{
  "id": 3206169,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Martinez",
  "decision_date": "1980-05-14",
  "docket_number": "No. 79-527",
  "first_page": "79",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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      "cite": "345 N.E.2d 480",
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1974,
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    {
      "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 105",
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      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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      "year": 1974,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:38.181565+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the defendant, Ronald Martinez, from his convictions for attempt murder, solicitation to murder and aggravated battery following a jury trial. The only issue raised in this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence presented to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe basis of the defendant\u2019s convictions for attempt murder and aggravated battery was the defendant\u2019s legal accountability for the act of another. If, either before or during the commission of an offense, a defendant, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that offense, solicits, aids, abets, argues or attempts to aid another person in the planning or commission of the offense, the defendant is legally accountable for the act of that other person. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2(c).) To demonstrate a common purpose to perpetrate a crime, the evidence need not establish words of agreement, but the common purpose can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. People v. Tate (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 105, 345 N.E.2d 480; People v. Minish (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 603, 312 N.E.2d 49.\nOn review, a conviction will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that there is insufficient credible evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but if the evidence, though conflicting, would be sufficient in the event the prosecution\u2019s witnesses are believed, the question is for the trier of fact. People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 116, 190 N.E.2d 738.\n\u201cThe jury may always believe as much or as little as they please of a witness\u2019 testimony. [Citation.] The jury\u2019s province is to sort out conflicting evidence, determine credibility and weigh testimony, and the verdict will not be disturbed unless so unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to the accused\u2019s guilt.\u201d People v. Fleming (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 1, 4, 355 N.E.2d 345, 348.\nIn the case at bar, the jury was presented with evidence that two women were instructed by the defendant to bring the victim, Daniel Pratt, to a garage where the defendant and his friends worked on their cars. Pratt, the two girls, and Daniel Carson, a friend of Pratt, were riding in Pratt\u2019s car all that afternoon before the incident, sharing two bottles of wine.\nAs to the events that occurred after the girls delivered Pratt to the garage, the testimonies of Pratt, Carson, and Timothy Tate, a security guard at the garage, were essentially identical. One of the girls went inside the garage to inform the defendant of their presence while the other girl delayed getting out of the back seat of Pratt\u2019s car until the defendant and his friends came out of the garage. One of the defendant\u2019s friends walked over to Pratt\u2019s car, opened his car door, and told Pratt that the defendant wanted to see him. The defendant confronted Pratt, who testified to never having personally met the defendant before, about some alleged statements Pratt made about the defendant and attempted to coax Pratt into taking some action. Pratt responded by conversation which was described by Tate as being \u201cnormal\u201d and nonthreatening to the defendant. At that point the defendant told his friend to go inside the garage and get a shotgun. According to the defendant, there was no shotgun in the garage and this was done only to frighten Pratt.\nPratt then left the scene by driving down an alley. Neither he nor Carson was familiar with the area or the streets and arrived at what appeared to be a dead end. There was testimony that there were two possible exits. However, the police officer who testified about the possible exits specifically stated he was not sure if any of the exits were blocked by snow on that particular date. Tate was the only person who testified that he checked the alley on the date in question, and found that an exit was snowbound. Pratt thus turned his car around and headed back towards the garage because it seemed to him to be the only exit available.\nUpon his return trip past the garage, Pratt noticed that the defendant was the only person who seemed to be still around. Pratt decided to attempt to discover why the defendant was angry at him since he did not want to be constantly looking over his shoulder in fear of the defendant. Pratt parked some distance away. He was not fearful of any shotgun at that time because the only person in sight was the defendant, who was holding a tire iron. As Pratt was getting out of his car to talk to the defendant, Carson said there was someone pointing a gun at them. As Pratt was getting back into the car, he heard the defendant state to Steve Filker, who was holding the rifle, either \u201cshoot him\u201d or \u201cgo ahead and shoot him.\u201d Carson testified that Filker yelled to the defendant, asking him if it was okay to shoot Pratt, to which the defendant stated: \u201cShoot him.\u201d Tate testified to having heard the same conversation. Filker shot through the car\u2019s front windshield and struck Pratt in the head. Pratt further testified while he was attempting to leave after being shot, the defendant was smiling and stated something to the effect that \u201cif you want war, you have war.\u201d\nThe defendant, codefendant Filker, and their witnesses testified that Pratt had a gun and pointed it at the defendant when Pratt was first brought to the garage. However, the defendants and their witnesses are, admittedly, all friends. In addition, the gun allegedly carried by Pratt was described differently by various witnesses and none, except Steve Filker, testified to seeing the shooting.\nPratt stated that he had no gun. Carson did not see a gun in Pratt\u2019s hand, and Timothy Tate did not at any time see a pistol in the possession of Pratt even though he had a fairly clear view of him the first time Pratt was at the garage. Tate clearly saw both of Pratt\u2019s hands on the steering wheel with no gun in hand when Pratt later returned. Furthermore, Pratt\u2019s alleged gun was not seen or found after Pratt was shot. None of the witnesses saw any gun being thrown out of Pratt\u2019s car window as it left towards a cafe approximately 50 yards away. No one at the cafe observed a gun. No gun or evidence of a gun was found in Pratt\u2019s car or on the persons of Pratt or Carson when the police arrived at the cafe, and no gun was found at the garage.\nOn the other hand, Douglas Cathcart testified that he had seen Pratt place a gun in the glove compartment of his car on a prior occasion. However, it was brought out during cross-examination that Cathcart was angry at Pratt for having been involved with Cathcart\u2019s wife and breaking up his marriage. Concerning the gun, Cathcart stated that he saw Pratt placed the alleged gun in the glove compartment while he, Cathcart, was sitting in the back seat of another car six to eight fee away. He admitted, \u201cI didn\u2019t really get that good a look on it [the gun]. * * * Somebody told me he had a gun and I took it from there.\u201d Cathcart further admitted he was a friend of defendant Martinez.\nExcept for Timothy Tate, all the incident witnesses are closely associated with either the victim or the defendant. Tate was a security guard who spent time in the company of the defendants and their friends and considered himself on a friendly basis with the defendants. He did not even know Pratt or Carson. Tate did not cooperate with the police when initially questioned by them after the shooting. But after conferring with his employer the next morning, he realized how much he stood to lose by not telling the truth. He had a police commission as a security guard and did not want to lose it. Tate also testified that he came forward to testify against the people he knew because that is what the law requires and he wanted to be a good citizen.\nBased on this evidence, any portion of which the jury could believe or disregard, the jury could properly find the defendant guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nALLOY, P. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE BARRY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Drew Parker, of Peoria, for appellant.",
      "Michael M. Mihm, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 79-527\nOpinion filed May 14, 1980.\nDrew Parker, of Peoria, for appellant.\nMichael M. Mihm, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0079-01",
  "first_page_order": 101,
  "last_page_order": 105
}