{
  "id": 3207288,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JANETTE FLOWERS, Defendant-Appellant",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JANETTE FLOWERS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Janette Flowers, was charged with armed robbery, armed violence, and aggravated battery. She was tried without a jury, found guilty of the offenses as charged, and sentenced to serve, concurrently, two 10-year terms and a 4-year term. On appeal defendant asks this court to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the State\u2019s petition for an extension of time within which to bring defendant to trial, and thus denied her the statutory right to a speedy trial. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(a), (c), (d).\nDefendant was arrested on October 15, 1978. Probable cause was found during a preliminary hearing held the next day. On October 30, the court-appointed defense counsel and the cause was continued by agreement. On January 10, 1979, defendant answered ready and demanded trial. The State asked for and was granted a continuance to January 29. On that date, and again on February 15, March 20, and March 26, the State moved for and was given a continuance even though defendant answered ready and demanded trial on each occasion.\nOn April 16, the 111th day attributable to State delay since defendant\u2019s arrest, the State filed its petition for an extension of time within which to bring defendant to trial. The petition averred, inter alia, that Investigator Martin Anderson (Anderson) of the Chicago Police Department was a material and essential witness; that the State has \u201cexercised due exertion to produce the presence of this witness\u201d; and that Anderson \u201cis on furlough, is out of the city and will be until the month of May.\u201d Defendant orally opposed the petition and the cause was continued until the next day.\nOn April 17, defendant filed a written objection which, inter alia, denied that the state\u2019s attorney\u2019s office had exercised due diligence to produce Anderson for trial at any time. After a hearing, the trial court granted the State\u2019s petition.\nOn May 1, defendant filed a petition for discharge claiming she had not been accorded her right to a speedy trial by April 24, the 120th day of her trial term. In addition, the trial court was informed that Anderson had returned to Chicago on April 8. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition. Trial began May 16, and defendant was convicted on May 18.\nDuring a hearing on defendant\u2019s post-trial motion, Anderson testified that his department scheduled his 28-day furlough almost five months in advance of his March 29 departure from Chicago. Furthermore, he testified that he returned to Chicago on April 8. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the State had exercised due diligence in obtaining Anderson\u2019s presence for trial and that the extension of time was proper.\nI.\nDefendant contends her convictions should be reversed and she should be discharged from custody because she was denied her statutory right to a speedy trial. She claims the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the State\u2019s petition for an extension of time. We agree.\nThe statutory right to a speedy trial is expressed, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c(a) Every person in custody * \u00b0 * shall be tried by the court 0 0 0 within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody\n# # #\n# e #\n(c) If the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case 000 the court may continue the cause on application \u00b0 e \u00b0 for not more than an additional 60 days.\n(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a) * * * and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody * 6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5.)\nThis statute is a codification of the constitutional protections against arbitrary and oppressive pre-trial delay and incarceration. People v. Shannon (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 185,187, 340 N.E.2d 129; see also People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 355, 263 N.E.2d 840, cert. denied (1971), 402 U.S. 972, 29 L. Ed. 2d 136, 91 S. Ct. 1658.\nThe decision of whether to grant an extension of the 120-day period \u201crests within the discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]\u201d (People v. Arndt (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 390,393, 280 N.E.2d 230.) Where, however, a court of review discovers facts insufficient to justify an extension \u201cit will protect this constitutional right by reversing a resulting conviction.\u201d People v. Richards (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 581, 583, 390 N.E.2d 86.\nThis court found facts insufficient to justify an extension in People v. Shannon. The trial court there granted an extension when the State alleged two eyewitness police officers were unavailable because they left the city on furloughs. This court reversed the trial court and held the \u201c* 6 * belated efforts to locate these essential witnesses were not sufficient to constitute due diligence on the part of the State. This conclusion is particularly supported by the fact that the vacation schedules of these two witnesses were in existence months before defendant was arrested.\u201d 34 Ill. App. 3d 185, 187.\nSimilarly, the instant record discloses facts insufficient to justify an extension. Anderson\u2019s furlough was scheduled within a month of defendant\u2019s arrest. He did, in fact, return to Chicago on April 8. Thus, he was actually available as a witness when the State alleged in its petition that he was out of the country. We can only conclude that the State failed to exercise sufficient control over the progress of this case. Due diligence was lacking. Therefore, absent due diligence, the extension of the term time was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we conclude the defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial was violated, and her convictions must be reversed.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter an order discharging the defendant.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nPERLIN, P. J., and STAMOS, J., concur.\nDefendant was also charged with the offense of attempt murder, but the court made no finding on that charge.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DOWNING"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, James S. Veldman, and Thomas A. Gibbons, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JANETTE FLOWERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 79-1157\nOpinion filed May 6, 1980.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, James S. Veldman, and Thomas A. Gibbons, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0563-01",
  "first_page_order": 585,
  "last_page_order": 588
}
