{ "id": 3234296, "name": "FARMERS STATE BANK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID A. DOERING et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Farmers State Bank v. Doering", "decision_date": "1980-02-01", "docket_number": "No. 15621", "first_page": "959", "last_page": "963", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 959" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "214 Kan. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 555463 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/214/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Colo. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 2702085 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/155/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5111326 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/351/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5377621 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5788528, 5789030 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/30/0484-02", "/ill-app-2d/30/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 N.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5278964 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/51/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 N.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2901997 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/101/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3329776 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/268/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 N.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1588978 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/114/0428-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 555, "char_count": 9544, "ocr_confidence": 0.855, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1595990036386872e-07, "percentile": 0.7696054866519245 }, "sha256": "5a4db067c693ba055e5415c9d3b945cfee1f8039bdaf5fddc2a627509766547f", "simhash": "1:1af35cdf1aa88c22", "word_count": 1515 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:24:24.666127+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FARMERS STATE BANK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID A. DOERING et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn May 16,1977, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint in the circuit court of Pike County, Illinois, seeking to enforce alleged liability of defendants on the basis of guaranty agreements. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff\u2019s motion was granted and judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of *93,127.03. The trial court entered an order under Supreme Court Rule 304 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 304) finding no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of the judgment.\nDefendant David Doering and Donald Sperry became involved in a business relationship in 1974 when the two began a hog-feeding operation. During 1975, defendant and Sperry conducted their business as an informal partnership which they at times referred to as David Doering\u2019s Pigs Unlimited. Defendant and Sperry began to do business as a corporation, Pigs Unlimited, Inc., on January 1, 1976.\nOn September 29, 1975, both defendants executed a guaranty to the plaintiff bank. The guaranty agreement executed by David Doering names Donald Sperry as the principal debtor. The guaranty executed by defendant Jean Doering designates David Doering as principal debtor. Both forms are identical except for the designation of principal debtor. The printed guaranty states the coverage as follows:\n\u201c[W]e hereby jointly and severally guarantee the full and prompt payment to said Bank at maturity, and at all times thereafter, and also at the time hereinafter provided, of any and all indebtedness, liabilities and obligations of every nature and kind of said Debtor to said Bank, and every balance and part thereof, whether now owing or due, or which may hereafter, from time to time, be owing or due, and howsoever heretofore or hereafter created or arising or evidenced, to the extent of All notes of indebtedness a *\nThe words \u201cAll notes of indebtedness\u201d were typed into a blank space which would appear to have ordinarily set forth a specific dollar amount. A later provision states that upon failure or default, the guarantor shall be liable for \u201call of said indebtedness, liabilities and obligations, to the extent of the amount of this guaranty \u201d * (Emphasis added.)\nOn October 4, 1976, and November 24, 1976, Pigs Unlimited, Inc., executed two promissory notes to the plaintiff. These two notes were in the total amount of *106,488.65. Donald Sperry executed his personal guaranty on the back of each of these notes. Thereafter, the corporation defaulted and the notes were reduced to judgment. Plaintiff then commenced the present actions seeking to enforce each defendant\u2019s guaranty agreement upon the two notes of Pigs Unlimited.\nIt is best to begin our analysis with the rules of construction applicable to the interpretation and construction of guaranty agreements. It is a rule that guaranty agreements be strictly construed in favor of the guarantor and that a guarantor\u2019s liability cannot be extended by construction. (King Korn Stamp Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (1969), 114 Ill. App. 2d 428, 252 N.E.2d 734.) A guarantor is a favorite of the law and may stand on the strict terms of his obligation when such terms are ascertained. (Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank v. Hart (1932), 268 Ill. App. 322.) Where a guaranty contract is unequivocal in its terms, it must be interpreted according to the language used since it is presumed that the parties meant what their language clearly imports. (National Acceptance Co. of America v. Exchange National Bank (1868), 101 Ill. App. 2d 396, 243 N.E.2d 264.) A guarantor is not liable for anything which he did not agree to and if the creditor and principal have entered into an agreement materially different from that contemplated by the instrument of guaranty, the guarantor will be released. Claude Southern Corp. v. Henry's Drive-In, Inc. (1964), 51 Ill. App. 2d 289, 201 N.E.2d 127.\nThe basic issue in the case before us is whether each defendant is liable to the plaintiff as a guarantor of a guarantor. Plaintiff argues that defendant David Doering\u2019s guaranty makes him liable for all of Donald Sperry\u2019s debts, including Sperry\u2019s guaranty obligations on the notes of Pigs Unlimited. The plaintiff further argues that defendant Jean Doering is correspondingly liable for the corporate notes through her guaranty of her husband\u2019s debts. Plaintiff contends that the language of both guaranty agreements is broad enough to encompass each principal debtor\u2019s secondary liability.\nPlaintiff principally relies on the decision in Fannin State Bank v. Grossman (1961), 30 Ill. App. 2d 484, 175 N.E.2d 268. In Fannin, the defendant executed a guaranty to the plaintiff for the payment of \u201cany and all indebtedness and liability of every kind, nature and character\u201d incurred by Gorchoff. Defendant\u2019s liability was limited to $10,00Q while \u201cthe amount of credit extended to or incurred to the bank by the borrower is not limited.\u201d The guaranty form was one suggested by the defendant. Gorchoff later endorsed a note given by a corporation to the plaintiff. When the corporation defaulted on the note, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant guarantor. The court rejected the defendant\u2019s contention that the guaranty should be strictly construed on the grounds that defendant herself had presented to the bank the type of instrument she wanted to execute. Even with strict construction, the court found the clause \u201ccredit extended or liability incurred\u201d broad enough to include Gorchoff\u2019s secondary liability as endorser. Thus, the court found the defendant liable and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.\nWe find Fannin distinguishable in two important respects. First the guaranty forms here were prepared and submitted by the plaintiff. Thus, we should construe the agreement in favor of the guarantor and not extend the guarantor\u2019s liability by construction.\nSecond, the guaranty terms in the present case are not as sweeping as those in Fannin. Each printed guaranty begins by guaranteeing \u201cany and all indebtedness, liabilities and obligations of every nature 0 * Taken by itself, this would arguably extend each guarantor\u2019s liability to cover secondary obligations of the principal debtor. However, this broad coverage is qualified by the typewritten phrase \u201call notes of indebtedness.\u201d By definition, a \u201cnote\u201d is a unilateral instrument containing an express and absolute promise of signer to pay a specified person or order, or bearer, a definite sum of money at a specified time. (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 956 (5th Ed. 1979).) This is a primary obligation and would not include a debtor\u2019s secondary liabilities accruing under a guaranty agreement. Under established rules of construction, the more specific typewritten provision controls over the general printed provision. (Faith v. Martoccio (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 999, 316 N.E.2d 164; Dixon v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1953), 351 Ill. App. 75, 114 N.E.2d 44.) Therefore, we find Fannin distinguishable and hold that the defendant\u2019s liability under the guaranty agreements does not extend to each principal debtor\u2019s guaranty obligations.\nWhen dealing with similar fact situations, courts in other States have also found Fannin distinguishable. In Rohn v. Weld County Bank (1964), 155 Colo. 490, 395 P.2d 1003, defendant wife executed a guaranty to plaintiff covering \u201cnotes and obligations\u201d of her husband. Her husband in turn guaranteed their son\u2019s line of credit to the same plaintiff bank. The supreme court of Colorado held that the terms of the wife\u2019s guaranty were confined to the debts arising out of credit extended to her husband and could not be extended to the son\u2019s debts. The court applied the rule of the ejusdem generis in concluding that the general term \u201cobligation\u201d only referred to the type of obligations particularly described in the guaranty. The court distinguished Fannin by its much broader guaranty coverage which was not limited by any specific terms. In Trego WaKeeney State Bank v. Maier (1974), 214 Kan. 169, 519 P.2d 743, defendant father executed guaranty to the plaintiff in consideration of the extension of credit to his son. The guaranty stated that it covered four specific types of primary debts and a fifth general class of \u201cany and all obligations, of every kind and character\u201d of the debtor. The son later guaranteed a note of a corporation. The supreme court of Kansas followed the reasoning in Rohn and interpreted the fifth clause to refer to the four specific primary obligations previously enumerated. The court refused to extend the guarantor\u2019s liability so as to include the secondary liabilities of his son. The court similarly distinguished Fannin by its much broader guaranty terms.\nIt is entirely possible that all of the parties intended the defendants be liable for extensions of credit to the business. However, the documents as executed do not reflect this intention. We cannot extend the liability of the guarantors by construction.\nThe judgment is reversed and this cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendants.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nMILLS, P. J., and WEBBER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stanley L. Tucker, of Hartzell, Glidden, Tucker & Neff, of Carthage, for appellants.", "Robert W. Cook, of Schmiedeskamp, Robertson, House, Neu & Mitchell, of Quincy, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FARMERS STATE BANK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID A. DOERING et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFourth District\nNo. 15621\nOpinion filed February 1, 1980.\nRehearing denied March 6, 1980.\nStanley L. Tucker, of Hartzell, Glidden, Tucker & Neff, of Carthage, for appellants.\nRobert W. Cook, of Schmiedeskamp, Robertson, House, Neu & Mitchell, of Quincy, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0959-01", "first_page_order": 981, "last_page_order": 985 }