{ "id": 5556119, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUIS LeBRON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. LeBron", "decision_date": "1980-04-24", "docket_number": "No. 78-585", "first_page": "598", "last_page": "605", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 598" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3264997 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2888258 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927327 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3384409 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5622225 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790508 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 953", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3290469 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "957" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0953-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5621763 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2642782 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0499-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 797, "char_count": 17892, "ocr_confidence": 0.822, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.594854863130892e-08, "percentile": 0.44989804424891183 }, "sha256": "91d5d8a65f853d430e06120dd7bb4696d5c0c4673b156e7fc23f04e84c422e1f", "simhash": "1:c9f519b2939730a5", "word_count": 2988 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:47.613815+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUIS LeBRON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant, Luis LeBron, was convicted of three counts of voluntary manslaughter (Ill 2). He was sentenced to 3 concurrent terms of not less than 6 nor more than 18 years. Defendant appeals from his conviction. We affirm the trial court.\nDefendant contends on appeal that (1) he was denied a fair trial, free from prejudicial error, where certain physical evidence was wrongly admitted, and (2) the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument was improper and prejudicial.\nJesse Abrego testified for the State that on August 10, 1975, at approximately 12:50 a.m., a small crowd gathered outside the Nite Lite tavern located at the corner of Tripp Street and North Avenue, in the city of Chicago. People were arguing and yelling at one another. According to the witness, defendant ran away from the crowd and away from North Avenue toward him (Abrego) and his companion, Joanne Santiago. Defendant was dressed in a dark velvet jacket and black trousers. Abrego testified that defendant stopped near the fence at the back of the tavern and stated, \u201cIf you MFers don\u2019t like it, I\u2019ll come back and kill you.\u201d He then reached into Ms jacket and drew out a revolver. Thereafter, he walked approximately 20 feet to a little side door near the fence on the right side of the tavern. Defendant raised the revolver and fired five shots in the direction of the men outside the tavern.\nAbrego further testified that the first gunshot struck Johnny Flores. The second and third shots struck Arthur Arcia, and the fourth and fifth shots struck Joseph Morris. After defendant fired the fifth shot, he turned and ran toward the alley. He stopped in the alley and \u201ctook something out of the gun [and] put it in his hand.\u201d In the alley he was joined by two other men and they all proceeded eastward down the alley.\nThe witness stated he walked toward the tavern after defendant fled. He observed the three bodies and called the police. When the police arrived, they asked some of the people whether they saw anything happen; there were no responses. While the police were searching the grassy area next to the building, Abrego told them to look in the alley by the telephone pole. There, the police found a suspended shell and four casings.\nAbrego gave an investigator a statement regarding the shootings and told the police he would go to the police station and give a statement if they so requested.\nPatricia Paris, who lived across the street from the Nite Lite tavern, testified that at about 3 a.m. on August 10 plain-clothes officers spoke with her in her apartment. She told them she saw the gunman approach the comer from the north, and when he reached the corner he fired four or five shots. During the defense\u2019s case, Officer Radke testified Patricia Paris told him that after the assailant fired the shots he fled, along with three other men.\nOn the morning of August 10,1975, Investigators Storck and Mudry were assigned the investigation of the triple homicide. On that same day, Storck interviewed Robbie Rivera and Esteban Rosario. The officer obtained a description of the assailant, but not his identity. After further investigation on that date, Officer Storck contacted several security agencies. On August 12, he and Investigator Mudry, accompanied by Rosario, went to defendant\u2019s place of employment. Rosario went inside the building and upon returning told the officers the man they were looking for was inside.\nInvestigators Storck and Mudry entered the building and saw defendant toward the rear, dressed in a security guard uniform. The officers asked defendant to surrender the weapon on his person, which he did. Thereafter, he was arrested and taken to the police station.\nA lineup was held on the afternoon of August 12, 1975. Defendant participated in the lineup, dressed in a velvet jacket with a boutonniere, pants and shirt. Jesse Abrego, Patricia Paris, Rosario, and John Mocheo viewed the lineup. Abrego identified defendant as the person who shot the three men on August 10,1975. John Mocheo told Abrego he could not pick the assailant out of the lineup.\nJesus LeBron, defendant\u2019s father, stated that on August 11, 1975, defendant gave him a gun and instructed him to put it in the house. Thereafter, Jesus LeBron gave the gun to defendant\u2019s brother-in-law, Nelson Cortez. Officer Sesso testified that on August 14, 1975, he visited the home of Nelson Cortez and spoke with him. After their conversation, the officer left and thereafter placed the building under surveillance. Cortez later went out the rear door of the premises and placed a brown paper bag over a fence. Officer Sesso retrieved the bag which contained the gun.\nOfficer Smith, a firearms identification expert, identified the revolver as the gun which fired the shell casings found in the alley behind the Nite Lite tavern. He also identified the gun as having fired the bullets removed from Arthur Arcia and Joseph Morris.\nTirso Escanio testified for the defense, stating that on the night of the shootings he was at the Nite Lite tavern. He stated that during the band\u2019s intermission he and a friend went outside. He noticed a fight break out near the back door of the tavern involving defendant and six Americans. He stated that so many people were talking at once he could not understand what anyone was saying. Escanio told the court his attention was drawn to the crowd when somebody called out \u201c \u2018A man pulled out a gun.\u2019 \u201d He stated that someone had also said, \u201c \u2018Mike, pull out the gun,\u2019 \u201d but he did not know who made the statements.\nAt certain points during Escanio\u2019s testimony, he gave conflicting statements. Initially, he testified that when the first shot was fired he did not know where it came from, subsequently, he testified the shot came from defendant and the others. He also stated that when the first and second shots were fired defendant and three other people were struggling with the gun on the back fence; thereafter, he testified that after the second shot he saw defendant struggling with three other people near the rear door of the tavern. Still later, he testified defendant had his back against the fence with three men facing him.\nEscanio further testified that one man was struggling with defendant and another was hitting him. He also stated they were punching defendant, the defendant \u201cwent down,\u201d and they were \u201crolling against the fence\u201d as defendant struck back with his hands. He did see \u201csomething\u201d in defendant\u2019s hands as defendant rolled along the chain fence to the alley. Finally, the witness stated he was in his car and started to drive away slowly after the second shot, and he saw defendant run, alone, toward North Avenue.\nThe court allowed into evidence both revolvers; the gun that was used in the shooting and the gun defendant surrendered to police at the time of his arrest. Defendant\u2019s jacket with the boutonneire, shirt, and pants were admitted into evidence, although defendant objected to sending to the jury clothing the police officer gave him to wear in the lineup. The court overruled the objection.\nDefendant contends he was denied a fair trial, free from prejudicial error, where certain physical evidence was improperly admitted. Defendant\u2019s shirt and pants were admitted into evidence, allowed to go to the jury, and commented upon by the prosecutor in closing remarks. The State maintains defendant was not denied a fair trial when the shirt and pants were admitted into evidence and commented upon by the prosecutor.\nThere must be a proper foundation laid before physical evidence can be admitted. The physical evidence must be connected with both the crime and the defendant to be admissible at trial. People v. Rogers (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 499, 502, 356 N.E.2d 413, 415.\nDefendant asserts there was no evidence at trial that established defendant had worn the shirt or pants in question on the night of the shootings. Defendant points to testimony given by Officer Storck that although Officer Mudry had received these clothes from defendant\u2019s wife they were not worn by defendant on the night of the shootings. This is not a totally correct statement of the evidence. According to the record, Officer Storck initially stated he did not believe defendant was wearing the shirt and pants in the lineup; thereafter, when he was shown the shirt and pants, he recognized them as the clothing provided by defendant\u2019s wife and worn by defendant in the lineup.\nA foundation for the introduction of objects into evidence may be laid either through their identification by a witness or through the establishment of a chain of custody. People v. Mendoza (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 774, 776, 379 N.E.2d 380, 382-83.\nDefendant contends the State stressed the clothing in its closing argument by stating the shirt and pants were worn by defendant on the night of the shootings, and neither, the pants nor the shirt was physically damaged. The State contended the condition of the clothing was inconsistent with defendant\u2019s assertion that he had been in a struggle and the shootings were done in self-defense. Defendant relies on People v. Rogers (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 499,356 N.E.2d 413, to support his position. In Rogers, the State\u2019s inability to establish a chain of custody for certain evidence coupled with the prosecutor\u2019s statements at opening and closing argument caused reversible error.\nWe find in our reading of Rogers that the court based its decision on the cumulative effect of the errors it found and for this reason held that the defendant did not receive a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nIn the present case, it was established on redirect examination of Officer Storck that the shirt and pants defendant wore in the lineup was the same clothing given to Officer Mudry by defendant\u2019s wife; but there was no clear testimony in the record to support the State\u2019s allegation that the shirt and pants, which were admitted into evidence, were worn by defendant on the night of the shootings. However, we do not find this to be error which would justify reversal of the jury\u2019s verdict. The defendant was positively identified by an eyewitness. Moreover, there were State\u2019s witnesses who testified there was no struggle or fight between defendant and the other men. We find any error that may have been committed in admitting the shirt and pants into evidence, sending them to the jury, and allowing the prosecutor to comment on them was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. See People v. Bailey (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 953, 957.\nDefendant also contends the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the gun worn by defendant while on duty as a security guard. We disagree.\nDefendant is correct in his statement of the law that a gun must be sufficiently connected with the defendant and the crime to be relevant evidence. (People v. Jones (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 592, 599, 177 N.E.2d 112, 116.) However, in People v. Upshire (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 248, 252, 379 N.E.2d 38, 41, the court stated:\n\u201cEven though a particular weapon was not used by the accused during the commission of the crime, it may be the subject of testimony concerning the details of arrest and may be admitted into evidence.\u201d\nAt the time of defendant\u2019s arrest, he was carrying a weapon which was part of his uniform as a security guard. He voluntarily gave the police his gun at the time of his arrest. Later, it was determined the gun defendant had on his person was not the gun that was used in the shootings. Two days after defendant\u2019s arrest, another gun was recovered near the home of defendant\u2019s brother-in-law. This gun was found to have fired the bullets on the night of the shootings.\nDefendant cites People v. Wade (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 721, 366 N.E.2d 528, as similar to the instant case. We find Wade and the present case have very different fact situations.\nIn Wade, the murder weapon was not present at the trial but the prosecutor elicited extensive testimony from the police regarding a gun they found on defendant at the time of his arrest. The People stipulated that the ballistics evidence would show the weapon found on defendant was not the murder weapon. However, this court stated, in reversing the 'trial court, that offering the gun to the jury was extremely prejudicial and constituted reversible error. The weapon in the instant case was clearly admissible as the subject of testimony concerning the details of the arrest.\nDefendant contends that portions of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument were improper and prejudicial. The State, in its closing argument, referred to the pants and the shirt as being worn by defendant on the night of the shootings. Defendant also contends the statement made by the prosecutor regarding the condition of the clothing prejudiced defendant. The prosecutor\u2019s comments regarding the clothing were improper, based on the evidence. However, we do not find prejudicial error resulting from his statement. The argument did not constitute a material factor in the conviction nor did it result in substantial prejudice .to the accused. We cannot find that the verdict would have been \u201c \u2018different had the improper closing argument not been made \u2022 * V \" People v. Bach (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 893, 898, 393 N.E.2d 563, 567, quoting People v. Trice (1970), 127 Ill. App. 2d 310, 319, 262 N.E.2d 276, 281.\nDefendant objects to the comment the State made concerning the guns being \u201cmates.\u201d The prosecutor stated:\n\u201c[At the time of defendant\u2019s arrest] the defendant was carrying in his possession, People\u2019s Exhibit No. 21-A, this gun. [Indicating.] This gun is a mate to the murder weapon.\u201d\nWe do not believe these remarks were prejudicial to defendant. The firearms expert testified the two weapons had similar class characteristics and they both had certain basic operation conditions. The prosecutor\u2019s remarks regarding the guns were not improper and should not have prejudiced the jury.\nDefendant further contends the prosecutor injected his own opinion of defendant\u2019s guilt in his closing argument.\n\u201cI ask you to think about each one of those instances, because after all, ladies and gentlemen, those are three human beings. And I ask you to give each one of those persons, and the State, who is bringing the charges against this gentleman\u2014\n[Defense]: Objection, Judge\u2014\n[Prosecutor]: a fair trial as to each one\u2014\n[Defense]: Objection, your Honor.\n[Prosecutor]: as to each one of those three.\nThe Court: Overruled.\u201d\nDefendant asserts these remarks constituted an expression of the prosecutor\u2019s opinion that defendant was guilty. We do not agree with defendant\u2019s allegation. It appears the prosecutor was merely speaking in the first person to beseech the jury to give the State a fair trial. We do not find that, outside the summary of the evidence, the prosecutor stated he believed the defendant was guilty.\nDefendant also states the prosecutor commented on the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. The prosecutor stated in the People\u2019s rebuttal closing:\n\u201cThis is evidence that you heard from here [indicating], and you have heard nothing from here [indicating], to say that those individuals, those three individuals were threatening the life of this defendant to the point where he had to kill them. \u00b0 6\n* 0 \u00b0 But, what you might not know about affirmative defenses, which the self-defense is one, is that in order to talk about self-defense, you have to bring forth some evidence of it. There has to be some evidence before you in order to decide that there is self-defense. Nothing, no credible evidence of that. And remember, every one of those three people.\u201d\nWhen the prosecutor referred to the lack of believable evidence and the lack of credible evidence, he made these statements during his rebuttal closing remarks. The defense attorney had already stated to the jury that \u201cwhat he did he did in fear for his person and for his life.\u201d We find the State\u2019s remarks to have been a proper response to defendant\u2019s closing argument.\n\u201cHis statement was a reply to and invited by comments which the defense counsel had previously made in his argument to the jury.\u201d People v. Zuniga (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 550, 558, 293 N.E.2d 595, 599.\nThe defendant cites People v. Burton (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 53, 57, 254 N.E.2d 527, 528-29, for the proposition that the prosecutor is forbidden to make a direct reference to a defendant\u2019s failure to testify.\nHowever, in that case, the court referred to the prosecutor\u2019s statements as \u201cdirect and unequivocal.\u201d The court stated that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were intended for no other purpose than to call the jury\u2019s attention specifically to the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. In the present case, the prosecutor referred to the lack of believable and credible evidence relating to the defense of self-defense.\nWe do not believe any of the remarks of which defendant complains could have affected the jury\u2019s determination in light of the evidence and testimony presented at trial. People v. Gunner (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 533, 538, 392 N.E.2d 165, 168.\nWe conclude the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was so overwhelming that the remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument did not result in substantial prejudice to defendant.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nLINN, P. J., and JIGANTI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Robert Guch and Aaron L. Meyers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Robert J. Kaiser, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUIS LeBRON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 78-585\nOpinion filed April 24, 1980.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Robert Guch and Aaron L. Meyers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Robert J. Kaiser, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0598-01", "first_page_order": 620, "last_page_order": 627 }