{ "id": 2760970, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Rondeau, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rondeau", "decision_date": "1971-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 71-81", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "290", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 286" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "51 Ill.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390219 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355-356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ill.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2843220 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2765380 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ill. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5245843 ], "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/340/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 L.Ed. 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911346 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 L.Ed. 493", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182629 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 Ill. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2509016 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/390/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2514847 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268-269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/392/0267-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 581, "char_count": 10201, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.639709010026491e-08, "percentile": 0.40481298330520427 }, "sha256": "3c30d110c62b232f9e36ab887888f2578096d4cc51a7628fda50068521d845cc", "simhash": "1:ebeb46cc5d3b8edb", "word_count": 1709 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:49.359959+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Rondeau, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 2 to 7 years for the offense of burglary, 2 to 5 years for the offense of theft of property exceeding $150 in value and 2 to 5 years for the offense of attempted escape, all terms to run concurrently. It is from the judgment of guilt and the order of sentencing in each instance that defendant appeals.\nDuring the pendency of the appeal, defendant\u2019s appellate counsel, the Illinois Defender Project, filed a motion (supported by a brief) to withdraw as his attorney. The motion claims the appeal to be frivolous. The brief in support of the motion relates consideration of the following issues: (1) the three indictments were legally sufficient, (2) the procedures leading to the taking of the guilty plea were in accordance with Illinois law and no error occurred, (3) the trial judge fully admonished the defendant concerning a) the nature of the charges, b) the possible length of the sentence and the defendant knowingly and understandingly waived his rights, (4) the sentence was unambiguous and, (5) the sentences imposed were not excessive.\nThe brief further states: \u201cthat on the attempted escape charge, an admonishment as to the possible length of sentence does not appear in the report of proceedings; that the judgment order, however, does contain the statement that such admonition was made and, therefore offers a presumption that a proper admonishment did occur (citing, People v. Farris, 392 Ill. 267, 268-269 (1946), and People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67, 69 (1945); that to upset the guilty plea on attempted escape would avail the defendant nothing since that sentence is being served concurrently with the sentences for burglary and theft.\u201d\nThe motion was filed on June 28, 1971, and a copy served upon the State and the defendant. On June 29,1971, this Court ordered the motion continued until July 30, 1971, to allow the defendant to file any additional matters meritorious on his behalf. A copy of the order was forwarded to the defendant in the customary practice; however, the defendant has not, up to the date the cause was taken under advisement (November 23, 1971), filed any response.\nOn May 8, 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed. 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396, pronounced the procedure to be followed in those instances where counsel for a defendant in a criminal appeal believes that a review of the case would be frivolous and without merit. Counsel herein has followed the procedure established. When this is done, \u201cthe court \u2014 not counsel \u2014 then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel\u2019s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if the state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.\u201d Anders, p. 744.\nWe have reviewed the records in each of the cases before us, as dictated by Anders, and question whether, on all three charges, proper admonition was afforded the defendant herein before the acceptance of the plea of guilty.\nTo avoid placing this Court in the position of an advocate and to allow the State the opportunity to respond to what might be a meritorious issue or issues, the Court will allow the motion of counsel to withdraw and, by supplemental order, appoint new counsel to proceed with the defendant's appeal.\nMotion to withdraw allowed; appeal continued.\nSEIDENFELD and GUILD, JJ., concur.\nSUPPLEMENTAL OPINION\nOn December 16, 1971, after filing the previously unpublished opinion above, this Court appointed Roy Lasswell, public defender of Kane County; the records herein were delivered to him on February 28, 1972. An order of June 20, 1972, directed the public defender to file briefs, abstracts or excerpts of record before July 17, 1972; After failure to comply, present counsel was appointed on July 20, 1972, with directions to file briefs or other pleadings on or before August 25, 1972.\nOn August 24, 1972, present counsel filed a motion (supported by brief) to withdraw as attorney, stating the appeal to be frivolous, and arguing that the defendant was properly admonished as to the burglary and theft charges.\nA review of the admonishment indicates that, though the trial court inquired as to the voluntariness of statements defendant had given to authorities, no inquiry was made as to the voluntariness of the plea.\nAdditionally, it is admitted that the trial court did not advise the defendant of his right to trial by jury. Counsel argues that People v. Reeves, 50 Ill.2d 28 (1971), which interpreted Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed. 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969), has overruled Appellate Court decisions citing Boykin for the proposition that it is reversible error not to admonish a defendant of his right to Mai by jury prior to the entry of a plea of guilty. Counsel misinterprets Reeves. The question of jury waiver was not before the Court; only the right to confront accusers and the privilege against self-incrimination were at issue. Counsel further argues that the statutes in force at the time defendant entered his plea (February 2, 1970) only required that the court not accept a plea of guilty until the consequences of the plea and the maximum penalty provided by law had been explained to the defendant. To this end, counsel cites Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110A, sec. 401(b); ch. 38, sec. 113 \u2014 4(c) and 115 \u2014 2. Counsel seems to have overlooked section 103 \u2014 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, sec. 103 \u2014 6), which was also in force at the time, and which provides:\n\u201cEvery person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless understandingly waived by defendant in open court.\u201d\nA trial court has a duty to see that defendant\u2019s waiver of the right to trial by jury \u201cis not only expressly but also understandingly made,\u201d (People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 265 (1930). See also, People v. Surgeon, 15 Ill.2d 236, 238 (1958); People v. Sailor, 43 Ill.2d 256, 260 (1969); Cty. of McLean v. Kickapoo Creek, Inc., 51 Ill.2d 353, 355-356 (1972).) Pertinent to the admonition on the offenses of burglary and theft, no inquiry was made of defendant regarding his willingness to forego a trial by jury. There could, therefore, have been no understanding waiver of that right evidenced in the record.\n' Counsel also admits that the court made no attempt to admonish the defendant before accepting his plea of guilty to attempted escape, but argues \u201cto upset the guilty plea of attempted escape charge would avail the defendant nothing since that sentence is being served concurrently with those for theft and burglary * * *. Petitioner further believes that because the record is lacking in any basis for appeal in cases 70-CF393 (burglary) and 70-CF395 (theft), the appeal should be considered frivolous and that defendant be directed to pursue any remedy which he may have under the Post Conviction Act * * We find no merit to this argument.\nHaving twice been met with motions for withdrawal of counsel on the basis that the appeal is frivolous, it seemed apparent that appointment of yet another counsel was not the remedy. As stated in the original opinion, this Court did not wish to assume the position of advocate by unfairly foreclosing the State\u2019s opportunity to replying to any conclusions we might reach in an ex parte manner. According to defendant\u2019s motion for reduction of bond (made pending trial), he had been incarcerated since November 27, 1969, and to further delay processing this appeal would certainly be unfair to defendant. Therefore, on September 26, 1972, an order was entered on this Court\u2019s motion, granting leave to the State to file a brief on or before October 25, 1972, stating why the judgments of conviction under appeal should not be reversed and remanded on the grounds of an insufficient admonishment by the trial court.\nThe State declined to file a brief but did file a written response wherein it, too, asserted the appeal to be frivolous, and claimed that Supreme Court Rule 401 (governing pleas of guilty and effective at the time herein) only required that the defendant understand the nature of the charge, consequences of his plea and his right to counsel, and that the rule did not require the defendant be informed of his right to trial by jury. We have already stated that while the rule does not so require, the statute does.\nThe State\u2019s response also informs us that the defendant was released on parole on July 24, 1972, and is presently employed. It is argued that this fact renders the issues in the case, moot. We do not agree. Granting of parole does not resolve the issues, nor does it cure errors discussed herein. While the defendant may be free from confinement, he is, on the basis of an invalid conviction, subject to reconfinement dming the period of the sentences imposed.\nFinally, the State reasons that if this Court were to reverse and remand the judgments herein, such action would not be in the best interests of the defendant. Determination of this proposition is best left to the defendant\u2019s election.\nCounsel\u2019s motion to withdraw is allowed. For the reasons stated, the judgments of conviction herein are reversed and the cases appealed are remanded with directions to permit the defendant to withdraw his pleas of guilty and plead anew.\nMotion to withdraw allowed; Cases reversed and remanded with directions.\nSEIDENFELD and GUILD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "E. Roger Horsky, of Defender Project, of Elgin, (Ralph Ruebner and Kenneth L. Gillis, of counsel,) for appellant.", "William Ketcham, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva, (W. Ben Morgan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Rondeau, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 71-81;\nSecond District \u2014\nDecember 6, 1971.\nSupplemental opinion filed December 1, 1972.\nE. Roger Horsky, of Defender Project, of Elgin, (Ralph Ruebner and Kenneth L. Gillis, of counsel,) for appellant.\nWilliam Ketcham, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva, (W. Ben Morgan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 308, "last_page_order": 312 }