{
  "id": 2761610,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel H. Moats, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moats",
  "decision_date": "1972-12-15",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel H. Moats, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DIXON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Daniel H. Moats plead guilty to the charge of forgery and was sentenced to a term of 1 to 5 years by the Circuit Court of Knox County. On this appeal he contends that the information did not state an offense.\nThe information for Forgery charged that the defendant, on the 18th of June, 1971, in Knox County, Illinois, \u201cdid feloniously, falsely and knowingly, with intent to defraud, falsely make and forge the check of Hank & Mike Speer, Auto Mechanics, Inc., of Yates City, Illinois, drawn on the Bank of Yates City, Illinois, which he passed at Home Savings and Loan Association, Galesburg, Illinois, with intent then and there to prejudice and defraud said Bank of Yates City, Illinois, in violation of paragraph 17 \u2014 3 ch. 38, Illinois Revised Statutes 8 8 8.\u201d\nAs described in the information the document would appear as follows:\n(Our reconstruction)\nBANK OF YATES CITY, YATES CITY, ILLINOIS\nPay to the Order of_$_ __DOLLARS\nHANK & MIKE SPEER, AUTO MECHANICS, INC.\nThe information omits; the name of the payee and the amount; there was no \u201ctenor description\u201d i.e., photocopy or facsimile of the check.\nSection 111 \u2014 3 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. Ill \u2014 3 (a) ), prescribes the manner of charging an offense. It provides that the \u201ccharge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by (1) Stating the name of the offense; (2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated; (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged; (4) Stating the date and county of the offense 8 8 8; (5) Stating the name of the accused 8 8 8.\u201d\nWe are concerned here with only (3) above, \u201cSetting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.\u201d\nSection 17 \u2014 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 17 \u2014 3 (a) ), defines the offense:\n\u201c(a) A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly:\n(1) Makes 8 8 8 any document apparently capable of de fmuding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another * * * OR\n(2) Issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made * # (Emphasis supplied.)\n\u201cThe section involves no change in the former law of Illinois, codifying the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court in several cases in regard to the common law and statutes on forgery in Illinois. (* * * People v. Ciralski, 360 Ill. 554, 196 N.E. 733 (1935) \u2014 \u2018Apparently capable\u2019 and other elements of forgery; * * Committee Comments, S.H.A. ch. 38, Sec. 17 \u2014 3.\nPeople v. Ciralski, on page 559 says that the essential elements of forgery are a false mating of an instrument in writing apparently capable of effecting fraud, together with a fraudulent intent. 19 I.L.P. Forgery, Sec. 2 states, \u201cForgery is the false making or alteration, with fraudulent intent, of an instrument apparently capable of effecting a fraud.\u201d\nThus we see that the document made must be apparently capable of defrauding another. (Goodman v. People, 228 Ill. 154.) This is an essential element of the crime and must be set forth in some fashion in the indictment. (19 I.L.P. Forgery, Sec. 4.) In People ex rel. Miller v. Pate, 42 Ill.2d 283, the court discussed the history of pleading forgery offenses and reached the conclusion that a forgery indictment need not set out the instrument by an exact copy or typed facsimile in haec verba but could contain a purport description, narrative in style and describing the salient aspects of the instrument. The Court stated, \u201cAlthough there is no tenor clause, the purport clause explicitly identifies and describes the instrument in narrative form, and charges the defendant in tire language of the statute * * *. As previously noted, the indictment recited that the defendant committed the offense in that he \u2018* # * altered a document capable of defrauding another,\u2019 #\nCan it be said that the instrument as pleaded in the instant case is apparently capable of defrauding another? In People v. Nichols, 391 Ill. 565, no payee was named in the check as pleaded in the tenor clause. There the court reversed. As was said in People v. Addison, 75 Ill.App.2d 358, and again in People v. Mustread, 94 Ill.App.2d 440, \u201cThe instrument in Nichols would defraud nobody.\u201d In Nichols the court defined a check as follows:\n\u201cA check is defined as a draft or order upon a bank purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds, for the payment of funds of a certain sum of money to a certain person named therein, or to his order or to bearer. Economy Fuse and Mfg. Co. v. Standard Electric Mfg. Co., 359 Ill. 504. An instrument is not a check if it does not appear from the face of the paper to whom it is payable. Equitable Trust Co. v. Harger, 258 Ill. 615; Geske v. State Bank of Heyworth, 273 Ill.App. 214.\u201d\nAt the time of this decision (1946) the Negotiable Instruments Law was in effect, however, the Commercial Code adopts the definition of a check contained in Section 184 of the Illinois N.I.L. (See Illinois Code Comment to Paragraph (b) Subsection (2) of Sec. 3 \u2014 104 of Uniform Commercial Code. (S.H.A. ch. 26, Sec. 3 \u2014 104.) ) If the indictment merely sets out an instrument which is a nullity on its face, without any allegation showing how it could be made to act injuriously or fraudulently by reason of independent matter, no case is made. The same is true when the instrument is imperfect and incomplete # # \u00b0. 36 Am.Jur.2d, Forgery, Sec. 36.\nUnless the instrument shows on its face that it is capable of defrauding, or such character is given it by extrinsic averments, forgery cannot be predicated upon it. Goodman v. People, supra.\nIn the case at bar the described instrument by omitting the amount and the payee could not be a check and could not be a \u201cdocument capable of defrauding another\u201d unless extrinsic facts were averred giving it such character. We do not believe that the information charged an offense.\nThe People argue that I.P.I. Criminal Instructions 13.25 and 13.26 do not contain the requirement that the document be capable of defrauding another. They overlook the Committee Note on page 221 which states, 'Whether a document is apparently capable of defrauding under Subsection (c) of the Section 17 \u2014 3 is a question of law to be determined by the court and no instruction on this point is necessary.\u201d\nThe People further argue that they have set forth the elements of the offense in the language of the statute, citing People v. Lee, 48 Ill.2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 488. They certainly did not charge forgery in the language of the statute. (Compare People v. Lanners, 122 Ill.App.2d 290.) There was no allegation, as in the language of the statute, of \u201ca document apparently capable of defrauding another * *\nThe last argument of the People is that the whole record shows that the check, in fact, was for $300 and was made payable to Daniel H. Moats, the defendant. While the record is competent evidence in showing a former conviction as a plea in bar (People v. White, 267 N.E.2d 129), it cannot be used to test the sufficiency of a charge or to supply matters of substance which have been omitted. (People v. Fore, 384 Ill. 455; People v. Powell, 353 Ill. 582.) Before a court can acquire jurisdiction in a criminal case the accused must be charged with a crime by a formal and sufficient accusation and there can be no trial, conviction or punishment for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation. (21 I.L.P. Indictments and Informations, Sec. 2.) If the charge is not sufficient to charge an offense, a judgment of conviction may not be upheld even though on a plea of guilty; and such defect may be raised for the first time on appeal. People v. Dzielski (1970), 130 Ill.App.2d 581 264 N.E.2d, 426.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court of Knox County is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nSTOUDER, P. J., and ALLOY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DIXON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James Geis, of Defender Project, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "James Moreno, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg, for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel H. Moats, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 72-19;\nThird District \u2014\nDecember 15, 1972.\nJames Geis, of Defender Project, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames Moreno, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg, for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0944-01",
  "first_page_order": 966,
  "last_page_order": 970
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