. (People v. Burton (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 53, 254 N.E.2d 527; Watt v. People (1888), 126 Ill. 9,18 N.E. 340.) It may argue that its case is uncontradicted, even if the only one who could contradict it is the defendant. (People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 4, 237 N.E.2d 697.) Repetition is not necessarily fatal. (People v. Hopkins (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 1, 284 N.E.2d 283 (\u201cuncontradicted\u201d used seven times).) But an argument whose thrust is the defendant\u2019s nonappearance rather than the strength of the State\u2019s case is error.\nHere the defense put on four witnesses, and strenuously attacked the State\u2019s evidence. Where the State\u2019s case is not in fact unchallenged, the suggestion that it is becomes suspect; it is not \u201can accurate summary of the evidence\u201d (Hopkins, 52 Ill. 2d 1, 6). The only reasonable point to the comment is the defendant\u2019s silence. The State suggests that many people other than the defendant could have contradicted its evidence, and that it was to them the prosecutor referred; but, in fact, it was the State that was defensive about the shortage of witnesses. Moreover, while \u201cuncontradicted\u201d is a colorless word, and could apply to almost anyone, \u201cundenied,\u201d though not per se impermissible (People v. McTush (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 214, 377 N.E.2d 1148) points more at the defendant: anyone can contradict anything, but one denies an accusation. The repetition shows that this was not just a careless choice of words, but deliberate, and assured that the jury would not miss the nuance. The prosecutor also remarked, \u201cThere was no defense in this case. No real defense.\u201d Again, since there was, in fact, a substantial defense, the comment hints that the only \u201creal\u201d defense would be for the defendant to testify. Having read the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal argument in its entirety, we conclude that the remarks in their fair and natural meaning did improperly focus attention on the defendant\u2019s silence.\nThe other errors relied on by the defendant either will not recur at a new trial or are not grounds for reversal. The State failed to disclose to the defense the threat Bradtke testified the defendant made to him when the lineup ended. The defendant now has complete information regarding the incident. The State also failed to disclose to the defendant the high school yearbooks which Bradtke used to identify New York as the defendant Escobar. Not disclosing these on request was error, but the harm is debatable. They were not being used to identify a suspect, but only to discover his name. Since the defendant will have the books at his new trial, it is unnecessary to decide whether the State\u2019s failure was reversible error.\nAnother of the defendant\u2019s claims of error is Officer Schuler\u2019s testimony that the man who opened the door of the apartment where Escobar was arrested pointed to the back when asked where New York was. The defendant argues that this was hearsay and inadmissible. The man\u2019s response, the equivalent of a verbal \u201cHe\u2019s back there,\u201d arguably signified not just that some person was there, but that the person who was there was known as New York. It tacitly acknowledged the nickname as the defendant\u2019s. This, however, does not necessarily make the man\u2019s gesture hearsay. A name is inherently a matter of repute, created and established by people\u2019s knowledge and use. An obvious way of proving a name is to show how others refer to the person whose name is in question. By pointing to the door, the man was demonstrating, not asserting, that the man behind it was New York. We do not believe this was hearsay; and hearsay or not, the man\u2019s unreflective gesture was no doubt as reliable as his testimony in court would be. In fact, a witness testifying in court as to a nickname could only state a conclusion from observations no less hearsay than what is offered here. For these reasons, Officer Schuler\u2019s testimony should be admitted at the new trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the conviction is reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcGILLICUDDY and RIZZI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago (Alan D. Goldberg, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr and Nicholas Iavarone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HECTOR ESCOBAR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 78-569\nOpinion filed September 26, 1979.\nRalph Ruebner, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago (Alan D. Goldberg, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr and Nicholas Iavarone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0169-01", "first_page_order": 191, "last_page_order": 201 }