{ "id": 5603661, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELTON HOLLOWELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hollowell", "decision_date": "1979-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 78-517", "first_page": "515", "last_page": "517", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 515" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 916", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581425 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0916-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 2d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2908063 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/131/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5394715 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0428-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 347, "char_count": 5722, "ocr_confidence": 0.924, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.66217029417753e-08, "percentile": 0.5285713568628905 }, "sha256": "28b0026fcee0a5c197876c6ae89fc29754075c73199f955c096bbdbc5e3906a0", "simhash": "1:89ae383f4788a4e5", "word_count": 980 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:08.757403+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELTON HOLLOWELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nElton Hollowell, after a bench trial, was convicted of theft of property valued at more than $150. He was sentenced to a term of not less than three nor more than nine years imprisonment, to be served concurrently with a sentence imposed after revocation of probation in an unrelated case. He appeals, contending that he was not tried on the charge before us within the limits of the speedy-trial statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(a).\nDefendant was charged by complaint on January 3, 1978, and apprehended on January 7. He posted bond the following day, but on January 20, 1978, a hearing was held on a petition to revoke defendant\u2019s probation in a separate case. At the conclusion of that hearing defendant\u2019s probation was revoked, and he was ordered held without bond pending sentencing. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to a term of from three to nine years in the Department of Corrections. Although there is nothing in the record to show that the mittimus was stayed, defendant was not transferred to the Department of Corrections but was instead retained in custody in the Du Page County jail. On March 7, 1978, a preliminary hearing was held with respect to the instant theft offense, at which time defendant filed a demand for speedy trial. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, in which the trial court found probable cause, defendant was ordered released on his own recognizance with respect to the theft charge but remained in confinement due to the sentence imposed following revocation of his probation. On July 14, 1978, defendant moved for discharge based on the State\u2019s failure to bring him to trial in compliance with the speedy-trial statute. The motion was denied, and the case was tried on July 25, 1978.\nIn issue is whether defendant was \u201csimultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county,\u201d which would permit trial \u201cupon at least one such charge\u201d within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody, and on the \u201cremaining charges\u201d within 160 days from the date on which the first trial is terminated. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(e).) The resolution of this issue is, in turn, dependent on whether a petition to revoke probation is a \u201ccharge\u201d within the purport of the speedy-trial statute. We conclude that it is not.\nThis court has previously held that the speedy-trial statute was not intended to be imported into the statutory scheme for probation violation hearings since the legislature had not seen fit to treat trials and revocation hearings in the same way. (People v. Williams (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 428, 430.) In Williams, we made reference to section 117 \u2014 3(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 then applicable which provided that a hearing must be held within a reasonable time after the apprehension of the probationer on the issue of the alleged violation of probation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 117 \u2014 3(b).) Subsequently section 117 \u2014 3(b) was repealed, and the subject matter was transferred to section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20144(b)). The statute presently provides that where an offender remains incarcerated as a result of his alleged violation of the court\u2019s earlier order of probation a hearing shall be held within 14 days of the incarceration. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20144(b).) The legislative history serves to reinforce the view that probation revocation matters shall be treated differently than criminal charges.\nUnder section 103 \u2014 5(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(e)) it has been held that where multiple charges are involved, as to one in custody, \u201call of such charges 0 \u201d * must be subject to being interdicted by the 120 day rule \u201d * 0 and if any one of such multiple charges are not so interdicted, then such charge is not a \u2018charge\u2019 so far as subparagraph (e) is concerned.\u201d People v. Brown (1971), 131 Ill. App. 2d 992, 994.\nWe therefore conclude that defendant must have been tried within 120 days from the time he was \u201cin custody\u201d on the felony theft charge. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(a).) We have held that the determination of a date upon which a defendant is to be considered \u201cin custody\u201d depends on whether any obstacle existed to trying the defendant in the particular county. (People v. Kerley (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 916, 918.) Defendant was sentenced on the unrelated charge on February 24, 1978. At that point the only \u201ccharge\u201d pending against him was that of felony theft and defendant was in fact then in the Du Page County jail. Thus, he was in custody in Du Page County in connection with this offense on February 24, 1978, and the State was required to try him under the facts in this record within 120 days thereafter. It is conceded that he was not tried within that period and he was therefore entitled to be discharged.\nThe judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion for discharge and to enter judgment discharging the defendant as to the theft charge before us.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nLINDBERG and NASH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Robinson, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELTON HOLLOWELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 78-517\nOpinion filed November 20, 1979.\nMary Robinson, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJ. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0515-01", "first_page_order": 537, "last_page_order": 539 }