{ "id": 5609649, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER ROCKAMANN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rockamann", "decision_date": "1979-12-05", "docket_number": "No. 79-202", "first_page": "575", "last_page": "584", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 575" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3410726 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 N.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1582628 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/121/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12126930 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2943903 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 N.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5314849 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 N.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832157 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856294 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3336899 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 918", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196194, 6197987, 6197115, 6196411, 6196635, 6197557, 6196885, 6197338, 6197787 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0918-01", "/us/412/0918-09", "/us/412/0918-05", "/us/412/0918-02", "/us/412/0918-03", "/us/412/0918-07", "/us/412/0918-04", "/us/412/0918-06", "/us/412/0918-08" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927578 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S. Ct. 1408", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12057516, 12057845 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0660-01", "/us/397/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 660", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12057516 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857193 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463620 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3360300 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 N.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5275286 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/50/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3367161 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2797602 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443843 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5639124 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3333000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 919", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3385575 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0919-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5408181 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0450-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1002, "char_count": 20658, "ocr_confidence": 0.883, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.086043325978431e-07, "percentile": 0.5636666462021531 }, "sha256": "79fd08bb68006b5eb0431f54815eb3ddf1f5cda48eda262d23a29ab5c6cdb00f", "simhash": "1:aa9fb89dba818ddc", "word_count": 3468 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:08.542664+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER ROCKAMANN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was charged by indictment with four counts of indecent liberties with a child. After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of two of the four charges and was sentenced to two concurrent 15-year prison terms. On appeal, defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial; (2) that the trial court erred in finding that he possessed the requisite mental capacity to commit the alleged crimes; and (3) that the trial court erred in ruling on certain evidentiary objections. For the following reasons we disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nDefendant was accused of taking indecent liberties with his 10-year-old daughter. The occurrence of these incidents, the sordid details of which need not be recounted, was never disputed. The indictment focused on the events of December 24, 1977, and July 7, 1978, although the evidence showed that such happenings had transpired for over a year prior to a criminal complaint being filed on July 21, 1978.\nOn September 1, 1978, defense counsel filed a \u201cPetition to Hold Competency Hearing\u201d pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141). The trial court granted the petition. The court also granted the State\u2019s motion to have defendant examined by Dr. Peter Heinbecker, a psychiatrist, which examination was held on October 20 and 25,1978. The fitness hearing was held on November 21, 1978.\nThe State\u2019s only witness at the hearing was Dr. Heinbecker. He testified that after approximately three hours of interviews, he determined that defendant\u2019s I.Q. was 84, placing him on the borderline of mental retardation, since 85 is the low level of normal functioning. He also diagnosed the defendant as having chronic depression and possibly a drug or alcohol problem.\nDr. Heinbecker admitted that it was difficult to obtain a medical history from defendant, that defendant\u2019s general fund of knowledge was poor, that he did not know the capital or president of the United States, that he could spell \u201cdog\u201d but not \u201ccat\u201d, that he could read and write only the simplest of sentences, that he had difficulty in understanding some of the questions on the I.Q. test, and that he could not interpret simple proverbs. Dr. Heinbecker also stated that chronic depression such as defendant\u2019s could affect one\u2019s memory and ability to concentrate, and that this could affect one\u2019s ability to cooperate with counsel. But he testified that he did not feel defendant was experiencing significant depression at the time of the interview. Furthermore, he felt that defendant had a certain degree of past paranoia and that this too could affect one\u2019s ability to cooperate with counsel. But Dr. Heinbecker did not find the paranoia present at the time of his interviews of defendant.\nNonetheless, Dr. Heinbecker rendered an opinion that defendant was fit to stand trial because he understood the nature of the charges against him and could assist his attorney with his defense. He did not feel defendant\u2019s fund of knowledge was so inadequate that he did not understand the criminal situation he was involved in. This was so because defendant cooperated with him during the interviews, admitted that he \u201cshouldn\u2019t have been messing with her [his daughter],\u201d and admitted having sexual relations with her. Finally, Dr. Heinbecker opined that defendant was not so depressed that he was out of touch with reality.\nThe defense\u2019s only witness at the fitness hearing was Dr. Julius Clyne, a board-certified psychiatrist, who was defendant\u2019s treating physician. Dr. Clyne generally testified in accordance with Dr. Heinbecker as to defendant\u2019s borderline mental retardation, informational inability, depression and paranoia. However, he disagreed with the method by which Dr. Heinbecker administered the I.Q. test, stated that defendant could not read or write, opined that defendant had a more severe depression than Dr. Heinbecker hypothesized, believed that defendant\u2019s paranoia possibly involved schizophrenia, and stated that defendant was so nonfunctional and had such severe mental illness that he was not competent to stand trial.\nAfter Dr. Clyne had first interviewed defendant on July 22,1978, the day after the criminal complaint was issued against defendant and he was arrested, defendant was hospitalized for a period of approximately 2M weeks. He was treated with medication which, in Dr. dyne\u2019s opinion, was helping to bring his depression to a partial remission. Dr. Clyne last saw defendant before the hearing on October 12,1978, and stated that he was \u201cvery, very nice, like a little boy about four years old.\u201d Yet he did mention that defendant knew he had charges pending against him and he was \u201cvery, very anxious and very uptight\u201d about his court appearance. Still, Dr. Clyne testified that defendant was not capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him or assisting his own defense.\nThe trial court found defendant fit to stand trial and a bench trial was held on March 19 and 20,1979. Defendant\u2019s daughter testified that she did not inform anyone of the events in question at first because the defendant told her not to and she was scared. Finally, however, she informed her mother, who did nothing for over one year but keep a record of the episodes in pocket calendars, based on the complaints of her daughter and her actual witnessing numerous incidents. The mother finally went to the police because she said she was afraid her daughter might become pregnant. Doctors Heinbecker and Clyne testified in accordance with their testimony at the fitness hearing. However, as to the defense of insanity, Dr. Clyne testified that defendant suffered from a mental defect, probably schizophrenia, which caused him to lack substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law, while Dr. Heinbecker testified to the contrary.\nAfter the testimony was completed, the trial court took the case under advisement. On March 31, 1979, the trial court found defendant guilty of the first two counts of the indictment. Defendant was found not guilty on the other two counts. Defendant was sentenced as aforesaid on April 27, 1978, and from that final judgment defendant appeals.\nAppellant first contends that he was not competent to stand trial and that the trial court erroneously found otherwise. Section 5 \u2014 2\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141) defines fitness to stand trial and procedures to be followed in making that determination. Section 5 \u2014 2\u20141(a) provides:\n\u201c(a) For the purposes of this Section a defendant is unfit to stand trial or be sentenced if, because of a mental or physical condition, he is unable:\n(1) to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; or\n(2) to assist in his defense.\u201d\nPursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20141(b), the question of defendant\u2019s fitness may be raised at any point in the proceedings by either party or by the court. But section 5 \u2014 2\u20141(c) requires that: \u201cWhen a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial or be sentenced is raised, the court shall order that a determination of that question be made before further proceedings.\u201d\nThis statutory procedure was followed in the present case. Defense counsel filed a petition to hold a competency hearing based on the two aforesaid grounds. The trial court apparently felt a bona fide doubt of the defendant\u2019s fitness existed and ordered a hearing. This was its responsibility (People v. Fontaine (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 450, 328 N.E.2d 685), which the trial court exercised diligently by complying with the State\u2019s request to appoint a qualified expert to examine the defendant and to testify regarding his fitness, pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20141(g) of the Unified Code of Corrections. The question of whether such a bona fide doubt exists lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (People v. Morthole (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 919, 366 N.E.2d 606; People v. Willis (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 737, 381 N.E.2d 799), and such determination will be accorded great weight by an appellate court absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. People v. Nesbitt (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 533, 364 N.E.2d 553; People v. Willis (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 737, 740.\nThe nature, extent and effect of defendant\u2019s disabilities, namely, his borderline mental retardation, minimum general fund of knowledge, paranoia and depression, were disputed by the two experts. However, we find persuasive on the issue of fitness the testimony of Dr. Heinbecker that appellant admitted having sexual relations with his daughter and that he \u201cshouldn\u2019t have been messing with her.\u201d This evidence was supported by Dr. Clyne\u2019s testimony that appellant knew he had criminal charges pending against him and he was \u201canxious\u201d and \u201cuptight\u201d over his court appearance. Both experts also testified that he cooperated with them during their interviews and tests.\nWe note that it has long been the law in Illinois that suffering from a psychiatric disturbance does not in and of itself render a defendant unfit to stand trial, for one can be fit to stand trial although his mind may otherwise be unsound or defective. (People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421, 432-33, 381 N.E.2d 677; Withers v. People (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 131, 135-36, 177 N.E.2d 203; People v. Fleming (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 755, 761, 362 N.E.2d 691; People v. King (1964), 50 Ill. App. 2d 421, 426-27, 200 N.E.2d 411.) We also recognize that the trial court was in a superior position to observe these witnesses as well as the defendant and to evaluate his behavior and ability to understand the proceedings and cooperate with counsel. (Murphy; Willis.) Where, as in the present case, there was sufficient evidence adduced by the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was fit to stand trial (People v. Hancock (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 596, 375 N.E.2d 909; People v. McCullum (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 306, 314, 362 N.E.2d 307), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so finding.\nAppellant contends that an unexplainable inconsistency exists where he was found competent to stand trial but a confession he made was suppressed on the basis that he did not knowingly understand and waive his Miranda rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.) Appellant construes the basis of the court\u2019s ruling on the suppression motion as being that he was incompetent to make a confession and that if he was so incompetent, he was also unfit to stand trial. Even if we assume arguendo the veracity of appellant\u2019s interpretation of the trial court\u2019s ruling, the State correctly notes that the standards to be met for determining fitness and the admissibility of a confession are quite different. The fitness standards have been set forth above. In determining whether a confession is admissible, we have stated the following:\n\u201cThe test which governs the admission of a confession by an accused is usually stated as whether or not the statement \u2018has been made \u201cfreely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort,\u201d or whether the defendant\u2019s will was overborne at the time he confessed. [Citations.]\u2019 (People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 497, 237 N.E.2d 466 [cert. dismissed (1970), 397 U.S. 660, 25 L. Ed. 2d 642, 90 S. Ct. 1408].) Voluntariness in this context is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 289 N.E.2d 601, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 37 L. Ed. 2d 144, 93 S. Ct. 2731.) Consideration must therefore be given to both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. [Citations.]\u201d (People v. Stone (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 654, 659, 378 N.E.2d 263.)\nAs can be seen, these two criteria contrast strikingly. A finding of unfitness under one test does not mandate such a conclusion under the other, and therefore no error was committed by the trial court.\nThe State argues that we should not reach the merits of appellant\u2019s first assignment of error because the matter of fitness was waived by his failure to file a post-trial motion. However, we find such a contention illogical. If the mainstay of fitness to stand trial is that \u201ca person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial\u201d as a matter of fundamental due process (Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 171, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 113, 95 S. Ct. 896, 903), then it would be ludicrous to hold that one who was unfit to stand trial but who was nevertheless tried and convicted could not appeal on the ground that his trial was void ab initio. Such fallacious argument is of the sort which the Illinois Supreme Court criticized in People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54, 169 N.E.2d 328, when it discussed the unconstitutionality of placing the burden of proof of unfitness on the defendant rather than on the State:\n\u201cLet us assume that defendant is in fact unable to cooperate with counsel and present his case in a rational manner. It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon him the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.\u201d\nTo burden a criminal defendant with a result which violates due process would fly in the face of that body of law to which we so often make reference: Plain errors and defects which affect substantial rights in general, and which deprive the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair trial in particular, will be noticed even if for the first time on appeal. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 615(a); People v. Howell (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121, 324 N.E.2d 403; People v. Richardson (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 170, 172, 363 N.E.2d 924.) Surely nothing could deprecate a defendant\u2019s substantial rights more than to be tried when he was not fit to stand trial in the first place. And to deny a defendant the right to make such a plea on appeal, even if we find it ultimately to be without merit, would be a travesty of justice. Therefore, no such waiver argument as is posed by the State will be entertained.\nAppellant next contends that the trial court erred in finding that he possessed the necessary mental capacity to commit the alleged crimes. In other words, he asserts the affirmative defense of insanity and argues that the State did not meet its burden of proving him sane beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of the offenses charged. Insanity is defined as \u201cthe lack of a substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of one\u2019s conduct or to conform one\u2019s conduct to the requirements of the law as a result of mental disorder or mental defect.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 1\u201411.) One is not responsible for his criminal acts if at the time of those acts he was insane. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 6 \u2014 2.) This latter statute \u201cadopts the position of earlier tests that either an impairment of cognition or an impairment of volitional capacity may prevent an individual from conforming his actions to the requirements of the law and therefore give rise to a defense of insanity.\u201d People v. Spears (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 510, 516, 380 N.E.2d 423.\nWhether or not defendant was insane at the time of the offense is a question for the trier of fact, and that decision will not be reversed by an appellate court unless it is so manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence as to indicate that the verdict was based on passion or prejudice. (People v. Ford (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 318, 321, 235 N.E.2d 576; People v. Muniz (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 130, 136-37, 198 N.E.2d 855.) While both psychiatrists found evidence of some mental disorder, they were diametrically opposed in their opinions as to whether appellant could understand the nature and quality of his actions and was able to control his behavior. However, there was testimony that appellant admitted the acts with his daughter, stated he \u201cshouldn\u2019t have been messing with her,\u201d knew he was in trouble and was \u201canxious\u201d and \u201cuptight\u201d over his forthcoming court appearances. That the trial court took this testimony and chose to accept one expert\u2019s opinion over another\u2019s is within the realm of discretion bestowed upon the trier of fact.\nWe are not persuaded that Dr. dyne\u2019s opinion should be afforded more weight as a matter of course simply because he was the treating psychiatrist and had more contact with appellant than did the State\u2019s expert, Dr. Heinbecker. Nor is it necessarily persuasive that Dr. dyne examined appellant closer to the time of the alleged crimes than did Dr. Heinbecker. These are merely factual details which are marshalled by each expert in support of his opinion and which are weighed by the trier of fact. (People v. Burress (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 17, 20, 272 N.E.2d 390; People v. Spears (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 510, 518.) That we might reach a different conclusion under the same evidence is of little import. The trier of fact is free to accept or not the conclusions of psychiatrists based on the testimony presented. (People v. Greenfield (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 333 N.E.2d 36; People v. Harrington (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 938, 317 N.E.2d 161.) There was sufficient support given by Dr. Heinbecker for his conclusion that appellant could appreciate and control his conduct. His testimony was that appellant was cooperative during the interviews, attempted to answer his questions, had some command of reading and writing, had the rudimentary know-how to run a junkyard business and was not so out of touch with reality as to be considered insane. Given this testimony, we believe appellant was proved sane beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAppellant also contends that it was inconsistent for the trial court to suppress his confession but find him to be sane. This argument is clearly without merit. The standards for the admissibility of a confession and for the insanity defense have been set forth above. Clearly the elements and concerns of each are vastly different. The trial court committed no error.\nAppellant finally contends that the trial court erroneously allowed his wife to testify regarding a prior inconsistent statement she made to the police and with respect to the record of the alleged incidents she kept in pocket calendars, as well as erred in admitting those calendars into evidence. While objections to these episodes were made at trial, the State notes that appellant filed no post-trial motion.\nHowever, we find these evidentiary contentions harmless error at best. This evidence was merely corroborative of that which had already been presented. The daughter testified as to the occurrence of certain acts and the manner of their perpetration. The defendant never denied the occurrence of these acts, but rather defended on the grounds of insanity. The trial court held this girl\u2019s testimony to be clear and convincing, and as such it was sufficient to support a conviction without more. (People v. Mueller (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 311, 313-14, 118 N.E.2d 1; People v. Falk (1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 1, 6, 257 N.E.2d 175.) Moreover, her testimony was substantially corroborated by Dr. Vilas Katty, the director of emergency services at St. Elizabeth\u2019s Hospital in Belleville, who examined the girl at the behest of the police. In short, he found evidence of sexual activity. We find that the daughter\u2019s clear and convincing testimony was substantially corroborated by Dr. Katty\u2019s testimony and, therefore, the conviction should be affirmed. (People v. Long (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 764, 370 N.E.2d 1315.) Any evidence which appellant\u2019s wife contributed was merely cumulative and it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that any such testimony or evidence did not influence the trial court\u2019s decision. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nJONES, P. J., and KASSERMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE HARRISON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul M. Storment, Jr., of Storment and Stegmeyer, of Belleville, for appellant.", "Clyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Gary L. Cobe, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER ROCKAMANN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 79-202\nOpinion filed December 5, 1979.\nPaul M. Storment, Jr., of Storment and Stegmeyer, of Belleville, for appellant.\nClyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Gary L. Cobe, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0575-01", "first_page_order": 597, "last_page_order": 606 }