{
  "id": 3222596,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROY ODOM, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Odom",
  "decision_date": "1980-04-09",
  "docket_number": "No. 15787",
  "first_page": "853",
  "last_page": "856",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 853"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 1
    },
    {
      "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5809665
      ],
      "opinion_index": 1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/68/0149-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:ca2e748d73fea1a3",
    "word_count": 1254
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:47.517302+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROY ODOM, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Roy Odom, with his wife and two children, lived next door to Mrs. Mildred Park in a residential area in Decatur. A picket fence separated the properties; the fence, or at least portions of it, had deteriorated. Mrs. Park\u2019s son, Dwayne, undertook the repair of the fence by putting in new sections of pickets. The new sections of pickets were painted before they were attached to the posts. A \u201cno trespassing\u201d sign was placed on the fence by the Parks. The fence was located entirely upon the property of Mrs. Park.\nTo make one existing survey pin more visible, Odom drove a pipe into the ground at the point of the survey pin. He then undertook to paint the pipe, and he did so with a spray can of black paint. The stake was two or three inches from the fence. Therein lies the origin of this criminal proceeding.\nMr. Odom either intentionally or accidentally got a substantial amount of black paint on the freshly painted white picket fence. He says it was an accident; Mrs. Park says no, and so does her son, Dwayne. The jury believed the Parks, and the defendant was convicted of criminal damage to property. The evidence in the case is to the effect that the damage done by the sprayed or splattered black paint was corrected by the purchase of one quart of white paint and repainting the fence. The repainting took about Bz hours. That time span was probably lengthened by reason of the fact that the repainting had to be done from the Parks\u2019 side of the fence rather than Mr. Odom\u2019s side of the fence because the neighborly relations had apparently deteriorated.\nThe antisocial conduct proscribed here is criminal damage to property. The foregoing is a recitation of the facts, the conduct and the evidence adduced in the jury trial that followed. Thus, the defendant stands convicted of criminal damage to property, a violation of section 21 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 21\u2014 1). He appeals and raises the sole issue on appeal \u2014 the excessiveness of his sentence. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 364 days. This was the sentence recommended by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and imposed by the court. Is it excessive? We certainly think so.\nAt sentencing, the only aggravating or mitigating factor discussed by the court was defendant\u2019s prior record. This record includes four misdemeanor battery convictions, a 1975 conviction for aggravated assault, three misdemeanor convictions for disorderly conduct, and several traffic offenses. Defendant has been fined various small amounts and had been sentenced to short terms in the county jail. The sentencing judge stated his belief that defendant had not yet decided to obey the law and that \u201cother things have not succeeded in keeping him out of trouble.\u201d For this reason, the court adopted the State\u2019s sentencing recommendation.\nIn coming to this result, however, the trial court failed to consider probation as an appropriate penalty for the defendant\u2019s conduct. Section 5 \u2014 6\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141) provides that except where specifically prohibited, a court shall impose probation or conditional discharge unless it is of the opinion that imprisonment is necessary to protect the public or that probation or conditional discharge would deprecate the seriousness of the offense and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice. The record does not show that the trial court fairly considered probation as an alternative to the sentence imposed. A 364-day prison term clearly is unnecessary to protect the public from a man convicted of splattering paint on a neighbor\u2019s fence. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine how probation would minimize the seriousness of defendant\u2019s offense.\nWe believe the sentence imposed for this offense is excessive even in light of defendant\u2019s substantial prior record. Article I, section 11, of our constitution states that all penalties shall be determined according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the defendant to useful citizenship. A sentence of 364 days\u2019 imprisonment for splattering paint on a fence violates this mandate.\nOne purpose of criminal sanctions is to rehabilitate offenders. The sentence is also to deter other criminal conduct. If the object and purpose of our criminal laws are to be realized, the relationship between the conduct and the sentence or punishment has to be such as not to bring the system of the administration of criminal justice into serious question, if not disrepute. If the sentence imposed is so out of proportion to the offense as to beget public indignation, it is counterproductive. We conclude that this sentence is in that category. It is no doubt true that this defendant has had other offenses and it could well be that the trial court could ascertain a pugnacious attitude or other antisocial attitudes, but the bottom line is that the sentence imposed has to bear some relationship to the offense committed. That which transpired in this case is essentially the same thing that transpires all too frequently when boundary fences between neighbors, sometimes known as spite fences, get constructed. Thus, although the defendant has a prior record, the sentence imposed bears no reasonable relationship to the crime.\nConviction affirmed; sentence vacated; cause remanded for resentencing.\nTRAPP, J., concurs.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN"
      },
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE MILLS,\nspecially concurring:\nOne look at Odom\u2019s prior record tells us he would hardly win the \u201cFriendliest Neighbor-in-the-Block Award.\u201d\nIn 10 years he racked up 23 misdemeanor and traffic convictions, had been fined 15 times, jailed on 9 different occasions, placed on probation twice, and violated his probation once. At least nine of his past offenses involved physical violence, although none had apparently involved criminal damage to property.\nThe intentional defacing and spattering of 8 to 10 feet of a neighbor\u2019s fence is not to be tolerated, and people\u2019s property must be respected. The offense of criminal damage to property is not to be denigrated or disparaged; it is not insignificant.\nI cannot agree with my colleagues that the legislative direction to impose probation has not been overcome on this record by the required showing that (1) imprisonment is needed to protect the public or (2) that probation would deprecate the seriousness of the conduct and be inconsistent with the ends of justice. Odom\u2019s litany of \u201cantisocial conduct\u201d neatly clears that hurdle in my view.\nBut the degree of the punishment \u2014 one year in jail \u2014 strikes me as excessive in view of the realistic damage inflicted in this case.\nThe proper standard of review \u2014 as set out in People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882 \u2014 is whether the sentencing judge abused his discretion. I conclude that he did. And not only should he have another crack at sentencing, but I would not preclude any of the sentencing options found in his arsenal. I merely conclude that the punishment that was imposed is too great.\nTherefore, I concur in the result reached by the majority.",
        "type": "concurrence",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE MILLS,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard J. Wilson and Charles M. Schiedel, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "Patrick M. Walsh, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Gary J. Anderson and David Mannchen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROY ODOM, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 15787\nOpinion filed April 9, 1980.\nMILLS, P. J., specially concurring.\nRichard J. Wilson and Charles M. Schiedel, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nPatrick M. Walsh, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Gary J. Anderson and David Mannchen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0853-01",
  "first_page_order": 875,
  "last_page_order": 878
}