{ "id": 3187057, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANNY LEE et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lee", "decision_date": "1980-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 78-722", "first_page": "922", "last_page": "939", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 922" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "397 U.S. 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12089544, 12089416, 12089640, 12089323, 12089588, 12089366, 12089689, 12089468, 12089437, 12089503 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0975-07", "/us/397/0975-03", "/us/397/0975-09", "/us/397/0975-01", "/us/397/0975-08", "/us/397/0975-02", "/us/397/0975-10", "/us/397/0975-05", "/us/397/0975-04", "/us/397/0975-06" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6334241, 6334690, 6334022, 6334470, 6334889, 6333643, 6335115, 6335376, 6333812, 6336277, 6335831, 6335608, 6336057 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0865-04", "/us/419/0865-06", "/us/419/0865-03", "/us/419/0865-05", "/us/419/0865-07", "/us/419/0865-01", "/us/419/0865-08", "/us/419/0865-09", "/us/419/0865-02", "/us/419/0865-13", "/us/419/0865-11", "/us/419/0865-10", "/us/419/0865-12" ] }, { "cite": "305 N.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2463107 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826177 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 N.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2780613 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S. Ct. 867", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 L. Ed. 2d 776", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581520 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S. Ct. 1094", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2819050 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/91/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2737893 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5627358 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S. Ct. 62", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 L. Ed. 2d 72", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 U.S. 827", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219205, 6220647, 6219464, 6220369, 6220085, 6219806 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/382/0827-01", "/us/382/0827-06", "/us/382/0827-02", "/us/382/0827-05", "/us/382/0827-04", "/us/382/0827-03" ] }, { "cite": "204 N.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2839836 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853113 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 1141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971650 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441461 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 1007", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5640230 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 L. Ed. 2d 270", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2890012 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5380007 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 N.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 850", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2968623 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0850-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1455, "char_count": 40325, "ocr_confidence": 0.892, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.352553053837782e-08, "percentile": 0.513991549314265 }, "sha256": "fd36caba5d084aec091361931f2165075947fae877a003d52d0c1213c3e5e184", "simhash": "1:33f9f6bcdbef9fd1", "word_count": 6743 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:08.867369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANNY LEE et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants Augustus Lewis, Felton Chase, Danny Lee and Jerome Trosclair were indicted for murder, attempt murder, aggravated battery, armed robbery and burglary. Pretrial severance motions were denied, and defendants were tried jointly by a jury. The jury found defendants Lewis and Chase guilty of three counts of armed robbery and one count of burglary. The jury found defendants Lee and Trosclair guilty of one count of murder, one count of attempt murder, three counts of armed robbery, one count of burglary and one count each of aggravated battery and battery. The trial court sentenced Lewis to three concurrent terms of 15 to 25 years\u2019 imprisonment for the armed robberies; Chase to three concurrent terms of 20 to 30 years for the armed robberies; Lee to five concurrent terms: 60 to 120 years for murder, 30 to 60 years for attempt murder and three terms of 20 to 30 years for armed robbery; and Trosclair to five concurrent terms: 40 to 80 years for murder, 25 to 50 years for attempt murder, and three terms of 25 to 30 years for armed robbery. All defendants appeal.\nThe State\u2019s evidence indicated that on January 12, 1976, Michael Watson, Kimberly Rhymes, Dewana Beard and Rhymes\u2019 and Beard\u2019s children lived in a third-floor apartment at 2117 East 70th Street, in Chicago. That evening the following people were also present: Darryle Sanders, Reginald Bell, Sr., Reginald Bell, Jr., Mary Ann Watson, Lorenzo (Junior) Boyd, Carl, Stanley and Sandra Watson, and William Cox. At about 10:30 p.m., Michael Watson answered a knock on the apartment door. Present outside the door were defendants Chase, Lewis, Trosclair and Lee, and Trosclair\u2019s brother Kenneth. Trosclair and Chase told Watson they wanted someone named \u201cJunior\u201d outside or they were coming in. Watson did not admit the visitors and defendants left the building. Michael and Carl Watson left the apartment 20 minutes later and went to a liquor store.\nAt about 11:30 p.m., Stanley Watson answered another knock on the apartment door. Defendant Trosclair asked for Michael Watson, and Stanley said he was not there. Trosclair grabbed Stanley around the neck and put a gun to his head. Within seconds, all the defendants entered the apartment. Reginald Bell, Sr., Kimberly Rhymes and Lorenzo Boyd ran out the back door. Sandra Watson, William Cox and Reginald Bell, Jr., ran and hid in the pantry. Reginald Bell, Sr., returned to the apartment and led his son out the back door. William Cox also left through the back door. Bell, Sr., then returned to the apartment.\nTrosclair dragged Stanley Watson into the kitchen, gathered the people remaining (except Sandra Watson, who remained hidden in the pantry), and ordered them into the living room. There, he made them lie on their backs on the floor. Darryle Sanders, who was intoxicated, was sleeping nearby.\nWhile in the kitchen, Trosclair had given Lee his gun. In the living room, Lee proceeded to take money, wallets, jewelry and articles of clothing from Stanley Watson, Mary Ann Watson and Bell, Sr. Lee tried to awaken Darryle Sanders by kicking him twice, but was not successful.\nTrosclair then said, \u201cKill them all.\u201d Dewana Beard pleaded for their lives. Trosclair said, \u201cNo, don\u2019t shoot Dewana, she is pregnant.\u201d Lee then said, \u201cI have to shoot, I have to kill someone.\u201d He said he had to kill at least two people. While Lee and Trosclair talked, Chase and Lewis took the stereo set out the front door of the apartment.\nLee first shot Reginald Bell, Sr. He then shot Darryle Sanders. Trosclair was nearby and watched the shootings. Lee and Trosclair then fled from the apartment.\nAt this point, Michael and Carl Watson returned to the apartment building and found Reginald Bell, Jr., hiding behind a car. They entered the apartment and found Darryle Sanders sitting on the toilet with a bullet hole in his stomach. Bell, Jr., went over to his father, who said, \u201cBuddy, I love you.\u201d\nOutside in the alley, Kimberly Rhymes had flagged down a squad car driven by Officer Thomas Wortham. Rhymes got in the car and as they drove toward the apartment, she saw three male Negroes running towards the alley and said, \u201cThere they go; that\u2019s them.\u201d The alley was blocked by a four-door black Oldsmobile. Two men were in the car and three others were about to get in. All five men fled from the car and ran into a courtway. Wortham and his partner stopped their squad car in the alley and pursued the five men on foot.\nWortham heard footsteps going up the back porch stairs of the building. Wortham then saw Lewis walk out into the alleyway. Lewis explained that he had come from his apartment on the second floor. Wortham investigated that apartment, discovered that Lewis did not live there, and arrested Lewis. Lewis also gave a false name.\nOther officers joined in the search and found defendants Trosclair, Lee and Chase and Kenneth Trosclair crouched behind a garbage can on a third floor landing. They were arrested and various stolen items were recovered from them and from the Oldsmobile. Wortham also recovered a revolver from the curb near the Oldsmobile. Lee\u2019s fingerprints were on the revolver.\nReginald Bell, Sr., was pronounced dead of gunshot wounds at the hospital. Darryle Sanders sustained serious abdominal injuries. The five men arrested were placed in a 15-man lineup. Kimberly Rhymes and Mary Ann Watson identified the four defendants. Sandra Watson identified Lee, Trosclair and Chase as the men she saw break in before she hid in the pantry. Stanley Watson identified Lee, Trosclair and Chase as the men he had an opportunity to see.\nLewis testified in his own behalf, and his testimony was adopted by Chase. On January 12, 1976, after 7:30 p.m., Lewis, Trosclair (his half-brother), Chase (his cousin) and Kenneth Trosclair went to 70th and Merrill to pick up Chase\u2019s suitcase from his brother Reginald\u2019s apartment. Near Reginald\u2019s apartment they saw a parked car belonging to a man named Larry. They had got into an argument with Larry earlier that day. They entered a building and knocked on the third floor apartment door. Michael Watson answered the door; a conversation ensued and became heated. The three defendants and Kenneth Trosclair left at the suggestion of Reginald Lewis, who came out of a nearby apartment. They then picked up Lee and someone named Larry and subsequently returned to the vicinity of 70th and Merrill to pick up Chase\u2019s suitcase. Larry, Trosclair and Lee got out of the car. Kenneth Trosclair parked the car in an alley behind Reginald\u2019s apartment building and Lewis, Chase and Kenneth went to Reginald\u2019s apartment. No one answered the door.\nAs they descended the stairs, they heard two gunshots. Lewis saw Larry running down the street carrying a stereo and defendant Trosclair running close behind. Everyone but Lee got into the car. However, at the sight of flashing blue lights, everyone jumped out of the car and ran. Lewis ran toward his brother\u2019s apartment and then returned to his car. There he was arrested by the police and questioned. Lewis testified that he told the officer his correct name and address.\nLee testified in his own behalf and sought to establish a compulsion defense. He testified that he was an epileptic and had been having seizures ever since he had been hit in the head with a pipe and had gotten a bullet in his head. Lee explained that in 1972 defendant Trosclair came over to Lee\u2019s house with a gun. When Lee picked up the gun it went off and a bullet lodged in his head. The bullet remained in his head and its entryway is covered by a metal plate. Lee described his epileptic fits as \u201cfallout\u201d \u2014 an inability to recall what had happened.\nAt this point, the trial court instructed the jury to ignore all of Lee\u2019s testimony regarding the shooting, being hit by the pipe and his epilepsy, because it was irrelevant and not supported by medical testimony.\nLee further testified that when he was in school he belonged to the Disciples Gang and that Trosclair was the leader. Leaders told the other members what to do. Other questions pertaining to gang activity were objected to and sustained. The jury was instructed to disregard occurrences and relationships Lee had prior to 1974. The court stated that the only admissible evidence of compulsion would be \u201cthat that occurred just prior to the time of occurrence, within a reasonable period of time, 0 \u00b0 Lee made an offer of proof as to earlier events.\nLee then testified that on the evening of January 12,1976, he planned to go out with a woman, but left with Trosclair because Trosclair told him to and he feared Trosclair. Lee, Chase, Lewis, Trosclair and Kenneth Trosclair got in a car and drove to Reginald Chase\u2019s home. They parked in front of Reggie\u2019s house and met someone named Larry. Lee, Larry and Trosclair went to a third floor apartment Lee had never visited before. Trosclair knocked on the door, talked for a few minutes and then busted the door in. Trosclair put his gun to the head of the man at the door and told the people inside the apartment to lie on the floor.\nLee further testified that he kept asking Trosclair to leave. Trosclair turned around, called to Lee and shoved the pistol into Lee\u2019s stomach. Trosclair told Lee to kill everyone. Lee said no, but Trosclair kept hollering, \u201cKill everyone.\u201d Lee said that he could not shoot the pregnant woman and Trosclair replied, \u201cDon\u2019t shoot her then. Shoot them two.\u201d Lee had the gun and was near the door and Trosclair was behind him. He said he fired the gun because Trosclair was behind him and he didn\u2019t know if Trosclair had another gun. He was afraid of being killed by Trosclair or someone in the house. Lee shot twice, ran and was apprehended by the police. He denied taking any property.\nOn appeal, defendants assert that the trial court erred: (1) in denying their respective severance motions, renewed severance motions and motions for mistrial; (2) by excluding Lee\u2019s testimony concerning his long-standing relationship with Trosclair, thereby depriving him of his right to present a defense of compulsion; (3) in refusing Lee\u2019s proffered instructions on compulsion; (4) in belittling Lee and his counsel in front of the jury; (5) in allowing decedent\u2019s young son to offer cumulative testimony that would prejudice and inflame the jury; (6) by allowing an officer to testify to a statement Lewis made when the substance of that statement was not provided during pretrial discovery; and (7) in imposing excessive sentences upon Lewis and Chase.\nDefendants contend that they should have had severed trials. Trosclair and Lee were the only defendants to make pretrial severance motions. Lee\u2019s written motion alleged that his interests and defenses were antagonistic with codefendants for reasons apparent from Lewis\u2019 answer to the State\u2019s discovery motion. Lewis\u2019 answer, filed on February 28,1977, indicated that he believed the evidence would show that the crimes charged were committed solely by Lee and Trosclair. Lewis further stated that he may assert the defense of alibi and would rely on the State\u2019s inability to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Lee further alleged that he had reason to believe that Trosclair\u2019s and Chase\u2019s defenses would be similar to Lewis\u2019 defense. Lee\u2019s motion was not supported by affidavit.\nAll the defendants responded to the State\u2019s discovery motions, revealing the following anticipated defenses: Trosclair, Chase and Lee all indicated they would rely on the inability of the State to prove them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Chase also stated that he may use an alibi defense. Lee also indicated that he may assert the defense of alibi, insanity, necessity, duress or self-defense. Lee\u2019s answer was filed on June 10,1976; Chase\u2019s on September 13,1977; and Trosclair\u2019s on September 29, 1977.\nOn June 28, 1977, Lee\u2019s severance motion was heard and denied by the trial court. At this time, Trosclair had not filed a severance motion and did not join in Lee\u2019s motion; indeed, his attorney was not even present for argument on this motion.\nLee\u2019s counsel argued essentially the same points contained in his written motion. Additionally, Lewis\u2019 counsel, a public defender, made a statement to clarify Lewis\u2019 discovery answer. He originally represented Trosclair, Chase and Lewis. However, his investigation revealed evidence that Lee and Trosclair were the perpetrators of the crimes charged. Because of this conflict of interest he was granted leave to withdraw as Trosclair\u2019s and Chase\u2019s attorney. The trial court denied Lee\u2019s motion for severance, finding that antagonistic defenses had not been proved.\nOn September 29, 1977, Trosclair filed a motion for severance, alleging co-defendants\u2019 defenses were antagonistic. He stated that he believed co-defendants made statements and admissions, not attributable to him, which the State would use at trial and that at least one of the co-defendants will or has given the State statements implicating him. These allegations were not supported by affidavit. On December 9, 1976, the State filed an amended answer to discovery indicating that Lee made an oral statement. The answer further indicated that the time, place, date and contents of the statement were set out in police reports tendered to the defense in open court. The record does not contain these reports nor does it indicate that the trial court was apprised of either the reports or Lee\u2019s statement during the hearing on Trosclair\u2019s severance motion.\nTrosclair did not argue this motion until immediately before the jury was sworn on September 29, 1977. The trial court found that the mere possibility that a co-defendant would testify against Trosclair was not a sufficient basis to grant a separate trial.\nGenerally, defendants jointly indicted should be jointly tried unless fairness to one or more defendants requires a separate tria!. (People v. Jones (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 850, 353 N.E.2d 375; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 8.) Whether a separate trial should be granted lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and its determination will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of discretion. (People v. Henderson (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 164, 351 N.E.2d 225.) Of paramount concern is whether their defenses are so antagonistic that a severance is imperative to a fair trial. People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 376, 258 N.E.2d 321, cert. denied sub nom. Guido v. Illinois (1970), 397 U.S. 975, 25 L. Ed. 2d 270, 90 8. Ct. 1094.\nA motion for separate trials of jointly indicted defendants must be made before trial. (People v. Precup (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 23, 365 N.E.2d 1007, aff'd (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 382 N.E.2d 227.) Insofar as the motion is based on facts not appearing of record, it should be supported by affidavit. (People v. Miner (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 273, 360 N.E.2d 1141.) Defendant must demonstrate how he would be prejudiced by the denial of a separate trial (People v. Rhodes (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 494, 244 N.E.2d 145) and must disclose specific grounds why the severance should be granted. (People v. Brinn (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 232, 204 N.E.2d 724, cert. denied sub nom. Clements v. Illinois (1965), 382 U.S. 827, 15 L. Ed. 2d 72, 86 S. Ct. 62.) Mere apprehension of a conflicting situation does not provide the trial court with sufficient grounds for granting a severance motion. (People v. Nickson (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 470, 374 N.E.2d 804.) Moreover, the fact that separate counsel had been appointed for jointly indicted defendants because of a conflict of interest does not, standing alone, entitle defendants to separate trials. People v. Friedrich (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 240, 169 N.E.2d 752; People v. Arnold (1968), 91 Ill. App. 2d 282, 233 N.E.2d 764.\nThe reviewing court will consider only petitions filed by defendants and matters alleged therein, and not subsequent happenings at trial. (People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 376, 256 N.E.2d 321, cert. denied sub nom. Guido v. Illinois (1970), 397 U.S. 975, 25 L. Ed. 2d 270, 90 S. Ct. 1094.) Nonetheless, the trial court has a continuing duty at all stages of trial to grant a severance if prejudice appears. People v. Clark (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 381, 389 N.E.2d 911; cf. Schaffer v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 511, 4 L. Ed. 2d 921, 80 S. Ct. 945 (application of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).\nApplying these principles, we find that Lee\u2019s pretrial severance motion was properly denied. Lee asserted that Lewis\u2019 defense would be antagonistic. Lewis\u2019 discovery answer indicated that he may assert an alibi defense and believed the evidence would implicate Lee and Trosclair. However, Lee\u2019s discovery answer indicated that he might use any of the following defenses: alibi, insanity, necessity, duress or self-defense. Only an alibi defense would necessarily be antagonistic. The other affirmative defenses serve to concede the actions yet deny criminal culpability.\nLee relied upon no ground for severance other than antagonistic defenses, did not support his motion by affidavit and presented the mere apprehension of a conflict. (People v. Nickson.) Under these circumstances, the appointment of separate counsel because of a conflict did not entitle Lee to a separate trial. People v. Arnold.\nNor do we believe that Lee was prejudiced at trial. His compulsion defense was not antagonistic with defenses presented by any co-defendant.\nWe also find that Trosclair\u2019s pretrial severance motion was properly denied. Trosclair asserted that co-defendants made statements that would be used to implicate him at trial. These allegations were not supported by affidavit nor are the alleged statements part of the record. Trosclair\u2019s mere apprehensions that co-defendants might implicate him are insufficient to sustain his pretrial severance motion.\nWe next turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred by failing to grant a severance for Trosclair at trial. Trosclair\u2019s answer to the State\u2019s discovery motion indicated he would rely on the inability of the State to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that he might testify. During opening statements, his attorney represented that Trosclair would testify and establish his innocence. His counsel also made a continuing motion for severance throughout the trial and made timely motions for a mistrial based on co-defendants\u2019 testimony.\nLewis\u2019 testimony indicated that Trosclair was let out of the car at the scene of the crimes and that Trosclair fled following \u201cLarry,\u201d who was carrying a stereo. Moreover, Lee\u2019s compulsion defense directly implicated Trosclair in the crimes charged.\nCo-defendants\u2019 testimony was patently antagonistic to Trosclair\u2019s defense. This was not apparent until trial. They placed Trosclair at the crime scene, indicated his responsibility for the crimes charged and inferred that he was fleeing with stolen property. Co-defendants\u2019 testimony may have necessitated Trosclair\u2019s decision not to testify.\nThe cumulative effect of co-defendants\u2019 antagonistic defenses prejudiced Trosclair. We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury was uninfluenced (Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824), and find that as to Trosclair the trial court breached its continuing duty to grant a severance when prejudice becomes apparent.\nLewis and Chase contend that they should have been granted a mistrial and severance because Lee\u2019s mentioning of gang membership prejudiced all defendants. Lee, however, only testified that he and Trosclair were gang members. Therefore, Lewis\u2019 and Chase\u2019s allegations of prejudice are conjectural. In any event, after deliberation, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard all events and relationships Lee had between 1970 and 1974, including gang membership. Moreover, the single reference to Lee and Trosclair\u2019s gang membership, without testimony that the gang was involved in the instant crimes or other criminal activities, does not constitute prejudicial error. See People v. James (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1051, 282 N.E.2d 760.\nWe next consider Lee\u2019s claims concerning the defense of compulsion. Section 7 \u2014 11(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 11(a)) provides:\n\u201cA person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct which he performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such conduct.\u201d\nInitially, we note that there is serious doubt whether the defense of compulsion is applicable in a murder prosecution. (People v. Smith (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 36, 311 N.E.2d 164; see Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 11, Committee Comments, at 432 (Smith-Hurd 1973).) In any event, we find the trial court\u2019s rulings were proper.\nCompulsion is an affirmative defense and, once it is properly raised by some evidence, the State must overcome it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Colone (1978), 56 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 372 N.E.2d 871.) Once compulsion is raised and \u201csome evidence\u201d is presented which supports the defense, it is error to refuse to instruct the jury on the defense. People v. Adcock (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 917, 331 N.E.2d 573.\nSo long as the fear of great bodily harm is reasonable, the defense of compulsion is available even though defendant might be mistaken in his belief of imminent danger. (People v. Adcock.) However, the defense is available only where compulsion has arisen without the negligence or fault of defendant. (People v. Rodriquez (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 118, 332 N.E.2d 194.) If defendant has ample opportunities to withdraw from the criminal enterprise but fails to do so, he may not avail himself of the compulsion defense. People v. Colone.\nLee contends that his testimony concerning his past relationship with Trosclair supported his defense of compulsion, was improperly ruled inadmissible and that his motion for a mistrial was improperly denied. He also asserts that the trial court erred by not giving instructions he proffered on compulsion.\nWhen the trial court curtailed Lee\u2019s references to activities which occurred six or seven years before the incident, his counsel made an offer of proof.\nIn addition to Lee\u2019s testimony which was stricken from the record (concerning his injury from a gun supplied by Trosclair and gang activity), counsel sought to introduce evidence of situations Lee was involved in as a youngster: Lee would testify that when Trosclair and he were gang members Trosclair gave him certain orders. Lee believed Trosclair would harm him if he disobeyed. Lee was told not to go to a certain park. When he disobeyed, he was beaten with a baseball bat. Counsel represented there were other incidents that made Lee reasonably believe on January 12, 1976, that Trosclair would seriously harm him for disobeying an order. Counsel did not specify what these incidents were.\nThe rest of Lee\u2019s testimony was allowed at trial because it pertained to how Lee and Trosclair interacted on January 12, 1976. Lee explained that he broke a date that night because Trosclair told him to come with him. Lee did not mention any threats of death or great bodily harm should he not accompany Trosclair. When defendants arrived outside the victims\u2019 apartment, Lee went with Trosclair and Larry, even though he did not know where they were going. Again, Lee did not mention that Trosclair threatened or forced him to go along.\nAt the apartment door, Trosclair talked to a man and then suddenly broke the door down, put a gun to the man\u2019s head and went inside the apartment. Lee claimed that he stood at the door watching. He did not attempt to leave the building. Nor did he testify that he was compelled to remain or that Trosclair held the gun on him.\nLee watched Trosclair order the occupants of the apartment to lie on the floor. He kept saying to Trosclair, \u201cCome on, let\u2019s go.\u201d Lee, however, did not leave. Lee further testified that Trosclair shoved the pistol at him and ordered him to kill everyone. Trosclair subsequently changed his command to kill only two, because Lee would not shoot the pregnant lady.\nLee stated that he was near the door and Trosclair was behind him. Lee claimed that he shot two people because he feared Trosclair, because Trosclair might have had another gun and because he feared the inhabitants of the apartment.\nWe believe that Lee\u2019s testimony fails to establish \u201csome evidence\u201d of compulsion. Lee was not in jeopardy of an imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, since he had the gun and never saw Trosclair with another weapon the night of the incident. Trosclair ordered Lee to shoot two people, but neither threatened to harm Lee if he failed to obey nor had the apparent ability to harm Lee. Moreover, Lee testified that Trosclair had run before he fired the second shot. Lee also had ample opportunity to withdraw from the criminal enterprise at its early stages, yet chose to remain.\nBecause Lee\u2019s account of the incident fails to support the affirmative defense of compulsion, the trial court\u2019s exclusion of his testimony concerning his relationship with Trosclair from 1970 to 1974 was not error. Lee\u2019s offer of proof is too remote and speculative. Furthermore, it is irrelevant as to Lee\u2019s state of mind at the time of the shooting because any fear of Trosclair was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Finally, having failed to raise \u201csome evidence\u201d of compulsion, defendant is precluded from obtaining jury instructions on this defense. People v. Adcock (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 917, 331 N.E.2d 573.\nLee next contends that he was prejudiced when the trial court belittled him and his counsel in the presence of the jury. Specifically, Lee complains of four remarks. The first remark occurred when Lee tried to explain how he shot himself in the head in 1972:\n\u201cA. Like, you know, Jerome had a gun, you know, he was at my house. So they was playing with it at first, you know. I went to the door and they said it wasn\u2019t no bullets in the gun.\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Objection. Objection.\nThe Court: Basis?\nMr. Goggin: It\u2019s hearsay.\nThe Court: He is stating what happened. He can testify.\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Judge, if I may. He just said, \u2018They said.\u2019\nThe Court: When you say \u2018they say,\u2019 are you saying that\u2014\nThe Witness: The People say.\nThe Court: They told you. Mr. Lee, you are advised not to indicate anything that anybody told you. You can only tell the court what happened to you that you know from your own knowledge only. You understand?\nThe Witness: Uh-huh.\nThe Court: Do not indicate what anybody else told you. You understand? You follow me on that matter, do you not? You know what I\u2019m saying?\nThe Witness: You saying\u2014\nThe Court: You could tell the court what happened to you that you know from your own personal knowledge. Not what somebody else told you. You understand?\nThe Witness: But I was saying, you know\u2014\nThe Court: Well, I\u2019m just telling you.\nThe Witness: This is how I got shot. I was trying to explain. I didn\u2019t want to say no names.\nThe Court: I understand. But I just wanted to let you know that you are limited only to tell what happened to you that you know yourself. Okay. You know that for your own personal knowledge. Continue.\u201d\nLee contends that the court\u2019s remarks create the impression that he was a deliberately noncooperative witness. We find that the court was merely explaining the hearsay rule to Lee until it felt Lee exhibited an understanding of the rule. A witness is not discredited merely by the court\u2019s admonitions to respond properly to questions. People v. Mahaffey (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 496, 504, 377 N.E.2d 85.\nWe have reviewed the record as to the second and third remarks by the trial court and find no error. The second remark was merely a reminder of the court\u2019s prior warning concerning hearsay testimony. In its third remark, the court explained that it was necessary for Lee to avoid narrative answers. The court\u2019s admonitions served to make Lee aware that his testimony must comply with evidentiary restrictions in order to avoid further objectionable testimony.\nFinally, Lee asserts that his counsel was disparaged by the court\u2019s comments. Lee testified that he shot the victims because of things he had seen \u201c[a]s long as I have known him.\u201d Lee\u2019s attorney then asked:\n\u201cQ. Known who?\nA. Jerome.\nQ. What have you seen?\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Objection.\nThe Court: Counsel, would you \u2014 Reporter, would you repeat that last answer?\n(Answer read.)\nThe Court: Mr. [Defense Counsel], to go beyond what we have discussed with reference to this matter, you are in dangerous territory. You may continue. Objection overruled.\n[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I have to have a side bar. I don\u2019t want to violate any rules.\nThe Court: Mr. [Defense Counsel], I don\u2019t think a side bar is necessary.\n[Defense Counsel]: Have any of the things that you have seen happen [sic] subsequent to 1974? Have any of the things that you are referring to happen [sic] subsequent to 1974. After 1974?\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Objection.\nThe Court: Objection sustained. Counsel, you\u2019re making a vague remark. Unless you have a situation, time, date and place and who was present in these the court will not let you go into that.\n[Defense Counsel]: I don\u2019t know what he is referring to, Judge. I have to ask him when this happened.\nThe Court: Counsel, you are aware of the rules of evidence. Are you aware of the rules of evidence?\n[Defense Counsel]: I am aware of them.\nThe Court: Thank you.\n[Defense Counsel]: I would like a side bar, Judge.\u201d\nDuring the side bar, Lee\u2019s counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that he, and thus his client, was belittled in front of the jury. The trial court denied the motion, but said to the jury:\n\u201cThe Court: While he is forming his question ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I had made a remark with reference to Mr. [Defense Counsel], whether or not he knew the rules of evidence.\nI would like to say that I apologize before you. Certainly that question was not called on on [sic] my behalf and I should never have addressed that. If he didn\u2019t know it he wouldn\u2019t be here.\nSo I wish you would disregard that statement with reference to it, and thank you.\nGo ahead, Mr. [Defense Counsel].\n[Defense Counsel]: Thank you.\u201d\nWe note that the court had previously acknowledg\u00e9d problems with Lee\u2019s testimony, but said to Lee\u2019s attorney: \u201cBut you understand the rules\u201d and \u201cYou understand the rules of evidence and narrative answers.\u201d Thus, Lee\u2019s counsel had been warned that the trial court expected him to abide by the rules of evidence in phrasing questions. Indeed, immediately before questioning counsel the court stated, \u201cCounsel, you are aware of the rules of evidence.\u201d\nThe court\u2019s inquiry appears to be in the nature of a firm reminder that counsel apply the rules of evidence he knew in phrasing questions, rather than impugning counsel\u2019s knowledge of the rules of evidence. Moreover, the court\u2019s apology to counsel in the presence of the jury and its instruction that the jury disregard the statement alleviated any misapprehension by the jury as to the purpose and meaning of the court\u2019s remarks. Review of the record convinces us that this remark was merely one isolated incident contrasted against a consistent pattern of cordiality and helpfulness to counsel exhibited by the trial court. In any event, the court\u2019s remarks evidently were provoked by defense counsel\u2019s failure to properly question his witness. (People v. Mahaffey.) Accordingly, Lee suffered no prejudice. See People v. Beasley (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 109, 369 N.E.2d 260.\nLee next contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Reginald Bell, Jr., the murder victim\u2019s son, and that the State inflamed the jury in closing remarks about his testimony. Lee further contends that Bell\u2019s testimony was cumulative and unnecessary because the State had already presented a \u201clife-and-death witness.\u201d\nSannon Bell, widow of the deceased Reginald Bell, Sr., testified as the State\u2019s life-and-death witness. Reginald Bell, Jr., testified, not as a life- and-death witness, but as an occurrence witness. He did not witness the shooting, but properly testified as to the events leading to the incident and to the discovery of the victim, his father. Reginald was near his father\u2019s car when he heard two shots. He saw two people run down the stairs, cross the street and run into the alley. One of them carried a record player. No one else testified about this occurrence. Upon returning to the apartment, Reginald went to his father. The colloquy at trial was simply:\n\u201cQ. [by State]: What happened when you went over to your father?\nA. He said, \u2018Buddy, I love you.\u2019\nQ. He was alive at that time?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nThe rest of Reginald\u2019s testimony concerned transporting his father to the hospital.\nDuring closing, the State argued:\n\u201cReginald Bell testified he saw the people running out of the apartment. You heard him testify to that. He was ducked down behind a car to hide because he might have got shot, too, because he was a witness. He was a witness to this armed robbery-home invasion-murder. He corroborated his testimony with Kim and what Sandy and what Mary Ann testified to.\nHe went back into that apartment and he will have to live with it for the rest of his life. And he was kneeling over his daddy and his dad said, \u2018Buddy, I love you.\u2019 His dad died by this bullet. His dad died by the hands of those four people seated in this courtroom.\nWhy did he have to die? What was the sense of it?\u201d\nThe extent to which cumulative evidence may be received rests within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Nahas (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 570, 292 N.E.2d 466.) The court may exclude cumulative evidence, especially when it is encumbered by other irrelevant evidence. (People v. Raby (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595, cert. denied (1969), 393 U.S. 1083, 21 L. Ed. 2d 776, 89 S. Ct. 867.) Evidence that the deceased left a spouse and family generally is not admissible because it is not relevant to the guilt or innocence of defendant and might inflame the jury. (People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 334, 146 N.E.2d 14.) Closing argument which dwells upon decedent\u2019s family is also inflammatory and improper. (People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359, 197 N.E.2d 436.) However, reference to or evidence that a murder victim had a family does not warrant a reversal where the victim\u2019s children are necessarily involved in the facts of the case (People v. Parker (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 774, 305 N.E.2d 228, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 865, 42 L. Ed. 2d 102, 95 S. Ct. 120), or witness the incident. See People v. Jayne (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 990, 368 N.E.2d 422.\nWe note that not all of Reginald\u2019s testimony was cumulative. Rather, he established an important portion of the State\u2019s case: two fleeing felons carrying stolen property from the crime scene. Thus, Reginald\u2019s testimony was necessarily part of a proper presentation of the State\u2019s case. (People v. Jayne.) The State\u2019s questioning of Reginald pertaining to his father was more incidental to his earlier testimony than calculated to prejudice the jury because of sympathy for the deceased\u2019s family. It was not presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it was material. (See People v. Wilson (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 302, 281 N.E.2d 626.) The State\u2019s closing comments merely reiterated Reginald\u2019s testimony and did not dwell upon decedent\u2019s family, and did not prejudice Lee.\nDefendants Lewis and Chase argue that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Wortham to testify that Lewis gave him a false address at the time of his arrest. They contend that their motions to strike the testimony or for a mistrial should have been granted. Lewis told Wortham he was coming from his apartment on the second floor. Defendants contend that they did not receive the substance of this oral statement as required under Supreme Court Rule 412 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 110A, par. 412). Instead, the State\u2019s answer to discovery stated that defendants \u201cmade no statements except to state their name, age and address.\u201d The State\u2019s amended answer to discovery indicated that police reports, tendered to the defense in open court, contained pertinent information on statements made by the defendants. Lewis\u2019 arrest report shows that the arrest was made at 2141 East 70th Street and that his residence was at 738 East 103d Place.\nWortham testified that he saw the assailants flee from the car in the alley and then heard footsteps on the rear porches. He then saw Lewis walk out into the alleyway. Wortham stopped Lewis and asked him where he had come from. Wortham testified, \u201cHe told me he was coming from his apartment on the second floor.\u201d Wortham investigated and determined that Lewis did not live there.\nWe agree that the State\u2019s discovery answer is misleading. Rule 412 requires that the State disclose \u201c* * # the substance of any oral statements made by the accused or by a codefendant, * \u00b0 A better State answer would be that when arrested Lewis claimed to live in a second floor apartment at 2141 East 70th Street. The State would not be obligated to expose the falsity of Lewis\u2019 claim because that was only apparent from subsequent investigation and not from his statement alone. However, defense counsel apparently would have learned of this discrepancy from the police reports which listed Lewis\u2019 current address, or from questioning his- client.\nDefense counsel claimed surprise that Lewis gave a false address and alibi upon arrest However, he made no motion for a continuance, but proceeded to cross-examine Wortham. Where defendant does not request a continuance but proceeds with trial, he has waived the issue of disclosure upon review. (People v. Callaham (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 377 N.E.2d 171.) In any event, Lewis\u2019 statement did not bear upon a material issue in this cause and disclosure would not have altered the outcome of the trial.\nFinally, Lewis and Chase claim their sentences are excessive because they were held responsible for the actions of Trosclair and Lee. Chase was sentenced to three concurrent terms of 20 to 30 years and Lewis to three concurrent terms of 15 to 25 years for these armed robberies. Defendants assert that these sentences amounted to murder sentences and that the trial court believed them guilty of murder despite murder acquittals by the jury.\nThese sentences were clearly within the statutory range and absent an abuse of discretion may not be altered upon review. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882.) Examination of the record convinces us that the trial court properly relied upon the presentence investigation reports and matters presented in aggravation and mitigation. Defendants\u2019 assertion that the court imposed sentences believing them guilty of murder is unfounded. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing.\nFor all the aforementioned reasons, the conviction and sentences of defendants Lee, Lewis and Chase are affirmed; the conviction of defendant Trosclair is reversed, and his cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook County for a new trial.\nAffirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.\nWe note also that Lee\u2019s testimony that Trosclair was the leader of the Disciples street gang, although subsequently stricken from the record, augments the prejudicial impact of co-defendants\u2019 antagonistic defenses.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Daniel Cummings, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant Danny Lee.", "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Michael Mikula and Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellants Augustus Lewis and Felton Chase.", "Richard E. Gorman, of Chicago, for appellant Jerome Trosclair.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Robert J. Kaiser, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANNY LEE et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-722\nOpinion filed July 21, 1980.\nRalph Ruebner and Daniel Cummings, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant Danny Lee.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Michael Mikula and Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellants Augustus Lewis and Felton Chase.\nRichard E. Gorman, of Chicago, for appellant Jerome Trosclair.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Robert J. Kaiser, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0922-01", "first_page_order": 944, "last_page_order": 961 }