{ "id": 3192093, "name": "MICHAEL D. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES R. GRUNDEL, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Richardson v. Grundel", "decision_date": "1980-06-09", "docket_number": "No. 79-843", "first_page": "46", "last_page": "50", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 46" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5437214 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 N.E. 1091", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5447030 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/138/0322-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 554, "char_count": 10404, "ocr_confidence": 0.861, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.292217809909693e-08, "percentile": 0.2707227332558771 }, "sha256": "777a8b76159835e96f449fbc861a33333e11708c6a579346cc7c4cc4dacc85fb", "simhash": "1:c7ea61d596525040", "word_count": 1736 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:26:52.691366+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHAEL D. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES R. GRUNDEL, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE ALLOY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nMichael D. Richardson appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Knox County, dismissing, for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, his claim against James R. Grundel. Mr. Richardson was the victim of a burglary perpetrated by a juvenile offender. The defendant, James R. Grundel, is the director of juvenile court services of Knox County. On April 27, 1978, the said juvenile offender was placed on probation by the circuit court. The juvenile was \u201cplaced under the guardianship and supervision of James R. Grundel, Director of Court Services, Knox County, Illinois, who also has the power of placement.\u201d Among the terms and conditions of his probation were that the \u201c[s]aid minor shall not leave Knox County without the permission of his probation officer\u201d and that the \u201c[s]aid minor shall make restitution by arrangement with his probation officer.\u201d\nOn April 28, 1978, the Assistant State\u2019s Attorney of Knox County informed Mr. Richardson that the minor was placed on juvenile probation and was ordered to make restitution to Mr. Richardson\u2019s firm, such restitution to be handled through Mr. James Grundel of Knox County juvenile court services. Subsequently, the juvenile\u2019s probation was revoked.\nOn June 12, 1979, Michael Richardson filed a small claim complaint with the Circuit Court of Knox County against James Grundel for the amount of $225.50 for \u201chis failure to enforce an Order of the Juvenile Court pursuant to his duties established by the Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 37, Section 705 \u2014 3(2)(o) and Section 706 \u2014 l(2)(g).\u201d Mr. Grundel moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Mr. Grundel appeared personally and by counsel. Mr. Richardson appeared pro se. Both parties filed briefs. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Mr. Richardson then moved for leave to amend. This was denied because \u201cthere is no basis in tort, contract, or otherwise to support the plaintiff\u2019s claim against the defendant.\u201d Mr. Richardson appeals.\nJames Grundel, as the director of juvenile court services of Knox County, was appointed by, works under the supervision of, and serves at the pleasure of the chief judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 706 \u2014 5(2)). It is clear, therefore, that the defendant, as well as other juvenile probation personnel, are judicial officers. (See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 706 \u2014 1.) Pursuant to section 6 \u2014 1(2) (c) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 706 \u2014 1(2) (c)), the juvenile offender was placed under the guardianship of the defendant. In addition, the juvenile was ordered to pay restitution by arrangement with his probation officer. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, pars. 705 \u2014 2(4) and 705\u2014 3(2)(1).) The probation officer is vested with power to supervise the collection of such restitution by section 6 \u2014 l(2)(g) of the Juvenile Court Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 706 \u2014 1(2) (g).\nIt is the long-standing law of this State that a judicial officer will not be held liable for an act done by him in the exercise of his judicial functions, if the act is within the scope of his jurisdiction. (People ex rel. Munson v. Bartels (1891), 138 Ill. 322, 328, 27 N.E. 1091; cf. People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 485, 502, 359 N.E.2d 149.) Official action is judicial where it is the result of judgment or discretion.\n\u201cAn officer will be regarded as being clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial functions, when the powers confided to him are so far discretionary that he can exercise or withhold them according to his own judgment as to what is necessary and proper. Where the question is one of opinion merely, * * * the discretion exercised cannot be disputed.\nBut where the duty imposed on an officer is purely ministerial, he will be held liable for an injury to another which results from his failure to perform it, or from his performance of it in a negligent or unskillful manner. Official duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task, and when the law which imposes it, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion.\u201d (People ex rel. Munson v. Bartels (1891), 138 Ill. 322, 328, 27 N.E. 1091.)\nThe plaintiff argues that the duty of the probation officer, to collect restitution from the defendant, was ministerial, in that he was under court order to perform it. However, it is clear that the court order gave the probation officer discretion as to the \u201ctime, mode and occasion\u201d of the collection of restitution from the juvenile.\n\u201cIf restitution is part of the disposition, the [juvenile] shall make restitution to the victim in accordance with the following:\n(a) A [dispositional] hearing shall be held to assess the financial capacity of the [juvenile] to make restitution as well as to determine the amount and conditions of payment at the court\u2019s discretion.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20146; ch. 37, par. 705 \u2014 2.)\nThe amount and conditions of payment were not determined at the dispositional hearing in the instant juvenile case. Instead, the juvenile probation officer was, by means of the court order, vested with the court\u2019s discretion to determine these matters.\nFurthermore, the court appointed the defendant, James Grundel, guardian and supervisor of the juvenile offender. It is the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act \u201cto secure for each minor subject [t]hereto such care and guidance \u00b0 \u00b0 6 as will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; * * \u00b0 and, when the minor is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should be given by his parents.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 701 \u2014 2(1).) \u201c \u2018Guardianship of the person\u2019 of a minor means the duty and authority, subject to residual parental rights and responsibilities, to make important decisions in matters having a permanent effect on the life and development of the minor and to be concerned with his general welfare.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 701 \u2014 11.\nThus, it is clear that the duties with which the defendant was entrusted by order of the court were of a highly discretionary nature, and not merely ministerial. In order to be free to exercise his discretion for the \u201cgeneral welfare\u201d of the juvenile, the defendant must, in this instance, be cloaked with immunity from personal civil liability to the victim of the juvenile\u2019s offense.\nMr. Richardson points out that the 1970 Illinois Constitution, article I, section 12, states that: \u201cEvery person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.\u201d Mr. Richardson further points out that, because the juvenile in question is no longer on probation, and therefore no longer subject to the order of restitution, procedure through the juvenile court for enforcement of the restitution order would be fruitless. Assuming this is true, we can only suggest to Mr. Richardson that he is not completely without remedy, as he may yet have a civil cause of action against the juvenile for the commission of tort against his property.\nMr. Richardson further contends that the trial judge displayed prejudice against him in remarks made during the course of the hearing. As the case was called, the trial judge commented, \u201cNow comes the main event.\u201d Although Mr. Richardson finds such a remark to evidence a light regard for the substance of his claim, this remark does not necessarily show a predisposition against Mr. Richardson on the part of the court. We can well sympathize with Mr. Richardson\u2019s reaction to the court\u2019s undignified reference to his case. Nevertheless, we do not find, as Mr. Richardson suggests, the use of a sporting term in reference to his case to display a lack of interest in its merits. Indeed, the court, by referring to it as the main event of its day, displays rather the opposite attitude. In the course of his day, a small-claims judge hears many cases. The overwhelming majority of these are mundane, both factually and legally. Mr. Richardson\u2019s case was doubtless a bright spot in the day of this judge, and he noted the event accordingly.\nNor do we find prejudice in the court\u2019s reference to Mr. Richardson as a \u201cquasi-layman\u201d. A small claims court does not usually hear cases argued by counsel. Lay argument is quite common. The court, after reading the briefs, made inquiry into Mr. Richardson\u2019s educational background, and concluded that he was a \u201cquasi-layman.\u201d Mr. Richardson prefers to view himself as a \u201cprivate citizen.\u201d Mr. Richardson\u2019s education and legal background are not matters of record before this court. From the record in this case, it seems that Mr. Richardson is, indeed, a layman. The addition of the appellation \u201cquasi\u201d by the trial court may well have resulted from the court\u2019s marvel at the erudition and skill with which Mr. Richardson researched and briefed his claim. This court is likewise impressed with the quality of this pro se appellant\u2019s brief and argument.\nAlthough Mr. Richardson objected to the remarks of the court at trial, he never specifically requested the trial judge to recuse himself. Thus, additional evidence on this issue is lacking. The evidence which Mr. Richardson presents to this court does not warrant a reversal on the grounds of prejudice on the part of the trial judge, especially where, as here, the case was disposed of on legal, rather than factual, findings of the court.\nFor the reasons stated, therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Knox County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTENGEL and BARRY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE ALLOY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael D. Richardson, of Galesburg, for appellant, pro se.", "Carl E. Hawkinson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg (Carey J. Luckman and Raymond G. Kimbell, III, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL D. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES R. GRUNDEL, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 79-843\nOpinion filed June 9, 1980.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied July 15, 1980.\nMichael D. Richardson, of Galesburg, for appellant, pro se.\nCarl E. Hawkinson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg (Carey J. Luckman and Raymond G. Kimbell, III, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0046-01", "first_page_order": 68, "last_page_order": 72 }