{ "id": 5556365, "name": "FARM PROGRESS SHOW CONCESSIONS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Farm Progress Show Concessions v. Department of Revenue", "decision_date": "1980-04-23", "docket_number": "No. 78-581", "first_page": "228", "last_page": "233", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 228" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441129 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4862905 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/277/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2591930, 2591526 ], "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/69/0490-02", "/ill-app-2d/69/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4779782 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/265/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360514 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2558116 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/381/0194-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 592, "char_count": 12351, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.095130193347235e-08, "percentile": 0.3805057746609937 }, "sha256": "f8977b297a4a22fafaa789f74334a9fde0840bdd9dfa2e1fd72c278b9bac40e3", "simhash": "1:5326de6fc208a764", "word_count": 1945 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:47.613815+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FARM PROGRESS SHOW CONCESSIONS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois (the Department) appeals from a judgment entered in the circuit court on administrative review which reversed the Department\u2019s denial of a sales tax exemption. The plaintiffs are 14 churches who for convenience have adopted the title of Farm Progress Show Concessions (the Churches). The tax was assessed by the Department pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of the Illinois Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 440) and pursuant to the interpretation of the rules promulgated by the Department.\nThe sales arose from the sale of food and soft drinks at a Farm Progress Show sponsored by the Prairie Farmer magazine. The Churches were solicited by the magazine to serve the food. The attendance was estimated at between 250,000 and 300,000 people. The Churches sold more than $200,000 worth of food. Volunteer workers were used, and no money was given to the Prairie Farmer magazine.\nThe 14 Churches were the only vendors of food at the show and none of them had ever been involved previously. The location of the show was 3 miles from the nearest town and the only commercial vendor of food within 3 miles of the show was a restaurant with a seating capacity of 10 chairs.\nThe Department assessed the tax in the amount of $11,449.27 on the Churches as a group. The tax was paid, and a claim for credit was filed. The Churches alleged that they should be exempt from taxation pursuant to the exception in section 1 of the Act for \u201coccasional dinners, social or similar activities of a person organized and operating exclusively for charitable, religious or educational purposes, whether or not such activities are open to the public.\u201d A hearing was held by the Department in which the Churches\u2019 claim was denied because the hearing officer found the sales in question did not satisfy the noncompetitive requirement and that the dominant motive of the purchaser of the food was not to make a donation.\nOn administrative review the circuit court of Winnebago County reversed, finding that the Churches\u2019 activities \u201cclearly and obviously come within the exceptions entitled occasional dinners, social, or similar activities.\u201d The court entered a judgment against the Department for $11,449.27 plus interest and costs of suit, from which the Department has appealed.\nSection 1 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act generally includes the sales of tangible personal property by a not-for-profit service enterprise,\n\u201c* \u201d \u201d excepting only a person organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious or educational purposes 000 (2), to the extent of sales by such person of tangible personal property which is not sold or offered for sale by persons organized for profit. * # * The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to nor subject to taxation occasional dinner, socials or similar activities of a person organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious or educational purposes, whether or not such activities are open to the public.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 440.\nRule 38, promulgated by the Department on March 1,1968; relates to taxing sales by not-for-profit organizations and notes that exclusively charitable, religious and educational organizations incur retailers\u2019 occupation tax liability when they engage in selling tangible personal property at retail except in three situations. The first exception relates to sales to members of the organization which is not involved here. The rule continues:\n\u201cNONCOMPETITIVE SALES\nThe second exception is that sales by exclusively charitable, religious or educational organizations are not subject to the retailers\u2019 occupation tax when it can be said that such selling is noncompetitive with business establishments. \u00b0 \u2018> *'\n# # #\nOCCASIONAL DINNERS AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES\nThe third exception is that occasional dinners, social or other similar activities which are conducted by exclusively charitable, religious or educational org\u00e1nizations or institutions are not taxable, whether or not such activities are open to the public. This exemption extends to occasional dinners, ice cream socials, fun fairs, carnivals, rummage sales, bazaars, bake sales and the like, when conducted by exclusively charitable, religious or educational organizations or institutions, whether the items that are sold are purchased or donated for the purposes of the sale, and even if the sale is open to the public.\nFor the purposes of this exemption, \u2018occasional\u2019 means not more than twice in any given one-year period.\nThis exemption does not extend to \u2018occasional\u2019 sales, by exclusively charitable, religious or educational organizations or institutions, of hats, greeting cards, cookbooks, flag kits and other similar items because these are not \u2018occasional dinners, social or similar activities within the meaning of the Act, and the selling of these kinds of items at retail even on an occasional basis does generally place the selling organization in substantial competition with business establishments.\u201d\nThe Department contends that activities which qualify for the \u201coccasional dinners\u201d exception must also be noncompetitive with enterprises organized for profit in order to be exempted from the tax. We do not agree. We see nothing in the language of the statute which persuades us that the legislature intended to require noncompetitiveness as a qualification for the occasional dinners exception.\nThe Department concedes that there is no express reference to noncompetition in the statutory exemption. It reasons, however, that this intention is to be found in the history of the legislation, and the various interpretations placed upon it from time to time by the Department in promulgating its rules, ostensibly in accordance with opinions of the Attorney General in construing changes made in the Act from time to time.\nIn tracing the legislative history the Department notes that originally the tax was held not to cover sales by not-for-profit organizations by the court\u2019s narrow reading of the term \u201cbusiness of selling \u00ae s at retail\u201d in section 2 of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, ch. 120, par. 441; Svithiod Singing Club v. McKibbin (1942), 381 Ill. 194.) Section 1 of the Act was amended in 1981 to expressly include sales by not-for-profit organizations,\n\u00ae \u00ae excepting only a person organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious or educational purposes to the extent of sales by such person to its members, students, patients or inmates of tangible personal property to be used primarily for the purposes of such person, and to the extent of sales by such person of tangible personal property which is not sold or offered for sale by persons organized for profit.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 120, par. 440.)\nFollowing the amendment, the Department promulgated Rule 38, incorporating the standards set out in several Attorney General\u2019s opinions, which essentially stated that the statute provided the requirement that the dominant motive of most transferees of the items sold was to make a charitable contribution; and that the practical effect upon competition must be considered. Rule 38 was ruled upon by the Illinois Supreme Court thereafter in Follett\u2019s Book & Supply Store, Inc., v. Isaacs (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 600. The supreme court found that the then rules were not in conformance with the legislative intention, referring to a portion of the Act involving sales of school books which is not here involved. The Department argues that since the legislature then amended a portion of section 1 (par. 440) in 1963 to show a contrary intention as to the school book exemption the legislature thereby impliedly adopted the views of the Attorney General regarding noncompetitiveness. We find the reasoning to be strained.\nThe \u201coccasional dinners\u201d exception is clearly stated in the Act obviating the need to resort to statutory construction or legislative history. Even the Department\u2019s own Rule 38 does not make noncompetitiveness a requirement related to occasional dinners. To import the Rule 38 standard of noncompetitiveness which is stated as a separate exception into the occasional dinners provision renders the latter provision meaningless. If a church dinner is noncompetitive, it is exempted under the exception found in section 1(2) (par. 440(2)), irrespective of the later sentence specifically mentioning it. At the same time, if it is competitive, it falls outside the section 1(2) exception and by the Department\u2019s reasoning is thus not exempt. We will not credit the legislature with adding a sentence devoid of any operative effect. The statute should be read so that every word has meaning. People ex rel. Cameron v. Flynn (1914), 265 Ill. 414, 424.\nThe Department has also argued that the Churches\u2019 activities do not come within the \u201coccasional dinners, social and similar activities\u201d exception.\nThe Department makes several points in arguing that the activities of the Churches are outside the scope of the exception. First, it refers to Rule 38, which, in discussing the occasional dinner^exception, requires that the dinner be \u201cconducted by\u201d the nonprofit organization. The Department contends that the Priaire Farmer magazine conducted the show, although conceding that the Churches conducted the food sale. The food sales, however, are the focus of attention, not the surrounding show. Also, the statute itself has no similar language regarding conducting of the event.\nThe Department next states that a coordinator and a bookkeeper were paid by the Churches and thus that all the profits were not used for religious purposes. However, the Department hearing officer found that all the proceeds went to the Churches, clearly using that term in the sense of monies after expenses were paid. Since the payments made were clearly not excessive they do not tend to disprove that all the profits were used for religious purposes.\nThe Department further contends that since Rule 38 defines \u201coccasional\u201d as not more than twice a year, the Churches\u2019 sales covering more than three days did not qualify as an occasional dinner. We agree with the Churches that the sales were over one unbroken time span and were thus one dinner within the rule. The term \u201coccasional\u201d has been interpreted in other statutes to mean \u201coccurring at irregular intervals.\u201d (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 95M, par. 282.3(f); People v. Johnson (1966), 69 Ill. App. 2d 490, 497.) In Aurora Brewing Co. v. Industrial Board (1917), 277 Ill. 142, the term \u201ccasual employment\u201d was held to mean occasional employment, or employment at irregular intervals. In Aurora Brewing, the court held that one job lasting four days was within the scope of casual or occasional employment. We find the Churches\u2019 activities are included as an occasional dinner under the facts before us.\nThe final major argument of the Department is that the Administrative Review Act, which provides that findings of fact of an administrative agency are prima facie true and correct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 274), was not followed by the court. The matters referred to are conclusions of law in the hearing officer\u2019s report and not findings of fact. Whether the Churches\u2019 activities were within the exception is a legal conclusion with no relevant factual dispute being involved. Thus, the Department\u2019s legal opinion, as well as its interpretative rules, are not binding on the courts except to the extent that they follow the statute. Cf. Du-Mont Ventilating Co. v. Department of Revenue (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 243, 247.\nWe therefore conclude that the Churches\u2019 activities are in the nature of \u201cdinners, socials, and similar activities,\u201d and are \u201coccasional\u201d as that term has been judicially construed in Illinois. The activities are therefore within the statutory exemption. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWOODWARD and NASH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Paul J. Bargiel and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Stinespring, Stinespring & Stinespring, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FARM PROGRESS SHOW CONCESSIONS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 78-581\nOpinion filed April 23, 1980.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Paul J. Bargiel and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.\nStinespring, Stinespring & Stinespring, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0228-01", "first_page_order": 250, "last_page_order": 255 }