{ "id": 3204940, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH EARL SLAUGHTER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Slaughter", "decision_date": "1980-05-27", "docket_number": "No. 78-2147", "first_page": "1103", "last_page": "1116", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 1103" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994769 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5378485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404489 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953181 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404559 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 1299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3403223 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 1377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075834 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069192 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2642267 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2489376 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2976462 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0978-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 N.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496344 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2622550 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S. Ct. 1947", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 L. Ed. 2d 1026", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12095427, 12095911, 12095465, 12095563, 12095824, 12095956, 12095510, 12095608, 12095385, 12095868 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/1022-02", "/us/384/1022-09", "/us/384/1022-03", "/us/384/1022-05", "/us/384/1022-07", "/us/384/1022-10", "/us/384/1022-04", "/us/384/1022-06", "/us/384/1022-01", "/us/384/1022-08" ] }, { "cite": "204 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2838755 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2474080 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/127/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 1038", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5344357 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2873911 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5277402 ], "year": 1870, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/53/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 N.E. 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ill. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3183002 ], "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/170/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.E. 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4784658 ], "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/266/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5628377 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 2d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1582674 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/121/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 N.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2911191 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2932530 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2896950 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853933 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2964844 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 1513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 L. Ed. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 937", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3106, 3091, 2397 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0937-02", "/us/435/0937-01", "/us/435/0937-03" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811071 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0564-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1227, "char_count": 33744, "ocr_confidence": 0.913, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.864481842152097e-07, "percentile": 0.7253137152011565 }, "sha256": "692f428689ad625df03fae70ebb0786a193163e4ba143c9d0690f388a94dbaef", "simhash": "1:af53b8ec324b8de1", "word_count": 5590 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:38.181565+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH EARL SLAUGHTER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Kenneth Earl Slaughter, was charged by information with the murder of James Sanderson in violation of sections 9 \u2014 1(a) and 9 \u2014 1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1(a), 9 \u2014 1(a)(2)). Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to not less than 18 years nor more than 25 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give his jury instruction on \u201cprovocation\u201d voluntary manslaughter; (3) the evidence supports reduction of his conviction to voluntary manslaughter; (4) the trial court erred in giving Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 24.09 and 24.11 (1968) (hereinafter IPI); (5) the State\u2019s closing argument was prejudicial; and (6) the trial court erred by refusing the jury\u2019s request to review defendant\u2019s testimony.\nJohnnie Mae Sanderson testified that she was James Sanderson\u2019s aunt. On December 8, 1977, her nephew lived with Ella Comer. That day, at about 6:30 p.m., Sanderson went to her nephew\u2019s birthday party at Comer\u2019s apartment. Sanderson saw defendant conversing with Comer. At about 8:30 p.m., James Sanderson and Comer told everyone that they wanted to be alone and the party was over. When defendant refused to leave, James Sanderson caught him by the sleeve, asked him to leave and escorted him to the door. Defendant took a long, thin knife from his pocket and pointed it towards James. When the witness told defendant there was no need for this and requested that he leave, defendant left.\nOn cross-examination, Sanderson testified that James had been drinking but did not appear drunk. She did not know if defendant had been drinking and he appeared sober. Before the guests were asked to leave, a teenage boy fell onto the kitchen table and cracked it. Sanderson testified that her nephew did not choke defendant.\nElla Comer testified that she lived with James Sanderson on December 8, 1977, and that they were engaged. Comer had known defendant about six or seven weeks prior to Sanderson\u2019s birthday party. She saw defendant on December 8 at about 12:30 p.m. at her apartment. Defendant stated that Sanderson was fat and ugly and asked her why she wished to marry someone like him. When he told her that Sanderson was not going to marry her, she asked defendant to leave.\nAt the party, at about 8:30 p.m., Comer\u2019s brother Anthony became intoxicated and fell on the kitchen table, breaking it. Sanderson then asked everyone to leave. When defendant remained, Sanderson again asked him to leave, grabbed him by the sleeve and led him toward the door. Comer heard Johnnie Mae Sanderson tell defendant to put the knife away. Defendant left the apartment.\nComer further testified that about 15 or 20 minutes later defendant returned and stood in the doorway. He asked Comer if she would come out on the ramp because he wanted to talk. She declined, but he kept repeating this request. Comer stated that defendant asked Sanderson if she could come out on the ramp and talk. Sanderson said that she was not going anywhere. Sanderson and her brother Reginald then went to the door. Because her back was to the door, Comer did not see what happened. A moment later Sanderson shouted, \u201cStop that, nigger.\u201d He was bleeding profusely from the left side of his chest. Comer and other family members took Sanderson to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Comer testified that Sanderson was unarmed and that she did not see him do any physical harm to defendant.\nOn cross-examination, Comer testified that Sanderson, defendant and she were drinking at the party. Comer believed defendant had been flirting with her the day of the incident and during the weeks preceding it. She told decedent\u2019s mother she felt responsible for his death.\nReginald Cross, Comer\u2019s 14-year-old brother, substantially corroborated his sister\u2019s testimony. When defendant refused to leave the party, Sanderson grabbed him by the sleeve and pushed him toward the door. Defendant pulled out a knife, but left when Johnnie Mae Sanderson intervened.\nCross further testified that when defendant returned and attempted to talk to Comer, Sanderson went to the door. Sanderson did not threaten defendant before he walked towards him, nor did he beat defendant anytime that night. Sanderson never touched defendant before he was stabbed, but held his arms out, with the palms of his hands extended toward defendant. However, Cross also testified that Sanderson walked up to defendant first, pushed him, and defendant stabbed him.\nOfficer Rokosik testified that he arrested defendant and advised him of his Miranda rights. Rokosik asked defendant if he was Kenny and if he had been to Comer\u2019s apartment. Defendant responded, \u201cYeah, I am the one that did it and I\u2019m glad I did it.\u201d As defendant was being handcuffed, he was asked if he had any weapons. He took a knife from his righthand pocket and said, \u201cThis is the knife I used here.\u201d Defendant also said the reason he had stabbed the victim was because Sanderson grabbed him by the tie. Defendant said, \u201cYou don\u2019t grab no nigger that is wearing a tie by the tie.\u201d On the way to the station, defendant kept repeating, \u201cI hope he dies; I hope he dies; I\u2019m glad I did it.\u201d Defendant wanted the police to take him to the hospital so he could stab Sanderson again. Officer Rokosik subsequently learned that Sanderson had been pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital.\nJames Newton, a Cook County Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, testified that he interviewed defendant at about 11:30 p.m. on December 8,1977. Defendant said that while he was at the party Sanderson grabbed him by the collar and started choking him. Defendant told Newton that he returned to his apartment and realized that his mama didn\u2019t raise no fool, didn\u2019t teach him to back down to anybody. Defendant further stated that he changed his clothes, went back to Sanderson\u2019s apartment and that this time when James grabbed him again, he didn\u2019t give him a chance to choke him. Defendant said that he just saw the victim\u2019s big stomach sticking out at him and he just stabbed him.\nInvestigator Francis Kehoe testified that he interviewed defendant after his arrest. Defendant stated that at the party Sanderson grabbed him by the collar, choked him and threw him out of the apartment for no reason. Defendant further stated that he went upstairs to his apartment and changed into shoes more suitable for fighting. He returned to Comer to determine why Sanderson had jumped on him. Defendant stated that Sanderson again attempted to grab him and this time he stabbed Sanderson. Defendant thought Sanderson was going to choke him again. Finally, defendant said that he wished he could have stabbed Sanderson nine more times, but fled because someone in the apartment might have had a gun.\nDefendant testified in his own behalf that on the afternoon of December 8, 1977, he talked to Ella Comer in her apartment. He told Comer that Sanderson cared for another woman and was calling her that day. Defendant denied telling her that he would do everything he could to prevent her from marrying Sanderson or that she should not marry Sanderson because he was fat and ugly. At the party that night, defendant was \u201chigh.\u201d At about 8:30 p.m. he heard a noise from the kitchen. Sanderson got up and started screaming at defendant. When defendant asked what did he do, Sanderson continued screaming and cursing and said, \u201cYou know, you know.\u201d Sanderson grabbed defendant in the chest and threw him against the wall and then grabbed defendant\u2019s throat and started choking him. When Sanderson eased up, defendant moved toward the door and pulled his knife from his pocket. Defendant told Sanderson, \u201cDon\u2019t come to me, don\u2019t grab me no more,\u201d and eased out the door. Defendant testified that Sanderson appeared intoxicated and angry during the altercation.\nDefendant went upstairs to his sister\u2019s apartment. He removed his jacket and tie and changed shoes because a heel was broken. He continued to wear the same pants with his knife in the back pocket. About 20 minutes later, defendant returned to Comer\u2019s apartment because he wanted to find out why Sanderson had jumped him. Standing outside the screen door, defendant called Comer two or three times. He then saw Sanderson coming toward him with his hands outstretched. Sanderson grabbed him, placing one hand on his shirt and jacket and the other hand on his throat. Defendant stated that he was afraid Sanderson was going to beat him up pretty badly or kill him. He moved to get away from Sanderson, who was bigger and stronger than he. When Sanderson was choking defendant and he could not get away, defendant became frightened and stabbed Sanderson to get him off. Defendant returned to his sister\u2019s apartment. A few minutes later, Sanderson\u2019s brother came to the apartment and cursed defendant. Defendant explained that the only reason he stabbed Sanderson was to get him off. When Sanderson\u2019s brother resumed cursing and swung a knife at defendant, he ducked and closed the door on him.\nWhen the police arrived, defendant told them he stabbed Sanderson and gave them the knife. He denied telling them that he hoped Sanderson would die and denied asking to go to the hospital to stab him again. Defendant also denied telling Investigator Kehoe that he changed into clothes more suitable for fighting or that he wanted to stab Sanderson nine more times.\nTerry Lynn Flowers, defendant\u2019s sister, testified that she was present at the party at Comer\u2019s apartment. When she left the party, defendant was still there. Defendant subsequently returned to her apartment, took off his jacket and changed into another pair of dress shoes because a heel was broken. Defendant told her that he was going to talk with Comer to find out why Sanderson had grabbed him by the collar and put him out. Sometime after defendant returned, the police arrived. They asked for defendant and he gave them his knife. Flowers testified that her brother did not tell the police that he hoped Sanderson dies.\nDefendant argues that he was not proved guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt because the State failed to prove he was not acting in self-defense. Section 7 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 1), on the use of force in defense of person, provides:\n\u201cA person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other\u2019s imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, * e\nWhere the affirmative defense of self-defense is raised, the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue, together with all other elements of the offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 3 \u2014 2(b).) The State met this burden.\nThe defendant\u2019s argument presents only his testimony and ignores the State\u2019s case. Defendant testified that when he was at Sanderson\u2019s party, Sanderson grabbed him, threw him against the wall and choked him. However, the State\u2019s witnesses indicated that Sanderson asked defendant to leave the party and when he refused, took defendant\u2019s sleeve and walked him to the door.\nDefendant also relies on his testimony that the victim grabbed him and choked him immediately before he stabbed the victim. He then asserts that his testimony was corroborated by Reginald Cross, a State witness. The record fails to support this assertion. Rather, Cross testified on direct and cross-examination that Sanderson approached defendant with his arms extended but never touched defendant when he was stabbed. Indeed, when the attorneys disagreed as to how to characterize Cross\u2019 reenactment of the scene, the court interjected: \u201cI think the record should show the palms of his [Sanderson\u2019s] hands were extended towards him [defendant].\u201d\nWhere the evidence is conflicting, it is the province of the jury to ascertain the truth. (People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 564, 367 N.E:2d 1313, cert. denied (1978), 435 U.S. 937,55 L. Ed. 2d 533,98 S. Ct. 1513.) A court of review will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact as to witness credibility. (Manion.) Moreover, whether the use of deadly force was justified is a fact question for the jury, and their determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to cause a reasonable doubt. People v. Acevedo (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 105, 351 N.E.2d 359.\nWe will not reverse the verdict or judgment simply because the jury chose to believe the State\u2019s testimony. (People v. Novotny (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 401, 244 N.E.2d 182.) The jury apparently believed that defendant stabbed an unarmed man who was not choking him and may not even have touched defendant.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that the trial court erred by refusing to give his instruction on \u201cprovocation\u201d voluntary manslaughter. Defense counsel tendered IPI Criminal No. 7.04 (based upon Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 982(a)(1)) to the trial court. This instruction, concerning killing under sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the deceased, was rejected by the court. The jury was given IPI Criminal Nos. 7.05 and 7.06, based upon section 9 \u2014 2(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2(b)) (\u201cunreasonable belief\u201d voluntary manslaughter \u2014 belief in self-defense that is unreasonable).\nIf there is any evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, would reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter, an instruction defining manslaughter should be given. (People v. Sykes (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 674, 359 N.E.2d 897.) Moreover, when there is evidence in the record to support \u201cunreasonable belief\u201d voluntary manslaughter as well as \u201cprovocation\u201d voluntary manslaughter, the court must give instructions on both. People v. Craven (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 419, 299 N.E.2d 1; People v. Johnson (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 249, 280 N.E.2d 764.\nAssuming, arguendo, that defendant\u2019s testimony that Sanderson grabbed him and choked him before the fatal stabbing could constitute serious provocation, we find that the record is devoid of evidence that defendant acted under sudden and intense passion due to provocation. The state of mind involved in \u201cprovocation\u201d voluntary manslaughter has been described as an act of passion or sudden act of revenge. (People v. Johnson (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 249, 280 N.E.2d 764.) Defendant, however, consistently testified that his actions were defensive and motivated by fear and a desire to escape from Sanderson.\nAccording to defendant, at the party Sanderson threw him against the wall and choked him. When Sanderson eased his grip, defendant retreated, pulled out his knife and said, \u201cDon\u2019t come to me, don\u2019t grab me no more.\u201d He then eased out the door. Twenty minutes later defendant returned. He testified that Sanderson grabbed him again, placing one hand on his jacket and the other on his throat. Defendant testified that he stabbed Sanderson because he was afraid that Sanderson, who was bigger and stronger, would kill or seriously injure him. He attempted to get away from Sanderson and stabbed him to get him off. Moreover, defendant subsequently explained to Sanderson\u2019s brother that the only reason he stabbed Sanderson was to get him off.\nIn short, defendant was motivated by fear and claimed to have acted in self-defense, rather than motivated by sudden and intense passion due to serious provocation. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s decision not to give an instruction on \u201cprovocation\u201d voluntary manslaughter was proper.\nDefendant\u2019s third contention is that the evidence does not support a conviction for murder but only a conviction for either \u201cprovocation\u201d or \u201cunreasonable belief\u201d voluntary manslaughter. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 2(a)(1), 9 \u2014 2(b).) He requests that we invoke our authority under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 615(b)(3)) to reduce his conviction from murder to voluntary manslaughter. We found no evidence of \u201cprovocation\u201d voluntary manslaughter in connection with defendant\u2019s second argument and again reject this contention.\n\u2022 With respect to \u201cunreasonable belief\u201d voluntary manslaughter, we note that the jury was fully instructed on this issue and was called upon to resolve conflicting evidence. Defendant presented evidence, summarized above, concerning self-defense. To the contrary, the State presented ample evidence that defendant either intended to kill Sanderson or knew his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) and (2).\nThe State\u2019s evidence indicated that defendant had been flirting with Sanderson\u2019s fiancee and had threatened to halt the marriage. At the party, Sanderson led defendant to the door after defendant refused to leave upon request. He returned about 20 minutes later, after changing into clothes more suitable for fighting, and was again confronted by Sanderson. The victim was not armed and had not threatened, hit or choked defendant. Defendant fatally stabbed Sanderson while Sanderson was reaching towards him. Defendant was also reported to have made numerous incriminating statements to law enforcement personnel.\nThe essential difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter is the mental state of the accused at the time of the killing. (See People v. Smith (1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 105, 257 N.E.2d 261.) It was the province of the jury to ascertain defendant\u2019s mental state and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. (People v. Novotny (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 401, 244 N.E.2d 182.) In our view, the evidence overwhelmingly supports their verdict.\nDefendant\u2019s fourth contention is that the trial court erred in giving IPI Criminal Nos. 24.09 and 24.11 over his objection. These instructions read:\nIPI Criminal No. 24.09: \u201cA person who initially provokes the use of force against himself, is justified in the use of force only if\n(1) the force used against him is so great that he reasonably believes he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the other person; or\n(2) he in good faith withdraws from physical contact with the other person and indicates clearly to the other person that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the other person continues or resumes the use of force.\u201d\nIPI Criminal No. 24.11: \u201cA person is not justified in the use of force if he initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to use that force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the other person.\u201d\nAt issue is whether there was evidence that defendant was the aggressor. People v. Walker (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 535, 374 N.E.2d 880.\nThe Committee Comments (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 4 (SmithHurd 1973)) state:\n\u201cMost of the reported Illinois cases concerning the rights of the defendant as the aggressor involve provocation consisting of a direct assault, deadly or non-deadly. A few, however, involve the use of words or actions other than assault. (E.g., People v. Grosenheider, 266 Ill. 324, 107 N.E. 607 (1914), \u2014 closing disputed right of way; Gedye v. People, 170 Ill. 284, 48 N.E. 987 (1897)\u2014 landlord obstructing chimney and removing windows from tenant\u2019s house; Greschia v. People, 53 Ill. 295 (1870) \u2014 goading victim with provoking words to re-enter defendant\u2019s dwelling.)\u201d\nIn Greschia v. People, defendant was indicted for murder and found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. As the victim turned to go upstairs, defendant said, \u201cCome back, I will fix you.\u201d Defendant invited the victim to \u201ccome on,\u201d thereby provoking him.\nIn People v. Curwick (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 757, 338 N.E.2d 468, the court discussed provocation in connection with a voluntary manslaughter charge. Generally, provocation is restricted to physical assault, mutual quarrel or combat, or adultery. Mere words, no matter how aggravating or abusive, do not supply adequate provocation; however, this rule is not absolute. (See People v. Ahlberg (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 301 N.E.2d 608; People v. Newberry (1970), 127 Ill. App. 2d 322, 262 N.E.2d 282.) Provocation was established in Curwick, where defendant shot the victim after she told him that she planned to marry his employer in a few days. The employer, who was visiting her at the time of the shooting, admitted to defendant that his relationship with the victim had been going on for a long time.\nWe note that defendant\u2019s brandishing his knife at the party might constitute an assault. Nonetheless, because of the lapse of 20-25 minutes, we must view defendant\u2019s conduct during the second encounter with Sanderson independently. Defendant stood outside the screen door, repeatedly asking to speak to Comer. She either declined or said nothing. Sanderson told defendant she was not coming out to talk to him. At this point, Sanderson approached defendant and was stabbed. Under these circumstances, defendant did not invite Sanderson to \u201ccome on,\u201d and he was not the aggressor by virtue of his language alone. There was no testimony that defendant\u2019s words were directed toward Sanderson, nor is there any evidence that defendant attempted to enter the premises. Accordingly, neither instruction should have been given to the jury.\nHowever, due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, this error is harmless. There was no question that defendant stabbed the victim, who was unarmed. The jury apparently believed the State\u2019s witnesses, who testified that the victim did not threaten or strike defendant. The jury was otherwise properly instructed regarding self-defense and \u201cunreasonable belief\u201d voluntary manslaughter and discounted defendant\u2019s theory of the case. Indeed, defendant\u2019s acts and statements after the stabbing prove beyond any reasonable doubt that he intended to kill Sanderson when Sanderson approached or he stabbed him knowing his act would result in death or great bodily harm. Accordingly, the error in giving these instructions does not justify reversal. See People v. Ward (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 253, 204 N.E.2d 741, cert. denied (1966), 384 U.S. 1022,16 L. Ed. 2d 1026, 86 S. Ct. 1947.\nDefendant\u2019s fifth contention is that the State\u2019s closing argument was prejudicial. The State maintains that defendant has waived this issue, in part, by failing to make timely objections. Although there is merit to this argument, we resolve this contention against defendant on the merits.\nDefendant first contends that he was prejudiced by the State\u2019s labeling of defense theories and evidence as \u201cdefense tactics.\u201d We find these remarks constitute legitimate inferences from the evidence and do not exceed the bounds of proper debate.\nThe prosecutor decried the \u201cdefense tactic\u201d of asking Comer on cross-examination whether she talked to the State\u2019s Attorney before testifying. We believe the prosecutor was merely informing the jury that it is proper for a witness to talk to both the State\u2019s Attorney and defense counsel prior to testifying. He was trying to negate any inference that this was a deceptive practice.\nDefense counsel also asked Comer whether she was using defendant to make Sanderson jealous. The prosecutor referred to this as a \u201cdefense tactic\u201d because there was no direct evidentiary support and because he apparently believed defense counsel was attempting to obscure the issues of this murder trial by speculation on jealousy.\nNext, defendant argues that the following comments implied that defendant was coached by defense counsel as to his testimony about the confrontation with decedent\u2019s brother:\n\u201cAnd he [defendant] has to put this thing in, the brother coming up there and he is going to sit up there and tell us he took the knife out of his pocket and said to the victim\u2019s brother, who he says was in a rage, who he says was slashing at him with the knife, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the crime of murder, but is merely a defense tactic\u2014\n[Defense counsel]: Objection, your Honor.\n[Prosecutor]: \u2014and think about what happened afterwards.\nO * <*\u201d\nThese remarks suggested that defendant\u2019s account was improbable and did not prove or disprove the elements of murder. No reference is made to defense counsel or coaching witnesses.\nLast, defendant asserts that the following remarks were improper:\n\u201c[Prosecutor]: But [defense counsel] wants to dirty it up and put in dirt. Didn\u2019t he tell you about some young lady James Sanderson was seeing? Oh, come on, what young lady? If that is true, where is that young lady? Those people have subpoena powers, they have investigators. Where is that young lady? Or better yet, what is her name? What is that lady\u2019s name?\n. They could make up a name. Well, what apartment does she live in? What building does she live in? Nonsense. That is a typical defense tactic. Dirty up our girl, Ella Comer, make her feel responsible, more responsible than she does already.\u201d\nGenerally, it is improper for the State to comment upon a defendant\u2019s failure to call a witness where the comment suggests that the witness would have testified unfavorably to the defendant and the witness is accessible to the State. (People v. Gamboa (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 242,332 N.E.2d 543.) Defendant did not reveal the name of the woman he claimed Sanderson cared for and her identity was unknown to the State. Thus, it was proper for the prosecutor to comment upon her failure to testify in corroboration of defendant\u2019s allegations. It was not error for the State to suggest that her failure to testify was a defense tactic.\nDefendant asserts that during closing argument the prosecutor improperly accused him of lying:\n\u201cThen we have the testimony of what I would term the law enforcement people in the case, two police officers and Mr. Newton.\nYou heard from two police officers who testified to the statements that this man made to them that night, but yet that man takes the stand and says he doesn\u2019t remember making any of those statements.\nHe testifies he doesn\u2019t remember making the statement, part of the statements he remembers, part he doesn\u2019t remember, but I want you to think of one important thing when you think of that man\u2019s testimony. Think of Officer Rokosik, and think of the defense attorneys, they never asked Officer Rokosik if the defendant asked or told them that James Sanderson\u2019s brother attacked him with a knife.\nDid they ask Officer Rokosik that one? Of course not, because he never did attack the defendant because the brother was never there, because that is nothing but a lie by the defendant. He made that up after he heard the State\u2019s case.\u201d\nA prosecutor may not give his personal opinion during closing as to the veracity of a defense witness\u2019 testimony. (People v. Martin (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 825, 331 N.E.2d 311.) However, if based on the evidence and inferences from it, it is not error to suggest that a witness is untruthful. People v. Owens (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 978, 361 N.E.2d 644; People v. Jones (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 321, 354 N.E.2d 104.\nHere, the prosecutor reviewed testimony as to statements made by defendant to the police. He noted there was no evidence that defendant told the police Sanderson\u2019s brother attacked him with a knife and concluded that defendant\u2019s testimony was fabricated. The prosecutor\u2019s conclusion was based on his interpretation of the evidence rather than personal opinion and was thus proper. See People v. Franklin (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 408, 355 N.E.2d 634 (prosecutor may discuss witness\u2019 credibility).\nDefendant also complains of these remarks by the prosecutor:\n\u201c\u00ab 0 \u00b0 [H]e [defendant] told Rokosik, I hope he is going to die. Rokosik did not make that up. That is the way it went down. He surely is lying, ladies and gentlemen.\u201d\nOfficer Rokosik testified that defendant told him, \u201cI hope he dies.\u201d Defendant denied this. The prosecutor\u2019s allegation that defendant was lying was a comment upon his credibility and based upon the evidence.\nDefendant also claims impropriety in the State\u2019s comments that there was no evidence of blood on the knife used to stab decedent and that defendant must have washed it off. Defendant asserts that there was no evidence that defendant washed off the knife. We have reviewed the record and find that defense counsel made timely objections to these remarks which were sustained by the trial court, thereby remedying any error. People v. Carbon (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 404 N.E.2d 233; People v. Malone (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 34, 397 N.E.2d 1377.\nLast, defendant complains of a lengthy portion of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument concerning Sanderson\u2019s right to be secure in his own home and self-defense. Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly implied that defendant was inside Sanderson\u2019s home when the evidence was to the contrary. Upon review of the closing arguments, we note that the remarks are proper when construed in conjunction with Sanderson\u2019s right to ask defendant to leave the party and to escort him out of the house when he refused to leave. The remarks are vague, however, and may have been construed by the jury as relating to the time of the stabbing. The evidence indicates that at this time defendant was outside Sanderson\u2019s home. Even if the jury was misled, proper jury instructions on self-defense and the justifiable use of force were given to the jury which corrected any misunderstanding. See People v. Pietrzyk (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 738, 369 N.E.2d 1299.\nIn summary, we do not find any prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Even if some of the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were improper, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt and the fact that the jury was instructed to reject arguments unsupported by the evidence, any error was not prejudicial.\nDefendant\u2019s sixth argument is that the trial court erroneously refused to exercise its discretion regarding the jury\u2019s request to review defendant\u2019s testimony. The court stated for the record that during the course of jury deliberations the jury sent out a note saying, \u201cCan we get the defendant\u2019s testimony?\u201d The trial judge also stated: \u201cAnd I sent back my reply, saying the defendant\u2019s testimony has not been written up. Sorry.\u201d No objection was made by defense counsel. Defendant asserts that the court\u2019s comments indicated the court believed it had no discretion to consider the jury\u2019s request. He suggests that the court stenographer could have read her notes to the jury.\nIt is within the discretion of the trial court to allow or refuse a jury\u2019s request for the review of testimony. (People v. Pierce (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 361, 308 N.E.2d 577.) Where trial courts have refused such requests under the mistaken belief that they have no discretion, such refusals are erroneous. People v. Autman (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 171,317 N.E.2d 570; People v. Queen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 560, 310 N.E.2d 166.\nThe trial court\u2019s understanding of these principles was demonstrated when this issue was first raised upon defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. In response to defendant\u2019s argument, the court replied:\n\u201cI think I should answer that. I was aware I had discretion. I chose to answer the note in that manner. I thought it would avoid complications as far as the jury was concerned. I was aware I had discretion. I didn\u2019t think it was necessary to either have it read to them or have it typed up.\u201d\nFinally, defendant cites People v. Briggman (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 747, 316 N.E.2d 121, for the proposition that the proper practice is for the court to discuss the jury\u2019s request with defense counsel and the prosecutor before responding to it. Indeed, the trial court followed this procedure concerning another note from the jury requesting pictures of decedent\u2019s body. We agree that the better practice, consistent with the trial court\u2019s posture concerning the jury\u2019s other request, was to discuss the jury\u2019s request with counsel.\nHowever, any error was not prejudicial. The Briggman court found defendant had been denied a fair trial because: (1) counsel and defendant were not present at the time of the jury\u2019s request to rehear certain specific testimony; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by not answering the request; and (3) the court\u2019s ambiguous response may have confused or misled the jury. In the instant case, only the first error resulted and coupled with the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18,17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824; see People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857.\nFor all the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Geraldine V. Biggs and James L. Rhodes, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, James S. Veldman, and Mary A. Jischke, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH EARL SLAUGHTER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-2147\nOpinion filed May 27, 1980.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Geraldine V. Biggs and James L. Rhodes, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, James S. Veldman, and Mary A. Jischke, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1103-01", "first_page_order": 1125, "last_page_order": 1138 }