{ "id": 3231095, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE B. LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lewis", "decision_date": "1980-01-04", "docket_number": "No. 79-273", "first_page": "807", "last_page": "809", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 807" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 1315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3273597 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965421 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0562-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 405, "char_count": 5665, "ocr_confidence": 0.917, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.689752517099727e-08, "percentile": 0.40674031574813824 }, "sha256": "23da8495b22f7ecec880f92d65ab6b0879086ba2184e7dd545088099dd3764d2", "simhash": "1:a1be98ae87e2b48a", "word_count": 905 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:24:24.666127+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE B. LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Willie B. Lewis, was convicted of burglary by a jury in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven years. Defendant\u2019s sole contention on appeal is that he was denied a fair post-trial motion and sentencing hearing where he was represented by counsel whom defendant characterized in motions before the court as incompetent during trial.\nWhile returning to her automobile from a clothing store in East St. Louis, Jo Ann Campanella observed a leg protruding from her vehicle through the open passenger-side door. As she neared the vehicle, she was noticed by the person in it, who immediately got out .of the automobile and fled on foot. The intruder carried off Ms. Campanella\u2019s telephone operator\u2019s headset and a flashlight. The victim gave chase; and when she was within three feet of the man, he dropped the headset and flashlight and ran away. Ms. Campanella returned to her car and noticed that the glove box had been pried open and the ignition system tampered with. She discovered several items which had not been in the vehicle previously, a brown hat, a steel pipe and a set of keys.\nAfter some difficulty, Ms. Campanella was able to start her automobile and proceed home. Shortly thereafter she saw the man who broke into her car crossing a street. When the man recognized the victim, he hailed a taxi. Ms. Campanella followed the taxi until she saw a police car parked in front of a Western Auto store. She entered the store and explained what had occurred to a policeman, who, coincidentally, was investigating an armed robbery at the store. He radioed for assistance, and soon another policeman entered the store with defendant in custody. Ms. Campanella identified defendant as the man who had been in her car. After the State\u2019s case in chief was concluded, defendant rested without presenting any witnesses.\nPrior to sentencing, defendant personally addressed several handwritten motions to the court alleging that his trial counsel was incompetent in that he failed to present a defense at trial. He also requested a new trial and new counsel since his counsel, Mr. Hermann, was a \u201cshell of a man 000 that had severe brain damage in which a tumor was removed from his brain.\u201d Mr. Hermann appeared at the post-trial motion and sentencing hearing on behalf of defendant. The trial court, indicating that it would treat defendant\u2019s pro se motions as part of the post-trial motion, denied them. At no time did the trial court inquire into defendant\u2019s allegations regarding the competency of defendant\u2019s trial counsel.\nDefendant contends that the net result of his motions challenging the competency of Mr. Hermann was to call Mr. Hermann\u2019s loyalty toward him into question. Thus, he claims that his counsel at the sentencing hearing labored under a conflict of interest; and his support for this contention comes from People v. Brown (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 562, 352 N.E.2d 15. In that case, defendant accused his counsel of inducing him to testify falsely. The same attorney represented defendant at the sentencing hearing. In remanding for a new sentencing hearing, the court stated:\n\u201cHere, the conflict is readily apparent. Counsel, having been accused of subornation of perjury, was placed in the awkward position of defending himself and denying the validity of defendant\u2019s accusation while urging the court to consider defendant\u2019s good moral character in an attempt to obtain probation or leniency. Moreover, counsel was expected to represent defendant zealously even though defendant had accused this attorney of committing a criminal offense and a serious breach of an attorney\u2019s ethical responsibilities.\u201d People v. Brown (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 562, 564, 352 N.E.2d 15, 17.\nWe find Brown inapposite to the instant case. The attorney in Brown was accused of conduct constituting criminal behavior; whereas here, the conduct ascribed to Mr. Hermann does not hint of criminal or unethical behavior. We are unable to say that defendant\u2019s remarks concerning incompetency were sufficient to affect the loyalty of his counsel. See also People v. Gustafson (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 497, 393 N.E.2d 1315.\nThe record indicates that defendant\u2019s counsel represented to the court that defendant had several motions which he had not seen. This remark came after the hearing on defendant\u2019s post-trial motion and demonstrated that defense counsel was unaware of defendant\u2019s dissatisfaction with him prior to that time. Although the court had been made aware of the fact that defendant was not satisfied with counsel, there is no showing that defense counsel shared this knowledge. Further, the record indicates that defense counsel presented a motion to suppress defendant\u2019s identification, thoroughly cross-examined the State\u2019s witnesses, offered jury instructions and presented a closing argument. Therefore, it cannot be said that defendant\u2019s remarks concerning counsel\u2019s competency affected his loyalty to the defendant or influenced his representation of defendant.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no error committed by the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJONES, P. J., and HARRISON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John H. Reid, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and E. Joyce Randolph, research assistant, for appellant.", "Clyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE B. LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 79-273\nOpinion filed January 4, 1980.\nJohn H. Reid, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and E. Joyce Randolph, research assistant, for appellant.\nClyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0807-01", "first_page_order": 829, "last_page_order": 831 }