{ "id": 3182372, "name": "THE CITY OF PEORIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL McMORROW et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "City of Peoria v. McMorrow", "decision_date": "1980-08-22", "docket_number": "No. 79-550", "first_page": "524", "last_page": "525", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 524" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "243 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1601122 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/104/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 N.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2620954 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0386-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 270, "char_count": 3709, "ocr_confidence": 0.904, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.0011153170616546e-08, "percentile": 0.31440597502016526 }, "sha256": "ce8518135eb5a3bdf7c777e38beafda0b54294cd5f1196e3430f512848fb5290", "simhash": "1:9a128e23c6a4faf6", "word_count": 611 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:36.886143+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE CITY OF PEORIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL McMORROW et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County holding that section 13 \u2014 8 of the Code of the City of Peoria is unconstitutional. Each defendant was charged with violating section 13 \u2014 8 in that \u201che did at or about 8 p.m. visit a place kept within the City for the purpose of permitting persons to gamble for any valuable thing * * Defendants moved to dismiss the complaints due to certain alleged defects in the ordinance. The City moved to amend the complaint to read that each defendant knowingly visited a place kept in the city for the purpose of permitting gambling. The city was permitted to amend the complaints, and then the trial court dismissed the complaints, finding the ordinance unconstitutional.\nOn appeal the sole issue is whether section 13 \u2014 8 of the Code of the City of Peoria is unconstitutional. We believe that it is.\nThe ordinance reads in pertinent part \u201cNo person shall * * * visit * * * any house, room, yard, boat, vessel or other structure, place or premises kept within the city for the purpose of permitting persons to game or gamble for any valuable thing.\u201d Peoria, Ill., Code \u00a713 \u2014 8 (1971).\nWe believe this ordinance lacks sufficient clarity and precision to give individuals the degree of definition constitutionally required in order to allow them to determine if their contemplated behavior is proscribed.\nIt is an established rule that no person can be held criminally or quasi-criminally responsible for conduct which he cannot reasonably understand to be prohibited. (City of Chicago v. Witvoet (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 386,332 N.E.2d 767.) Consequently, laws must be drawn in such a fashion as to state articulable, objective standards pursuant to which one may gauge his conduct. In those instances where ordinances are drafted which do not provide the required degree of certainty, such vagueness and uncertainty render the ordinance void. City of Rockford v. Floyd (1969), 104 Ill. App. 2d 161, 243 N.E.2d 837.\nWe do not believe that the phrase \u201cvisit * * * any house, room, yard, boat, vessel or other structure kept within the city for the purpose of permitting persons to game or gamble for any valuable thing\u201d adequately describes conduct which identifies the proscribed behavior. The term \u201cvisit\u201d is vague. It is arguable as to what constitutes a visit. The city contends that \u201cvisit\u201d means to go and stay at a place for a short time and that this adequately defines \u201cvisit.\u201d We disagree. Any person walking past a building in which he knows gambling is taking place and sees a friend in the yard of the building and stops to talk for a few minutes could be said to be \u201cvisiting\u201d under the State\u2019s definition. However, it is obvious the city did not intend to proscribe such behavior. Thus, it can be seen that the city\u2019s definition of \u201cvisit\u201d fails to clearly describe the behavior intended to be proscribed. Nor have we found any definition of \u201cvisit\u201d which clearly describes the proscribed behavior. Indeed, the problem is that words such as \u201cvisit\u201d do not lend themselves to a limiting construction. The city fails to describe exactly what behavior is proscribed. Therefore, we believe the ordinance in the present case is impermissibly vague and is therefore unconstitutional.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTENGEL and SCOTT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Eric Margolis and David L. Thomas, both of Peoria, for appellant.", "G. Edward Orr, of East Peoria, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE CITY OF PEORIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL McMORROW et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 79-550\nOpinion filed August 22, 1980.\nEric Margolis and David L. Thomas, both of Peoria, for appellant.\nG. Edward Orr, of East Peoria, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0524-01", "first_page_order": 546, "last_page_order": 547 }