{ "id": 3187846, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATE SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sanders", "decision_date": "1980-06-27", "docket_number": "No. 78-1112", "first_page": "457", "last_page": "476", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 457" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 1513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 L. Ed. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 937", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3106, 3091, 2397 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0937-02", "/us/435/0937-01", "/us/435/0937-03" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811071 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5350588 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812665 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464792 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 1230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 1013", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5582334 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1020" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/1013-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958289 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812072 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172901 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323-24" }, { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2715073 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2902885 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9139028 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "2191" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "532" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "2193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 F.2d 453", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 869995 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/578/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 F.2d 1356", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 94458 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1359-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/501/1356-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170322 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1013", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574708 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5335567 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/88/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2889949 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 N.E.2d 242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378747 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2684118 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 N.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2715084 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5624081 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2862157 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3327901 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 1135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3416993 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5301371 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/61/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5627499 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 N.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395587 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0250-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1664, "char_count": 50633, "ocr_confidence": 0.854, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.100739361128744e-07, "percentile": 0.9556317762155245 }, "sha256": "0d03ea43556f571b7374be20d07d58cd770bedc72e5f8a39347b845b9070f8ef", "simhash": "1:915439dc37c16b57", "word_count": 8638 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:08.867369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATE SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE MEJDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of the murders of James Smith and Randolph White (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1) and was sentenced to a term of 100 to 300 years. On appeal, he contends that: (1) he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5); (2) he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial; and (3) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm. The pertinent facts follow.\nOn October 3, 1974, Chicago police officers found the bodies of James Smith and Randolph White in the basement of an abandoned building. A warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest was issued on November 14, 1974. Defendant was arrested and charged with the murders on March 1, 1975. On April 2, 1975, the State requested to nolle prosequi (nolle pros) the case because it lacked sufficient competent evidence against defendant. The motion was granted and defendant was released. On April 13,1976, defendant was indicted for the murders and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On December 5, 1976, defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct and a traffic offense and the outstanding murder warrant was executed.\nPrior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment alleging that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial, alleging that the nolle pros had been entered to avoid the running of the 120-day statutory period. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5.\nAt the hearing defendant\u2019s evidence established the following pertinent facts. Mrs. Stanberry, the sister of Jessie Deloach, who was also charged with the instant murders, testified that upon defendant\u2019s release from custody in April 1975, he began living with her mother. After a short residence at a second location, defendant moved in with Mrs. Stanberry where he remained until his arrest in December 1976. This arrangement was known to a number of their friends. Defendant submitted numerous documents bearing that residence as defendant\u2019s address. To her knowledge defendant never received letters from the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office while at that address, nor was he contacted by any Chicago police officers.\nIn response to defendant\u2019s motion, the State introduced the following pertinent testimony. Investigator Smith was investigating the instant murders and defendant\u2019s name was first connected to the murders on November 14 or 15 when Scott, Deloach and Byas each gave defendant\u2019s name to Smith. The investigator made repeated efforts over a six-week period to locate defendant at various addresses and at his place of employment, but was unsuccessful. During one of his attempts to locate defendant he heard that defendant had left the State for Michigan or Mississippi. A second investigator testified that he spoke to defendant\u2019s mother, who told him that she last saw defendant on November 16 when he told her that he was leaving town because the police were looking for him.\nWhen defendant was finally arrested on March 1, 1975, he told an investigator that he had left Chicago to go to Mississippi on October 1 or 2, 1974, and that he knew of the murders before he left. He was then informed that the bodies had not been discovered until October 3,1974, and stated that he did not care to have any further conversation.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Elden was assigned to handle defendant\u2019s case in which the preliminary hearing was about to be held. After reviewing the police reports and speaking with an investigator, he realized that he could not hold a preliminary hearing since the only evidence against defendant was statements of his codefendants. Elden communicated with his superior and another assistant State\u2019s Attorney concerning the situation and was granted two continuances until April 2, 1975. On that date his superior directed Elden to nolle pros the case because of a lack of sufficient competent evidence against defendant and Elden did so, stating his reasons on the record. He further stated that neither defendant\u2019s demand for trial nor the 120-day period entered into the consideration of this decision. At the time of the motion to nolle pros the case, Elden had no intention to reinstate the charges, nor did his superior\u2019s order indicate an intention to do so.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Shalgos was assigned to the courtroom where Keith Scott, Phillip Byas and Jessie Deloach were charged with offenses arising from the deaths of Smith and White. Elden spoke with him about the difficulties with defendant\u2019s case. After reviewing the evidence against defendant, Shalgos told Elden\u2019s superior that it was his conclusion that there was not enough evidence against defendant to get an indictment. During this conversation the ramifications of the 120-day rule were discussed as well as the case of People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 287 N.E.2d 688, but not the difference between a nolle pros and striking the case with leave to reinstate (SOL).\nIn early 1976, Shalgos was preparing for the trial of Scott, Byas and Deloach. In January or February, he began negotiations with Scott\u2019s attorney, which lasted until April 12, 1976, when Scott testified before the grand jury to indict defendant. After defendant\u2019s indictment, repeated attempts to locate defendant were made by police officers who visited defendant\u2019s last-known addresses and contacting his family members. These efforts were unsuccessful. Finally, defendant was arrested on December 5, 1976.\nAfter argument, the motion to dismiss the indictment was denied.\nThe pertinent evidence presented at trial established the following. On October 3, 1974, Chicago police officers entered the basement of an abandoned multiple-story building located at 3743 West 19th Street. A pungent odor emanated from a trunk in the basement, and further inspection revealed a decomposed body behind the trunk. The body appeared to be that of a male and its hands were tied behind its back with an extension cord. The body and the trunk were transported to the morgue where a second decomposing body was discovered under a blanket inside the trunk. The head of the second body was covered with a plastic bag. It was stipulated that the body found outside the trunk was that of James Smith and that the body found inside the trunk was that of Randolph White. It was also established that the two had been deceased for approximately 17 days prior to their discovery.\nThe pathologist who conducted the autopsies on the two victims testified that James Smith had a large bullet wound in his forehead between his eyebrows and that the internal examination revealed that a bullet had lacerated his brain. Randolph White\u2019s body had six bullet wounds in the head, and death was caused by a bullet wound lacerating the brain.\nShelley Edwards, James Smith\u2019s former girlfriend, testified that she was with Smith at his apartment at 1140 South Independence on the evening of September 15, 1974. She spent the night in Phillip Byas\u2019 apartment with Smith, Randolph White, Jean Townsend, Byas and Keith Scott. She left at about 6 or 7 a.m. on the following day and drove her car to her home. About half an hour later she returned to pick up Smith who was going to drive her to work. Smith drove her to work, took the car, and was supposed to return to pick her up after work. Shortly after arriving at work, she spoke to Phillip Byas on the telephone and asked that Smith return her call. She never spoke to Smith or saw him alive again. After work she waited for Smith for several hours before accepting another ride home. She went to Phillip Byas\u2019 apartment into which Smith and White had moved and stayed there for about five days. During those five days she went upstairs to Smith and White\u2019s apartment and saw nothing amiss. She stated that defendant looked familiar but that she did not know his name.\nKeith Scott, the State\u2019s chief witness, began his testimony by admitting that he had been arrested in connection with the instant homicides and had been charged with two counts of concealing a homicide. In September 1974, he lived with Phillip Byas at 1140 South Independence. Randolph White and James Smith lived on the second floor of the building. On September 15, 1974, he left his apartment at about 5 p.m. When he left Phillip Byas, Randolph White, Shelley Edwards, James Smith, Jessie Deloach and Jean Townsend were present. He returned between 11 and 11:30 p.m. and saw that Shelley Edwards and Gene Townsend were asleep on the living room floor and Phillip Byas and Deloach were asleep in a bedroom adjacent to Ms own. He went straight to bed.\nThe next morning, September 16, between 7 and 8 a.m., he was awakened by a tap on his shoulder. He saw defendant standing above him holding two revolvers. Defendant told him that they had just shot \u201cBubba\u201d White (Randolph\u2019s nickname) and told him to hide the revolvers. Scott expressed disbelief but defendant assured him that it was true. Scott told him that he didn\u2019t want to get involved but was told \u201cYou are here and you are involved so there\u2019s nothing you can do.\u201d At that time Phillip Byas and Jessie Deloach came toward Scott\u2019s room. Defendant handed the guns to Scott who hid them in a car tire in a closet. Deloach then informed them that he didn\u2019t think White was dead. The other three went upstairs for a moment and then returned. Byas said that they had to clean the upstairs and defendant suggested that they decide on alibis. The three returned upstairs to clean and shortly thereafter Scott saw them carrying a bloody blanket with a body inside to the rear of the apartment and into the basement. When they returned, Scott and Deloach cleaned the blood from the first floor while Byas and defendant cleaned the upstairs. They then discussed their alibis and how to \u201ctake care\u201d of Smith. Defendant said that if anyone talked they would \u201cget the same thing because he wasn\u2019t going to jail for murder.\u201d\nThe phone rang, Byas answered it, announced that it was Shelley Edwards, and she wanted Smith to return her call at work. Smith entered the apartment shortly thereafter, and Byas relayed Miss Edwards\u2019 message. Smith attempted to return the call but was stopped by Deloach. Byas then asked Smith if he and White planned to kill him because they said he had stolen their food stamps. Scott related a conversation that took place on September 14, 1974, in which White asked Byas and Deloach whether they had stolen his food stamps. Smith denied any knowledge of the plan but Byas told him that they had already killed White. To convince Smith of this fact, Byas, Deloach and defendant took him to the basement while Scott waited at the head of the stairs. They returned and went into Byas\u2019 bedroom where Deloach and defendant were holding guns.\nScott was in his bedroom and could hear Smith plead for his life. Deloach told Smith to put his hands behind his back and tied Smith\u2019s hands with an extension cord. Smith continued to plead for his life. Scott heard Smith ask for a cigarette and then heard a crash of glass. Byas, Deloach and defendant ran from the bedroom and said that Smith had jumped from the window. Scott looked out the window but did not see Smith. He went to the front porch and saw Byas at the corner. He did not see any of the others. He heard someone at the rear of the building yell, \u201cI got him\u201d and as he was going to the rear he heard a single shot. He went halfway down the stairs and saw Smith slumped against a wall with a bullet hole in his forehead. Deloach and defendant were pointing guns at Smith and smoke was coming from defendant\u2019s gun.\nByas got blankets from the second floor in which to wrap Smith\u2019s body and after moving the body into the basement, he began to wrap it. Byas told Scott to get a bag in which to wrap White\u2019s body and to clean the blood and glass. Deloach had gone home at his mother\u2019s request. Byas and defendant then went to get Smith\u2019s keys so they could use Ms. Edwards\u2019 car to get a trailer. They returned between 20 and 40 minutes later with a trailer hitched to the rear of Ms. Edwards\u2019 car. Byas placed a plastic bag over White\u2019s head and defendant, Byas and Scott placed the body in a trunk which Byas\u2019 brother, Eddie, had been told to bring. Smith\u2019s body was placed in blankets. The bodies were then placed in the trailer.\nDefendant and Byas rode in Ms. Edwards\u2019 car while Scott and Eddie Byas followed in separate cars. They drove around looking for a building in which to dispose of the bodies and found an abandoned building at 19th and Ridgeway. Scott parked on the corner while Byas and defendant drove into the alley out of Scott\u2019s view. After a few minutes Byas and defendant parked next to Scott and the trailer was empty. Byas told Scott to go to another location and to wait for them while they returned the trailer. When they returned, the trailer was no longer on the car. Byas told Scott to follow him so that he could \u201cditch\u201d Ms. Edwards\u2019 car. They drove to the housing projects at 35th and Federal where Byas and defendant parked Ms. Edwards\u2019 car and joined Scott.\nThey returned to Scott\u2019s apartment and discussed their alibis. Byas decided that he had a doctor\u2019s appointment while defendant decided to make up his own. Scott was to say that he was not present at the time of the murders. Defendant again stated that if anyone talked, he would get the same thing since he was not going to be charged with murder by himself. Scott then took defendant home and Byas to his doctor\u2019s appointment.\nAt trial Scott identified the trunk, the blanket in which White\u2019s body was found, and White\u2019s clothing. He identified a picture of Smith\u2019s body with its hands tied by the extension cord. He also identified photographs of Ms. Edwards\u2019 car and the trailer used to remove the bodies.\nIn October 1974, Chicago police officers contacted Scott about the disappearance of Smith and White. Scott admitted that at that time he lied about what he knew.\nOn cross-examination Scott testified that Phillip Byas was his closest friend and that he had seen defendant several times before the killings. He also testified that on September 14 White had told Smith that he was going to take care of Phillip Byas and that Jessie Deloach, Byas\u2019 cousin, had overheard the conversation. In addition, during early September 1974, Byas had told Scott of an altercation between Byas and White when Byas attempted to return a gun which he had borrowed without permission.\nScott stated that the sight of the guns and the bodies caused him to be fearful of defendant. When the police first came to speak to him in October, he told them that he did not know the victims very well and that he couldn\u2019t give them any more information. At that time he feared for his life and he was afraid of defendant and of any punishment he might receive for his part in the crimes. On about November 14, the police came to his home a second time and took him into custody. Scott told an investigator and an assistant State\u2019s Attorney that he knew litde of the victims and that he had last seen them on September 15. He also told an investigator that when he awoke on September 16 at 11 a.m. or 12 p.m. the only people in the apartment were Phillip Byas and Jessie Deloach. He did not see or hear anything unusual and first learned of the murders on September 17 when Byas, Deloach and defendant told him of the killings. Scott admitted at trial that this version was untrue but stated that he lied during the interview because he was afraid both of being punished for his part in the crime and of defendant and his threat. The first version was basically the alibi that had been worked out on the day of the murders. Later, the investigator told him that no one would know if he named the murderers. Scott then told the investigator that Byas, Deloach and defendant were involved in the murders. Corrections were made in his earlier statement and Scott signed it.\nAfter speaking with the investigator he gave a signed statement to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. He initially gave the earlier version of the events of the day of the murders but later described his participation in disposing of the bodies. The written statement described how Byas and defendant loaded the trunk and placed it on the trailer, how Scott followed defendant and Byas who were driving Ms. Edwards\u2019 car, and how Byas and defendant drove to the place where the bodies were eventually recovered. The statement also described how Scott waited until the trailer was returned and drove to 31st or 35th and Federal where Byas and defendant got into his car and were driven home.\nAfter making the statement, Scott was charged with concealing the homicides. In late 1975 or early 1976, he was offered immunity from prosecution for those offenses in exchange for his testimony, and he accepted the offer. However, when the case came to trial, Scott refused to testify because of fear for his life and the lives of his family. He was finally compelled to testify through the contempt powers of the court.\nThe president of a gas station testified that part of his business included washing cars and renting trailers. He was contacted by police sometime in November 1974 and he provided them with an original of a standard trailer rental form which contained defendant\u2019s written name, his address, driver\u2019s license number, phone number, license plate number, and a description of the car to which the trailer was hitched. The first initial of the driver\u2019s license was \u201cS\u201d and the license number of the car was \u201cHA 167.\u201d The time stamp on the form showed that the trailer was taken at 9:30 a.m. on September 16, 1974, and was returned at 11:37 a.m. on the same day.\nOn August 23, 1977, pursuant to court order, defendant filled out a handwriting exemplar form and signed his name on the document. A document examiner of the Chicago Police Department compared defendant\u2019s signature on the exemplar with an employment application which defendant stipulated was signed by him and with the trailer rental contract. It was the examiner\u2019s opinion that all three signatures were executed by the same person.\nA police investigator testified that he and his partner located Ms. Edwards\u2019 automobile with license plate number \u201cNA 8167\u201d at 3625 South Federal.\nIt was also stipulated that if called as a witness, a certain evidence technician would testify that on October 14,1974, he examined the trunk in which White\u2019s body was found for fingerprints but that no fingerprint impressions suitable for examination were found. The State rested.\nDefendant called two witnesses in defense. The first was the forensic pathologist who had performed the autopsies on the victims. He testified that as part of his autopsy of James Smith he observed the victim\u2019s skin. He did not observe any cuts or glass splinters in his skin nor did he find any broken bones other than the fractured skull which was caused by a bullet. Both bodies were in a state of decomposition usually represented by a grayish discoloration of the skin, softening of the tissue within the skin and extensive peeling of the superficial skin layer. The pathologist concluded that it was possible that there were superficial abrasions, such as cuts by glass, on Smith\u2019s skin which were no longer visible at the time of the autopsy.\nShelley Edwards testified that she went to Phillip Byas\u2019 and Keith Scott\u2019s apartment on September 16 or 17 and remained there for five days. She testified that neither Byas nor Scott closed off any rooms to her, nor did she recall seeing any broken windows or feeling any cool air in the apartment. On cross-examination she stated that while there, she stayed in the living room. She did not recall if she ever went into Byas\u2019 bedroom and stated that a window could have been broken in the room. She also stated that there could have been cool air in the apartment.\nThe defense rested. The jury found defendant guilty of both murders arid judgment was entered on the verdicts. Defendant was sentenced to a term of 100 to 300 years and brought this appeal.\nOpinion\nI.\nDefendant contends that his stautory right to a speedy trial (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5) has been violated in the instant case since the State sought to avoid the statutory term by entering the nolle pros of the original complaint. The State argues that since there was no charge pending against defendant after the nolle pros and he was neither incarcerated nor on bond for the offenses, the statutory speedy trial provisions were not violated by the delay between the nolle pros and the indictment. The State asserts that the nolle pros had the same effect as a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing since both would terminate the prosecution. In addition, the State submits that the evidence presented at the hearing to dismiss the indictment clearly showed that the reason for the nolle pros was the lack of sufficient competent evidence against defendant and not an attempt to evade the statutory term.\nSection 103 \u2014 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, \u00b0 \u00b0\n(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, * * \u00b0.\n* * *\n(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance.\u201d\nThis section expressly applies only to persons either \u201cin custody\u201d or \u201con bail or recognizance\u201d and has been construed as being inoperative unless charges are pending against a defendant. (People v. Toney (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 364, 367, 374 N.E.2d 695; People v. Lowe (1965), 61 Ill. App. 2d 262, 266, 210 N.E.2d 31.) The crucial inquiry in this case is whether a nolle pros tolls the stautory term or allows it to continue to run.\nResearch has not revealed an Illinois case which has addressed the precise factual situation presented here. Cases dealing with speedy trial questions raised by the dismissal of charges and their subsequent reinstatement generally distinguish between three separate types of dispositions. They are: (1) a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing; (2) the charges being stricken with leave to reinstate (SOL); and (3) a nolle pros of the charge.\nWhen a defendant is discharged after a finding of no probable cause after a preliminary hearing in the absence of a showing that the State purposely secured that finding as an evasionary tactic, the rule is that the speedy trial period does not continue to run after the dismissal, and that a totally new period begins to run when defendant is subsequently indicted. (People v. Gimza (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 477, 371 N.E.2d 1135; People v. Toney (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 364, 367, 374 N.E.2d 695; People v. Garcia (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 472, 475, 382 N.E.2d 371.) On the other hand, where charges are stricken with leave to reinstate (SOL), the rule is that the statutory period continues to run after that disposition. (People v. Baskin (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 141, 145, 230 N.E.2d 208; see People v. Griffin (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 644, 646, 374 N.E.2d 1031; People v. Garcia; People v. Toney; People v. Gimza.) The reason for the distinction between an SOL and a finding of no probable cause was stated in People v. Toney as follows:\n\u201c* * 6 Where a charge has been stricken with leave to reinstate, the same charge subsequently may be reinstated. After a discharge for want of probable cause, however, the proceedings may begin again only after the State secures additional evidence and files new charges against the defendant. A dismissal for lack of probable cause is a judicial determination in favor of the defendant rather than a voluntary act on the part of the State. Where charges are dismissed upon a judicial determination of no probable cause, the State has little opportunity to manipulate the proceedings or to purposefully evade the operation of the statutory term.\u201d (58 Ill. App. 3d 364, 368.)\nThe nature of an SOL was discussed further in People v. Griffin where the court stated:\n* * In the latter case [SOL] the charges continue to lie against the accused, albeit in a dormant state, and they may be resurrected upon the State\u2019s motion at any time. Because such a procedure occurs upon the State\u2019s motion and does not effectively terminate a prosecution upon the initial charges, it has been held that the statutory speedy trial term continues to run after the charges have been stricken with leave to reinstate as long as the defendant demands trial.\u201d (58 Ill. App. 3d 644, 646.)\nClearly, because of the nature of the SOL, a defendant\u2019s anxiety and concern over his accusation of a crime would continue after the entry of such an order.\nWhat then is the nature of a nolle prosequi? In People v. Watson (1946), 394 Ill. 177, 68 N.E.2d 265, cert, denied (1946), 329 U.S. 769, 91 L. Ed. 662, 67 S. Ct. 130, the following explanation was given:\n\u201c* * * \u2018A nolle prosequi is not a final disposition of the case, and will not bar another prosecution for the same offense. It is not an acquittal, but it is like a nonsuit or discontinuance in a civil suit, and leaves the matter in the same condition in which it was before the commencement of the prosecution.\u2019 [Citation.] Again, it has been said that the ordinary effect of a nolle prosequi is to terminate the charge to which it is entered and to permit the defendant to go wherever he pleases, without entering into a recognizance to appear at any other time. If it is entered before jeopardy has attached, it does not operate as an acquittal, so as to prevent a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.\u201d 394 Ill. 177, 179.\nUnless his actions are vexatious or repetitious, the State\u2019s Attorney has the absolute power to nolle pros a charge and if it is refused, a court may be compelled to enter an order of nolle pros. (People ex rel. Castle v. Daniels (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 43, 47-48, 132 N.E.2d 507; People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli (1953), 415 Ill. 79, 89-90, 112 N.E.2d 156.) The decision to nolle pros lies within the nearly unfettered discretion of the State\u2019s Attorney and could be used to manipulate proceedings in the same way as an SOL. See People v. Fosdick (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 524, 224 N.E.2d 242; People v. Lee (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 161, 254 N.E.2d 469.\nCase law generally treats an SOL and nolle pros similarly for purposes of speedy trial. (People v. Gimza; People v. Garcia; People v. Toney.) Each of these cases expressly states that the statutory term continues to run if the State either nolle presses a case or SOLs it. However, the issue in each of those cases was whether a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing tolled the statutory term to allow the defendant\u2019s later indictment and prosecution. The cases consistently held that such a finding does not toll the term. The statements concerning the effect of a nolle pros were therefore dicta. The authorities relied on in each case for the statement concerning the nolle pros were People v. Fosdick and People v. Lee. In those cases it is unclear if the court is dealing specifically with charges which were nolle prossed because the court in Lee merely states that \u201cthe State moved to dismiss\u201d (44 Ill. 2d 161, 165) and in Fosdick that \u201cChampaign County voluntarily dismissed its charges.\u201d (36 Ill. 2d 524, 528.) However, since an SOL is not a dismissal of a charge but a suspension of it, and the nolle pros is actually a dismissal of those particular charges and is done in the State\u2019s discretion, we conclude that the charges in Fosdick and Lee must have been nolle prossed. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Gimza, Garcia and Toney each considered the dismissals as nolle presses.\nFosdick and Lee clearly state that the statutory period continues to run when the original charges are nolle prossed and the defendant is subsequently prosecuted. However, in both cases and in the older case of Brooks v. People (1878), 88 Ill. 327, relied on by the court in Lee, the defendant remained in custody during the period after the nolle pros and until indictment or reindictment. In that respect those cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. Here defendant was out of custody for over a year before he was indicted for the murders.\nAs already concluded, a nolle pros and an SOL are treated similarly in that neither of them tolls the statutory period where the defendant remains in custody or on bond or recognizance. The crucial issue here is whether the period continues to run even though defendant is not in custody or on bail or recognizance. This was the basis for the trial court\u2019s ruling that the speedy trial act was inapplicable to defendant. People v. Bauer (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 537, 388 N.E.2d 1013, dealt with this issue in the context of an SOL. There an information was SOL\u2019d and defendant was released from bail. Defendant was subsequently indicted and admitted to bond 170 days after the SOL. The question presented was whether the 170 days after the SOL during which time defendant was not on bond or in custody should be counted as part of the statutory 160-day period. The court found People v. Baskin (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 141, 230 N.E.2d 208, wherein the supreme court stated that dismissal of a criminal matter with leave to reinstate did not toll the statutory period, to be dispositive, and counted the 170-day period in which defendant was neither in custody or on bail towards the statutory period. However, Bauer neglected to note that in Baskin the defendant was \u201con bond at all times subsequent to the filing of the complaint\u201d (38 Ill. 2d 141, 145) bringing Baskin within the express provisions of the speedy trial statute. The Bauer court did not discuss the applicability of the statutory period to a defendant who was not in custody or on bond.\nIn any event there are sufficient differences between an SOL and a nolle pros to find that the statutory period is tolled by a nolle pros where the defendant is neither in custody nor on bail or recognizance. As already noted, when a charge is SOL\u2019d, it continues to lie against the defendant in a dormant state. The prosecution is not terminated and may be reinstated at any time upon the State\u2019s motion. The nolle pros terminates the charge and requires the institution of a new and separate proceeding to prosecute a defendant for that offense. Our nolle pros is distinguishable from the \u201cnolle prosequi with leave\u201d in Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967), 386 U.S. 213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1, 87 S. Ct. 988, which allowed the prosecutor to reinstate the charge on his own motion. That procedure closely resembled our SOL. After an SOL, a defendant would still be charged with the offense, while after a nolle pros that charge would be terminated. When a charge is nolle prossed and the defendant released from custody without bond, there is no charge pending against him. Since the speedy trial statute runs only when a charge is pending against a defendant (People v. Lowe (1965), 61 Ill. App. 2d 262, 210 N.E.2d 31; People v. Gimza (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 477, 371 N.E.2d 1135) and no charge was pending after the nolle pros, the period from April 2,1975, to December 5,1976, should not be counted towards the statutory term. When that period is omitted, it is clear that defendant\u2019s statutory right was not violated. While we recognize that Fosdick and Lee may suggest a contrary result, here, unlike those cases, defendant did not remain in custody or on bond after the nolle pros.\nThis case is similar to United States v. Flores (2d Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1356, which involved the interpretation of court rules for achieving prompt disposition of criminal cases. The rules required that the government be ready for trial within six months of the date of arrest or charge unless the term was tolled for various reasons. Four months and 27 days after defendant\u2019s arrest, the complaint was dismissed because the government determined that it had insufficient evidence when a witness refused to cooperate. Four months later, when the witness agreed to testify, defendant was indicted. In determining whether defendant\u2019s speedy trial rights under the rules had been violated, the court stated:\n\u201cThe Government contends, and we accept, that for the period after the dismissal of the complaint against appellant and prior to appellant\u2019s indictment the clock should not run against it. During this period appellant was not subject to any of the disabilities associated with being under arrest, the subject of a complaint or indictment, or in the midst of a criminal prosecution. He was under no more jeopardy than any other citizen, and the fact that he might have been under investigation has no more effect after the dismissal on the running of the six-month period than it would have had before his arrest, that is, none.\u201d 501 F.2d 1356, 1359-60.\nFlores was later followed and a similar result reached in United States v. Hillegas (2d Cir. 1978), 578 F.2d 453. We find the reasoning of those cases persuasive and reach a similar conclusion that defendant\u2019s statutory right was not violated under the circumstances of this case.\nPerhaps most importantly, the record in the instant case does not evidence an attempt by the State to evade the speedy trial act by use of the nolle pros. As was recognized in dicta in People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 255, 287 N.E.2d 688, \u201cthe real issue, when a charge against a defendant is dismissed and he is later re-indicted on the same offense, may be whether the circumstances suggest that the State is seeking to evade the consequences of the 120 day rule, or whether the delay, in any event, would constitute a denial of the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial.\u201d\nDefendant contends that the State\u2019s intent to evade the statutory period is evidenced by the fact that from the time of the nolle pros until the indictment and second arrest, no new evidence against him was discovered. While the State concedes that it did not gain any additional evidence before the indictment, it is clear that it gained Scott\u2019s cooperation which it needed to proceed to trial. Contrary to defendant\u2019s suggestion, the State did not change Scott\u2019s testimony between the nolle pros and the indictment. Scott\u2019s later statements to the police and assistant State\u2019s Attorney were consistent with his trial testimony. As soon as Scott\u2019s cooperation was secured, defendant was indicted and attempts to locate him began. The record shows diligent efforts to locate defendant after his indictment and does not demonstrate an attempt to delay his arrest.\nWe therefore find that defendant\u2019s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated where he was neither in custody nor on bond or recognizance after the charges against him were nolle pressed, and there is no evidence that the dismissal of the charges was undertaken to evade the statutory period.\nDefendant also contends that the 21-month delay between his first arrest and the first delay attributable to him (a by-agreement continuance on December 13, 1976) deprived him of his Federal constitutional right to a speedy trial (U.S. Const., amend. VI) which is applicable to the States through the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; see Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967), 386 U.S. 213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1, 87 S. Ct. 988.) Determination of whether defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated requires consideration of four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) defendant\u2019s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant. Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182; People v. Henry (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 312, 265 N.E.2d 876.\nThe delay of which defendant complains is approximately 21 months. \u201cUntil there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.\u201d (Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2191.) The delay in the instant case is not so great as to be presumptively prejudicial. (See People v. Henry, delay 25-26 months; People v. Jones (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 515, 346 N.E.2d 430, delay 23 months; People v. Gray (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 526, 288 N.E.2d 26, delay 45 months.) In addition, when the other factors are balanced, it is clear that defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.\nDefendant asserts that no justification for the delay appears in the record. On the contrary the record reveals that the reasons for the delay were the unavailability of competent evidence against defendant and the inability to locate him after his indictment. While it may be true that defendant did not cause any delay before his second arrest, the record shows no attempt by the State to hamper the defense and no lack of diligence in prosecuting defendant. (Barker v. Wingo; People v. Henry.) As the Supreme Court recognized in Barker v. Wingo, a missing witness may be a valid reason for delay. (407 U.S. 514, 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192.) Although Scott was not \u201cmissing\u201d the record is clear that he would not testify against defendant until an agreement to drop the charges against him was completed and even then hesitated at trial because of his fear of defendant. Unlike People v. Harflinger (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 31, 35, 363 N.E.2d 875, in this case it is clear that Scott would have refused to testify earlier and that the delay was justified.\nThe third factor to be considered is whether defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. Following the nolle pros defendant asserted his right by demanding trial. However, at that time no charge was pending against him, a situation similar to a discharge upon a finding of no probable cause. (See People v. Toney (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 364, 367, 374 N.E.2d 695; People v. Griffin (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 644, 646, 374 N.E.2d 1031.) While such a demand may have been effective if defendant had remained in custody or had been released on bail, here he was under no restraint or charge and the demand to be tried on nonexistent charges must be considered ineffective. (Toney; Griffin.) In addition, after his second arrest, the defendant was responsible in part for delays in his trial and did not bring the petition for discharge until 3% months after his arrest. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that defendant vigorously asserted his right to a speedy trial.\nFinally, the prejudice to the defendant must be considered in light of the interests which the speedy trial right is designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize the accused\u2019s anxiety and concern; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense may be impaired. Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192.\nDefendant was in custody for approximately one month prior to the nolle pros and the last two weeks before trial. We do not view this incarceration as excessive or oppressive in a speedy trial context. During the months after the nolle pros no charge was pending against defendant and he was not \u201cliving under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility\u201d (Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2193) so as to cause him to suffer concern over his prosecution. These interests protected by the speedy trial right were not infringed upon in defendant\u2019s case.\nFinally, the impairment of the defense caused by the delay must be considered. At trial defendant asserted that he was unable to recall his whereabouts on the date of the murders and was unable to locate a potential witness, a woman with whom he had been living. Defendant does not urge these grounds on appeal and we assume that he concluded, as the trial court did, that these contentions were unfounded. The record fails to disclose any prejudice suffered by defendant because of the delay.\nBalancing the four factors found in Barker, it is clear that defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.\nDefendant also contends that he was denied due process of law because the State nolle prossed the original complaint and then consciously and intentionally delayed his second arrest to effect a change in Scott\u2019s testimony and to gain a second statutory period in which to try the case. To constitute a due process violation it must be shown that the delay between crime and arrest or charge caused substantial prejudice to the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. (United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 323-24, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468, 480, 92 S. Ct. 455; see People v. Lawson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 449, 367 N.E.2d 1244.) Defendant has not alleged that he has suffered any actual prejudice at trial except that Scott was willing to testify against him at that time. This is not the kind of prejudice necessary to establish a due process violation caused by a delay in prosecution. As already discussed, the nolle pros and later prosecution were not done to gain a second statutory term and thereby evade the speedy trial statute or to gain a tactical advantage over defendant. We therefore find this contention to be without merit.\nII.\nDefendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because: (1) there was no evidence presented to show that \u201cdefendant\u2019s criminal agency\u201d caused the deaths of the victims; (2) Keith Scott\u2019s testimony was thoroughly impeached, unworthy of belief, and suspect because of his own involvement in the crimes; and (3) the circumstantial evidence presented did not substantially corroborate Scott\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant initially contends that because Scott did not actually see him shoot either victim and the weapons were never produced at trial, the State failed to prove that he caused the victims\u2019 deaths. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant caused White and Smith\u2019s deaths. Although White had already been killed when defendant woke Scott, defendant freely admitted his responsibility for the killing and enlisted Scott\u2019s aid for the disposal of the body. Later, when Smith came home, Scott heard Smith pleading for his life and then the crash of a window. Although he lost sight of defendant in the confusion that followed, within seconds of hearing a single shot, he saw defendant pointing a smoking pistol at Smith who now had a bullet hole in his forehead. The fact that Scott did not actually see defendant pull the trigger is immaterial. Defendant\u2019s admission of guilt for White\u2019s slaying and the circumstances surrounding Smith\u2019s death which Scott related were clearly sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that defendant had caused the deaths.\nDefendant asserts that there was no corroboration of Scott\u2019s story linking him to the guns nor were the guns introduced at trial to establish that link. While the introduction of the guns at trial coupled with testimony that defendant\u2019s fingerprints covered them would have been ideal, their unexplained absence does not weaken Scott\u2019s testimony. Defendant was not arrested until 5M months after the murders. As the State notes, this was ample time for a man who was cautious enough to suggest alibis immediately after the crimes to dispose of the weapons. The evidence showed that the victims had been shot and that defendant was responsible. Obviously the jury found that the guns existed at the time of the murders and that their absence at trial did not raise a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant next challenges Scott\u2019s testimony asserting that it was unbelievable because: (1) he was an \u201caccessory after the fact\u201d who had been granted immunity from prosecution; and (2) he originally lied to the police about his knowledge of the murders and was \u201cthoroughly impeached\u201d at trial.\nThe State acknowledges that Scott was granted immunity from prosecution for concealing the deaths of the victims but disputes defendant\u2019s assertion that his testimony should be considered as that of an accomplice. A witness is an accomplice if he could have been indicted for the offense as a principal or an accessory. (People v. Robinson (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 184, 190-91, 319 N.E.2d 772; People v. Wade (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1020, 389 N.E.2d 1230.) The evidence did not indicate that Scott participated in the murders or could be held accountable for them. (See People v. Wade.) While Scott could not have been indicted for the murders, defendant contends that his participation in the events warrants careful scrutiny of his testimony. The State maintains that even if Scott\u2019s testimony is viewed as that of an accomplice, it was sufficient to prove defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWhether accomplice testimony, corroborated or uncorroborated, is a satisfactory basis for conviction goes to the weight of the evidence and is in the province of the jury. (People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349, 362 N.E.2d 291.) Even if Scott were to be considered an accomplice, his testimony was sufficiently corroborated to carry an \u201cabsolute conviction of the truth.\u201d (Wilson, at 349-50.) Scott described the exact manner that the bodies were found by the police with Smith\u2019s hands tied with the electric cord and a plastic bag covering White\u2019s head. He correctly described the location of the building where the bodies were found and the area where Ms. Edwards\u2019 car had been abandoned. Finally, the trailer receipt proved that defendant rented the trailer during the time period in question and that it was used for a short period of time as described by Scott. These factors were all corroborative of Scott\u2019s testimony and would lead to the conclusion that his testimony was accurate and truthful. The evidence as a whole is not so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Yarbrough (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227, 367 N.E.2d 666.\nDefendant contends that the inconsistencies between Scott\u2019s earlier statements to the police and assistant State\u2019s Attorneys in which he professed ignorance of the circumstances of the murders and his trial testimony in which he detailed the events demonstrate his untrustworthiness. He suggests that Scott\u2019s trial testimony was motivated by malice toward defendant and a desire to fulfill his bargain for immunity. In addition, he asserts that the fact that Scott was not threatened after the day of the murders belies Scott\u2019s assertion that the earlier statements were motivated by fear.\nIn People v. Smith (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 428, 185 N.E.2d 150, a key witness\u2019 testimony changed between defendant\u2019s first and second trial and defendant was convicted at the second trial. Defendant charged that testimony at the second trial was perjury and was improperly used to convict him. The court answered this contention by saying:\n\u201cAll of the facts covering his change in testimony at the former trial were brought out before the jury at the second trial and he testified that his testimony at the present trial was true and that his original testimony was not true. The fact that this witness changed his testimony does not establish that he was committing perjury on the second trial. The circumstances were fully brought out before the jury who had the right to pass upon the witness\u2019s credibility.\u201d 25 Ill. 2d 428, 431.\nThe same is true of this case. The jury was well aware of the fact that Scott\u2019s trial testimony varied from his earlier statements and of his alleged reason for the variance. Those circumstances would be considered in assessing Scott\u2019s credibility and the weight to be given to his testimony. The jury obviously believed that the earlier statements were made out of fear of reprisal and that Scott\u2019s trial testimony was truthful. A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the jury\u2019s on questions involving the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 564, 578, 367 N.E.2d 1313, cert, denied (1978), 435 U.S. 937, 55 L. Ed. 2d 533, 98 S. Ct. 1513.) The jury\u2019s determination was fully supported by the evidence. We will not disturb that verdict.\nDefendant\u2019s contention that Scott was \u201cthoroughly impeached\u201d is also unfounded. He cites only two instances of impeachment and both involved minor points unrelated to the events of the day of the murders. We therefore find this claim to be without merit.\nDefendant asserts that the pathologist\u2019s testimony indicating that Smith\u2019s body had no visible trauma or external injuries and Shelley Edwards\u2019 testimony that she did not recall seeing any broken window in the apartment after the murders contradicts the notion that Smith jumped from the window. Defendant neglects to note that the pathologist also testified that due to the advanced state of decomposition of Smith\u2019s body it was possible that superficial abrasions such as glass cuts v/ould not be visible. In addition, Shelley Edwards testified that she did not go into Byas\u2019 room and that the window could have been broken. When considered in toto the two witnesses\u2019 testimony does not contradict Scott\u2019s version of the events preceding Smith\u2019s death.\nFinally, defendant contends that the only evidence other than Scott\u2019s incredible testimony was circumstantial and insufficient to prove his guilt. As already discussed, the jury found Scott credible and we will not disturb that determination. We note that the other evidence set forth earlier in this opinion corroborated Scott\u2019s testimony in many regards and established defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAccordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLORENZ and WILSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE MEJDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Andrew Berman, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr and Linda Dale Woloshin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATE SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 78-1112\nOpinion filed June 27, 1980.\nRalph Ruebner and Andrew Berman, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr and Linda Dale Woloshin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0457-01", "first_page_order": 479, "last_page_order": 498 }