{
  "id": 3191483,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN R. FEARON, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Fearon",
  "decision_date": "1980-06-26",
  "docket_number": "Nos. 79-1246, 79-1247 cons.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:26:52.691366+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN R. FEARON, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE JIG ANTI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, John R. Fearon, was charged with violating section 5 of the Bingo License and Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 1105). That section provides in part that any person who \u201cwilfully violates any rule or regulation of the Department [of Revenue]\u201d is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment not to exceed one year or both. The specific rule of the Department of Revenue (the Department) which the defendant is charged with violating is Rule 1(D) (13) which deals with \u201coperators\u201d of bingo games. The defendant was also charged with violating section 28 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 28 \u2014 3) as the keeper of a gambling place.\n\u2022 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaints in the trial court alleging that the Department had exceeded its authority in promulgating Rule 1(D)(13). Section 2(2) of the Bingo License and Tax Act provides:\n\u201cNo person except a bona fide member of the sponsoring organization may participate in the management or operation of the game.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 1102(2).)\nDepartment Rule 1(D) (13) provides:\n\u201cNo person may participate in the management of a bingo game who is not listed as an Operator on the application * * * .\u201d\nThe complaint alleged that the defendant was not listed as an \u201cOperator\u201d on the application for a bingo license.\nThe defendant argues Rule 1(D) (13) improperly narrows the definition of persons who may serve as \u201cOperators\u201d of bingo games. He also contends that rule is invalid because only the State legislature may define what constitutes a criminal offense. Finally, he asserts that if the rule is void then the charge of keeping a gambling place must also be void. The trial court dismissed both complaints.\nThe first issue is whether Rule 1(D) (13) constitutes a valid exercise of the Department\u2019s rule-making authority. The statute places a number of restrictions on persons who may participate in the management and operation of bingo games. Section 2(2) of the statute provides that only bona fide members of the sponsoring organization may participate in the management or operation of the game. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 1102(2).) Additionally, the statute prohibits convicted felons, professional gamblers, gambling promoters and persons not of good moral character from obtaining a license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 1101(7).) The legislature has also provided that applications for bingo licenses \u201cshall be prepared in accordance with the rules of the Department \u00b0 \u00b0 \u00b0 .\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 1101(2).\nIn addition to the requirement contained in Rule 1(D) (13), other Department rules require an organization applying for a license to list the names, addresses, social security numbers, birthdates and telephone numbers of the president and secretary of the organization and also members who will act as \u201cOperators.\u201d Those signing as officers and operators must attest to the fact that they are bona fide members of the sponsoring organization, that they are of good moral character and that they have not been convicted of a felony. The State contends these license application requirements represent an attempt to ensure that persons who are deemed ineligible for a bingo license will act neither as officers of a sponsoring organization or as \u201cOperators\u201d of the bingo games.\nAdministrative agencies have the power to adopt rules or regulations concerning matters coming within their province in order to effectuate the duties imposed on them by statute. (People v. Kueper (1969), 111 Ill. App. 2d 42, 249 N.E.2d 335.) Rules made in the exercise of power delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if possible, an effectual piece of legislation. People v. Johnson (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 441, 369 N.E.2d 898.\nWe believe the enactment of Rule 1(D) (13) constituted a valid exercise of the power delegated to the Department by the legislature. The legislature authorized the Department to serve as a licensing body for bingo games and has specifically directed the Department to establish rules covering applications for bingo game licenses. In accordance with the legislature\u2019s intent to keep certain categories of persons from obtaining licenses, the Department has promulgated Rule 1 (D) (13) which requires all \u201cOperators\u201d to be disclosed on the applications and to attest to the fact that they do not fit any of the prohibited categories of persons defined by the legislature. Although the rule is admittedly more restrictive than the statute, the defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that the Department has exceeded its authority by promulgating such a rule. We do not think the further restriction contained in the rale is unreasonable.\nThe defendant also contends the rule is invalid because only the State legislature may define what constitutes a criminal offense. It has long been established that it is constitutionally permissible for the legislature to provide a criminal sanction for the violation of rules or regulations which it has validly empowered an administrative agency to promulgate. (United States v. Grimaud (1911), 220 U.S. 506, 55 L. Ed. 563, 31 S. Ct. 480; People v. Robertson (1922), 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815; see generally Abrahams & Snowden, Separation of Powers and Administrative Crimes: A Study of Irreconcilables, 1 S. Ill. U.L.J. 1 (1976); Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and Imposition of Penalties, 1970 Wash. U.L.Q. 265.) We thus conclude the legislature had the power to delegate to the Department the authority to make rules, violation of which could result in criminal penalties.\nThe trial court apparently dismissed the second complaint on the basis of its finding that Rule 1(D) (13) was invalid. In light of our conclusion that Rule 1(D) (13) constituted a valid exercise of the Department\u2019s rule-making authority, we believe the trial court also erred in dismissing the complaint which charged the defendant with keeping a gambling place.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgments of the circuit court of Cook County are reversed and remanded.\nReversed and remanded.\nLINN, P. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE JIG ANTI"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William J. Scott, Attorney General, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, both of Chicago, for the People.",
      "John J. Muldoon, of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN R. FEARON, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNos. 79-1246, 79-1247 cons.\nOpinion filed June 26, 1980.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, both of Chicago, for the People.\nJohn J. Muldoon, of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1087-01",
  "first_page_order": 1109,
  "last_page_order": 1112
}