{ "id": 3202943, "name": "RICHARD J. TROY, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Troy v. State Board of Elections", "decision_date": "1980-06-03", "docket_number": "Nos. 78-1390, 78-1599 cons.", "first_page": "740", "last_page": "744", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833631 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. 2d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2795611 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 N.E. 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5030942 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/298/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5408484 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0272-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 549, "char_count": 9749, "ocr_confidence": 0.891, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.652955729911712e-08, "percentile": 0.40543290361716067 }, "sha256": "55a2e18985b6b426d5937bb954b65ac31a88fb3b4032917190d72a41bec73c65", "simhash": "1:d390e655d2ddd4b4", "word_count": 1525 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:38.181565+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RICHARD J. TROY, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRichard Troy, plaintiff, presented a verified complaint (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 20) before the Illinois State Board of Elections alleging that William Scott and Stanley Enlund (acting as chairman of Citizens for William J. Scott), had violated the provisions of the campaign disclosure act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 1 etseq.). Specifically, he claimed in two counts that, first, $16,000 of campaign committee funds had been diverted to legal fees generated by a Federal tax probe of Scott\u2019s finances; and, secondly, Scott had authorized the formation of a legal defense fund to solicit contributions for the candidate\u2019s personal use. He asked that Enlund be found in violation of the act and be forced to repay the $16,000 allegedly improperly expended. He also prayed that the Board find that the campaign disclosure act prohibits candidate solicitation of funds for personal use. Plaintiff, however, did not identify which specific provisions of the act were alleged to have been violated. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 20(3).\nA hearing examiner was appointed, and a closed preliminary hearing was held during which the act required that plaintiff demonstrate his complaint was filed on justifiable grounds and that a public hearing on the matter should be held. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 21.) Scott and Enlund filed motions to dismiss the complaint without further hearing because no justifiable grounds existed. The motion was taken with plaintiff\u2019s case. Plaintiff presented a Federal court opinion pertaining to subpoenas issued by a grand jury investigating Scott, five newspaper clippings, and portions of the Enlund committee\u2019s campaign contribution reports. Plaintiff presented no other documents nor any sworn testimony to support his allegations.\nRespondents submitted two sworn affidavits, one from an attorney who stated that he billed Scott separately for purely personal services, and one from an accountant who averred that his firm had performed the billed services solely for the committee. Arguments were presented and the hearing examiner issued an opinion and recommendation dismissing the complaints. The examiner reasoned that the campaign disclosure act regulated only disclosure of expenditures and not the propriety of the disbursements. Since there was no question but that Scott had fully disclosed, and since the enforcement powers of the Board were limited to regulating disclosure, the examiner found the requirements of the act were satisfied and count I did not present justifiable grounds for further inquiry. Similarly, count II was also dismissed. The hearing examiner stated that allegations of future intent to raise funds for purely personal expenditures did not bring Scott\u2019s activities under the act. General counsel for the Board, who were also present at the hearing, examined the report and endorsed the recommendations contained therein.\nThe State Board of Elections, after consideration of the hearing examiner\u2019s report, review of the record, and examination of general counsel\u2019s opinion, found the complaints were not filed upon justifiable grounds. Pursuant to statute, the appeal was taken directly to the appellate court. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 22(1).\nAlthough a definition of \u201cjustifiable grounds\u201d does not appear in the act or in the Board\u2019s rules and regulations (see Bernardini, The Illinois State Board of Elections: A History and Evaluation of the Formative Years, 11 J. Mar. J. 321,340-42 (1978)), as applied by the hearing examiner and Board this generic term means some preliminary showing that the complaint was based on reasonable grounds and that the \u201cviolations\u201d alleged were within the ambit of the Board\u2019s cognizance under the statute. (Cf. Johnson v. Marshall Field & Co. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 272, 278, 312 N.E.2d 271 (interpretation of statute by concerned administrative agency is informed source for ascertaining legislative intent).) Thus, to sustain his burden under the act, plaintiff was required to make allegations with some degree of substance that acts were performed which constituted violations of the campaign disclosure act.\nThe first count of plaintiff\u2019s complaint pertains to \u201cpersonal\u201d disbursements made out of campaign funds. He contends that funds Scott\u2019s committee paid attorneys and accountants were for both campaign and personal services. His proof, however, falls far short of that necessary to provide reasonable grounds for further inquiry since it consists only of newspaper stories, several of his own interviews, and inferences and assumptions to be drawn from increased payments to attorneys and accountants at the same time a Federal grand jury was conducting an investigation. In contrast, respondents submitted sworn affidavits averring that the services rendered to the committee were billed to the committee and that services to Scott personally were billed to Scott. Furthermore, as the hearing examiner also indicated, there is no portion of the act which purports to regulate the disbursal of funds while the committee is a continuing, viable organization. (Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 5 (\u201cIn no case shall these funds be used for the personal aggrandizement of any committee member or campaign worker [when funds remain upon dissolution of the political committee])\u201d.) Rather, the act is a disclosure statute, with sanctions for failure to account accurately for funds designated by the statute as contributions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 1.4), and expenditures (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 1.5), and for noncompliance with organizational, advertising and accounting provisions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, pars. 9 \u2014 2 through 9 \u2014 14.) The act provides the Board of Elections with power to administer the reporting provisions, promulgate rules and regulations, report apparent violations to law enforcement agents, and hold investigations, inquiries and hearings concerning any matter covered by the act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, pars. 9 \u2014 15, 9 \u2014 16, 9 \u2014 18, 9 \u2014 19, 9 \u2014 21, 9 \u2014 23.) None of the above provisions gives the Board the authority to question the propriety of disbursals (we use the word \u201cdisbursal\u201d rather than \u201cexpenditures\u201d because expenditure, by definition in the statute, would not include personal, nonpolitically connected disbursals), whether for political or nonpolitical accounts. It is clear that other than the provision precluding personal disbursements upon dissolution, the act is designed to mandate and regulate the extent and explicitness of campaign disclosure but not to allow inquiry into the seemliness or legality of personal vis-a-vis political disbursals. The statutory provision which established the State Board of Elections and its duties and powers specifically limits the Board\u2019s authority to those areas prescribed by the statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 1A \u2014 1.) Additionally, it has long been held that the power of an administrative agency is closely limited to that conferred on it by the statute which created it. (People ex rel. Brundage v. Righeimer (1921), 298 Ill. 611, 618, 132 N.E. 229; Department of Public Works 6- Buddings v. Ells (1962), 23 Ill. 2d 619, 179 N.E.2d 679.) Plaintiff\u2019s reading of the statute, allowing the Board authority and sanctioning power over the actual correctitude of disbursements, would overreach the bounds of the act and accordingly circumvent legislative intent. The invitation to substitute our judgment for that of the Board must be declined, and such an expansive interpretation rejected. (See generally DeGrazio v. Civil Service Com. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 482,489, 202 N.E.2d 522.) The dismissal as to count I is therefore affirmed.\nThe second count also fails to present justifiable grounds for further inquiry by the Board. As the hearing officer noted, plaintifFs allegations of impropriety in the solicitation of legal defense funds are based upon a newspaper article which reports that Scott\u2019s attorneys were investigating the legality of formation of such a fund. Once again, the evidence presented during the hearing fails to support a cause of action under the act. First, plaintiff has failed to substantiate or even to allege in this count present or past violations of the act. Second, plaintiff has alleged that Scott intended to collect the funds for \u201cpersonal use,\u201d yet plaintiff concludes that \u201csolicitation of funds for the use of a political candidate must be construed to be \u2018political contributions\u2019 as that term is defined in the Act.\u201d Plaintiff, however, as also noted by the hearing officer, has failed to present evidence which would demonstrate such a fund to be comprised of political contributions as those are defined by the act, that is, funds received \u201cin connection with the nomination for election, or election\u201d of a political candidate. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 46, par. 9 \u2014 1.4.) Without at least a minimal preliminary showing of a political connection, any funds, if indeed ever raised, remain personal to Scott and not subject to the disclosure requirements of the act in its present form.\nAccordingly, the ruling of the Board dismissing plaintiff s complaint for lack of justifiable grounds to conduct further inquiry is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDOWNING and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard J. Troy, of Sneider & Troy, of Chicago, for petitioner, pro se.", "Michael Levinson, of State Board of Elections, of Chicago (John J. O\u2019Toole, of counsel), for respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICHARD J. TROY, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Respondents.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNos. 78-1390, 78-1599 cons.\nOpinion filed June 3, 1980.\nRichard J. Troy, of Sneider & Troy, of Chicago, for petitioner, pro se.\nMichael Levinson, of State Board of Elections, of Chicago (John J. O\u2019Toole, of counsel), for respondents." }, "file_name": "0740-01", "first_page_order": 762, "last_page_order": 766 }