{
  "id": 3180121,
  "name": "GREGORY LIALIOS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANIES, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lialios v. Home Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1980-08-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 79-2356",
  "first_page": "740",
  "last_page": "742",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 740"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
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    {
      "cite": "79 N.Y.S.2d 597",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d",
      "year": 1948,
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      "cite": "191 Misc. 567",
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    {
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d",
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "44 Misc. 2d 131",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Misc. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1145012
      ],
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/misc2d/44/0131-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "257 A.2d 359",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "A.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "214 Pa. Super. 522",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Pa. Super.",
      "case_ids": [
        786798
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "524-25"
        }
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/pa-super/214/0522-01"
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 302,
    "char_count": 4667,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.85,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.1891442671053106e-07,
      "percentile": 0.590945649727069
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    "sha256": "ad511b2b34b53641426adca5170d1696a0df30f4dbbe2e648cb0a414f3b48b12",
    "simhash": "1:62345464d08db7a6",
    "word_count": 769
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:36.886143+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "GREGORY LIALIOS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANIES, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Gregory Lialios, brought suit against defendant, The Home Insurance Companies, the drawer of a draft, alleging that he was a holder in due course and seeking $1275, the face amount of the draft.\nOn December 21,1978, defendant settled a workman\u2019s compensation claim with Costas Moulopoulos for $1275. On that date, defendant through its duly authorized agent, issued draft No. 19668648, drawn upon defendant, payable through Citibank, New York, New York, and made payable to Moulopoulos. The draft states on its face \u201cupon acceptance pay to the order of Costas Moulopoulos.\u201d\nOn December 28, 1978, Moulopoulos returned to defendant and stated that he lost draft No. 19668648 and requested another draft. Defendant issued a stop payment order on draft No. 19668648 and issued Moulopoulos another draft.\nMoulopoulos had not lost draft No. 19668648, but instead had negotiated it to plaintiff. When plaintiff\u2019s bank presented draft No. 19668648 to Citibank, payment was refused due to defendant drawer\u2019s stop payment order.\nPlaintiff brought action against defendant drawer, alleging he was a holder in due course. Defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff\u2019s complaint, alleging the draft was conditional and therefore not a negotiable instrument. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment.\nThe trial court granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant\u2019s motion to strike plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Defendant appeals.\nThe sole issue upon review is whether draft No. 19668648 was a negotiable instrument. Section 3 \u2014 104(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 104(1)) sets the requirements for negotiability:\n\u201c(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must\n(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and\n(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article; and\n(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and\n(d) be payable to order' or to bearer.\u201d\nDefendant contends that the words \u201cupon acceptance\u201d indicate a conditional promise to pay. It further contends that the draft was not payable upon demand or at a certain time.\nNeither contention has merit. The instrument indicates that Citibank is merely the collecting bank and that defendant is both drawer and drawee. As stated in Falk\u2019s Food Basket of Easton, Inc. v. Selected Risks Insurance Co. (1969), 214 Pa. Super. 522, 524-25, 257 A.2d 359, 360:\n\u201c \u2018UPON ACCEPTANCE\u2019 does not destroy the negotiability of this instrument because it is only a restatement of an \u2018implied or constructive condition\u2019 of any draft or check, which must be accepted to charge the drawee. \u2018A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not made conditional by the fact that the instrument (a) is subject to implied or constructive conditions;\u2019 Section 3 \u2014 105(1). Cf. Merson v. Sun Insurance Co., 44 Misc. 2d 131, 253 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1964). However, the Code provides, \u2018A draft drawn on the drawer is effective as a note.\u2019 Section 3 \u2014 118(a). Where a draft is drawn by one person on himself or itself, which has the effect of a promissory note or an accepted bill of exchange, it is considered to be accepted by the very act of issuing it and presentment and acceptance are not necessary to make the draft a liability of the drawer to the payee or holder. Cable & Wireless, Limited v. Yokohoma Specie Bank, Limited, 191 Misc. 567, 79 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1948); 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills and Notes \u00a723. The use of \u2018UPON ACCEPTANCE\u2019 on this note is superfluous for this additional reason.\u201d\nFinally, because the draft here is drawn on the drawer it is effective as a note (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 118(a)), and because no definite time for payment is stated in the instrument, it is payable on demand (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 108). Neither the language \u201cupon acceptance\u201d nor the absence of a definite time for payment destroyed this instrument\u2019s negotiability, and because there is no other allegation that plaintiff had any other notice of a defense against the instrument, plaintiff is a holder in due course. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 302(1) (c).\nAccordingly, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel T. Crowe, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "J. Henry Wolf, of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "GREGORY LIALIOS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANIES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 79-2356\nOpinion filed August 18, 1980.\nDaniel T. Crowe, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJ. Henry Wolf, of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0740-01",
  "first_page_order": 762,
  "last_page_order": 764
}