{ "id": 5602675, "name": "DOROTHY WATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS GOVERNING COMMISSION OF COOK COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Watkins v. Health & Hospitals Governing Commission", "decision_date": "1979-11-15", "docket_number": "No. 78-557", "first_page": "468", "last_page": "473", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 468" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 964", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3290150 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3265595 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5403592 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 1263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1267" }, { "page": "1271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579114 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" }, { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 933", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3392084 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0933-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 929", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5575845 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0929-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" }, { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3336072 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" }, { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 934", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "938" }, { "page": "938" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3357336 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" }, { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2900656 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 N.E.2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2844622 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0054-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 614, "char_count": 13676, "ocr_confidence": 0.897, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8440404786409653e-07, "percentile": 0.7225716634444711 }, "sha256": "891b808745d159646ce52dcef5e7b921a89e9bf664c2c7aa92b96b1c03c64a60", "simhash": "1:18e77584ef4e9cfd", "word_count": 2297 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:08.757403+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DOROTHY WATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS GOVERNING COMMISSION OF COOK COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Dorothy Watkins, brought an action for medical malpractice to recover for the loss of her right leg at the knee. The defendant, Health and Hospitals Governing Commission of Cook County (commission) moved to dismiss the complaint and amended complaint on the grounds that the suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 85, pars. 8 \u2014 101, 8 \u2014 102, 8 \u2014 103). The motion was allowed by the trial court. Plaintiff moved to vacate the order of dismissal and the court denied the motion. Plaintiff appeals from that order. We reverse.\nThe issue to be determined is whether the statute of limitations begins to run when the injured party discovers, or should have reasonably discovered, not only the nature of her injury but also that the injury may have been wrongfully caused.\nThe complaint as amended alleged that on or about January 16,1973, plaintiff was confined to Cook County Hospital for treatment of a kidney infection. The course of treatment specifically required that she be injected with a certain type of dye in connection with one of the tests being performed upon her. As a result of the dye injection, plaintiff developed blood clots, ultimately necessitating the amputation of her right leg at the knee. She was discharged from the hospital in May 1973 and continued treatment at Cook County Hospital until September 23, 1974. On September 23,1974, she was advised that the amputation of her leg was the result of the negligent care and treatment given by Cook County Hospital.\nOn November 27, 1974, the commission was served with notice of plaintiff\u2019s claim. On August 7, 1975, the County of Cook was also served with statutory notice of the asserted cause of action.\nPlaintiff\u2019s original complaint was filed on September 23, 1976. On March 21, 1977, the commission moved to dismiss the complaint. An amended complaint was thereafter filed on June 22, 1977. On July 25, 1977, the commission filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint, based on the statute of limitations of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 85, pars. 8 \u2014 101, 8\u2014102, 8\u2014103). That act provides that an action must be commenced within 2 years from the date the \u201cinjury was received or the cause of action accrued.\u201d It also provides a written notice upon the commission within 1 year. The trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on October 14,1977. Plaintiff then filed her motion to vacate the dismissal order. On December 30, 1977, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate the order of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals that order.\nPlaintiff contends that the applicable statute of limitations begins to run when the injured party knew, or should have known, both that she had a physical injury and that the injury was the result of someone\u2019s negligence.\nThe statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff\u2019s malpractice claim is section 21.1 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 22.1), which provides in relevant part:\n\u201cNo action for damages for injury or death against any physician or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State * * * shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, * * * of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action * 9 9, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 5 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.\u201d\nThe commission, in filing its motion to dismiss, relies on sections 8 \u2014 102 and 8 \u2014 103 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. Section 8 \u2014 102 requires written notice of the claim within 1 year of the injury or cause of action, and section 8 \u2014 103 sets forth the effect of failure to serve notice. These two sections of the Act apply to any actions brought for alleged malpractice at Cook County Hospital.\nThe issue in this case revolves around the application of the statute of limitations. Defendant relies on the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act in its dismissal action because of Cook County Hospital\u2019s involvement. However, both the Limitations Act and the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act have the same statutory limitations. First, we consider the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 22.1) in determining whether plaintiff\u2019s cause of action was wrongfully dismissed.\nAs first announced in Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656, section 21.1 of the Limitations Act has been called the \u201cdiscovery rule.\u201d The rule was later applied in medical malpractice cases. (Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450.) Lipsey stated that a cause of action accrues in medical malpractice cases when the person injured learns of his injury, or should reasonably have learned of it. The court stated:\n\u201cThe reason for the application of the discovery rule is the same in each instance. It is manifestly unrealistic and unfair to bar a negligently injured party\u2019s cause of action before he has had an opportunity to discover that it exists. This is true whether the malpractice consists of leaving a foreign object in the body or whether it consists of faulty diagnosis or treatment.\u201d Lipsey, 46 Ill. 2d 32, 41.\nIn a more recent case, Roper v. Markle (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 706, 710, 375 N.E.2d 934, 938, the court interpreted what the Lipsey court stated in reference to the phrase \u201clearns of the injury.\u201d Roper interpreted that phrase as intending to express that the statute of limitations begins to run \u201cwhen there is a concurrence of the actual or constructive knowledge of both the physical problem and the possibility that someone is at fault for its existence.\u201d Kristina v. St. James Hospital (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 810, 380 N.E.2d 816, and Licka v. William A. Sales, Ltd. (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 929, 388 N.E.2d 1261, both reiterated the conclusion advanced by the Roper court.\nDefendant contends that Ilardi v. Spaccapaniccia (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 933, 369 N.E.2d 144, is controlling in this case. We disagree. In Ilardi plaintiff complained of the alleged negligence of several doctors in operating on her feet. Plaintiff developed a separation of the web between the first and third toes of both feet. One doctor told her that her toes would heal, but instead of healing she developed a separation between the first and second toes of both feet. The doctor offered to reoperate, but plaintiff declined. She remained in his care for another year, at which time she sought the advice of her family physician. Thereafter, she consulted various specialists about her condition. She argued that the first time she had reasonable grounds to believe her injury was the result of the operation was more than 2 years later. She asserted that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff either knows, or reasonably should know, that her injury was caused by defendants\u2019 negligence. The llardi court stated that in Lipsey a cause of action accrues \u201cwhen the person injured learns of his injury or should reasonably have learned of it.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 32, 40, 262 N.E.2d 450, 455.\nIn llardi, plaintiff admitted in her complaint that she learned of her injury shortly after the operation, more than 3M years before she brought suit. Citing llardi, another court stated:\n\u201cHaving actual knowledge of the injury she would have reason to know that the operating doctors might be responsible. The statute of limitations began to run with her knowledge of the injury.\u201d (Martinez v. Rosenzweig (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 155, 160, 387 N.E.2d 1263, 1267.)\nllardi can clearly be distinguished from the instant case.\nDefendant further contends that the amputation of plaintiff s leg was a \u201ctraumatic event\u201d and, therefore, should follow the law applicable in such cases. The courts have held that a cause of action accrues for personal injuries resulting from a traumatic event at the time the plaintiff was injured. Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co. (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 548, 558, 309 N.E.2d 550, 556.\nWe prefer to follow the view of Kristina v. St. James Hospital (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 810, 813, 380 N.E.2d 816, 818, where the court stated that the classification of an injury as traumatic or nontraumatic, alone, is of no significance. The only benefit that could be obtained from that classification would be in determining when the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, that the injury was caused by the wrongful conduct of defendant. Courts have been holding that the more obvious the injury the more easily a plaintiff should be able to determine its cause. Berry, 56 Ill. 2d 548, 559.\nOne recent case which used the terminology \u201ctraumatic event\u201d found that because of the obviousness of the physical injury plaintiff could have found the cause for such an injury. (Ikenn v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 694, 699, 392 N.E.2d 440, 444.) In that case, plaintiff was bom prematurely and placed in an incubator. An uncontrolled flow of oxygen was given to her, and because of that excessive amount of oxygen she became blinded in both eyes. Plaintiff was 22 years of age when she brought the suit. She alleged she had no knowledge that her blindness might have been caused by defendants, until a magazine article was read to her linking the possible causation to a negligent act. The court held that such a physical problem was the result of a traumatic event because of another\u2019s wrongful act. The court stated that by making an inquiry plaintiff could have learned before her 20th birthday that her blindness was caused by improper treatment at the hospital when she was bom.\nIn view of the cases cited, we find the controlling rule to be that the limitations period does not begin to run in malpractice cases until the injured party discovers, or should reasonably have discovered, not only the nature of the injury but also the possibility that it was wrongfully caused. Roper v. Markle (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 706, 710, 375 N.E.2d 934, 938.\nWhether plaintiff should have known the negligent cause of her injury prior to September 23, 1974, is a question of fact. See Lind v. Zekman (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 432, 395 N.E.2d 964; Martinez v. Rosenzweig (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 155, 165, 387 N.E.2d 1263, 1271.\nPlaintiff entered Cook County Hospital for treatment of a kidney infection in January 1973. In the process of running tests on her, the dye that was injected into her right leg caused a blood clot which necessitated the amputation of part of her right leg. Her complaint alleged that she was a known diabetic, and defendant should have known that blood clots could present future problems for her. In light of the fact of plaintiff\u2019s diabetic tendencies, it was possible for her to have her leg amputated and reasonably believe it was caused by her diabetic condition. This possibility was enough to prevent her from knowing or suspecting the negligence of the hospital in administering the dye test to her.\n\u201cIn many cases the nature and circumstances of the injury render its cause obvious to the injured party at the time of the occurrence. However, the nature and circumstances of the injury may be such that its cause is unknown or apparently innocent at the time it occurs. In the latter type of situation it would be \u2018manifestly unrealistic and unfair to bar a negligently injured party\u2019s cause of action before he has had the opportunity to discover that it exists.\u2019 \u201d Kristina v. St. James Hospital (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 810, 813, 380 N.E.2d 816, 819.\nThere is nothing in the pleadings that suggests she should have reasonably become aware of the connection between the dye test and the amputation of her leg. It would be quite reasonable for plaintiff, a diabetic, to assume the amputation was a result of her diabetes and not the defendant\u2019s negligence. It was not until plaintiff discovered the amputation was due to another\u2019s negligence that she should be imputed with knowledge of her right to a cause of action. Whether she discovered, or should have discovered, prior to September 23, 1974, that her injury was due to defendant\u2019s conduct is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact, based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case.\nTherefore, we find that plaintiff\u2019s cause of action was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations and should not have been dismissed by the trial court.\nDefendant further asserts that the necessary notices were not timely filed under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. In reviewing the record, we find that notices to defendant and the County of Cook were filed within the statutory time period.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing plaintiff\u2019s cause of action is reversed and remanded to the trial court for a trial on its merits.\nReversed and remanded.\nJIGANTI, P. J., and LINN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sheldon Oliver Zisook, Ltd., of Chicago (Reid S. Neuman, of counsel), for appellant.", "Calvin Sawyier, of Chicago, for appellee Health and Hospitals Governing Commission." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DOROTHY WATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS GOVERNING COMMISSION OF COOK COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 78-557\nOpinion filed November 15, 1979.\nSheldon Oliver Zisook, Ltd., of Chicago (Reid S. Neuman, of counsel), for appellant.\nCalvin Sawyier, of Chicago, for appellee Health and Hospitals Governing Commission." }, "file_name": "0468-01", "first_page_order": 490, "last_page_order": 495 }