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On appeal he contends: (1) that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his belief that the killing of Robert Lancaster was justified was unreasonable; (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury a non-IPI instruction; (3) that he was denied a fair and impartial trial due to numerous acts of prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) that the sentence he received was excessive.\nThe trial of this cause lasted six days. Twenty-eight witnesses testified for the State, while nine gave testimony for the defense. Three other witnesses testified in chambers out of the presence of the jury. The transcript of these trial proceedings exceeds 1000 pages, with the entire record encompassing 14 volumes. Therefore, we recite only those matters necessary for a clear understanding of this case.\nA four-count information was issued against defendant as a result of the shooting death of Robert Lancaster in Farmersville, Illinois, on December 21, 1976. On December 30, 1976, a four-count murder indictment was issued against defendant. From March 7 through March 14, 1977, a jury trial was held in Montgomery County circuit court. However, the jury was deadlocked and a mistrial was declared. Pursuant to his motion for a change of venue, defendant was retried in the circuit court of Fayette County from May 2 through May 7, 1977.\nThe evidence showed that the defendant was hired to work at the Virden Crown 2 Mine in Farmersville as a repairman beginning on December 6, 1976. He rented an apartment there while his family remained in Belleville. Defendant had first met the victim, Robert Lancaster, at their physical examination for their new jobs during the last week of November. Other than a few minutes of conversation, they did not see each other again until December 11, 1976.\nDefendant encountered Lancaster at the Uptown Tavern in Farmersville on December 11. When defendant pulled some money from his pocket to buy a round of beer for Lancaster and some of his friends, a .38-caliber wadcutter fell from his pocket. A wadcutter, as shown at trial, is a bullet with a flat, rather than protruding, rounded projectile which is used mainly for target shooting. At that time, Lancaster apparently initiated a discussion as to what effect he thought the wadcutter would have when it was fired into a one-gallon milk jug filled with water. Lancaster hypothesized that it would make a clean hole, while defendant opined that it would blow the back of the jug out because of the flat projectile. Finally, a $20 bet was made regarding the dispute, which bet was written down by a woman in the bar, Sue Ellen Morgan, and signed by defendant.\nSeveral discussions followed as to how and when to settle the bet. The following night, December 12, Lancaster took defendant to Lancaster\u2019s truck where he had two milk jugs. Lancaster told defendant that he had won the bet, because it had taken \u201chis .357 to do what I said the .38 would do.\u201d Defendant told Lancaster that since the .38 wadcutter had not been fired, the bet was still not settled. Defendant testified that Lancaster then said \u201cthat I would pay him or I would find out what that other bullet would do but it wouldn\u2019t be on any jug.\u201d They agreed to settle the bet the following morning.\nThat night while working, defendant injured himself. Therefore, defendant did not meet Lancaster the next morning as planned. According to defendant, when the two next encountered each other at work on Wednesday, December 15, Lancaster walked toward him \u201clike he wanted to say something.\u201d However, Lancaster\u2019s friend, Ray Stansbury, \u201ctold Robert to come on, that that wasn\u2019t the time or place,\u201d and no further discussion occurred. While the argument subsided for the moment, defendant claims that the next morning, Thursday, December 16, Lancaster threatened him with a hammer.\nAfter work on Thursday, defendant went to Belleville to see his family. Defendant testified that on Thursday evening he went to Sir Arthur\u2019s Tavern where his wife had worked for approximately three weeks prior to his getting the job in Farmersville. There he spoke about purchasing a gun with a man who referred him to another man from whom he purchased a .22-caliber revolver. Defendant said he purchased it because he had \u201cnever once been threatened e e # and when somebody threatens my life I consider it, well, a danger to me.\u201d He also testified that he was afraid of Lancaster at the time he bought the gun. Defendant did not know the full name of the man who sold him the gun and that person did not testify at trial.\nAfter working the midnight shift on Tuesday morning, December 21, defendant said he drove to Zalar\u2019s Tavern, arriving at approximately 8:45 a.m. He ordered a beer and one shot of brandy. About 20 minutes later, according to defendant, Lancaster and Stansbury came into the bar. Defendant bought them both a beer. Defendant testified that Stansbury left about one-half hour later, but no witnesses ever saw Stansbury at the bar. In fact, Stansbury testified that he did not go to the tavern at all that morning, but arrived only after he learned of the shooting.\nAbout 11 a.m. Lancaster went outside and brought in the two milk jugs, claiming to have won the bet. The argument went on for a while, but died down. The argument commenced once more and continued for approximately one-half hour. About this time Lancaster took defendant to the other end of the bar to discuss the bet with Illinois State Trooper Charles E. Traylor, an acquaintance of Lancaster\u2019s who was off duty and in the tavern. Traylor was with another off-duty State trooper, Ronald Wilton. Defendant claimed that Traylor was not introduced to him as a police officer, although \u201cit might have been said but I didn\u2019t hear it.\u201d However, Traylor testified that he was introduced as a State trooper. Nonetheless, Traylor said he could not settle the bet for them.\nDefendant further testified that in order to show Lancaster he was not trying to back down, he tried to raise the bet to $100. He took out a $100 bill and slapped it on the bar in front of Lancaster who picked it up and asked Frank Zalar, the owner of the bar, to change it, give him his *20 and return the balance to defendant. Zalar testified that he did not want to have anything to do with bets and refused to change it. At this time Lancaster threw the bill back to defendant telling him not to \u201clet him see me again until I was ready to settle the bet.\u201d\nDefendant then testified: \u201cWell, I was wanting out of the tavern. I was pretty scared. I was wanting out of the tavern so I left.\u201d He said he got into his car but it would not start, claiming that he had also had trouble starting it earlier that morning. Two State\u2019s witnesses, however, Loren Guthals and Robert Gorman, were outside the tavern while defendant was at his car and testified that he did not get in behind the wheel but only opened the driver\u2019s door. But neither could really tell what defendant was doing at the car. Defendant testified that he remembers leaving his cigarettes and lighter in the bar and returning to get them as well as to ask Guthals, whom he had seen inside earlier, to give him a jump start. However, he said he was afraid of Lancaster, and therefore, took the .22 pistol from the floor of his car and put it in his pocket.\nDefendant\u2019s version of the story continued as follows. He went back in the tavern and went straight to the bar. He did not see Lancaster when he first arrived, but then Lancaster came up beside him and started to drink his beer. According to defendant, Lancaster \u201casked me if I was back for some crap or if I came back to settle the bet.\u201d Defendant replied that he had only come back for the lighter and while they continued to argue, he started walking toward the door to leave. He had taken a few steps when he turned to Lancaster and said he was not trying to back down from a \u201c[obscenity] thing,\u201d claiming that the obscenity was not directed personally at Lancaster. While continuing toward the door, defendant heard chairs rattling or crashing and someone say \u201coh, no, or oh, my God, no.\u201d Upon turning around he saw Lancaster coming toward him \u201cat a good clip.\u201d Lancaster\u2019s jacket was open and his arms were at his side, but he could not see his hands. Lancaster appeared angry and defendant said he was scared so he reached in his pocket and pulled his gun. Defendant told Lancaster to \u201chold it right there\u201d and said a profanity. All this time defendant claimed to be backing up toward the door.\nAbout the time defendant said he issued his warning, he heard someone say, \u201che\u2019s got a gun.\u201d At the same time he heard this, the defendant testified that Lancaster\u2019s hand started coming out from behind his coat when they were within a few feet of each other. He further testified:\n\u201cWhen someone said \u2018he\u2019s got a gun\u2019 my first thought was 357 because that is what he had been talking about that morning several times. He had mentioned his 357 and what it would do, you know, and in a threatening manner. When I thought a 357, I thought of that milk jug. When I thought of the milk jug it was frightening.\u201d\nAt this time defendant fired one shot at Lancaster. Since Lancaster kept coming at him, defendant closed his eyes and fired two more shots. Defendant said that while his eyes were still closed, the gun was knocked from his hand and hit him in the nose, thereafter landing on the floor. Presumably, it was Lancaster who jarred the gun loose. Defendant bent over, picked the gun up and intended to go out the door but Lancaster was blocking it. Defendant ran to the far end of the bar looking for a back door. Finding none, he ran back the way he had come. Lancaster, according to defendant, was away from the door but still standing when he ran out of the tavern.\nThis is a remarkably different story from the one rendered by the over one dozen State\u2019s witnesses who were present in the bar at the time of the shooting. Most agreed that at times, the voices of defendant and Lancaster rose above the other noise in the tavern, but none felt that this was extraordinary at the time. Yet, most agreed that defendant\u2019s voice was louder than Lancaster\u2019s. Ray Emerson, a part-time city policeman in Farmersville, said that Lancaster appeared to be calm and laughing \u201clike it was a joke.\u201d And Rick Brockmeyer, a witness who was in the bar, said that after defendant came back into the bar from outside, Lancaster \u201cwasn\u2019t saying a word,\u201d while defendant continued the argument.\nAlso, while defendant testified he did not see Lancaster when he returned to the bar from outside, the consensus was that Lancaster was on the telephone at the time defendant returned. At least one witness, Steve Rigney, who was closest to the telephone, testified that defendant, while \u201cmouthing a little bit,\u201d walked up to Lancaster when he was on the phone, but Lancaster ignored him. When Lancaster returned to the bar, six witnesses agreed that defendant inveighed Lancaster with one or more profanities they preferred not to repeat in the courtroom. This was contrary to defendant\u2019s testimony that the profanity was not directed at Lancaster. Subsequent to this, some witnesses heard Lancaster say to defendant, \u201cWhat do you want, a piece of my ass,\u201d or something to that effect.\nAfter defendant\u2019s invective, Lancaster began to approach him. No one other than defendant heard anyone say, \u201coh, no, or oh, my God, no.\u201d Only one of the State\u2019s witnesses, Bob Gorman, testified that Lancaster was walking at other than a normal pace toward defendant. He said Lancaster advanced toward defendant \u201ca little bit faster than normal walk but not much.\u201d The witnesses generally agreed at trial that Lancaster\u2019s hands were by his side when he went toward defendant, although defense counsel tried to impeach one of the witnesses with a prior inconsistent statement he had given to a defense investigator. And while Emerson said that Lancaster approached defendant with his arms \u201cout like that,\u201d he further stated that Lancaster\u2019s arms were at his side when he was shot. While not all the witnesses could see Lancaster\u2019s hands as he advanced toward defendant, the substance of the testimony was either that Lancaster had nothing in his hands or that no one saw him reach under his jacket and draw his hand out as stated by defendant. None of the State\u2019s witnesses heard defendant warn Lancaster to \u201chold it right there\u201d prior to firing the first shot, or heard someone say \u201che\u2019s got a gun\u201d as testified to by defendant. Also, the witnesses for the State agreed that Lancaster had not threatened defendant prior to the shooting. Numerous witnesses saw a chrome-plated revolver in defendant\u2019s hand immediately prior or subsequent to the shots being fired. Finally, all of the witnesses\u2019 testimony had Ray Emerson along with Frank Zalar helping Lancaster to the floor before defendant ran through the front door.\nState Trooper Steven Huggins, who was called to the scene, testified that he checked the outer pockets of Lancaster\u2019s coat and shirt, and patted the outside of his pants pockets but found no gun on or near the body. Officers Traylor and Wilton, who had left prior to the shooting but who apprehended defendant approximately one-quarter to one-half mile from the scene, testified in accordance with Huggins that Lancaster showed no signs of life at the time they investigated the scene, approximately one-half hour after the shooting. In fact, the witnesses testified that Lancaster died three to four minutes after the shooting. This was corroborative of the' testimony of Dr. William K. Drake, the pathologist from the Montgomery County coroner\u2019s office, who testified that one of the three bullets pierced the right atrium of Lancaster\u2019s heart, causing him to bleed to death.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant filed a post-trial motion but it was denied on June 7, 1977. On June 13, ,1977, defendant was ordered committed to the Joliet Correctional Center for presentence examination. On September 6,1977, the sentencing hearing was held. Defendant had submitted a motion for probation while the State had filed a motion for an extended term sentence.\nSix men testified on behalf of defendant that he was a good candidate for probation. Defendant\u2019s wife testified that she had found her husband a job in California as a brick mason and that he should be released on probation \u201cbecause he has a family and because we miss him.\u201d Defendant testified:\n\u201cI know for a fact that a prison sentence can in no way help, help me or help the Lancaster family or help anyone involved. It can\u2019t change or correct in any manner what has happened. I\u2019m certainly sorry that this happened, extremely sorry.\u201d\nHe felt that further imprisonment was not needed to protect the public because \u201can incident like what has happened would never happen again. I\u2019ll never place myself in a situation such as this.\u201d Continued imprisonment, said the defendant, could benefit no one and only be a \u201cfinancial problem and extreme hardship for my wife.\u201d\nEthel Lancaster, the victim\u2019s wife, testified for the State. She said that she had to move from her house because her two boys were afraid of it and afraid defendant or his family would come there and kill them. She felt probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offense and felt defendant should be punished the rest of his life, even to the point of his life being taken. Trooper Huggins also testified that defendant, as well as every individual convicted of voluntary manslaughter, should receive at least five years\u2019 imprisonment or else the seriousness of the offense would be minimized.\nThe evidence at the sentencing hearing showed that this was defendant\u2019s first offense. Psychological and psychiatric evaluations in the presentence report concluded that this offense was situational rather than premeditated. Defendant argued that from all the evidence adduced at the hearing it was clear he had good rehabilitative potential. However, the trial court denied both defendant\u2019s motion for probation and the State\u2019s motion for an extended term sentence, stating the following in issuing its sentence:\n\u201cNow the Court has considered all the evidence in this case, of course, considered the Pre-sentence Report and the two supplements in connection therewith, considered the information that has been elicited here in open court both on behalf of the State and on behalf of the Defendant and either in aggravation or mitigation and allowed the defendant to speak in his own behalf and heard the arguments of counsel and has also considered the report of the examinations in the Correctional Center at Joliet and has taken all of these matters into consideration. This is a very serious offense in the mind of the Court and it\u2019s the judgment of the court that the defendant be sentenced to an indeterminate number of years with the Department of Corrections, Adult Division, State of Illinois for a minimum period of not less than six years and a maximum period of not more than eighteen years. Judgment will be entered for costs. In view of the defendant\u2019s unemployment for the past period of time I see no reason for imposing a fine. I don\u2019t see how it would be possible for him to be able to pay a fine.\u201d\nFrom this judgment a notice of appeal was filed on September 8, 1978. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAppellant first contends that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his belief of justification was unreasonable. In other words, he argues that he was not proved guilty of voluntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. The basis of this position is that because the victim was four inches taller and 85 pounds heavier than he was and was advancing toward him, he was justified in using self-defense. We need not embark on an extended recitation of the law of self-defense, other than to note that justification thereunder has always been a question for the trier of fact. (People v. Jordan (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 489, 492, 165 N.E.2d 296; People v. Reeves (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 406, 409, 362 N.E.2d 9.) The resolution by the trier of fact will not be set aside unless the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Dawson (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 260, 264, 174 N.E.2d 817; People v. Watkins (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 273, 263 N.E.2d 115.\nAppellant\u2019s effort to persuade us as to the reasonableness of his beliefs is nothing more than an attempt to recite the evidence most favorable to his defense and urge us to adopt the position rejected by the jury. As set forth above, while the evidence against appellant was overwhelming, there was some conflicting testimony as to the nature and extent of the argument prior to and at the time of the shooting and the manner in which the victim approached appellant immediately prior to the shots being fired. These conflicts are minor and affect only the witnesses\u2019 credibility rather than establish a reasonable doubt of guilt. (People v. Lewis (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 259, 281, 393 N.E.2d 1098.) These evidentiary discords are properly resolved by the jury and will not be set aside where, as here, there was more than enough evidence to sustain the verdict which was returned.\nAppellant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to tender to the jury a non-IPI instruction regarding self-defense. Defendant\u2019s instruction No. 2 read as follows:\n\u201c[TJhat if one who is not the first assailant is in a place where he has a lawful right to be and is put in apparent danger of his life or of suffering great bodily harm, he need not attempt to escape but may lawfully stand his ground and meet force with force even to the taking of his assailant\u2019s life.\u201d\nThe State objected to the instruction and the trial court refused to tender it.\nAppellant correctly cites Supreme Court Rule 451(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 451(a)) in this regard. That rule reads as follows:\n\u201cWhenever Illinois Pattern Instructions in Criminal Cases (IPI-Criminal) contains an instruction applicable in a criminal case, giving due consideration to the facts and governing law, and the court determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, the IPI \u2014 Criminal instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law. Whenever IPI-Criminal does not contain an instruction on a subject on which the court determines that the jury shall be instructed, the instruction given on that subject should be simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument.\u201d\nHowever, we disagree with his application of the rule in this case. Since the rule mandates the use of applicable IPI Criminal instructions and leaves it to the trial court\u2019s discretion as to when an instruction on a subject not covered in IPI Criminal shall be given, we will not set aside the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion unless the same is abused. We note that during the instructions conference, the trial court simply stated, \u201cI am not going to give this, Mr. Meyer. Show this refused,\u201d when the State objected on the grounds, \u201cNot in IPI.\u201d While no further explanation was given, we believe the trial court\u2019s decision was correct, given another instruction which was tendered to the jury.\nThe court gave, without objection by defendant, People\u2019s instruction No. 15, which was IPI Criminal No. 24.06 (1968). The instruction read as follows:\n\u201cA person is justified in the use of force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself against the imminent use of unlawful force.\nHowever, a person is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself.\u201d\nApparently defense counsel was not satisfied with this single instruction and requested that defendant\u2019s instruction No. 2 be given. However, we agree with the State that the refused instruction was but an \u201cargumentative version\u201d of IPI Criminal No. 24.06, and conclude that People\u2019s instruction No. 15 sufficiently presented appellant\u2019s version of the case.\nWe are mindful that a trial court abuses its discretion with respect to jury instructions if its \u201crefusal to give an instruction results in the jury not being instructed as to a defense theory of the case which is supported by some evidence.\u201d (People v. Hines (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 976, 985, 329 N.E.2d 903.) And while we might agree that appellant\u2019s suggested instruction is a correct statement of the law, we believe that appellant\u2019s \u201cdefense theory\u201d was properly before the jury vis-a-vis IPI Criminal No. 24.06.\nAppellant further contends that he was denied a fair and impartial trial because of numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The State initially argues that the following points have been waived by appellant\u2019s failure to object to them at trial and to specify them in his motion for a new trial. Appellant counters that most of these points were preserved for appeal through Ms allegations in the post-trial motion that he \u201cdid not receive a fair trial,\u201d \u201cwas denied due process of law,\u201d and \u201cwas denied equal protection of the laws.\u201d Section 116 \u2014 1(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 116 \u2014 1(c)) mandates that \u201cthe motion for a new trial shall specify the grounds therefor.\u201d We believe that this statute generally calls on counsel to specify with more particularity the grounds for his motion than appellant did here. But we are also cognizant of that body of law which holds that even though no objection was made at trial, a reviewing court may consider assignments of error relating to extremely prejudicial arguments and conduct of counsel \u201cwhich deprive the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial * \u00b0 (People v. Howell (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121, 324 N.E.2d 403; People v. Manzella (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 187, 195, 306 N.E.2d 16, cert. denied (1974), 417 U.S. 933, 41 L. Ed. 2d 236, 94 S. Ct. 2644; People v. Richardson (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 170, 172, 363 N.E.2d 924; People v. Young (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 443, 447, 337 N.E.2d 40.) Since appellant contended in his post-trial motion that he was denied a fair trial, we choose to decide this case on its merits so as to discuss the permissible bounds of prosecutorial conduct.\nAppellant argues that the prosecutor erred in asking him whether he lied during trial and to comment on the credibility of certain State\u2019s witnesses. First, we find no error with the State asking appellant, \u201cHave you told any lies? * * * Have you told any lies today, Mr. Bost?\u201d Appellant answered, \u201cNo, sir, I haven\u2019t. I have tried to be as truthful and honest as I could be.\u201d Since there were discrepancies in appellant\u2019s testimony and a witness\u2019 credibility is always at issue in a case, we find no error here.\nAppellant further points to the following episodes in arguing that the State engaged in improper questioning. The State had elicited testimony from two witnesses to the effect that they had seen appellant put his hand on the tavern door or open it before he shot at the victim. When appellant denied engaging in any such activity, the State replied, \u201cTwo witnesses saw you do that. Were they wrong?\u201d Appellant responded, \u201cYes, sir. They were.\u201d The State contends that it can properly point up differences in the testimony of witnesses and ask one witness if another\u2019s testimony is wrong, citing People v. Morse (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 384, 342 N.E.2d 307. This court there held that asking if another witness was \u201cwrong\u201d or \u201cmistaken\u201d was allowable, since it did not force the defendant to judge the truthfulness of the witnesses which is, of course, prohibited. Therefore, such questioning was proper.\nAgain, the State asked appellant if the testimony of two other witnesses, to the effect that they heard him threaten another man, was wrong. Appellant replied, \u201cI\u2019m not only saying they\u2019re wrong. I am saying they told a wilful lie.\u201d As we will discuss below, the subject of the State\u2019s question was improper. Nonetheless, the State seems to rely on the answer to justify its questioning appellant as to whether other State\u2019s witnesses were liars and vice versa. The prosecutor asked appellant if Traylor, the off-duty State trooper, was \u201ca liar too?\u201d Appellant was asked if the victim threatened him. The answer was yes, to which the prosecutor retorted, \u201cEverybody that was asked that question said that he hadn\u2019t threatened you.\u201d Appellant\u2019s wife was asked, \u201cHe [appellant] never lies?\u201d Stansbury was asked, \u201cIf David Bost testified that you had threatened him or he had been threatened by Mr. Lancaster in your presence would he be telling the truth?\u201d The State contends that appellant questioned the credibility of its witnesses and that therefore such questioning was proper. We disagree.\nThe State admits that \u201celiciting an opinion that another witness is lying usurps the jury\u2019s function.\u201d The Morse case so held. Given that clear understanding, we are at a loss to explain why we are continually asked to review such improper tactics by the State prosecutor, especially after the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s bristling mandate in People v. Butler (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 45, 51-52, 317 N.E.2d 35. It is more than well settled that \u201cit is within the province of the jury to determine which witnesses, whose testimony conflicts, are telling the truth. [Citation.]\u201d (People v. Hicks (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 424, 434, 273 N.E.2d 450.) Therefore, \u201c[i]t is improper to ask a defendant\u2019s opinion concerning the veracity of other witnesses,\u201d and vice versa. (People v. Riley (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 176, 185, 379 N.E.2d 746.) However, it has also been held that such questions, \u201cstanding alone, although improper, were not prejudicial.\u201d (People v. Meeks (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 973, 980, 297 N.E.2d 705; People v. Hill (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 822, 826-27, 374 N.E.2d 1020.) Therefore, we find this improper questioning insufficient in and of itself, to mandate reversal, given the length of this trial, the numerous witnesses, and the otherwise convincing evidence of guilt.\nAppellant\u2019s next assignment of error with respect to alleged prosecutorial misconduct involves the prosecutor\u2019s cross-examination of appellant as follows:\n\u201cQ. [Mr. Long] Did you ever tell a Mr. Wedekamp [sic] about carrying a gun under the seat of your motorcycle in the State of California and to use it to run people off your front porch?\nA. Oh, come on now. To do what? Repeat that.\nQ. Did you ever tell a coal miner by the name of Wedekamp [sic] you had a gun, pistol, under the seat of your motorcycle when you lived in California and you drew that gun out and ran three people off your front porch?\nA. To run three people\u2014\nQ. MR. MEYER: Before you answer that, let me make an objection at this point, Your Honor. It would be totally irrelevant here. Has nothing to do with this case at all. No probative value. Beyond the scope of direct examination.\nA. Never said it anyway.\nMR. MEYER: Let me make this objection.\nTHE COURT: There hasn\u2019t been any time element established as to when this was. Think I\u2019ll sustain the objection.\u201d The State admits that this cross-examination was \u201ctechnically irregular,\u201d but suggests that it could not have been prejudicial because the court sustained the defendant\u2019s objection.\nIt has long been recognized that evidence or suggestion of other crimes, unrelated to the charge being considered, is improperly introduced at trial. (People v. Smith (1952), 413 Ill. 218, 223; People v. Decker (1923), 310 Ill. 234, 243; McCormick, Evidence \u00a7190, at 447 (2d ed. 1972).) Therefore, we do not at all condone the asking of such a question. However, it is also well established that such error is not reversible where \u201cthe evidence so clearly and conclusively showed the defendants to be guilty that the court could say that such misconduct did not substantially prejudice the rights of the defendants.\u201d (People v. Decker (1923), 310 Ill. 234, 243.) We have already noted that the evidence in this cause was overwhelming and more than sufficient to sustain the verdict. Moreover, appellant voluntarily denied the State\u2019s accusation while his attorney was in the process of objecting; and defense counsel apparently did not deem the exchange so prejudicial to his client as to request that the testimony be stricken from the record and that the jury be charged to disregard it. Indeed, it is difficult to see how appellant was prejudiced by his response. Given the length of the trial, the number of witnesses, and the conclusiveness of the evidence, we find that the conviction should not be reversed because it does not appear that justice was denied or that the jury verdict may have resulted from such error. People v. Spaulding (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 663, 676-77, 386 N.E.2d 469; People v. Ballard (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 831, 842, 382 N.E.2d 800.\nAppellant also contends that the State improperly cross-examined him and his wife about their children being on welfare in California. The State, relying on People v. Longstreet (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 556, 276 N.E.2d 825, responds that the defense adduced evidence that appellant was the father of a two-year-old boy in order to prejudice the jury and that it could delve into the provider of care and support for him. This is a closer case than Longstreet, for there the defendant testified on direct that he was divorced but paid child support for his children. The State then properly cross-examined as to the amount of payment and whether his wife was receiving public aid, because defendant had initiated the inquiry on direct. In the present case, the appellant and his wife testified only to the existence of the child and his age. Still, it was appellant who initiated the inquiry into his children, and \u201c[i]t is well established that a defendant cannot complain when, on cross-examination, the prosecutor pursues a line of inquiry which he initiates. [Citations.] Since defendant, in his direct testimony, touched on these subjects, cross-examination concerning them was proper.\u201d People v. Clark (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1003, 293 N.E.2d 666.\nAppellant complains further that the State improperly asked him if he was guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter. He contends that such questioning invaded the province of the jury, whereas the State responds that it had the right to seek a binding judicial admission, even though it admits the chances of one were slim. Undoubtedly, a defendant has a right to confess in open court. (People v. Green (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 35, 42, 160 N.E.2d 814, cert. denied (1960), 361 U.S. 972, 4 L. Ed. 2d 551, 80 S. Ct. 605.) It would follow then that the State could seek the same, so long as there was no coercion and that the confession was made under circumstances guaranteeing reliability. Moreover, appellant\u2019s objection was waived when, apparently as a matter of trial strategy, his counsel withdrew his objection to the question, \u201cYou feel you\u2019re guilty of any crime, Mr. Bost?\u201d Appellant cannot now complain.\nAppellant contends that the State violated his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses by introducing the prior trial testimony of Sue Ellen Morgan during cross-examination, when she did not testify in this trial and there was no showing of her unavailability therefor. However, as the State correctly notes, it was appellant himself who opened up this matter on direct. It was he who initially testified, over the State\u2019s objection, that Sue Ellen Morgan told him \u201cnot to argue with him [Lancaster].\u201d It was later d\u00faring cross-examination that the State\u2019s attorney queried without objection: \u201cAnd she denied she ever said that to you, didn\u2019t she?\u201d Appellant replied: \u201cYes, sir, I believe she did.\u201d Again, on surrebuttal appellant\u2019s counsel questioned him as follows:\n\u201cQ. David, drawing your attention to the evening you were at the Uptown Tavern with Stansbury, Lancaster and Sue Ellen Morgan. That\u2019s the time I\u2019m talking about. Did Sue Ellen Morgan come to this group and sit down?\n# 6\nQ. You told what conversation that she had with you. What was the tone of her voice when she talked to you?\u201d\nIt was after such questioning that the State\u2019s attorney cross-examined as follows:\n\u201cQ. Isn\u2019t it a fact, though, Mr. Bost, that Mrs. Morgan testified under oath in your presence that she never said anything like that? MR. MEYER: Going to object to this, Your Honor. This is improper. It\u2019s irrelevant and immaterial. It\u2019s not correct cross-examination or proper cross-examination. She\u2019s not testified in this case at all.\u201d\nWe might tend to agree with appellant that this matter was improperly injected into the case by the State, if the State ab initio had catalyzed its admission. There was no showing that Mrs. Morgan was unavailable for this trial, and without such a showing, prior testimony is not admissible. (People v. Payne (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 624, 332 N.E.2d 745.) But again, appellant initiated the inquiry as to these matters on direct, and he cannot now complain that the State responded to his improper questioning. The criminal defendant who takes the stand opens himself to legitimate cross-examination. People v. Williams (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 478, 487, 363 N.E.2d 801.\nAppellant next contends that the State erroneously cross-examined two character witnesses about specific acts of misconduct (arrests) on his part and introduced a specific act in rebuttal. The episodes from cross-examination included the following, where the prosecutor was questioning Don Patton:\n\u201cQ. Is it your testimony though that Mr. Bost has an unblemished past record?\nA. Yes. I do not know anything in his past that \u2014 He was always a gentleman and as far as anybody talk with [sic] he was a gentleman.\nQ. Always law abiding?\nA. Always law abiding.\u201d\nWhile cross-examining witness Dennis Thomas, the State conducted the following interrogation:\n\u201cQ. Are you saying that by being a law abiding citizen he\u2019d never been arrested or anything like that?\nA. I don\u2019t remember him ever being arrested for anything since I have known him.\nQ. Could he have been?\nA. I don\u2019t see how it could happen. The coal mine is just like any other type deal. Gossip and rumors travel pretty easy and pretty fast. Just about anything that happens to a person, 600 people know about it the next day.\nQ. You\u2019re not telling this jury you know what happened in Farmersville, Illinois on the 21st of December, are you?\nA. Pardon.\nQ. You\u2019re not telling the jury and court today you know what happened in Farmersville on the 21st?\nA. I know what I read in the Belleville paper.\nQ. Are you telling the jury that Mr. Bost didn\u2019t commit this crime? A. I am not telling them anything. I was just shocked when I read it in the paper. Just disbelief. I couldn\u2019t believe it.\u201d\nAppellant contends that such questioning involved particular acts of misconduct rather than evidence of bad character and was, therefore, improper. Appellant correctly observes that in the first instance, \u201cevidence concerning a person\u2019s reputation as to peace and quiet, or as a law-abiding, orderly, peacable or quiet citizen is admissible where his reputation in that respect is in issue.\u201d (5 Callaghan\u2019s Illinois Evidence \u00a710.34, at 290 (1964), and cases cited therein; People v. Fedora (1946), 393 Ill. 165, 65 N.E.2d 447.) On the other hand, it is the general rule that testimony is inadmissible \u201cas to particular acts or transactions for the purpose of showing bad character or rebutting proof of good character.\u201d (5 Callaghan\u2019s Illinois Evidence \u00a710.22, at 277 (1964), and cases cited therein; People v. Stanton (1953), 1 Ill. 2d 444, 115 N.E.2d 630; People v. Myers (1968), 94 Ill. App. 2d 340, 236 N.E.2d 786.) This \u201cis not permissible because of the risk of unfair surprise, undue prejudice, confusion of issues, and undue consumption of time involved in proving character by collateral events * * * .\u201d Card, Illinois Evidence Manual R. 99, Comment (1963).\nWe believe that such questions amounted to asking the witnesses whether they had knowledge of past bad acts by appellant and were therefore improper. (People v. Greeley (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 428, 432-33, 152 N.E.2d 825; People v. Hermens (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 277, 286-87, 125 N.E.2d 500.) This is particularly true of the State\u2019s questioning of Dennis Thomas with respect to his knowledge of the events which were the subject of this trial. He was not an occurrence witness but a character witness, and as such, he had no first-hand knowledge of the events surrounding the shooting. The State could not impeach his testimony by asking if he knew what happened and if he was telling the jury appellant was not guilty as charged, and this court does not countenance such tactics.\n\u2022 16 However, we note that such questioning did not evoke from defense counsel objections or a request that the jury be cautioned to disregard this line of testimony. Moreover, we repeat that the evidence against appellant was overwhelming. Therefore, while portions of the prosecutor\u2019s cross-examination were improper, we conclude that they did not constitute a material factor in the conviction and did not result in substantial prejudice to the accused. People v. Manzella (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 187, 200; People v. Helm (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 39, 46-47, 237 N.E.2d 433.\nAppellant also contends that rebuttal testimony adduced by the State, to the effect that the two witnesses heard him threaten to harm the union president of the mine, was irrelevant and immaterial rebuttal which constituted erroneous introduction of a particular act of misconduct to the jury, and was compounded by the prosecutor\u2019s arguing during closing argument that it evidenced a violent nature. While defense counsel objected to such questioning, which objections were overruled by the trial court, he then pursued this line of inquiry on cross-examination of the two witnesses.\n\u201cIt has been held that where defendant objects to certain testimony on direct examination, but then qu\u00e9stions the witness on cross-examination concerning the allegedly inadmissible testimony, any error is waived for purposes of appeal. (People v. Jenkins (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 727, 734, 315 N.E.2d 269; People v. Calvin (1969), 116 Ill. App. 2d 471, 481, 253 N.E.2d 922.)\u201d (People v. Lewis (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 259, 287.)\nSince appellant pursued what might have otherwise constituted error, he cannot be heard to contest the point on appeal. Moreover, we fail to see how appellant was prejudiced by testimony which he later denied.\nAppellant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because the victim\u2019s widow was called to identify certain exhibits, at which time she broke into tears on the stand. The contention is that she was called for the sole purpose of inflaming and prejudicing the jury. We cannot agree.\nThe deceased\u2019s wife was called to identify the victim\u2019s bloody clothing and a photograph of him lying dead on the floor of the bar, which she did. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the clothing and picture had already been sufficiently identified to be admitted as evidence and that her testimony was for the sole purpose of inflaming the jury. The trial court denied the motion. The prosecutor then announced he had no more questions for Mrs. Lancaster and defense counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial which was again denied. The prosecutor then questioned the witness about the deceased\u2019s knowledge, use, and possession of firearms. Appellant argues that these matters were introduced as an afterthought based on his objection, while the State responds that the prosecutor simply forgot to ask them because of the intervening defense motions and arguments and rulings thereon.\nBoth parties agree that the breakdown of a witness on the stand does not itself constitute prejudicial error. (People v. Hudson (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 177, 263 N.E.2d 473.) Nothing more than that happened here. The witness was called to identify physical evidence and a photograph to establish that the victim had, in fact, been killed. While appellant argues that the clothing had been sufficiently identified by prior witnesses, he subsequently objected to their admission into evidence because an allegedly insufficient foundation had been laid for their introduction. Thus, the defense cannot contend, on the one hand, that the witness\u2019 testimony was merely cumulative, while arguing on the other that even with such testimony an inadequate foundation for their admission had been laid.\nAppellant agrees that the State can call \u201cfife and death\u201d witnesses to establish the identity of the victim and the fact of his death. This witness\u2019 testimony was important to the State\u2019s case since it helped establish a sufficient foundation in the eyes of the trial court to admit the photograph into evidence. We cannot speculate how the court would have ruled without such testimony. It has long been the law in Illinois that \u201cwhen a trial is upon a plea of not guilty the State is permitted to go ahead and introduce its full proof of the crime charged in the indictment.\u201d (People v. Scheck (1934), 356 Ill. 56, 62, 190 N.E. 108.) (Emphasis added.) The only limitation seems to be that when such proof is offered through relatives, that there be no undue emphasis that the victim left a surviving family. (People v. Jordan (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 83, 230 N.E.2d 161; People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359, 197 N.E.2d 436.) This being the case, we find no error in the widow\u2019s testimony. Her appearance was short, her emotions were visible but not offensively so, and the circumstances of the surviving family were not embellished or dwelled upon. In this context we find appropriate the following language from People v. Hudson:\n\u201cDefendant asserts that he was prejudiced by the fact that the deceased\u2019s wife was emotionally upset when she gave her testimony. Counsel for the defendant made a motion for a mistrial at the conclusion of her testimony on the ground that the witness was sobbing and crying throughout her testimony * * **. The court denied a motion for mistrial. This court has pointed out that on a plea of not guilty the State has the right to prove every element of the crime * * *. [Citation.] The witness\u2019s testimony was brief and was elicited to prove the identification of the decedent and his death. There was no attempt to obtain the jury\u2019s sympathy by dwelling at length upon the fact that the deceased left a family, a practice which has been condemned by this court. (People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359.) We are of the opinion that the fact that the widow was emotionally upset does not constitute prejudicial error requiring reversal.\u201d 46 Ill. 2d 177, 196-97.\nAppellant finally contends numerous errors were committed by the State in closing argument. Initially he points out that the prosecutor characterized him as a \u201cliar\u201d in his version of the events and his testimony as \u201clies.\u201d It is well settled that such argument is improper unless it is based on evidence in the record and legitimate inferences therefrom. (People v. Mitchell (1975), 35 Ill. App. 3d 151, 164, 341 N.E.2d 153.) A review of the record shows that defendant\u2019s version of the events surrounding the shooting were controverted by virtually every State\u2019s witness. No one corroborated appellant\u2019s testimony that he heard someone say, \u201cHe\u2019s got a gun,\u201d prior to the time he fired. Nor did anyone confirm his statement that the victim was still standing when he left the premises. Additionally, the State points out a direct discrepancy in that appellant testified he was not introduced to Officer Traylor as a State trooper until several hours after he was arrested, whereas the evidence was clear that Traylor, after identifying himself as a police officer, initially arrested him. There were other instances of conflicting testimony and prosecutorial comment thereon, but they need not be recounted here. They were relatively few and far between, given the length of the trial and the closing arguments. Such references were in no way comparable to the situation in People v. Weathers (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 114, 338 N.E.2d 880, cited by appellant, where the prosecutor went on a rampage of impermissible commentary after numerous objections and rulings and warnings by the court. While there was some evidence of differences of opinion in the present case, the testimony as it appears in the record leads us to conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were based on justifiable inferences deduced from the evidence. As such, they did not prejudice the jury.\nAppellant also asserts that the prosecutor made certain remarks during closing argument which were not based on the evidence. The State admits one such error, that being the prosecutor\u2019s allegation that Ray Stansbury was present when Lancaster allegedly threatened appellant with a hammer. In reality, appellant testified that Stansbury was not present during that threat. We find such error to be de minimis in light of the length of the trial and the probable minimal part it played in the jury\u2019s decision. The comment was made during closing argument, and the jury was instructed that such arguments were not evidence in the case and were not to be taken as such. Appellant was thoroughly protected by such instruction in this instance.\nWhile appellant points to other alleged instances of unsupported comments, he admits that such constitutes reversible error only when the evidence is highly conflicting. (People v. Thomas (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 88, 92, 311 N.E.2d 597.) This is not to say that a defendant who is confronted with a case of overwhelming evidence against him is entitled to a less fair trial than one who is not so confronted. On the contrary, the lodestone of the constitutional right to trial is that every individual, guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair trial. (People v. Stock (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 461, 472, 309 N.E.2d 19; People v. Rongetti (1928), 331 Ill. 581.) But under the circumstances of a particular case, what may be prejudicial in one trial may not be so in another. Therefore, the other purported instances of error, i.e., the prosecutor\u2019s charge that appellant gave no warning prior to firing, that his gun was held in such a way as to be inconspicuous to the victim, the description of his actions as \u201cluring\u201d Lancaster toward him, the scenario that Lancaster would have had to unsnap his jacket pocket to pull out a gun as alleged by appellant, the argument that appellant bought a gun that could not be traced, and the effect of Sue Ellen Morgan\u2019s testimony (as discussed above), were all either supported by the evidence or were fair inferences therefrom and explained by the prosecutor as such, save one. That comment was that Ray Stansbury \u201ctried to be friendly to Mr. Bost because he was a new coal miner there at the mine.\u201d While there was no evidence in the case to support such a statement, we do not view it as prejudicial to appellant under the circumstances of this case.\nAppellant alleges that additional irrelevant and prejudicial comments were made by the prosecutor during closing argument. He first points out that the rebuttal testimony regarding the prior threat against the union president was highlighted by the State. But as noted above, this point was the subject of examination by both parties. Appellant cannot now complain that he was prejudiced as the result of the trial tactics which he too engaged in.\nAppellant also claims that the following argument presented by the State was erroneous: \u201cMrs. Bost * * * worked in two taverns, one included that sells guns, Sir Arthur\u2019s.\u201d The testimony which appellant in fact presented was that while in Sir Arthur\u2019s he approached one man about purchasing the gun who referred him to the individual from whom he finally bought it. The jury heard this testimony for itself, and the instruction of the court that closing arguments of the attorneys are simply that and not evidence. In this light, we do not believe that appellant was prejudiced by this argument.\nLikewise, we do not conclude, as urged by appellant, that the State erroneously portrayed the basis of Mrs. Bost\u2019s testimony as being for sympathy. The prosecutor commented during closing argument:\n\u201cMr. Bost also had his wife on the stand. She didn\u2019t add much. She came up with he was frightened on a Thursday and she didn\u2019t know why before he killed Mr. Lancaster on the 21st, was a Tuesday. The Thursday before that was the 17th [sic]. She says he\u2019s home that night and all day. He says he\u2019s down at someplace called Sir Arthur\u2019s buying a gun. Somebody is not telling the truth. She is up here to get your sympathy. She doesn\u2019t know anything about the occurrence. She\u2019s got him home when he\u2019s out buying a gun.\u201d\nWe believe such a characterization of her testimony is a legitimate inference based on the evidence. Moreover, the prosecutor did not overemphasize this point or unduly dwell on it. There was no error here.\nAppellant next contends that the prosecutor gave his personal opinion as to appellant\u2019s guilt, and that such constituted error. The disputed comment was as follows:\n\u201cIf you will remember, at the beginning of the trial I told you we would prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of murder. I think we have done that. We accomplished our task.\u201d\nWe do not consider this an improper comment. The prosecutor did not express his personal opinion as to appellant\u2019s guilt. He simply argued his belief that a conviction was warranted under the evidence, an argument he has a right to make. It is clear that this argument was based on the evidence which had been presented. (People v. Williams (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 190, 193, 186 N.E.2d 353.) Moreover, defense counsel seemed to approve of the statement since in his closing argument he said: \u201cHe [the State\u2019s Attorney] must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. Now I am sure he is going to tell you he\u2019s done that. Already told you he done that as far as that is concerned.\u201d No error was committed.\nLikewise, it was not error for the prosecutor to urge the jury to not let appellant \u201cgo loose on the streets.\u201d The State was not \u201cmaking predictions of the consequences of the jury\u2019s verdict\u201d (ABA Standards, The Prosecution Function \u00a75.8 (approved draft 1971)), as alleged by appellant, but was rather discussing the evil results of the crime, commenting on the conduct of the accused, and urging a fearless administration of the criminal law. Such arguments are properly within the scope of the State\u2019s closing argument. People v. Williams (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 190, 194; People v. Provo (1951), 409 Ill. 63, 71.\nAppellant also points out that the prosecutor commented on the fact that certain evidence was not presented during his retrial and that the State was not allowed to put on character witnesses against him. The State admits impropriety with respect to the first point, but argues that it was harmless. The second is a clear misstatement of the law, for once the defendant introduces evidence of his good character, the State may introduce evidence in rebuttal. (People v. Holt (1947), 398 Ill. 606, 613.) However, these errors occurred during closing argument, and as an appellate court we must determine whether the objectionable remarks influenced the verdict of the jury. (People v. Davis (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 554, 560, 264 N.E.2d 140.) We do not find, based on overwhelming evidence against appellant in the record, that he suffered substantial prejudice by these comments, or that they constituted a material factor in the conviction. (People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, 390, 288 N.E.2d 363; People v. Nilsson (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 244, 248, 255 N.E.2d 432, cert. denied (1970), 398 U.S. 954, 26 L. Ed. 2d 296, 90 S. Ct. 1881.) For these reasons, we are of the opinion that we would not be justified in reversing the judgment of the circuit court.\nAppellant\u2019s final specific contention regarding closing argument is the prosecutor\u2019s reference to the change of venue in this case. The comment was:\n\u201cI hope and trust \u2014 know this offense didn\u2019t occur in your county, it occurred in our\u2019s [sic] \u2014 you won\u2019t let this man go loose on the streets.\u201d\nAppellant contends that People v. Munday (1917), 280 Ill. 32, supports his theory that this was error, while the State counters that the comments in Munday were much more blatant than those here. In Munday the prosecutor \u201creferred to the fact that a change of venue had been taken from Cook county to Grundy county and that plaintiff in error had not the courage to face the many persons he had defrauded in Cook county.\u201d (280 Ill. 32, 49.) The supreme court then noted:\n\u201cGenerally it is error for the prosecution to refer to the fact that a defendant has secured a change of venue from the county in which the crime is alleged to have been committed. The court determines, after a showing has been made, whether or not a change of venue should be granted, and it must be presumed when a change is granted that such action was necessary in order to secure for the defendant a fair trial.\u201d 280 Ill. 32, 49.\nNot only is the character of the comment in this case more innocuous than the one in Munday, but it must be considered in light of numerous other remarks throughout the entire trial. The record is replete with references to appellant\u2019s first trial, such as: \u201cNow were you present during the last trial?\u201d \u201cWere you present when Sue Ellen Morgan testified?\u201d \u201cSo your testimony last time, last trial was incorrect in that regard?\u201d \u201cYou heard them all testify twice didn\u2019t you?\u201d \u201cMr. Gorman didn\u2019t testify before. He testified in this case\u201d; and \u201cI heard that in the last trial also.\u201d It is evident that the jury was well aware another trial of this defendant had occurred. Given that fact, we cannot say appellant was denied a fair trial because of this passing remark regarding place of trial.\nAppellant suggests that even if we do not find any of the alleged prosecutorial errors to be reversible in and of themselves, their cumulative effect worked to Ms prejudice. However, these incidents in neither their singular nor cumulative form were prejudicial. Appellant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial, and he was accorded that right. While certain errors were committed, a review of the entire record does not evidence the \u201ccalculated pattern of misconduct\u201d suggested by appellant. Therefore, we decline to reverse this case because of the actions of the prosecutor.\nAppellant finally contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 6 to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment and asks that the sentence be reduced to 1 to 3 years. He argues, based on People v. Short (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 172, 383 N.E.2d 723, that the trial court improperly considered the testimony of Trooper Huggins and Mrs. Lancaster, the victim\u2019s wife, presented by the State during the sentencing hearing. In Short, the State had offered the testimony of the chief deputy sheriff of the county, the local postmaster and fire chief, the local assistant fire chief, and the two victims of the criminal damage to property there at issue in aggravation at the sentencing hearing. This court in dicta criticized the parade of prominent members of the community as to their opinions on the sentence to be imposed.\nHowever, Short is inapposite here. The State presented Trooper Huggins, who was one of the investigating officers in this case. He testified that probation in any voluntary manslaughter case would deprecate the seriousness of the offense and that every person should receive a minimum of 5 to 6 years\u2019 imprisonment for such a conviction. This testimony was a direct response to the procession of eight witnesses, including appellant and his wife, in mitigation, who testified to one ultimate conclusion \u2014 that appellant should receive probation for this offense. The six men who so testified based this conclusion mainly on their employment relationship with him for various lengths of time. The State can hardly be faulted under these circumstances for responding with two witnesses who rendered opinions contrary to those who testified in mitigation. The testimony of Trooper Huggins does not come close to the parade of horribles we discussed in Short. Nor does the testimony of Mrs. Lancaster represent the enlistment of public clamor for stricter sentences which we criticized there.\nAs noted earlier, the trial court stated that it considered the presentence reports and the two supplements thereto, all of the testimony adduced at the sentencing hearing, the arguments of counsel, as well as the evidence in the case. Then the court determined that, based on the seriousness of the offense, the aforesaid sentence should be imposed. Therefore, appellant\u2019s argument that the trial court gave more credence to the serious nature of the crime than to his rehabilitative prospects is without merit on this record. The trial court is to consider both of these factors, which it did, and not one to the exclusion of the other. (People v. Waud (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 588, 595-96, 373 N.E.2d 1.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the sentence it did. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882.) Appellant has not rebutted the presumption that the trial court acted properly, nor made the necessary affirmative showing that the sentence was erroneous in his particular case. (People v. Choate (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 267, 389 N.E.2d 670.) Therefore, appellant\u2019s sentence is affirmed.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nJONES, P. J., and KASSERMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE HARRISON" } ], "attorneys": [ "John H. Reid and Patricia L. Morris, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Kelly D. Long, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Gillum Ferguson, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID BOST, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 77-506\nOpinion filed February 6, 1980.\nJohn H. Reid and Patricia L. Morris, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nKelly D. Long, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Gillum Ferguson, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0933-01", "first_page_order": 955, "last_page_order": 980 }