{ "id": 3288666, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ramsey", "decision_date": "1979-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 78-1200", "first_page": "294", "last_page": "298", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 294" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812665 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5456228 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3338119 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 U.S. 98", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177400 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "2253" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "2253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/432/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394563 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5456897 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9639 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "2259" }, { "page": "599" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "2259" }, { "page": "599" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "2259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378816 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "1880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3421487 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471-72" }, { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 1037", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3271016 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/1037-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 9912, "ocr_confidence": 0.885, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5104488228350294e-07, "percentile": 0.6673647768653693 }, "sha256": "e3ed080fdf24a9d5be5e07b9a53294fdcffde75d23b7222970163f4d8aed4598", "simhash": "1:9005239623f95a8f", "word_count": 1619 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:13.635442+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, Jerry Lee Ramsey (defendant) was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 5 to 10 years. Defendant appeals.\nAt trial, Dennis Howard (complainant) testified that on April 1,1974, he was employed by a vending machine company. While making rounds to service machines, he entered a company van and was knocked to the floor by two men. One of them was later identified as the defendant. The men began kicking complainant. Complainant testified the van was well lighted and he was able to view the men for several minutes. The men demanded money. Defendant had a gun. Defendant and the other intruder searched the shelves inside the van and went through complainant\u2019s pockets. Complainant\u2019s wallet, containing *16 and identification, was taken as were his rings.\nDefendant demanded the keys to the van\u2019s safe. When complainant stated he did not have the keys, defendant placed the gun against complainant\u2019s head and threatened to \u201cblow his * * * brains out.\u201d Complainant told the men to take whatever they wanted from the van. Defendant found a money bag beneath the shelves in the van. He became very angry and hit complainant over the head with a heavy object. Complainant remained conscious. The two men took cases of cigarettes from the shelves. Defendant again threatened to kill complainant but was prevented from shooting him by the other intruder. The men left the van and told the complainant not to leave for 10 minutes.\nAfter several minutes, complainant left the van. He was met by Willie Celsor, a truck driver. Celsor testified that he observed two black men leaving a van carrying something. The men ran to a car and quickly drove away. Celsor wrote down the license number of the car. Said license was later identified as registered to a motor vehicle owned by defendant.\nOn April 4,1974, complainant viewed approximately 200 pictures of black males between the ages of 20 and 30. He picked three photographs as possibly showing the men who robbed him. He identified one of these as depicting the man who had a gun during the robbery. The photograph was of the defendant. Complainant stated he was pretty sure that it was a photograph of the man with the gun. He stated he wished to see the man in person. Complainant did not know at this time whether the police had checked the license number provided by Celsor.\nOn April 26, 1974, defendant was stopped by Officer Henry F. Gralak while driving his car in Chicago. Officer Gralak testified defendant had a ragged piece of paper taped to the lower right-hand portion of the windshield. He approached defendant and told him he was \u201cbeing stopped for no city vehicle or proper application displayed in the window.\u201d The officer asked to see defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95M, par. 6 \u2014 112.) Defendant was unable to produce a driver\u2019s license and was taken into custody. While proceeding to the police station, the officer learned defendant\u2019s vehicle was involved in an investigation for armed robbery. On April 27, 1974, a police lineup was held. The complainant identified the defendant as being the man with the gun who had robbed him.\nDefendant contends his arrest was the result of an illegal stop. He argues that his subsequent arrest and identification are tainted and must not stand. He further contends he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant was stopped for failure to display a Chicago vehicle sticker. This court has found stops for that specific purpose to be permissible. (See People v. Johnson (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 393 N.E.2d 40; see also People v. Morrison (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 468, 471-72, 373 N.E.2d 520, and cases there cited.) When an officer has reason to believe an ordinance has been violated, a resulting stop is based upon \u201cspecific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.\u201d (Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880.) Furthermore, the officer had a duty to stop defendant pursuant to the Municipal Code of Chicago 1973, ch. 11, sec. 31-32. In instances where \u201ca police officer could justifiably be disciplined for failure to act, his action can hardly be characterized as unreasonable.\u201d People v. Moore (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 399, 403, 220 N.E.2d 443.\nThus, after making a legal stop, Officer Gralak demanded to see defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license pursuant to the above cited statute. Upon defendant\u2019s failure to produce a valid driver\u2019s license his custodial arrest by the officer was both legal and appropriate. See Morrison, 57 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472, and cases there cited.\nThe subsequent information that defendant\u2019s car was involved in an armed robbery investigation was received by the officers as a result of a routine inquiry after defendant\u2019s arrest. Defendant\u2019s contention that this information was tainted by an illegal stop therefore fails. In our opinion, the evidence establishes that both the stop and the ensuing custodial arrest were legal.\nAssuming, arguendo, that defendant\u2019s stop and subsequent arrest contained elements of illegality, the products of the arrest would still be admissible against defendant in the instant case. As pointed out in Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 599, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 424, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2259, quoting from Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 488, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, all evidence is not necessarily \u201cfruit of the poisonous tree\u201d \u2019 \u201d when its discovery results from illegal police action. Rather, the issue becomes whether the evidence was uncovered through \u201cexploitation of that illegality\u201d or in a manner \u201csufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.\u201d Brown, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 424, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2259.\nIn the instant case, it cannot be said that evidence of defendant\u2019s involvement in the armed robbery was uncovered through \u201cexploitation\u201d of an alleged illegal stop. The discovery that defendant\u2019s car was involved in a police investigation and the series of events triggered by that information were revealed \u201cby means sufficiently distinguishable\u201d from the initial stop \u201cto be purged of the primary taint.\u201d Brown, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 424, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2259.\nDefendant also contends he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He alleges his in-court identification was \u201cunduly tainted by the pretrial picture display and lineup.\u201d The complainant made a pretrial identification of defendant by photograph and at the lineup and also an identification of defendant at trial. Identification based on pretrial photographic examination will be rejected only if the photographic identification procedure was so \u201c \u2018impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Allender (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 38, 42, 370 N.E.2d 509.) We find no evidence in the record to indicate that the photographic identification or the lineup were suggestive here. Defendant did not attack the validity of identification by these methods prior to or during trial or in a post-trial motion. The burden of doing so and of proving illegality was upon the defendant. (People v. Brown (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 94, 100, 285 N.E.2d 1.) We therefore find complete waiver of these contentions.\nIn addition, consideration of the merits of these attacks upon the identification in this court leads to a negation of the contentions of defendant in this regard. The United States Supreme Court has stated \u201creliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony \u201d * (Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 114, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140, 154, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253.) In our opinion, examination of the five pertinent factors set out in Manson demonstrate that the in-court identification of the defendant was highly rehable. The complainant had ample opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the crime for several minutes in a well-lighted truck. The complainant\u2019s testimony concerning the occurrence reflects a high degree of attention during the incident. Complainant\u2019s prior description of his assailants was reasonably accurate. It must be noted that while defendant argues the description was not complete, \u201cprecise accuracy in description of the offender by an identifying witness is not a necessity.\u201d (People v. Pickens (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 857, 863, 380 N.E.2d 868.) The complainant manifested a high level of certainty when selecting defendant\u2019s picture from 200 photographs. Finally, the photographic confrontation occurred three days after the incident thus making it sufficiently close in time to bear positively on the issue of reliability. See People v. McKinley (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 145, 152, 370 N.E.2d 1040, citing Manson, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140, 154, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253.\nThe testimony of one witness is sufficient to convict in instances where the witness is credible. (People v. Yarbrough (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 222, 226, 367 N.E.2d 666.) In the instant case not only was complainant\u2019s testimony credible and reliable, but it was corroborated by the evidence of the license number. We conclude that the guilt of defendant was proved beyond reasonable doubt.\nFor the above reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMcGLOON and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James L. Rhodes, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Joan S. Cherry, and John R. Roe, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-1200\nOpinion filed September 24, 1979.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James L. Rhodes, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Joan S. Cherry, and John R. Roe, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0294-01", "first_page_order": 316, "last_page_order": 320 }