{ "id": 5609231, "name": "ROBERT SCHULTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Schultz v. Continental Casualty Co.", "decision_date": "1979-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 79-11", "first_page": "1035", "last_page": "1039", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 1035" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3277829 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3366988 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 922", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3388714 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0922-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 Ill. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314099 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2967304 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0092-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 427, "char_count": 9550, "ocr_confidence": 0.873, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.27879270835649e-07, "percentile": 0.6167811327996343 }, "sha256": "cf3e324f06bfedb6000a32ea5dafb8235bc150fc63421e3d5eff6425100bb74f", "simhash": "1:673d6cf11d46d7d7", "word_count": 1474 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:08.542664+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT SCHULTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\n\u2018 Plaintiff, Robert Schultz, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing his second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, Continental Casualty Company (hereinafter Continental), an insurance carrier, for a declaratory judgment as to inter alia whether defendant\u2019s insurance policy provided coverage for plaintiff and sought production of the complete insurance policy. Defendant denied plaintiff was insured by its policy and refused to produce the insurance policy in question for inspection. Pursuant to section 45 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 45), defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and attached two pages of the insurance policy in question as exhibits to a memorandum in support of said motion. The court sustained defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and at the same time denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to produce the complete policy for inspection. This appeal followed.\nWe reverse and remand.\nPlaintiff was employed by Ravinia Hardware, Inc. (hereinafter Ravinia), to install gas log igniters in private residences. Plaintiff installed an igniter in the residence of Marvin and Susan Dickman, and subsequently a fire occurred causing damage to the Dickman residence and to their personal property. The Dickmans and their subrogee insurance carrier filed two lawsuits against Ravinia and plaintiff alleging personal injury and property damage due to the negligent installation of said igniter by plaintiff, acting as agent and servant on behalf of Ravinia. Plaintiff tendered defense of the suit to Ravinia\u2019s insurer and carrier, Continental, defendant herein, to provide defense and indemnity to plaintiff. Defendant refused the tender of defense on behalf of plaintiff, although defendant had provided defense and indemnity to Ravinia.\nPlaintiff then filed the present declaratory judgment action alleging that plaintiff is entitled to defense and indemnity of said lawsuits from defendant under defendant\u2019s policy of liability insurance issued to Ravinia and its organization. Plaintiff alleged that he was a member of Ravinia\u2019s organization, that plaintiff had been sued as an agent and servant of Ravinia, and that therefore, said litigation was within the liability coverage of defendant\u2019s insurance policy. Plaintiff further claimed that plaintiff is entitled to coverage because defendant has waived any question of coverage by extending defense and indemnity to Ravinia as to the Dickman suits and is estopped to deny coverage to plaintiff since plaintiff has been sued as agent and servant of Ravinia under the same two lawsuits. Continental repeatedly refused to permit plaintiff to inspect the policy in question and then filed a section 45 motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff filed a motion for an order directing defendant to produce the complete policy but this motion was denied and the court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint.\nOn appeal, plaintiff alleges: (1) the second amended complaint states a cause of action; and (2) the motion directing defendant to produce the entire policy should have been granted.\nDefendant has asserted that plaintiff\u2019s allegations in the second amended complaint that plaintiff is entitled to defense and indemnity of said lawsuits under Ravinia\u2019s policy because (1) plaintiff was a member of the organization of Ravinia, and (2) plaintiff has been sued as agent and servant of Ravinia, are legally insufficient.\nThe two Dickman complaints were attached to plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint, and defendant asserts that the two complaints do not contain any allegation against plaintiff either as part of Ravinia\u2019s organization or as agent and servant of Ravinia\u2019s organization. Additionally, defendant asserts that the second amended complaint does not allege that plaintiff was a part of Ravinia\u2019s organization or that plaintiff was sued in tort as agent and servant of Ravinia\u2019s organization.\nParagraph 10 of plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint alleges that defendant was the general liability carrier of Ravinia and its organization under a certain policy of insurance referred to as \u201cStorekeepers Insurance\u201d that provided liability coverage to Ravinia and its organization, arising out of the operations of Ravinia, and its organization. However, defendant claims that paragraph 10 fails to state that defendant was the liability carrier or insurer of plaintiff, or that the insurance policy \u201callegedly issued\u201d by defendant to Ravinia and its organization provided liability coverage to plaintiff either directly or as agent, servant or member of the organization of Ravinia. Furthermore, the second amended complaint nowhere alleges any facts sufficient to show what is meant by the undefined phrase \u201cand its organization,\u201d and said complaint consists entirely of plaintiff\u2019s arguments and conclusions of fact and law.\nIn paragraph four of the first Dickman amended complaint, plaintiff was sued individually and as agent and employee of defendant Ravinia, and in the second action by the subrogee insurance carrier, plaintiff was sued individually and as agent of Ravinia.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss resulted in a determination by the court that the second amended complaint was legally insufficient and at the same time prevented plaintiff from any inspection or examination of the subject policy to assist in the preparation of any amendment to said complaint.\nAt the December 17,1977, hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint and plaintiff\u2019s motion to produce the complete insurance policy, the court stated, \u201cHow am I going to litigate the motion to dismiss without the policy.\u201d Notwithstanding the above statement, defendant did attach two pages of the policy as exhibits to defendant\u2019s memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.\nIt would appear that defendant desired on the one hand to withhold the inspection and examination of the complete insurance policy, while at the same time, complain of the failure of plaintiff to set forth the facts pertaining to said policy with greater detail.\nIn determining the sufficiency of the second amended complaint when brought under attack, all well-pleaded facts are taken as true. (City of Chicago v. Loitz (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 92, 329 N.E.2d 208.) The disposition of the motion must be made upon a consideration of the allegations contained in plaintiff\u2019s pleadings, and the exhibit consisting of the two pages of said policy cannot properly be considered in determining the sufficiency of the pleadings. Mutual Tobacco Co. v. Halpin (1953), 414 Ill. 226, 111 N.E.2d 155; American Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 922, 367 N.E.2d 104; Brooks v. Midas-International Corp. (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 266, 361 N.E.2d 815.\nThe Civil Practice Act provides that pleadings are to be liberally construed with a view of doing substantial justice between the parties. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 33(3).) Section 42(2) also provides that \u201c[n]o pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he is called upon to meet.\u201d Hence, plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint has apprised the defendant of the nature of the claim and has alleged that plaintiff is a part of Ravinia\u2019s organization and has attached the two underlying Dickman lawsuits as exhibits to the pleadings. Defendant had knowledge of the two Dickman lawsuits and was defending Ravinia in said suits. Paragraph 15(c) of plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint alleges that \u201cthe suits against Schultz as agent and servant of Ravinia Hardware, Inc. are suits against Ravinia Hardware, Inc., and its organization and fall within the liability coverage of said policy.\u201d Elsewhere, the second amended complaint alleges that plaintiff was employed as agent, servant and member of the organization of Ravinia Hardware, Inc., to install gas log igniters in private residences upon the direction and control of said corporation.\nThe Civil Practice Act is designed and intended to permit controversies to be determined according to substantial justice between the parties and not according to the technicalities or niceties of pleading. (McCarthy v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 320, 395 N.E.2d 139.) The factual allegations contained in the second amended complaint are adequate to inform defendant of the nature of the claim it is called upon to meet. We are not persuaded by the defendant\u2019s arguments. In our opinion the defendant has adequate knowledge and understanding of the asserted cause of action by plaintiff. The second amended complaint states a cause of action and deserves a response by way of an answer by defendant.\nBased upon the foregoing, the orders denying production of the complete insurance policy are reversed. We also reverse the order dismissing the second amended complaint and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CAMPBELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Raymond P. Concannon, of Chicago, for appellant.", "John M. Bames, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT SCHULTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 79-11\nOpinion filed December 17, 1979.\nRaymond P. Concannon, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn M. Bames, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1035-01", "first_page_order": 1057, "last_page_order": 1061 }