{
  "id": 2761989,
  "name": "S & H Realty and Investment Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Consumers Budget Loan Company, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "S & H Realty & Investment Co. v. Consumers Budget Loan Co.",
  "decision_date": "1972-10-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 71-71",
  "first_page": "206",
  "last_page": "209",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 206"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "71 N.E.2d 556",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "330 Ill.App. 304",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        3410094
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/330/0304-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "72 N.E. 204",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "212 Ill. 146",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3311417
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/212/0146-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 464,
    "char_count": 7489,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.752,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.08414892142360424
    },
    "sha256": "f386e8a12f289f36ed0ee2609cfbcb5d9d4d0fe43430bd232dba222f3b1db5b0",
    "simhash": "1:51188fefead436e4",
    "word_count": 1222
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:49.359959+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "S & H Realty and Investment Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Consumers Budget Loan Company, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE JONES\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case comes to this court from the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and the dismissal of plaintiffs cause of action.\nOn September 14, 1966, defendant entered into a lease for office space in a building owned by plaintiff located in East St. Louis. The lease provided for a rental in the amount of $3600 annually, payable in monthly installments of $300 for a term of five years. On April 17, 1970, defendant directed a notice of termination to plaintiff, claiming the right to do so under paragraph 9 of the lease, asserting that it had \u201clost some $86,000 in receivables,\u201d that the \u201cFederal Reserve Bank caused the prime rate .of interest to increase,\u201d and that defendant has \u201csuffered several armed robberies,\u201d and \u201ccustomers were reluctant to do business in the shopping area with its many vacancies.\u201d\nThe paragraph in the lease relied upon by defendant reads as follows:\n\u201cIt is agreed by and between the parties hereto that if during the term of this lease or any extension or renewal thereof, any law, decision, regulation or condition exists, continues or is made effectual in this City, State or Nation which in the judgment of the lessee adversely affects or makes it unprofitable for the lessee to carry on its business , in these premises, then in any such event this lease may be cancelled by the Lessee by serving a ninety [90] day written notice of cancellation on the Lessor or its [his] authorized agent and Lessee shall not be hable for any installments of rent accruing after the effective date of cancellation contained in said notice.\u201d\nDefendant furnished its check in the amount of $900 with said notice. Plaintiff did not negotiate the check, but instituted suit to declare the lease binding until its expiration date of August 31, 1971, and to collect damages in the sum of $5000.\nDefendant maintains , that the word \u201ccondition\u201d in paragraph 9 can be interpreted properly to mean \u201ceconomic conditions\u201d and, therefore, it was entitled to exercise a right or option to cancel or terminate the lease before the expiration of the stated terms.\nPlaintiff opposes this position arguing that the rule of ejusdem generis restricts the meaning of \u201ccondition\u201d to a \u201cmeaning of the same general character, sort, kind, or class\u201d as \u201claw, decision, regulation.\u201d By plaintiff\u2019s definition \u201cconditions\u201d would refer to \u201cenactments or rulings of governmental units\u201d and not to \u201cenvironmental or economic factors.\u201d\nInasmuch as it is clear that this lease could be terminated under some circumstances and inasmuch as defendant is not relying on \u201cany law, decision [or] regulation\u201d which \u201cadversely affects it,\u201d deciding the merits becomes one of determining the meaning in this lease of \u201ccondition.\u201d\nThe rule of ejusdem generis relied on by plaintiff was subjected to logical analysis in Gage v. Cameron (1904), 212 Ill. 146, 72 N.E. 204. In that opinion, after defining the maxim ejusdem generis as a specific application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis (\u201cWords are known by the company they keep.\u201d 17A C.J.S. 149) and as a \u201crule of construction that, when general words follow particular words, the former can mean only things or persons of the same kind or class as those, which are particularly mentioned,\u201d the court restricted its application as follows:\n\u201cIn the first place, in defining the meaning of the maxim ejusdem generis, and applying it to the construction of statutes and contracts, the cases, decided by this court, are nearly all cases where the word \u2018other is used to qualify the general terms, which follow the specific designations. * * * [Here follows a lengthy list of examples from cited cases.] * * * In the second place, the rule, that, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by general words or phrases, the latter are held to refer to things of the same kind as those specified, is only one of the many rules of construction, which are employed for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legislature, or of the contracting parties, as expressed in a statute or contract sought to be construed, \u2018and where from the whole instrument a larger intent may be gathered, the rule under consideration will not be applied in such manner as to defeat such larger intent;\u2019 or the rule will not be applied where from the whole statute or contract a larger intent may be gathered, if the application of the rule will operate to defeat such larger intent. * * * In the third place, \u2018the restriction of general words to things ejusdem generis must not be carried to such an excess as to deprive them of all meaning. The enumeration of particular things is sometimes so complete and exhaustive as to leave nothing, which can be called ejusdem generis. If the particular words exhaust a whole genus, the general words must refer to some larger class. * * V \u201d\nIn the case at bar, to limit the meaning of \u201ccondition\u201d to a category ejusdem generis with those specifically named would be to render it surplusage and practically meaningless. The words \u2018law, decision, regulation\u201d for all practical purposes exhaust the genus of enactments or rulings of governmental units, and, therefore, the general word \u201ccondition must refer to some larger class. The maxim ejusdem generis, thus must yield to another rule of construction of written contracts. \u201cNo word in a contract is to be treated as meaningless if any meaning which is reasonable and consistent with other parts can be given it.\u201d 17A C.J.S. 180.\n\u201cCourts must construe written contracts according to the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the contract. * * * In arriving at that intention, effect must be given to each clause, word and term employed by the parties rejecting none as meaningless or surplusage unless absolutely necessary.\u201d Olson v. Rossetter (1947), 330 Ill.App. 304, 71 N.E.2d 556.\nSince plaintiff is a realty and investment company and presumably knowledgeable concerning matters involving leases and clauses involving termination thereof, and presumably knowledgeable regarding the possible deterioration of business conditions in a particular community, it cannot be said that our construction of the lease is repugnant to the intention of the parties. There is nothing absurd about including in a contract a provision that \u201cif during the term of this lease * * * any * * * condition exists * 6 \u00b0 which in the judgment of lessee adversely affects or makes it unprofitable for the lessee to carry on its business in these premises * * It may be heavily favorable to the lessee, but that does not make it fail for want of consideration or mutuality. The agreement was not illusory and lacking in mutuality because both were bound, the lessor to provide certain space, the lessee to pay certain rentals, the term is for a specific time unless described circumstances made continuance unprofitable for the lessee, the lessor to be advised and notified in a certain manner.\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of plaintifFs motion for summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiffs cause is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nEBERSPACHER, P. J., and CREBS, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE JONES"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Walker & Williams, of Belleville, (Harry J. Sterling, of counsel,) for appellant.",
      "Apoian & Ross, of East St. Louis, (Samuel F. Ross, Jr., of counsel,) for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "S & H Realty and Investment Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Consumers Budget Loan Company, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 71-71;\nFifth District \u2014\nOctober 20, 1972.\nWalker & Williams, of Belleville, (Harry J. Sterling, of counsel,) for appellant.\nApoian & Ross, of East St. Louis, (Samuel F. Ross, Jr., of counsel,) for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0206-01",
  "first_page_order": 228,
  "last_page_order": 231
}