{
  "id": 3209822,
  "name": "SALON TRUCKING CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Salon Trucking Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission",
  "decision_date": "1980-05-09",
  "docket_number": "No. 79-1210",
  "first_page": "604",
  "last_page": "608",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 604"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 210",
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      "cite": "84 N.E.2d 372",
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    {
      "cite": "402 Ill. 401",
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        "/ill/402/0401-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:38.181565+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "SALON TRUCKING CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE WILSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Salon Trucking Co., Inc., appeals a trial court order affirming an Illinois Commerce Commission (hereafter ICC) order revoking a portion of plaintiff\u2019s motor carrier certificate. Plaintiff contends that the ICC acted outside the scope of its authority under the Illinois motor carrier of property law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95/2, par. 18 \u2014 100 et seq.) when it revoked a portion of the motor carrier certificate. We affirm the order of the trial court.\nOn December 16, 1972, plaintiff and Salon Piggyback Service,Inc. (hereafter Piggyback) filed a joint verified application for transfer of plaintiff\u2019s certificate of public convenience and necessity as a common carrier with the Motor Carrier of Property Division of the ICC. The certificate authorized plaintiff to perform a transportation service in intrastate commerce within the State of Illinois limited to:\n\u201cWaste material, cinders, ashes, garbage, black dirt, excavating material, advertising material, food products, home appliances, household goods and general commodities within a fifty (50) mile radius of 2700 So. Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois and to transport such property to or from any point outside of such authorized area of operation for a shipper or shippers within such area.\u201d\nHearings were conducted on the transfer and on May 15, 1974, the ICC entered an order granting a transfer of plaintiff\u2019s certificate to Piggyback. In its order, however, the ICC found that plaintiff had abandoned some of its authority and consequently, it reduced the scope of the certificate transferred such that it only authorized the transportation of: On August 19, plaintiff and Piggyback filed a joint verified petition to vacate this order because of their failure to consummate the sales transaction which necessitated transfer of the certificate. The ICC granted the petition on November 6, but did not reinstate the abandoned authority when it returned the certificate to plaintiff.\n\u201cGeneral commodities * s * within the terminal area of Chicago, Illinois, as defined by the Illinois Motor Carrier of Property Law, and to transport such property to or from any point in Illinois within a Fifty (50) mile radius of Chicago, Illinois, for a shipper within such authorized area of operation.\u201d\nOn December 16,1974, plaintiff filed a petition for a rehearing on the November 6 order and on December 26, the rehearing was granted. Prior to the actual rehearing, the ICC cited plaintiff to show cause why its certificate should not be revoked for failure to comply with section 18\u2014 308 of the Illinois motor carrier of property law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95/2, par. 18 \u2014 308), which prohibits the abandonment of any authority without ICC approval. Both the petition for a rehearing and the citation were subsequently heard on a joint record. On August 13,1975, the ICC found that plaintiff was unable to show that the modified certificate represented anything other than its actual scope of operation and consequently, affirmed the November 6,1974, order. On August 21,1975, the order was served on plaintiff and on either September 19 or October 14, it filed a petition for a rehearing. The petition was granted and a hearing was held. On March 24, 1976, the ICC affirmed the August 13, 1975, order. Pursuant to section 68 of the Public Utilities Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. Ill 2/3, par. 72), plaintiff then filed a complaint in the trial court on May 3,1976. On April 3,1979, the trial court affirmed the order of the ICC. This appeal followed.\nOpinion\nBefore reaching the issue raised by plaintiff in this appeal, we must consider defendant\u2019s claim that this appeal should be dismissed because of plaintiff\u2019s failure to file a timely petition for rehearing on the August 13, 1975, order.\nSection 67 of the Public Utilities Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 1112/3, par. 71) provides that:\n\u201cWithin 30 days after the service of any rule or regulation, order or decision of the Commission any party to the action or proceeding may apply for a rehearing in respect to any matter determined in said action or proceeding and specified in the application for rehearing.\u201d\nSince this 30-day time period is statutory, neither the parties nor the Commission could extend it. (People ex rel. Illinois Highway Transportation Co. v. Biggs (1949), 402 Ill. 401, 84 N.E.2d 372.) Thus, in resolving defendant\u2019s claim we merely need to determine whether plaintiff filed its petition for rehearing of the August 13 order within 30 days of the date on which service of the order was made.\nThe record indicates that the order was served on August 21 and the petition for rehearing was filed 54 days later on October 14. This late filing date would seemingly make plaintiff\u2019s petition untimely and would justify dismissal of the appeal. Yet, plaintiff has attached to its reply brief in this case a copy of a petition for rehearing which is apparently authentically stamped as being filed with the ICG\u2019s Motor Carrier of Property Division on September 19,1975. This petition is almost word for word the same petition contained in the record. No explanation has been offered us regarding these remarkably similar petitions. Also, despite defendant\u2019s claim and record support that plaintiff did not file its petition until October 14, the ICC did conduct a hearing and render a decision on plaintiff\u2019s petition. We believe that all of these circumstances would normally warrant some explanation by the parties. However, in light of the lengthy lapse of time and in the interest of judicial economy, we accept the date of filing as September 19, 1975, and therefore, as timely filed.\nPlaintiff\u2019s sole contention in this case is that the ICC did not have the authority to revoke a portion of its certificate in the manner in which it chose to do so. Plaintiff argues that it is proper to delete authority in a certificate in a transfer proceeding only if the transfer is consummated and remains consummated. It claims that once the order of transfer has been set aside, the deleted authority should be restored and only deleted again for abandonment pursuant to procedures required by section 18\u2014 307 of the Illinois motor carrier of property law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 18 \u2014 307). We disagree.\nA transfer proceeding is conducted pursuant to section 18 \u2014 309 of the Illinois motor carrier of property law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95/2, par. 18 \u2014 309). Section 18 \u2014 309 provides for the transfer of a certificate after a hearing at which the following facts are to be determined:\n\u201c(1) the proposed purchaser or lessee is fit, willing and able, (2) that the proposed seller or lessor has not abandoned, suspended, or discontinued operations, and (3) that the transaction proposed will be consistent with the public interest and the policy declared in this Chapter and that the conditions of this Section have been or will be fulfilled * * (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95M, par. 18 \u2014 309(c).)\nUnder this section, transfers may be made by the ICC \u201cupon such terms and conditions as it finds to be just and reasonable.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95/2, par. 18 \u2014 309(c).) Plaintiff agrees that this section authorizes the ICC to delete abandoned authority from a certificate to be transferred, but claims that if the transfer is set aside, as was the case here, then proceedings pursuant to section 18 \u2014 307, which is entitled \u201cAmendment or revocation of authority,\u201d provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cCertificates and permits shall be effective from the date specified therein, and shall remain in effect until suspended, canceled or revoked as herein provided. Any such certificate or permit may upon application of the holder thereof, in the discretion of the Commission, be amended, suspended, canceled or revoked, in whole or in part, or may upon complaint, or on the Commission\u2019s own initiative, after notice and hearing * * * be suspended, amended, canceled or revoked in whole or in part, for failure to comply with any provision of this Chapter * * Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 18 \u2014 307.\nIf we were to agree with plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of section 18 \u2014 309, we would have to direct the ICC to provide notice and conduct a hearing on the matter pursuant to section 18 \u2014 307. Yet, such a direction would be absurd. A hearing has already been conducted at the section 18 \u2014 309 transfer proceeding at which plaintiff was allowed to prove the scope of his operations. There, plaintiff failed to disprove its abandonment of authority. Plaintiff has not argued that a hearing under section 18 \u2014 307 would be any different than the 18 \u2014 309 hearing, and we can find no support for such an argument. Absent such support, a direction to conduct another hearing would be an absurdity and as such could not have been within the contemplation of the legislature when it drafted these sections of the Illinois motor carrier of property law. (See People ex rel. Oak Supply & Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 210, 342 N.E.2d 53.) Therefore, we hold that the ICC did not exceed its authority in revoking a portion of plaintiff\u2019s certificate.\nAffirmed.\nLORENZ and MEJDA, JJ., concur.\nSubsequent orders entered by the ICC refer to this reduction in scope as limiting transportation authority to:\n\u201cGeneral commodities * \u00ae \u00b0 within a ten (10) mile radius of Chicago, Illinois, and to transport such property to or from any point within a fifty (50) mile radius of Chicago, Illinois, for a shipper or shippers within said ten (10) mile radius.\u201d\nNevertheless, any difference between this description and the description in the May 15 order is irrelevant to this appeal because plaintiff is contesting the ICC\u2019s authority to revoke, not the extent of the revocation.\nIn addition to a stamped copy of the petition, the record contained a copy of the order on rehearing which referred to October 14 as the date on which the petition was filed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE WILSON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James R. Madler, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Hercules F. Bolos and Mary C. Ubatuba, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "SALON TRUCKING CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 79-1210\nOpinion filed May 9, 1980.\nJames R. Madler, of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Hercules F. Bolos and Mary C. Ubatuba, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0604-01",
  "first_page_order": 626,
  "last_page_order": 630
}