{ "id": 3191421, "name": "DAVID DORNER, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Dorner v. Illinois Civil Service Commission", "decision_date": "1980-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 78-858", "first_page": "957", "last_page": "963", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 957" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "285 N.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 3d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2470023 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/6/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581409 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460946 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/398/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 N.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5299920 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/62/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2880617 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0567-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 609, "char_count": 16535, "ocr_confidence": 0.904, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2918166949789374e-07, "percentile": 0.6199809332513209 }, "sha256": "7cfd5b5783008c99fbb69a8f8d524305ae7f1b2e18b0df689ad189cfdef94f6a", "simhash": "1:ffe0683afc79b718", "word_count": 2638 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:26:52.691366+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAVID DORNER, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Miss PRESIDING JUSTICE McGILLICUDDY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County in which the court found that the Department of Corrections violated the plaintiff\u2019s right to a voluntary reduction in status and his right to reemployment as provided by the rules of the Department of Personnel of the State of Illinois.\nThe plaintiff, David A. Dorner, was employed by the Department of Corrections Training Academy as a correctional academy trainer IV (CAT IV). On July 6, 1976, the plaintiff was suspended from work for alleged mismanagement of his duties. On July 8,1976, he was notified in a letter from the superintendent of the academy that the suspension was rescinded. However, the plaintiff was also informed that due to a significant budget deficit, all CAT IV positions would be abolished and all incumbents laid off effective August 1, 1976. The superintendent instructed the plaintiff not to return to the academy so that he would have ample opportunity to seek alternative employment.\nAt the time of the layoff there existed four levels of correctional academy trainers. All three employees in the CAT IV positions, the highest level, were laid off along with 10 of 17 employees in CAT II positions. The department\u2019s explanation of the layoff was lack of funds.\nOn July 27, 1976, the plaintiff notified the director of personnel and the acting director of the Department of Corrections by mail of his intention to accept a voluntary reduction to a current vacant position pursuant to the rules of the Department of Personnel. Rule 2 \u2014 550 provides in pertinent part that,\n\u201cA certified employee\u201d \u201d \u201d who is subject to layoff as a result of the Director\u2019s approval of a layoff plan shall be promptly notified thereof of the effective date of layoff, and shall then be advised of the opportunity to request voluntary reduction to a current vacant position in accordance with Rule 2 \u2014 500. An employee seeking voluntary reduction must request such in writing to the head of the employing agency prior to the proposed effective date of layoff.\u201d\nRule 2 \u2014 560 provides that such person shall be preferred for any current vacant position in a lower class within the same agency and location in which the employee is then incumbent at the time of such layoff.\nOn August 5, 1976, the acting director of the Department of Corrections notified the plaintiff that his right to a voluntary reduction to a current vacancy expired on August 1, 1976, the effective date of the layoff. In addition, the acting director stated that he was unaware of any vacancies at the academy.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s request for reconsideration of the decision approving the layoff was granted, and a hearing before the Department of Personnel was held on October 15,1976. The review officer found that no violation of the rules occurred. Upon review of this report, the director of personnel found that there was no reason to reconsider his original decision.\nOn November 5, 1976, the plaintiff appealed the decision of the Department of Personnel to the Civil Service Commission pursuant to its rules and asserted that the layoff was a subterfuge for discharge. On December 1, 1976, Bruce J. Finne, the executive secretary of the commission, notified the plaintiff that after a review of the entire matter, a recommendation would be made to the commission to deny his appeal. Although Finne acknowledged that the notification of the rescission of the suspension and the intended layoff in the same communication raised serious doubts about the motives of the department of corrections, he concluded that the layoff was in good faith. Finne also accepted the Department of Personnel\u2019s interpretation of Rule 2 \u2014 560 that once an employee is laid off, he is no longer eligible for a voluntary reduction. Finne noted that a CAT III position vacancy did not occur until after the effective date of the layoff.\nThe plaintiff responded to this notification with a letter repeating his request for a formal hearing to determine whether his layoff was merely a subterfuge for discharge. In addition to arguments previously presented to the commission, the plaintiff contended that the department also violated his right to reemployment pursuant to Rule 2 \u2014 570:\n\u201cThe Department shall establish and maintain a reemployment list, by class and agency and county, or other designated geographical area approved by the Director before layoff. A certified employee who has been laid off shall be placed in order of length of continuous service as defined in Rule 2 \u2014 190 on a reemployment list for recall to the first available assignment to a position in the class (or related classes with substantially similar requirements and duties) and agency, and county, or other designated geographical location or area in which the employee was assigned prior to being placed on the reemployment list. Where circumstances warrant, at the discretion of the director, such reemployment list may be established by related classes whose duties are substantially similar to the class from which the employee was laid off.\u201d\nThe plaintiff argues that when the CAT III position became available subsequent to his layoff, the department was required to offer him that position because CAT III and CAT IV positions had substantially similar requirements and duties.\nFinne responded on January 18, 1977, with a letter which repeated his opinion that a formal hearing was unnecessary because there had been no violation of the Department of Personnel\u2019s rules. Finne asserted that according to the department\u2019s interpretation, Rule 2 \u2014 570 required only that the department place the plaintiff on a reemployment list for the specific position of CAT IV. Finne informed the plaintiff that the commission\u2019s decision constituted a final administrative decision within the purview of the Administrative Review Act.\nOn February 23? 1977, the plaintiff filed his complaint for administrative review. On February 23, 1978, the Circuit Court of Cook County reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and ordered the Department of Corrections to offer the plaintiff the next available CAT position within the department. In addition, the trial court denied the plaintiff\u2019s prayer for back pay.\nThe plaintiff appeals that portion of the judgment order which denied him back pay. The defendants appeal that portion of the order which reversed the decision of the commission and ordered the Department of Corrections to offer the plaintiff the next available CAT position.\nThe following issues are raised in this appeal:\n1. Whether the Civil Service Commission had jurisdiction under the personnel code to review the plaintiff\u2019s claim.\n2. Whether the plaintiff\u2019s right to a voluntary reduction in work classification was violated.\n3. Whether the plaintiff\u2019s right to reemployment was violated.\n4. Whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff\u2019s prayer for back pay.\nThe defendants assert for the first time on appeal that the Civil Service Commission lacked jurisdiction to review the validity of the layoff plan under which the plaintiff was laid off and to make findings concerning the plaintiff\u2019s voluntary reduction and reemployment rights. They conclude, therefore, that because there existed no final decision of the commission which was reviewable under the Administrative Review Act, the circuit court also lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 63bllla.\nThe defendants rely on Chestnut v. Lodge (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 567, 216 N.E.2d 799, in which the plaintiffs brought a mandamus action to contest their layoff from the Department of Conservation. The trial court ordered the department to reinstate the plaintiffs with back pay. The appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had no right to challenge the propriety of their layoff except by proceedings under the Administrative Review Act. (62 Ill. App. 2d 27, 210 N.E.2d 336.) The supreme court disagreed, concluding that the Civil Service Commission had no authority to consider the validity of the layoffs, and, therefore, the Administrative Review Act was inapplicable. In arriving at this conclusion the court observed that the commission itself had consistently rejected the notion that it had jurisdiction to review the validity of layoffs.\nThe facts in the instant case, however, differ from the facts in Chestnut, where the plaintiff challenged the validity of his layoff. Here, the plaintiff argued that his layoff was a subterfuge for discharge. Article XII \u2014 \u201cTransaction Used as Subterfuge for Discharge\u201d \u2014 of the rules of the Civil Service Commission states in pertinent part the following:\n\u201cSection 1201. A certified employee who believes that he has been separated from State service by a personnel transaction used as a subterfuge for discharge may within a period of 15 days after service upon the employee of notice of transaction appeal in writing to the Commission.\u201d\nTherefore, the plaintiff was entitled to challenge the suspected discharge before the Commission.\nIn addition, the plaintiff alleged that the Department of Personnel rules concerning his voluntary reduction and reemployment rights were violated. The Civil Service Commission has determined that it has jurisdiction to review alleged violations of these rules. In Decker v. Department of Personnel, 66-71, 67-71 (December 5,1972), the plaintiffs had alleged an impropriety in their layoffs and a failure by the Department of Personnel to place them on a reemployment list in accord with its rules. Rejecting the defendants\u2019 argument that the commission lacked jurisdiction, the commission held that,\n\u201cSection 10 of the Personnel Code, Duties and Powers of the Commission, provides, under Subsection 9, that the Commission has a duty to direct compliance if the Commission discovers any violation of the personnel Code and, of course, the rules made thereunder. Accordingly, if an agency denies rights to an employee who has been laid off from his job, which rights are guaranteed to the employee by the Department of Personnel Rules, the Commission does have jurisdiction to determine the existence of violation.\u201d\nAccordingly, we conclude that the Civil Service Commission did have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the ^plaintiff\u2019s charges.\nIn its order of February 16,1978, the trial court found that the plaintiff was wrongfully deprived of.his right to voluntary reduction in status and of his right to reemployment. The plaintiff had argued that on July 10,1976, a CAT III employee had requested a transfer to another facility and that pursuant to the Department of Personnel rules concerning voluntary reduction in status, he had preference for this position.\nThe CAT III position referred to by the plaintiff, however, did not become vacant until September 1,1976, subsequent to the effective date of his layoff. We agree with the defendants that once the plaintiff\u2019s layoff became effective on August 1, 1976, his right to voluntary reduction terminated. The rules concerning voluntary reduction refer to a \u201ccurrent vacant position\u201d and require a request for such a reduction to be made \u201cprior to the proposed effective date of layoff.\u201d Once the date of layoff passes, the employee must rely on the rules concerning reemployment.\nAlthough we find no violation of the rules concerning voluntary reduction, we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff\u2019s right to reemployment was violated. Rule 2 \u2014 570 provides that a certified employee who has been laid off shall be placed on a reemployment list for recall to the first available assignment to a position in the class (or related classes with substantially similar requirements and duties) and agency, and county in which the employee was assigned prior to being placed on the reemployment list. When the CAT III position was vacated on September 1, 1976, the Department of Personnel was required to offer that position to the plaintiff.\nThe defendants argue that the plaintiff only has a right to be placed on a reemployment list for the class from which he is laid off. They claim that the Department of Corrections has complied with the mandatory requirements of Rule 2 \u2014 570 by placing the plaintiff\u2019s name on a reemployment list for CAT IV in Cook County. However, the defendants admit that the CAT IV position was abolished subsequent to the plaintiff\u2019s layoff and that, consequently, the plaintiff will never be recalled to his former position.\nWe reject the defendants\u2019 limited interpretation of Rule 2 \u2014 570. That rule specifically states that the employee is to be placed on a reemployment list for recall to the first available position in the class, or related classes with substantially similar requirements and duties, in which he was assigned prior to placement on the reemployment list. If the CAT III and CAT IV positions had similar requirements and duties, the Department of Personnel was required to offer the plaintiff the CAT III position vacated on September 1, 1976.\nBecause the Civil Service Commission narrowly construed Rule 2 \u2014 570 to require only that the plaintiff be placed on the CAT IV reemployment list, it did not determine whether the CAT IV and CAT III positions had substantially similar requirements and duties. Pursuant to our request at oral argument, the Department of Personnel has provided this court with its job descriptions for these positions.\nOur review of the job descriptions convinces us that the CAT III and CAT IV positions had similar requirements and duties. A CAT III employee managed and coordinated the Department of Corrections\u2019 personnel training, designed training materials, and supervised lower level trainers. Although the CAT IV employees had greater administrative and supervisory responsibilities, they also directed the development and implementation of the training programs and supervised the formation of the curriculum. Because the positions had similar requirements and duties, the plaintiff was entitled to the vacated CAT III position. We therefore affirm that portion of the trial court\u2019s order which reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission.\nThe plaintiff appeals from that portion of the order which denied his prayer for back pay. He argues that the trial court erred in ordering the Department of Corrections to offer the plaintiff the next available CAT position, and should have ordered the department to reinstate the plaintiff with back pay.\nThe Administrative Review Act provides that the reviewing court has the power to affirm or reverse the decision of the administrative agency in whole or in part or to remand the cause for additional evidence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 275.) There is no provision in the Act for the j oinder of a mandamus action for reinstatement to the former position or an action for back wages. Drezner v. Civil Service Com. (1947), 398 Ill. 219, 75 N.E.2d 303; Basketfield v. Daniel (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 877, 390 N.E.2d 492; Sgrov. City of Springfield (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 478, 285 N.E.2d 589.\nThe trial court was limited to a determination of whether the decision of the Civil Service Commission was against the manifest weight of the evidence. It lacked jurisdiction to order the Department of Corrections to offer the plaintiff the next available CAT position. Likewise, it lacked jurisdiction to compel reinstatement or back pay.\nF or the foregoing reasons, those portions of the trial court\u2019s order which reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and denied plaintiff\u2019s prayer for back pay are hereby affirmed. That portion of the order which directed the Department of Corrections to offer the plaintiff the next available CAT position is hereby reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings consistent with our finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the CAT III position vacated on September 1,1976.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with directions.\nSIMON and RIZZI, JJ., concur.\nThis article became effective January 28, 1974.", "type": "majority", "author": "Miss PRESIDING JUSTICE McGILLICUDDY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Martin Rubin, of Frank, Levin & Rubin, of Chicago, for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joseph D. Keenan, III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID DORNER, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 78-858\nOpinion filed June 18, 1980.\nMartin Rubin, of Frank, Levin & Rubin, of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joseph D. Keenan, III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0957-01", "first_page_order": 979, "last_page_order": 985 }