{ "id": 3209193, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "1980-05-27", "docket_number": "No. 79-394", "first_page": "896", "last_page": "900", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 896" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 1238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 850", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579275 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0850-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S. Ct. 534", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 L. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305463 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505383 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5197439 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/328/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320487 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5332878 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826177 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2888588 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525264 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 74", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046557 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S. Ct. 1168", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 L. Ed. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 964", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746817, 11746753, 11746915, 11746661, 11746697, 11746989, 11746870 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0964-04", "/us/405/0964-03", "/us/405/0964-06", "/us/405/0964-01", "/us/405/0964-02", "/us/405/0964-07", "/us/405/0964-05" ] }, { "cite": "452 F.2d 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 783420 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/452/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. 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App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3360090 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5363269 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0116-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 665, "char_count": 11366, "ocr_confidence": 0.901, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9223629905308853e-07, "percentile": 0.7331628214617918 }, "sha256": "1783bfb270a1cfb112ffb5190898866d792dc0bc9fde11954f05d0c52f3175ba", "simhash": "1:659d3dce6fa61fe7", "word_count": 1913 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:38.181565+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, Robert Jones was convicted of the murders of Samuel and Campbell Thompson. Defendant was sentenced to a term of 100 to 300 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony; (2) that defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) that the trial court erred in refusing to include the second paragraph of Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.02 (1968) (hereinafter IPI) in its instructions to the jury.\nWe affirm.\nOn June 17, 1977, the bodies of Samuel and Campbell Thompson were found in the front seat of a car which was parked in a vacant lot. Both men died from gunshot wounds to the head.\nAmong the witnesses called by the State were Nancy Thompson, Albert Thompson, Clifford Lindsey, Brenda Clay and Juanita Simpson. Nancy Thompson, the wife of Samuel Thompson, testified that on June 15,1977, she withdrew $420 from her credit union and gave it to Samuel. Over defendant\u2019s objection she stated that Samuel told her that he was meeting a man from whom he was going to purchase a 1977 Lincoln Continental for $1,000. He left home alone and returned later that day without the money. On June 16, 1977, Samuel drove his wife to the train and told her that he was going to pick up the car, but did not state where or with whom he was going. Mrs. Thompson did not see her husband again that day.\nAlbert Thompson testified that during June 1977, he lived with his mother, two sisters, and brother Campbell Thompson. Albert testified over defendant\u2019s objection that on June 15,1977, Campbell told him that he and Samuel Thompson were purchasing an automobile from Robert Jones for $1500 and that they were getting the. car the following day. Albert stated that he had been introduced to defendant by his brother Calvin and that defendant had been at Albert\u2019s home with Campbell Thompson.\nClifford Lindsey, a step-brother of Campbell and Samuel Thompson, testified over defendant\u2019s objection that on June 16,1977, Samuel told him that he intended to buy a car from Robert Jones later that day. Samuel wanted Lindsey to accompany him and drive the car back, but Samuel never arrived at Lindsey\u2019s house. Lindsey had previously been introduced to defendant by Campbell Thompson.\nBrenda Clay testified that she had known defendant for approximately 20 years and that in June 1977 she lived in the same apartment building as defendant. Clay saw Samuel and Campbell Thompson with defendant in the basement of the building on June 15th or 16th. She read about the deaths of Samuel and Campbell Thompson on June 18, 1977. Clay further testified that approximately 2 or 3 days before she read about the Thompsons\u2019 deaths, defendant came to her apartment and gave her a black knit hat. Defendant told Clay that the hat contained a gun and asked Clay to keep the gun for him. Although Clay did not look inside the hat, she testified that it contained a heavy object and that she put the hat and gun in a drawer. After receiving the hat, Clay also received two black briefcases from defendant.\nAfter learning that the police had been to defendant\u2019s apartment on July 12, Clay placed the hat under some wood beneath the back stairs to her apartment. On July 13, 1977, Investigator Laskey arrived at Clay\u2019s house with a search warrant for the gun and briefcases. Clay showed the investigator where she had placed the gun.\nJuanita Simpson testified that she lived with defendant in June 1977. She stated that she had met Samuel and Campbell Thompson in the summer of 1977 and that they were both at the apartment on June 16, 1977. Simpson never saw the Thompsons alive after this day.\nVarious police officers and investigators testified to the recovery of the gun from under the stairs and to the chain of custody of the weapon and the bullets which were removed from the Thompsons. After test firing the weapon, Sergeant Smith determined that the bullets recovered from the Thompsons could only have been fired from the .38-caliber revolver found under Clay\u2019s back stairs.\nDefendant first argues that the testimony of Nancy Thompson, Albert Thompson, and Clifford Lindsey regarding their conversations with Samuel and Campbell Thompson is hearsay and was improperly admitted because they did not fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.\nHearsay has been defined as \u201c \u2018testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted therein \u201d \u00b0 \u201d (People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741.) While we agree with defendant\u2019s contention that the witnesses\u2019 statements are hearsay, we note that similar testimony has been held to be admissible under a \u201cdeclaration of intent or mental state\u201d exception to the hearsay rule. People v. Fletcher (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 310, 375 N.E.2d 1333; People v. Johnson (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 425, 355 N.E.2d 699; People v. Reddock (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 296, 300 N.E.2d 31.\nDefendant argues that People v. Cole (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 369,329 N.E.2d 880, is applicable to the issue of the admissibility of the testimony in this case. In Cole, the court held that it was improper to admit the testimony of a witness regarding statements made to him by a murder victim that he intended to go to defendant\u2019s home. The court stated that there was \u201cno basis for establishing in a criminal case \u2018the declaration of mental state\u2019 or \u2018a statement of intention\u2019 as an exception to the hearsay rule in derogation of the defendant\u2019s rights of confrontation and cross-examination as assured by the constitution.\u201d 29 Ill. App. 3d 369, 374, 329 N.E.2d 880, 885.\nHowever, we do not agree that a defendant is denied his cross-examination and confrontation rights merely because hearsay testimony is admitted. In United States v. Cerone (7th Cir. 1971), 452 F.2d 274, cert. denied (1972), 405 U.S. 964, 31 L. Ed. 2d 240, 92 S. Ct. 1168, the court stated:\n\u201c[I]n the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), it is stated:\n\u2018It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment\u2019s Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule [of exclusion] stem from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline to do so now.\u2019 400 U.S. at 86, 91 S.Ct. at 218.\n* e e\n[T]he sixth amendment\u2019s confrontation clause applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment with no less vigor than is true of its application to federal prosecutions. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The refusal to equate the sixth amendment with the hearsay rule thus applies equally to federal and state prosecutions.\u201d (452 F.2d 274, 283.)\nWe therefore question the rationale and holding in Cole, and find that, in the case at bar, the testimony of the three witnesses was properly admitted to show the decedents\u2019 intent to meet with the defendant.\nSecondly, defendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of this contention, he states that the lack of eyewitnesses and the failure of the State to produce other evidence placing him at the scene of the crime did not exclude the possibility that another person was responsible for the murders.\nIn People v. Marino (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 562, 580, 256 N.E.2d 770, 780, our supreme court, enunciating the standard for determining whether a defendant had been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence offered against him is all or largely circumstantial, stated:\n\u201c[I]t is well settled that the commission of an offense may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence. As we observed in People v. Bernette, 30 Ill.2d 359, 367, \u2018a conviction may be sustained upon circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence, (People v. Russell, 17 Ill.2d 328,) it being necessary only that the proof of circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tendency leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion and producing a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one else committed the crime. (People v. Magnafichi, 9 Ill.2d 169; People v. Grizzel, 328 Ill. 11.) The jury need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish guilt, but it is sufficient if all the evidence, taken together, satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused\u2019s guilt.\u2019 \u201d\nMoreover, in many homicide cases, there are no eyewitnesses, yet this does not mean that the guilt of a defendant may not be proved by facts and circumstances which indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that he is the perpetrator of the crime. People v. Merkel (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 298, 319 N.E.2d 77.\nWe find that sufficient evidence was presented from which the jury could conclude that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the murders of Samuel and Campbell Thompson. The testimony of -Nancy Thompson, Albert Thompson, Clifford Lindsey, Brenda Clay, and Juanita Simpson placed defendant with the Thompsons on the day of their deaths. Moreover, there was clear and convincing evidence linking defendant to the murder weapon.\nLastly, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to include the second paragraph of IPI Criminal No. 3.02 in its instructions to the jury. The paragraph provides, \u201cYou should not find the defendant guilty unless the facts and circumstances proved exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.\u201d\nThe Committee Notes to this instruction are couched in terms limiting the times when it is permissible to give the second paragraph, and courts of review are therefore reluctant to rule that the failure to give the second part of IPI Criminal No. 3.02 is reversible error. (People v. Hammers (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 498, 341 N.E.2d 471, cert. denied (1976), 429 U.S. 1002, 50 L. Ed. 2d 614, 97 S. Ct. 534.) Reversible error occurs only if it appears that justice has been denied or that the verdict resulted from such error. People v. Cox (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 850, 389 N.E.2d 1238, citing People v. Hammers and People v. Merkel (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 298, 319 N.E.2d 77.\nWhile the State\u2019s case consisted primarily of circumstantial evidence, the testimony concerning the gun constituted direct evidence and the trial court\u2019s refusal of the second paragraph of IPI Criminal No. 3.02 was therefore not error. Even if the refusal was error no reversible error occurred because it does not appear that justice was denied or that the verdict resulted from the refusal to give the second paragraph of the instruction.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nJudgment affirmed.\nO\u2019CONNOR and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Daniel F. Nolan and Mary T. Woodward, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Joan S. Cherry, and William J. Frost, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 79-394\nOpinion filed May 27, 1980.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Daniel F. Nolan and Mary T. Woodward, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Joan S. Cherry, and William J. Frost, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0896-01", "first_page_order": 918, "last_page_order": 922 }