{ "id": 5552128, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL TEDDER et al., Defendantts-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tedder", "decision_date": "1980-04-18", "docket_number": "Nos. 78-162, 78-163 cons.", "first_page": "874", "last_page": "885", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 874" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "358 N.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2815251 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2614109 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3386723 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.E. 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4852409 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/276/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.E. 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ill. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5282051 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/357/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 N.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5291806 ], "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/66/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937034 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2807787 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 N.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5379390 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937684 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 1210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3318907 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3417486 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2488975 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3267304 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2820177 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/91/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 866", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3273770 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2896191 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3278733 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809206 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2902885 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 N.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2920931 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 F.2d 361", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1062604 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/535/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 N.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2554857, 2554716 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/84/0033-01", "/ill-app-2d/84/0033-02" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 1223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581223 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 1880", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 L. Ed. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 1008", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2914, 2381, 2927, 2257, 2932, 2486, 3096, 2490, 2683, 2686 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/1008-04", "/us/435/1008-05", "/us/435/1008-07", "/us/435/1008-01", "/us/435/1008-03", "/us/435/1008-09", "/us/435/1008-10", "/us/435/1008-06", "/us/435/1008-08", "/us/435/1008-02" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5639975 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 1222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5621643 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3383796 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 1004", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3280225 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/1004-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2816731 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2897951 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3401955 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0682-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1175, "char_count": 24787, "ocr_confidence": 0.878, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.20900717342644e-07, "percentile": 0.5954360659636914 }, "sha256": "696e8ba26639ce3e84f962f097c27ba102e2f1dda4b08ceb6ff5842830e39465", "simhash": "1:245769dceef62584", "word_count": 4098 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:47.613815+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL TEDDER et al., Defendantts-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants Tedder and Nettles were charged with burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1), armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2) and aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4). Their first trial resulted in a mistrial due to improper opening statements by the prosecutor. Following a second jury trial, defendants were found guilty as charged, except Nettles who was found not guilty of aggravated battery. Defendants were sentenced to a term of 6 to 18 years for burglary and 30 to 50 years for armed robbery. Tedder was also sentenced to 3 to 9 years for aggravated battery. Both defendants\u2019 sentences were to be served concurrently.\nDefendants raise the following issues on appeal: (1) they were denied their constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) there was no probable cause for their arrests and the direct and derivative facts of the arrest should have been suppressed; (3) they were denied their constitutional right to a speedy trial; (4) the trial court erred in denying them use of a composite sketch for impeachment purposes; (5) they were not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (6) they were denied a fair trial by the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments; and (7) their sentences for armed robbery are excessive.\nOn August 12, 1976, at about 3:30 a.m., Mrs. Ruth Fruehling was awakened by a loud noise while she was alone in her home at 320 South Greenwood in Park Ridge, Illinois. She got up, turned on a light and walked to the front door to see if it was raining. She then turned on the light at the top of the basement steps and proceeded down the stairs to the basement. Before she reached the bottom of the stairs, the light went out and she was grabbed and told not to scream. When she cried out, she was pistol-whipped across the head for about five minutes which resulted in a deep gash on her forehead.\nDefendants then demanded a coin collection which they contended she had previously shown to another lady. When she denied knowledge of any such collection, Tedder, described as the short, muscular defendant, went upstairs to search the house while Nettles, identified as the tall, skinny defendant, remained in the basement with her. When the upstairs hall light was turned on again, Mrs. Fruehling noticed that both men had guns and flashlights and were wearing surgical gloves. She saw their faces because neither man wore a mask. Nettles kept a gun pointed at her for the next 20 minutes. He put his flashlight down on the steps, and it provided additional illumination in the basement. She noticed that Nettles had \u201cdeep penetrating eyes,\u201d and was wearing round-toed beige earth shoes.\nWhen Tedder, the defendant who beat her, returned, he stood close to her with his gun pointing at her. He was wearing a gray T-shirt with short sleeves and had tattoos on his arms. Tedder asked Nettles what to do with her. Nettles replied, \u201cDo you want to silence her?\u201d Tedder then threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident, and the two left through the basement door that they had earlier broken to gain entry. At various times that evening, the face of each defendant had been within nine inches of the face of Mrs. Fruehling.\nAfter they left, Mrs. Fruehling realized that her head was bleeding profusely. She went upstairs to make a telephone call but found that her telephone cord had been cut, her bedroom and dining room drawers ransacked and $117 stolen from her purse. She went to a neighbor\u2019s house and called the police. Several stitches were required at the hospital to close her head wound.\nOn September 21,1976, Mrs. Fruehling viewed a lineup at the Area 6 police station in Chicago. When the curtains covering the one-way window of the lineup room were opened, she immediately recognized Tedder as the short, muscular intruder, and exclaimed, \u201cOh, my God. There\u2019s one of them.\u201d She then immediately identified Nettles as the tall, skinny intruder. She also identified defendants in court as the intruders in her basement that evening.\nOn cross-examination, Mrs. Fruehling recalled that she described the two assailants to Park Ridge policemen. One of the police officers had an \u201cIdenti-Kit,\u201d Le., a sketch composed of various features of the human face. She admitted that she told the police officer that the eyes, ears, lips and nose of the two intruders were not similar. She further admitted that her observations of Tedder\u2019s tattoos on direct examination differed from her testimony at the preliminary hearing, where she stated that she saw no marks on his arms. As to Nettles, she testified that on one occasion during the night of the crime, he held a small white card in front of his face in an attempt to mask his identity.\nDetective Frank Koehler, a Chicago policeman had learned of the August 12, 1976, home invasion and had a physical description of the assailants. He and four other Chicago policemen arrested defendants on September 21, 1976, as they emerged from Tedder\u2019s apartment. Later that same day, he conducted a lineup twice for Mrs. Fruehling to insure that no mistake was made in the identification of defendants.\nPark Ridge Police Officer, Louis Sciarra, testified for the defense. He had a conversation with Mrs. Fruehling on August 12,1976, in which she described her assailants. Defendants\u2019 trial counsel was not allowed to elicit testimony from Sciarra about the composite sketches he prepared at her direction, nor was he allowed to question Sciarra about the alleged similarities in the two sketches. Mrs. Fruehling separately described both men to Sciarra. Although she described both men as having similar facial characteristics, she told him that the eyes, nose and lips of the two men were different.\nOpinion\nThe first issue that defendants raise concerns whether they were denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed under the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV.) This claim is premised upon both trial counsel\u2019s failure to preserve for review certain issues raised at trial, and counsel\u2019s alleged reliance on the disclaimer of waiver provision contained in his motion for new trial.\nIn Illinois, the standard for inadequate representation by counsel is whether the representation is of such a character as to reduce the trial to a farce or sham. (People v. Virgil (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 682, 370 N.E.2d 74.) For a defendant to prevail in this regard, the following factors must clearly be established: (1) actual incompetence of counsel, as reflected by the manner of carrying out his duties at trial; and (2) substantial prejudice resulting, without which the outcome probably would have been different. People v. Johnson (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 255, 359 N.E.2d 791.\nIn the instant appeal, no actual incompetence was shown by counsel\u2019s failure to include certain issues raised at trial in the motion for new trial. Certainly, the choice of which issues, if any, to preserve for appeal is a matter of judgment on an attorney\u2019s part. Normally, an attorney\u2019s exercise of discretion or judgment at trial does not constitute incompetence. (People v. Virgil (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 682, 370 N.E.2d 74.) In fact, it has been held that an attorney\u2019s failure to file any post-trial motion is only a factor in determining counsel\u2019s competence. (People v. Greenlee (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 536, 358 N.E.2d 649.) Moreover, our review of the issues that counsel failed to include in the motion for new trial shows no substantial prejudice to defendants, since those issues would not have affected defendants\u2019 convictions, and an effort to raise them would have been futile. (People v. Knowles (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 395 N.E.2d 706.) We now turn to those issues.\nThe first issue that counsel failed to include in the motion for new trial was the alleged lack of probable cause for defendants\u2019 warrantless arrest, and the attendant suppression of the fruits of the arrest. This issue was argued vigorously by counsel at pretrial hearing and denied by the trial court.\nAn arrest without a warrant is proper if an officer has probable cause to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense. (People v. Faulisi (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 529, 366 N.E.2d 1072.) The existence of probable cause or reasonable grounds for arrest depends on the totality of facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest. (People v. Williams (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 874, 379 N.E.2d 1222.) Probable cause to arrest may be founded upon evidence not admissible at trial of the charge in question. People v. Smith (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 320, 365 N.E.2d 558, cert, denied (1978), 435 U.S. 1008, 56 L. Ed. 2d 390, 98 S. Ct. 1880.\nIn the instant case the totality of the facts and circumstances known to Officer Koehler at the time of the arrest reveals that he had probable cause to arrest Tedder and Nettles. During the first week of September 1976, he received sketches and physical descriptions of two men wanted for a home invasion occurring in Park Ridge, Illinois, on August 12,1976. Because he was then investigating another matter, Koehler paid little attention to this information. The next time he looked at the sketch was on or about September 21, 1976. Upon closer review, Koehler recognized one sketch as portraying Tedder. He then obtained the offense report from the Park Ridge police and noticed that the offenders wore surgical gloves during the crime. Koehler remembered that that was the modus operand! of Tedder, with whom he had dealt since 1971. Tedder was described in the report as 30 years old, muscular, agile, having a Southern accent and thick bushy eyebrows. Nettles was said to be tall, skinny and emaciated, and about 35 years old, Koehler realized that these descriptions matched those of Tedder and Nettles, whom he knew had been sharing an apartment at 844. W. Ainslie, Chicago, for the previous month. Armed with this information, Koehler and other Chicago police officers arrested defendants in front of Tedder\u2019s apartment on September 21,1976. The sketch of Tedder was \u201cone of the best Identi-Kit match-ups that I [Koehler] had ever seen.\u201d The other sketch bore a similarity to Nettles and identified him when coupled with the physical description in the police report. Tedder, 34, was 5'5\" tall and 160 pounds at the time of trial, while Nettles, 39, was 6'3\" tall and weighed 150 pounds.\nAlthough Koehler had no warrant for defendants\u2019 arrest, he was aware that these men matched the physical descriptions and composite sketches reported by the victim. These factors, coupled with Koehler\u2019s prior dealings with Tedder, supplied the probable cause for defendants\u2019 arrest. (See People v. Philson (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 513, 389 N.E.2d 1223; People v. Jennings (1967), 84 Ill. App. 2d 33, 228 N.E.2d 566; United States ex rel. Burbank v. Warden (7th Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d 361.) Defendants reliance on People v. One 1968 Cadillac (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 780, 281 N.E.2d 776, is misplaced. In that case defendant was neither observed violating any law nor did he match a physical description of a wanted suspect, but was merely \u201cknown\u201d as a gambler, and had been previously arrested. In the present case Koehler not only recognized the modus operand! of Tedder in the Park Ridge home invasion and knew him to reside with Nettles at Tedder\u2019s apartment, but also had physical description and sketches of both intruders that fit both defendants.\nSince there was probable cause for their arrest, defendants\u2019 pretrial motion to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence was properly denied. Consequently, the lineup and in-court identification of defendants, along with all property seized from them, was admissible into evidence.\nDefendants\u2019 second contention, raised at trial, but not included in the motion for new trial, is that they were improperly denied their motion for discharge for violation of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) Defendants specifically argue that they were not promptly retried after the first trial, which resulted in a mistrial.\nThe constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be defined in terms of an absolute or precise standard of time within which an accused must be given trial. (People v. Henry (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 312, 265 N.E.2d 876.) Four factors are to be considered in determining whether there has been a breach of defendants\u2019 constitutional right to a speedy trial: the length of delay; the reasons for the delay; the prejudice to the defendant; and whether the defendant may be considered as having waived the right. (People v. Bazzell (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 177, 369 N.E.2d 48.) When a mistrial has been declared, the standard for evaluating the passage of time before the retrial is whether the interval is reasonable. Bazzell.\nIn the instant case the delay between the date defendants were taken into custody, September 21,1976, and the beginning of jury selection for the first trial, May 20,1977, was not unreasonable, in that defendants were accountable for much of the delay. As to the period from mistrial, May 24,1977, to the date of retrial, August 16,1977, only 84 days elapsed. The first 35 days were unexplained by the State, but the parties agreed that the next 49 days were requested by the State because of the absence of a material witness, Police Officer Koehler. Nevertheless, the record reveals no prejudice to defendants as a result of the delay during this period, and defendants have pointed to none. Consequently, we find that the delay between mistrial and retrial was reasonable. (See Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d 177, 369 N.E.2d 48; People v. Daniel (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 646, 395 N.E.2d 163.) Therefore, defendants were not denied their constitutional right to a speedy trial.\nThe final issue that defense counsel failed to include in the motion for a new trial was the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 request to impeach Mrs. Fruehling\u2019s identification testimony with the composite sketches prepared at her direction. Defendants claim that the sketches were admissible as prior inconsistent statements of Mrs. Fruehling, and that it was error to preclude their use of this impeachment.\nThe composite sketches in question were prepared by Officer Sciarra by use of an \u201cIdenti-Kit.\u201d Although the record does not reveal the actual process by which these sketches were assembled our understanding of an \u201cIdenti-Kit,\u201d gleaned from oral arguments, is as follows. An \u201cIdenti-Kit\u201d consists of several series of individually numbered transparent plastic overlays. Each series represents a different facial feature of the alleged suspect. A witness selects one of the overlays from each of the series and places them together until an image resembling the suspect appears. This image is referred to as a \u201ccomposite sketch\u201d and can be photographed and sent to the other police officers at various locations. A composite sketch constructed from an \u201cIdenti-Kit,\u201d as in this case, differs from the traditional artist\u2019s sketch, which is a drawing made from an artist\u2019s freehand interpretation of physical descriptions he receives from a witness.\nThe courts in Illinois have consistently held that it is error to admit a police artist\u2019s sketch into evidence because the sketch constitutes impermissible written hearsay evidence. (E.g., People v. Fair (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 301, 359 N.E.2d 848; People v. Rogers (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 866, 394 N.E.2d 813.) An artist\u2019s sketch frequently reflects the artist\u2019s interpretive impressions based upon the personal observations of another and is therefore inadmissible. (People v. Turner (1968), 91 Ill. App. 2d 436, 235 N.E.2d 317.) There may be situations, however, where a witness can adopt the artist\u2019s sketch by reviewing the various features portrayed on the sketch and accepting th\u00e9 final product as substantially accurate. (See People v. Burgin (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 58, 392 N.E.2d 251.) When this occurs, the sketch is no longer the statement of the artist, but becomes, by adoption, that of the witness. In this situation, the witness may be subject to cross-examination by use of the sketch for any material discrepancies between the sketch and subsequent identifications testimony.\nTurning to the record in this case, we find that Mrs. Fruehling never affirmatively adopted the two finished composite sketches as her own. She told Officer Sciarra that the assailants had different eyes, lips, and noses, yet Sciarra testified that the plastic overlays representing those features on the sketches of Tedder and Nettles were identical. At no time did Mrs. Fruehling express satisfaction with his efforts to match the descriptions she gave him with the finished composite sketches.\nBecause Mrs. Fruehling never made a clear and definite adoption of the sketches, we conclude that the trial court properly found them inadmissible for impeachment purposes.\nThe foregoing issues, even if raised by counsel in the motion for new trial, would not have affected defendants\u2019 convictions. We therefore hold that counsel\u2019s representation of defendants was effective, and defendants were not substantially prejudiced in this regard.\nWe now turn to other issues raised by defendants. Defendants contend that they were not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A verdict of guilty will not be set aside unless the trial evidence is so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt as to defendants\u2019 guilt. (People v. Yarbrough (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 222, 367 N.E.2d 666.) Identification by a single witness who had opportunity to observe defendants is sufficient to support a guilty verdict. (People v. Butler (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 750, 354 N.E.2d 568.) Minor discrepancies in descriptions by the identification witnesses are to be considered by the jury in determining the credibility of witnesses. People v. Harrison (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 9, 372 N.E.2d 915.\nMrs. Fruehling testified that the upstairs hall light and defendants\u2019 flashlights provided sufficient illumination for her to identify Tedder and Nettles. When she was alone with Nettles for a period of 20 minutes, he was only a short distance away from her. She observed Tedder as he held her and pistol-whipped her, and later as he prepared to leave her basement. Because of these opportunities for observation, she immediately identified both defendants at the lineup and later in court. We find the evidence at trial not so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt as to defendants\u2019 guilt.\nDefendants\u2019 next issue, preserved in Tedder\u2019s pro se motion for a new trial, deals with the closing arguments by the prosecutor which allegedly deprived defendants of a fair trial. Defendants specifically object to the following three comments made to the jury by the prosecutor:\n\u201cYou heard an Assistant State\u2019s Attorney talk. Why? Because the procedure in Cook County [sic] we don\u2019t like to arrest innocent men. We don\u2019t like to charge innocent men. And we don\u2019t like to prosecute innocent men.\n# # e\nThe most important question that you can ask yourself is can you ever forget these faces. And I put it to you you cannot because I know I can\u2019t.\n# # #\nAnd let me submit this to you: I want you to think when you go back to that jury room of what\u2019s going on in your home now and when you think about that, and the people that you\u2019ve left alone or your relatives who are alone, you will come back with a finding of guilty.\u201d\nA prosecutor is allowed wide latitude in making closing arguments. (People v. Dykes (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 403, 383 N.E.2d 1210.) Generally, the trial court\u2019s determination of the propriety of the closing arguments will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Smothers (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 172, 302 N.E.2d 324.\nIn the instant case, we initially note that no objections were made by defense counsel during the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments and any prejudice to defendants arising from these arguments may be considered waived. (People v. Simmons (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 310, 315 N.E.2d 226.) Nevertheless, after reviewing defendants\u2019 arguments it is our opinion that certain comments made by the prosecutor, though improper, neither constituted a material factor in defendants\u2019 convictions nor will they require reversal. People v. Lewis (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 995, 349 N.E.2d 528.\nDefendants challenge the prosecutor\u2019s first two statements as improper because .they: (1) vouch for the strength of the State\u2019s case by placing the credibility of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office behind the charge, and (2) inject the prosecutor\u2019s personal feelings and various immaterial considerations into the case. A similar attack was made in People v. Skorusa (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 577, 304 N.E.2d 630, where the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cI say to you now, ladies and gentlemen, that if we in conscience didn\u2019t know for a fact that the defendant, Stanley Skorusa, shot and killed Irene Kowalkowski, you ladies and gentlemen wouldn\u2019t be sitting here in judgment of him.\u201d (Skorusa, 55 Ill. 2d 577, 585, 304 N.E.2d 630, 634.)\nThe court held that comment to be harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at the trial. The cases of People v. Fuerback (1966), 66 Ill. App. 2d 452, 214 N.E.2d 330, People v. Cepek (1934), 357 Ill. 560, 192 N.E. 573, and People v. King (1916), 276 Ill. 138, 114 N.E. 601, cited by defendants are distinguishable from the present situation. In each of those cases, the inflammatory remarks by the prosecutor, only when coupled with other errors at trial, were a material factor in defendants\u2019 convictions. There were no such errors in the trial below. Defendants\u2019 convictions resulted from the clear convincing testimony of the victim, not from the prosecutor\u2019s remarks.\nDefendants also assert that the prosecutor\u2019s third comment was a blatant appeal to the jurors\u2019 fears that was made solely in order to convict them. We disagree.\nIt is proper argument to urge the effective administration of law through vigorous law enforcement. (People v. Griggs (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 224, 366 N.E.2d 581.) We note that a similar warning to the jury that they should not release the defendant unless they wanted an unsafe community has been found to be not inflammatory in nature. (People v. Taylor (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373, 309 N.E.2d 642,647.) Although we do not encourage the type of arguments made by the prosecutor at trial, we do not feel that they deprived defendants of a fair trial. Therefore, we hold that any error resulting from the comments was harmless.\nDefendants have raised several other contentions in Tedder\u2019s pro se supplementary brief filed with this court. We have reviewed these contentions and have found them to be without merit.\nThe final issue for review is defendants\u2019 assertion that the sentences they received for armed robbery, 30 to 50 years in the penitentiary, are excessive. Defendants argue that the length of the sentences are unduly harsh in that they were independently sentenced for other crimes arising out of the same incident.\nSentencing is not a function of a reviewing court. This court will not substitute its judgment for that of a trial court merely because it might' have imposed a different sentence. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882.) The trial judge sees the defendants and is in a better position to appraise them and evaluate the likelihood of their rehabilitation. (People v. Willett (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 545, 358 N.E.2d 657.) Defendants\u2019 sentences will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Perruquet.\nThe instant defendants both have lengthy criminal backgrounds which include convictions for burglary and armed robbery. The present crimes for which they stand convicted involve the home invasion and severe beating of an elderly woman whom they threatened to \u201csilence\u201d if she went to the police. Considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and particularly the history and character of defendants, we cannot say that the sentences imposed in the case at bar are an abuse of discretion.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nSULLIVAN, P. J., and WILSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Marc Fogelberg, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellants.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Iris E. Sholder, and Paul D. Kerpan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL TEDDER et al., Defendantts-Appellants.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNos. 78-162, 78-163 cons.\nOpinion filed April 18, 1980.\nRehearing denied May 16, 1980.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Marc Fogelberg, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellants.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Iris E. Sholder, and Paul D. Kerpan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0874-01", "first_page_order": 896, "last_page_order": 907 }