{ "id": 3229267, "name": "In re LINDA MURO.-(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. LINDA MURO, Respondent-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Muro", "decision_date": "1980-02-11", "docket_number": "No. 15576", "first_page": "21", "last_page": "25", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 21" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454414 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 N.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832542 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 F.2d 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3580362, 2203535 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/408/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 1224", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 L. Ed. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 996", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11763540 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0996-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 F.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2224095 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/432/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440986 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2711002 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281-82" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0278-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 546, "char_count": 10261, "ocr_confidence": 0.906, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.3393290496859083 }, "sha256": "709a0798873d83e821d532be2c37d9f0d4a3052e95dc93183907814adef4908d", "simhash": "1:2620f8fa181cd59e", "word_count": 1700 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:10.623879+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re LINDA MURO.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. LINDA MURO, Respondent-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn March 23, 1979, respondent, Linda Muro, was found hitchhiking in a confused state on an interstate highway in Champaign County. Respondent is 34 years old and a resident of Peoria County.\nRespondent was brought to the Champaign police department where she was interviewed by a social worker. Thereafter she was hospitalized at Mercy Hospital in Urbana. On March 26,1979, a petition for involuntary judicial admission to a mental health facility was filed with the circuit court of Champaign County. On March 29,1979, a hearing was scheduled for April 2, 1979, to determine whether respondent was a person subject to involuntary admission. The hearing was to be held in Rantoul, Champaign County.\nOn April 2, 1979, prior to the commencement of the hearing, respondent, by her attorney, made an oral motion to transfer the commitment hearing to Peoria County. The trial court heard arguments on the motion, denied respondent\u2019s request for change of venue without stating a basis therefor and called the matter for immediate hearing in Rantoul.\nAfter the hearing, the court found respondent to be in need of mental treatment and subject to involuntary admission to a mental health facility. The court ordered respondent to be hospitalized with the Department of Mental Health at the Zeller Mental Health Zone Center, Peoria.\nRespondent appeals from the order of involuntary commitment and the order denying her motion for change of venue. The appeal involves a single issue: Whether the trial court should have allowed respondent\u2019s motion for a change of venue.\nSection 3 \u2014 800 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 800) provides, in part:\n\u201c(a) Unless otherwise indicated, court hearings under this Chapter shall be held pursuant to this Article. * * * Any party may request a change of venue or transfer to any other county because of the convenience of parties or witnesses or the condition of the respondent. The respondent may have the proceedings transferred to the county of his residence.\u201d\nAt the April 2, 1979, hearing, respondent requested that the hearing be held in Peoria County where she resides.\nThe State argues that the trial court did not err in denying respondent\u2019s motion for a change of venue because the decision to allow the transfer is a determination within the trial court\u2019s discretion. The State, citing United States v. Cook (7th Cir. 1970), 432 F.2d 1093, cert. denied (1971), 401 U.S. 996, 28 L. Ed. 2d 535, 91 S. Ct. 1224, observes that in the construction of statutes, the word \u201cmay,\u201d as opposed to \u201cshall,\u201d is indicative of discretion or choice between two or more alternatives.\nWhile the foregoing rule of thumb was recited in Cook, the Court, in the same sentence, qualified the rule by noting that the context in which the word appears must be the controlling factor.\n\u201cMay\u201d ordinarily connotes discretion, but neither in lay or legal understanding is the result inexorable. Rather, the conclusion to be reached \u201cdepends on the context of the statute, and on whether it is fairly to be presumed that it was the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary power or to impose an imperative duty.\u201d 432 F.2d 1093, 1098, quoting Thompson v. Clifford (D. C. Cir. 1968), 408 F.2d 154, 158.\nThe supreme court in People ex rel. Barrett v. Barrett (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 360, 364-65, 201 N.E.2d 849, 851, stated another rule of statutory construction: \u201c[Significance and effect should, if possible, without destroying the sense or effect of the law, be accorded every paragraph, sentence, phrase and word. [Citation.] A statute should be so construed, if possible, that no word, clause or sentence is rendered meaningless or superfluous.\u201d See also People v. Warren (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 620, 627, 373 N.E.2d 10.\nWe agree with respondent\u2019s contention that the plain meaning of section 3 \u2014 800 mandates the trial court to transfer the case to the county of respondent\u2019s residence.\nThe first provision of section 3 \u2014 800 provides that \u201c[a]ny party may request a change of venue or transfer to any other county\u201d for certain enumerated reasons. (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 800.) The second provision provides that \u201c[t]he respondent may have the proceedings transferred to the county of his residence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 800.) \u201cMay request\u201d clearly indicates that transfer for those enumerated reasons is subject to the trial court\u2019s discretion. The word \u201crequest\u201d means to ask for something; the word itself does not connote certainty as to the granting of the request.\nThe legislature has chosen to address separately the situation where the respondent requests that the hearing be transferred to his residential county. Here, the legislature states not that the respondent \u201cmay request\u201d the proceedings to be transferred, but, rather, that the respondent \u201cmay have\u201d the proceedings transferred. The plain meaning of \u201cmay have,\u201d when read with the statute\u2019s preceding provision, indicates that once the respondent requests a transfer to his county of residence, the trial court must order the transfer. To interpret this provision otherwise would render it superfluous or meaningless. If such transfer also was within the trial court\u2019s discretion, it would be encompassed by the preceding \u201crequest\u201d provision.\nWe believe that this interpretation fulfills a probable purpose for the \u201cmay have\u201d provision of section 3 \u2014 800. As respondent points out, in most circumstances an involuntary commitment proceeding would be conducted in a respondent\u2019s county of residence. Therefore, in a case where a petition is filed in another county, the legislature apparently has decided that the hardship which might be imposed on a respondent who is separated from family, friends, and familiar surroundings requires the cause to be transferred upon request.\nThe State also argues on appeal that respondent failed to comply with the procedures for requesting a change of venue that are prescribed in section 3 of the venue act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 503).\nSection 6 \u2014 100 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 100) provides, in part, that judicial proceedings conducted under the Code shall be conducted in accordance with the Civil Practice Act. Section 3 of the venue act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 146, par. 3, now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 503) states:\n\u201cEvery application for a change of venue by a party or his attorney shall be by petition, setting forth the cause of the application and praying a change of venue, which petition shall be verified by the affidavit of the applicant. A petition for change of venue shall not be granted unless it is presented before trial or hearing begins and before the judge to whom it is presented has ruled on any substantial issue * *\nRespondent\u2019s motion was made before the judge ruled on any issue, but the motion was oral.\nThe State argues that section 3 is controlling since the venue provision of the Mental Health Code does not specify the procedures for change of venue. The State concludes that since respondent did not file a verified petition prior to the hearing, the trial court did not have the authority to grant her request. We disagree. The verified petition requirement of the venue act is limited in its application to those reasons for change of venue that are set out in section 1 of that act: where the judge has some type of interest in the action or relationship with a party or where a party fears that he will not receive a fair trial due to judicial or community prejudice. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 501(1), (2).\nThe judgment is reversed and cause remanded with directions to allow respondent\u2019s motion.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nGREEN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN" }, { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP,\ndissenting:\nThe statute here examined (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 800) uses the word \u201cshall\u201d on four occasions in two paragraphs. In the same paragraphs, the word \u201cmay\u201d is used three times. It is agreed that in the sentence in which the word \u201cmay\u201d modifies the word \u201crequest\u201d the action of the court is deemed to be discretionary. In paragraph (b) of the statute, it is provided that upon a continuance of the proceeding, the respondent \u201cmay continue to be detained pending further order of the court.\u201d As a matter of plain language, the word \u201cmay\u201d as it modifies \u201ccontinue\u201d imparts discretion in the making of an order with respect to detention.\nThe majority opinion, however, concludes that in the particular usage where the word \u201cmay\u201d modifies the word \u201crequest\u201d, there is created a mandatory duty of the trial court to change the place of hearing.\nIn Baker v. Salomon (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 278, 281-82, 334 N.E.2d 313, 316, the court stated:\n\u201cIn statutory construction, it is a rule of long standing that where the same, or substantially the same, words or phrases appear in different sections of a statute, they will be given a generally accepted and consistent meaning where legislative intent is not clearly expressed to the contrary. [Citations.] Therefore, a word that appears more than once in a statute is presumed to have been used by the legislature with the same meaning each time, absent an indication that a different meaning was intended. [Citations.] This being so, the word \u2018same\u2019 as it modifies \u2018parties\u2019 in the first part of section 0 0 0 must be given the same meaning it has when it modifies \u2018cause.\u2019 * \u201d\nSee also People v. Lutz (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 204, 212, 383 N.E.2d 171, 174.\nOne here finds no clear legislative intent to change the meaning of the word \u201cmay\u201d in the context of discretion.\nI would affirm the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP," } ], "attorneys": [ "Anthony E. Novak, Assistant Public Defender, of Urbana, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Donald R. Parkinson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), and Kim Irvine, law student, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re LINDA MURO.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. LINDA MURO, Respondent-Appellant.)\nFourth District\nNo. 15576\nOpinion filed February 11, 1980.\nTRAPP, J., dissenting.\nAnthony E. Novak, Assistant Public Defender, of Urbana, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Donald R. Parkinson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), and Kim Irvine, law student, for the People." }, "file_name": "0021-01", "first_page_order": 43, "last_page_order": 47 }