{ "id": 3181898, "name": "DONNA HARTIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HUGH ROBERTSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Hartigan v. Robertson", "decision_date": "1980-08-18", "docket_number": "No. 79-1237", "first_page": "732", "last_page": "740", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 732" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2489139 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3272633 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3235166 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3183714 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3382885 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 1009", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579526 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/1009-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2725801 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/43/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 N.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2598285 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/57/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 2d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2556297 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/83/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 1359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3282596 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1580171 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/123/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 873", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2805221 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0873-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 N.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334608 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12131280 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1586074 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/117/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5237560 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/34/0472-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 977, "char_count": 17911, "ocr_confidence": 0.865, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.779211516894471e-07, "percentile": 0.7132234350342433 }, "sha256": "a8beedb980c44ea5d77da98b6e52e1855787af702c7b59bbb6b01ffc1d14988e", "simhash": "1:337d6fe7b8c67cd0", "word_count": 2929 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:36.886143+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DONNA HARTIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HUGH ROBERTSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDonna Hartigan (plaintiff) brought suit to recover damages for personal injuries arising from an automobile accident with Hugh Robertson (defendant). The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $50,000. Defendant appeals.\nAt about 4 p.m. on November 2, 1973, plaintiff was driving east on Dundee Road in Northbrook, Illinois. Shortly west of its intersection with Skokie Boulevard, Dundee Road consists of two eastbound and two westbound lanes. Immediately to the west of the intersection of Dundee Road and Skokie Boulevard the lanes are divided by a median raised curb. Farther to the west the raised curb becomes a \u201crumble strip which a vehicle can go over without damaging.\u201d There is a traffic light at the intersection of Skokie Boulevard and Dundee Road. The posted speed limit is 45 miles per hour.\nPlaintiff drove in the inner, left lane at 40 to 45 miles per hour. She intended to turn left and proceed north on Skokie Boulevard. She began to decrease her speed 1% blocks before the intersection. At 35 miles per hour, plaintiff observed defendant\u2019s car some four car lengths ahead. Defendant was moving slowly to the north in the driveway of Bojan\u2019s Auto Body Shop. The driveway was south of and perpendicular to the right, eastbound lane. Defendant intended to cross the two eastbound lanes and turn left to go west on Dundee Road.\nAfter seeing defendant\u2019s car, plaintiff decreased her speed again and began \u201cbraking harder.\u201d She kept defendant\u2019s car in \u201ccontinuous observation.\u201d Defendant\u2019s car entered the right lane. Plaintiff honked the horn, but defendant continued to move. Plaintiff noticed defendant\u2019s car moved into her lane going \u201cnorth and west.\u201d Defendant was \u201cmaking a left turn.\u201d The collision occurred in the left lane where plaintiff was. Plaintiff testified, \u201cThe point of impact occurred where the raised median starts and where you can still go over that bump in the road.\u201d The right front section of plaintiff\u2019s car was struck by the left front section of defendant\u2019s car. Plaintiff then told defendant, \u201cI\u2019m okay. I\u2019m really shaken\u201d and \u201cI could not stop in time.\u201d\nDefendant, then 82 years old, testified prior to the accident he was at a \u201cdead stop\u201d in the driveway of Bojan\u2019s Auto Body Shop. Defendant testified, \u201cThere were a few cars coming along.\u201d When he looked to the left, \u201cthere wasn\u2019t a thing in sight.\u201d To the right, the stop light at Skokie Boulevard was red. Defendant stated, \u201cThen I proceeded and when I got on the outer lane, I looked again and this man stopped to let me go through. I had my directional light on for a left turn.\u201d He was going two or three miles per hour. As he turned left, defendant testified, he \u201ccouldn\u2019t see anything. The sun was right in my face.\u201d Then he collided with plaintiff\u2019s car. Defendant testified he was attempting to go to the left or west on Dundee Road to Waukegan Road. That was his route to his home.\nDefendant first contends this case is close on the facts and the jury might have decided either way. Defendant cites several errors in the trial which \u201ctip the scales in favor of the successful party\u201d and thus require a reversal.\nWe disagree. In our opinion the evidence of defendant\u2019s negligence is strong beyond doubt. Plaintiff testified traffic conditions on Dundee Road were \u201cbusy.\u201d Defendant testified there were a few cars and one yielded to let him cross in a northerly direction. Defendant, despite being blinded by the sun, emerged from a driveway in an effort to proceed across two eastbound lanes of traffic in a northwesterly direction so that he could cross the median and go west on Dundee Road. There was evidence defendant could not go due north across Dundee Road at that point without traversing to the west. Photos in evidence show a raised median curb between the eastbound and westbound lanes immediately north of Bojan\u2019s Auto Body shop. Plaintiff testified defendant had to go north and then west over the median strip. The photographs also show a lower and broader median strip, or \u201crumble strip,\u201d in the area somewhat west of the body shop. Defendant had his left turn signal flashing to show his intention to proceed west on the eastbound lanes.\nSection 11 \u2014 906 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95*2, par. 11 \u2014 906) provides:\n\u201cThe driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from an alley, building, private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered.\u201d\nSimilarly, section 11 \u2014 1205 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 9512, par. 11 \u2014 1205) provides:\n\u201cThe driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway within an urban area shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving into the sidewalk area \u00b0 * **, or in the event there is no sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the street to be entered * * *, and upon entering the roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on such roadway.\u201d\nDefendant thus had a clear statutory duty to yield to all oncoming traffic. In addition, defendant conceded he was partially blinded by the sun. If so, it was his duty to avoid inflicting injury on one who might be using the street while defendant was unable to see. Proceeding without vision has been aptly described as \u201cnegligence as a matter of law.\u201d (Barth v. Reichert (1962), 34 Ill. App. 2d 472, 478, 181 N.E.2d 609. See also Kirby v. Swedberg (1969), 117 Ill. App. 2d 217, 223-24, 253 N.E.2d 699.) In Duffy v. Cortesi (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 511, 518, 119 N.E.2d 241, a number of cases from Illinois and other jurisdictions are cited for this point.\nDefendant cites cases from Minnesota, Kansas and Texas as support for his statement that \u201cA driver momentarily blinded by the sun is not negligent as a matter of law.\u201d We need not and we expressly refrain from passing on this issue. The sole question before us at this point is the degree to which the verdict is supported by the evidence. In addition, the jury returned a special interrogatory finding plaintiff not guilty of contributory negligence. In both instances the jury acted properly. Plaintiff\u2019s statement of her inability to stop in time was truthful and did not constitute an admission of contributory negligence. The evidence in support of the verdict and the interrogatory is so strong that contrary results were hardly possible.\nDefendant contends plaintiff\u2019s attorney pre-educated and indoctrinated the prospective jurors. One of defendant\u2019s principal criticisms is the use of the word \u201cvictim\u201d by plaintiff\u2019s trial attorney. Our examination of the record shows this word was used the first time without objection. On its second and apparently final use, defendant promptly objected. The trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection.\nIn addition, defendant points out plaintiff\u2019s trial counsel stated to a prospective juror plaintiff\u2019s burden of proof was the \u201cgreater weight of the evidence\u201d and not \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Defendant objected as to plaintiff attempting to instruct the jury. The trial judge sustained defendant\u2019s objection as to the form of the question. In our opinion, Illinois Pattern Instructions, Civil, Nos. 1.01, 21.01 and 21.02, all given by the trial court, were sufficient to clarify this situation.\nDefendant also urges the trial court should have sustained defendant\u2019s objection when plaintiff asked a prospective juror if a case involving thousands of dollars was a \u201cfender bender.\u201d This phrase \u201cfender bender\u201d was used by both counsel and by the prospective jurors several times. We have examined the voir dire to determine its fairness. The entire procedure is reflected in about 200 pages of the record. During this time, counsel for defendant made three objections. Two were sustained and one was overruled. These rulings by the trial court were within the bounds of reasonable discretion. (People v. Lobb (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 287, 300, 161 N.E.2d 325.) No specific claim of bias or prejudice is raised by defendant. We find no reversible error in this regard.\nIn his opening statement plaintiff\u2019s trial attorney stated prior to the accident defendant had picked up his car \u201cfrom having some body work done.\u201d Defendant objected on the ground this statement was \u201cprejudicial and unrelated to the cause on trial.\u201d Defendant asserts here plaintiff\u2019s trial attorney should not have stated facts he did not intend to prove and could not prove, and prior accidents were not admissible into evidence.\nThe statement some body work had just been done on a car does not necessarily mean the car was involved in a prior accident. But, in any event, \u201cone cannot complain of admission of evidence offered by one party where practically the same evidence is afterward introduced by the party so complaining.\u201d Forest Preserve District v. South Holland Trust & Savings Bank (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 873, 876, 349 N.E.2d 689; Santiago v. Package Machinery Co. (1970), 123 Ill. App. 2d 305, 313, 260 N.E.2d 89, appeal denied (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 586.\nDefendant\u2019s attorney questioned defendant on this very subject. He asked defendant where he was coming from when he had the accident, had he just picked up his car from the body shop, was he familiar with the building, and other related questions. Any conceivable prejudicial effect the statement by plaintiff\u2019s attorney may have had was rendered meaningless by the later testimony elicited by defendant\u2019s attorney. In addition, at the trial court\u2019s suggestion, plaintiff\u2019s attorney modified this statement to say defendant was \u201ccoming out of the driveway from the garage.\u201d We find no error here.\nDefendant asserts plaintiff\u2019s attorney in his closing argument misled the jury by reference to facts never adduced in evidence. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney stated to the jury defendant testified damage to his car amounted to over $751. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel added that instead of having plaintiff testify as to numbers, he would \u201cmake one picture worth a thousand words.\u201d He then told the jury they could compare the damage to the vehicles by looking at the photographs.\n\u201cIn arguing a case to the jury, counsel is permitted broad latitude to draw reasonable inferences and conclusions from the evidence.\u201d (Levenson v. Ldke-To-Lake Dairy Cooperative (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 526, 537, 394 N.E.2d 1359.) Plaintiff\u2019s attorney in the instant case may well have made these references to emphasize the impact the plaintiff endured. Actually, the statement by plaintiff\u2019s counsel may be construed as proper response to the evidence of property damage adduced by defendant. The reference was reasonable.\nDefendant next contends the trial court should not have allowed the investigating police officer to testify as to whether he issued a traffic ticket at the scene of the accident. Defendant called the officer as his witness. On direct examination by defense counsel, the officer testified completion of his usual investigation entailed \u201cciting of a driver or drivers.\u201d On cross-examination by plaintiff\u2019s attorney, over objection, the officer testified citing a driver meant issuing a ticket. When the officer was asked if he issued a ticket, the defendant\u2019s attorney objected. The trial court overruled the objection and the officer answered he did issue a ticket.\nUnder the circumstances here disclosed, we find no reversible error in allowing the officer to testify simply that he had issued a ticket. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel was not allowed to ask to whom the ticket had been issued or what type of citation it was. These facts differentiate the instant case from Schneider v. Kirk (1967), 83 Ill. App. 2d 170, 226 N.E.2d 655, appeal denied (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 632, and Allen v. Yancy (1965), 57 Ill. App. 2d 50, 206 N.E.2d 452, cited and relied upon by defendant.\nConcerning the final alleged trial error, plaintiff was desirous of proving defendant had pleaded guilty in traffic court and was fined. Defendant sought to overcome this by testimony he had actually pleaded not guilty. Plaintiff first offered in evidence a certified copy of the \u201chalf sheet\u201d or court record. In chambers, defendant commented the entries on this exhibit were illegible. Counsel for defendant stated that since the judge who heard the traffic case had made the entries, \u201cWe need Judge Limperis here to testify to that.\u201d Counsel for plaintiff stated the presence of the traffic court judge was unnecessary. After further discussion, the trial court ruled the certified copy was illegible and he refused to receive it in evidence. Counsel for plaintiff then agreed he would bring in the traffic court judge.\nBefore that event occurred, plaintiff called defendant for adverse examination. Over objection defendant answered he had appeared in the traffic court after the occurrence and had pleaded not guilty, \u201cbut I don\u2019t think they heard the not.\u201d This in effect raised defendant\u2019s theory regarding an attempt impeachment of the plea of guilty.\nThe fact that a defendant charged with negligence had pleaded guilty in traffic court is proper evidence as an admission against interest. (See Cogdill v. Durham (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 940, 942, 358 N.E.2d 6.) After this testimony by defendant, counsel for plaintiff called Judge Limperis who had presided at the traffic hearing. The judge testified the entries on the half sheet meant plea of guilty, jury waiver, finding of guilty, and a fine of $10 plus $5 costs. Counsel for defendant cross-examined the traffic judge who testified he could not recall if defendant actually said guilty or added the word \u201cnot.\u201d No objection was made by counsel for defendant to this portion of the testimony. Counsel for defendant then cross-examined the traffic judge with reference to the subject matter of whether defendant actually pleaded guilty.\nWe have given careful consideration to each and all of these alleged trial errors. It is our considered opinion that none of the trial errors above discussed, either individually or collectively, caused substantial prejudice to the defendant. As above pointed out, the strong evidence of defendant\u2019s negligence and of plaintiff\u2019s freedom from contributory negligence made the verdict here the only possible or reasonable conclusion which the jury could have reached.\nIn addition, the object of this court on review \u201cis not to determine whether the record is totally free of error but whether any error occurred which substantially prejudiced plaintiff and affected the outcome below.\u201d (Kyowski v. Burns (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1019, 388 N.E.2d 770; Needy v. Sparks (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 350, 372, 366 N.E.2d 327, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 639.) We conclude defendant was not prejudiced by any or all of the alleged trial errors above discussed.\nDefendant finally argues the award of $50,000 in damages is excessive. Plaintiff\u2019s total medical and hospital expenses were approximately $1949.58. Plaintiff had car rental expense of about $223.59.\n\u201cThe amount of damages to be awarded is largely within the discretion of the jury.\u201d (Cummings v. Chicago Transit Authority (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 914, 408 N.E.2d 737.) Unless improper instructions were given or evidence erroneously excluded, courts are \u201creluctant to overturn a jury\u2019s determination of damages when the award is within the range of the evidence * \" (Terracina v. Castelli (1979), 80 Ill. App. 3d 475, 481, 400 N.E.2d 27; Palmer v. Avco Distributing Corp. (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 598, 608, 394 N.E.2d 480.) The test of an excessive verdict is whether the total amount thereof falls within the flexible limits of fair and reasonable compensation or is so large as to shock the judicial conscience. King v. City of Chicago (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 356, 359, 384 N.E.2d 22; Chapman v. Foggy (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 552, 559-60, 375 N.E.2d 865.\nThe verdict was not excessive here. Plaintiff\u2019s condition was diagnosed as chronic cervical strain. She was under the care of an orthopedic surgeon for 4M years following the accident. For the first 18 to 24 months, plaintiff was in constant pain and suffered from numbness in two fingers of the right hand. While in the care of her physician, she received physical therapy, traction, and cortisone injections. She underwent various tests including an electromyogram and cervical myelogram. She took pain pills and muscle relaxants. She wore a cervical collar. Her doctor advised her active sports participation would aggravate her injuries. He testified plaintiff may continue to have recurrent episodes of pain. He testified there was \u201csome residual scar tissue in the muscle and ligaments which is a permanent status in her neck.\u201d Plaintiff said she continued to have recurrent pain, but it has been controlled by pain pills and muscle relaxants.\nAlthough plaintiff\u2019s actual expenses were minimal in contrast to the final award, the court in Kupcikevicius v. Fitzgibbons (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 405, 413, 354 N.E.2d 434, held:\n\u201cIn determining on appeal whether a disputed verdict is the result of passion or prejudice, emphasis is not placed solely on the specific medical expenses incurred by the injured claimant. [Citation.] Rather, consideration should also be given to all of the testimony surrounding the claimed elements of damage [citation] as well as the fact that the trial judge, who saw and heard all that took place at trial, approved the verdict.\u201d\nFor these reasons, we affirm the judgment appealed from.\nJudgment affirmed.\nO\u2019CONNOR and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Walter H. Djokic, of Pretzel, Stouffer, Nolan & Rooney, Chartered, of Chicago (Robert Marc Chemers and Joseph B. Lederleitner, of counsel), for appellant.", "Philip E. Howard, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte and Francis Patrick Murphy, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONNA HARTIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HUGH ROBERTSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 79-1237\nOpinion filed August 18, 1980.\nWalter H. Djokic, of Pretzel, Stouffer, Nolan & Rooney, Chartered, of Chicago (Robert Marc Chemers and Joseph B. Lederleitner, of counsel), for appellant.\nPhilip E. Howard, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte and Francis Patrick Murphy, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0732-01", "first_page_order": 754, "last_page_order": 762 }