{ "id": 5610098, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. O. D. WADE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wade", "decision_date": "1979-12-04", "docket_number": "No. 78-550", "first_page": "554", "last_page": "559", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 554" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "353 N.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2970081 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5411263 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1059", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5578584 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3384409 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0721-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 646, "char_count": 11099, "ocr_confidence": 0.878, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.16289598351100779 }, "sha256": "d85fd55d5be9997693f90955105c22f54e25eae40ae1a055a41c7e45113fa89e", "simhash": "1:31c539d4f61e9d41", "word_count": 1864 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:08.542664+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. O. D. WADE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant was convicted in the circuit court of St. Clair County of murder and sentenced to 35 to 70 years. On direct appeal, this court reversed his conviction (People v. Wade (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 721, 366 N.E.2d 528) and remanded the cause for a new trial. A bench trial was had on remand, following which defendant was again convicted of murder. A new sentencing hearing was had, and defendant was sentenced to 14 to 21 years imprisonment. Defendant appeals, alleging there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.\nThe facts relevant to this question are as follows:\nIn the early evening of January 26, 1975, Glennon Rodgers (the deceased) was driving a 1970 Chevrolet, which was owned by Cedric Taylor\u2019s father, in East St. Louis. Cedric Taylor, age 16, and John Billops were passengers.\nAbout 6:30 p.m., this group, travelling south on 19th Street, stopped at a 4-way stop sign at the intersection of 19th and Central. It was just getting dark; however, there is a poolroom and a tavern at that intersection, both of which were equipped with doorway lights, and the area was illuminated by nearby street lights.\nTaylor and Billops saw a white 1965 Oldsmobile parked in front of the poolroom. Both knew it was driven by Elijah Parker, Richard Hart, and defendant.\nTaylor testified he heard Billops say the names of defendant, Parker, and Hart. Looking toward the poolroom door, he saw the three men. Rodgers drove slowly through the intersection. Defendant ran into the street, crouched, pointed a \u201cpistol\u201d toward the Chevrolet, and fired. Taylor did not indicate he saw anyone else firing, although he testified several shots were fired in all.\nBillops\u2019 account of these events varies from Taylor\u2019s in that he thought it was Rodgers who said the three men\u2019s names, and that this occurred after the first shots were fired. He did not see defendant and did not notice who was at the intersection during these events.\nRodgers was shot and lost control of the car. Billops was also shot, and he and Taylor reached for the wheel and stopped the car. Billops then ran for help, and when he returned, Taylor had Rodgers out of the car. Billops went to a friend\u2019s house and then to a hospital.\nWhen the ambulance arrived and before the police came, Taylor ran home. It was several days before he went to the police and told them of his presence at the shooting. Rodgers died of his wounds.\nTaylor testified that he saw defendant almost every day and that he thought defendant had been involved in shooting three of Taylor\u2019s friends in the past.\nDefendant, testifying in his own behalf, denied he was present at the shooting. He testified he was at Mrs. Bolden\u2019s residence, asleep, when Parker woke him and said he had shot someone in a Chevrolet. Parker did not mention being wounded and did not appear to be injured.\nParker was sworn as a witness for defendant, but refused to answer all questions addressed to him, citing his privilege against incriminating himself. Over the State\u2019s objection, his testimony from defendant\u2019s earlier trial was admitted in evidence. His testimony at that trial was as follows: He was alone at the time in question when he was shot in the back from a passing car. Retrieving a rifle from Hart\u2019s Oldsmobile, he returned the fire. He drove to Mrs. Bolden\u2019s house, where he called to defendant and spoke to him from the yard. He walked away, lost consciousness and awoke in a hospital.\nYvonne Jackson, testifying for defendant, stated that she was with Parker, leaving the car he drove to enter her own house when he fired a rifle at a passing car. Its occupants did not return the fire.\nMs. Jackson\u2019s testimony at defendant\u2019s first trial was admitted in evidence. There, she testified she was on the porch of her home when she saw Parker, whom she knew, fire at a passing car. She admitted her hatred for Parker, who had gotten her and another woman pregnant.\nMrs. Bolden testified she and the defendant were at her home at the time in question, and that Parker arrived and announced from the yard that he had \u201cgot one.\u201d\nRichard Hart testified that defendant was in bed asleep when Parker woke him and said he had \u201cgot one.\u201d The three men then left, walking up an alley. Parker was hit when someone came out of a house and fired at them. They left Parker and went to a friend\u2019s house where they spent the night.\nState\u2019s Attorney\u2019s investigator Raymond Herr testified for the State in rebuttal that the two bullet holes he found in the Chevrolet were caused by different weapons. He based this opinion on his observation that the hole in the bumper was approximately three times the size of the hole in the trunk lid. On cross-examination, he stated he had taken into account the differences in the metals involved as well as the speed of the vehicle.\nDetective John Thurman testified he received a description of a very dirty white Oldsmobile from Billops. When he located such a car outside Mrs. Bolden\u2019s residence, he radioed for a tow truck and assistance. He testified in rebuttal that, once assistance had arrived, he knocked on Mrs. Bolden\u2019s door and called out, without reply. Soon afterward, he heard a \u201cvolley\u201d of shots from somewhere behind the residence. Investigating, he found Parker lying on the ground, bleeding profusely from an abdominal wound which was \u201cstill steaming.\u201d Thurman asked Parker who shot him; Parked replied he (Thurman) did.\nIt was stipulated Detective L. C. Moore would testify Parker told him he had been shot by Thurman after he failed to halt as ordered.\nOn appeal, we are confronted with the testimony of Taylor, who knew defendant and who purported to have seen defendant firing at the car Taylor was riding in. Testimony by a single identification witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction. (People v. Hefner (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 693, 388 N.E.2d 1059.) The testimony of an identification witness will be strengthened to the extent of his prior acquaintance with the accused. People v. Lumpkin (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 710, 329 N.E.2d 262.\nHere, Taylor\u2019s acquaintanceship with defendant provided him a basis to make a reliable identification of defendant at a reasonably short distance under what appears to have been ample artificial light. The fact that they were acquaintances also disclosed the existence of a grudge or feud, and, hence, a motive to falsify. However, under these facts, we are not persuaded that such motive rendered Taylor\u2019s testimony less than credible. This potential bias was fully exposed before the trial court, who, as the trier of fact, was charged with weighing the credibility of the witnesses. Significantly, Taylor was straightforward about this bias from the outset, having included it in his initial statement to police.\nDefendant urges that we discount Taylor\u2019s identification of defendant because he did not name defendant to the police until several days after the shooting. The inference defendant seeks to draw, that failure to name \u2022 defendant immediately amounts to a declaration that defendant was not present, is not compelled here. Taylor delayed altogether in reporting his presence at the shooting until some days had passed. When he made his first report, he named defendant and explained the ill will between the two groups. We might be suspicious of Taylor\u2019s testimony if he had first reported the incident without naming defendant, as such facts would suggest an attempt to falsely inculpate defendant. However, it appears Taylor\u2019s initial delay in making any report must be ascribed to some other motive under these facts. Taylor\u2019s presence at the shooting is not in doubt.\nDefendant has conceded that the testimony of the alibi witnesses was inconsistent, contradictory, and improbable. In our opinion, the trial court was justified in not believing that testimony. It is the function of the trier of fact to weigh the testimony, judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine factual matters in debatable sets of circumstances. (People v. Wade (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 721, 366 N.E.2d 528.) The fact that defendant denies his guilt and that defense witnesses corroborate his alibi does not, in and of itself, create a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt; and a reviewing court has neither the duty nor privilege to substitute its judgment as to the weight of disputed evidence or credibility of witnesses for that of the trier of fact. People v. Wade.\nHere, there was evidence impeaching defendant\u2019s alibi witnesses. In particular, Ms. Jackson\u2019s testimony indicated reasons she might have for testifying that Parker alone did the shooting. We will not substitute our judgment on the witness\u2019 credibility for that of the trier of fact.\nThe admissibility of the testimony of Raymond Herr was challenged by defendant at his first trial; however, it was introduced without objection in this cause. We do not find his opinion that the two bullet holes in the Chevrolet were made by different weapons to be critical to the State\u2019s case. If it were to be assumed that both Parker and defendant fired on the Chevrolet but only Parker caused the bullet holes, defendant\u2019s accountability for the offense remains clear. We note the State made no effort to prove that a bullet from defendant\u2019s weapon in fact struck the victim.\nFinally, we must reject defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court\u2019s delay in announcing the finding of guilt amounted to a showing of doubt on the part of the trier of fact. People v. Warren (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 353 N.E.2d 250, cited by defendant, is inapposite. There, unlike the instant case, the court in a bench trial expressly stated its doubts as to the State\u2019s proof. The instant delay must also be distinguished from delay by a deliberating jury in announcing its verdict. Here, there were other likely causes for an extended delay. The record reveals the court was not yet in possession of all transcripts and documentary proof admitted into evidence at the time it took the matter under advisement. Further, the court presumably had other responsibilities during this period, whereas a deliberating jury would have but one task before it. The record does not reveal how long the court in fact considered its decision. Accordingly, we do not find the instant delay tantamount to an affirmative indication of doubt by the trier of fact.\nWe conclude that the evidence adduced was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJONES, P. J., and KARNS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John H. Reid and Daniel M. Kirwan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Clyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Gary L. Cobe, both of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. O. D. WADE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 78-550\nOpinion filed December 4, 1979.\nJohn H. Reid and Daniel M. Kirwan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nClyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Gary L. Cobe, both of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0554-01", "first_page_order": 576, "last_page_order": 581 }