{
  "id": 3181165,
  "name": "In re ARDEN RIZER.-(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ARDEN RIZER, Respondent-Appellant.)",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Rizer",
  "decision_date": "1980-08-19",
  "docket_number": "No. 79-2328",
  "first_page": "795",
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      "year": 1976,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:36.886143+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re ARDEN RIZER.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ARDEN RIZER, Respondent-Appellant.)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the respondent, Arden Rizer, from 'an order of the circuit court of Cook County which found him to be in need of hospitalization for mental treatment. The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in denying respondent\u2019s motion to strike the testimony of the examining psychiatrist.\nFor reasons hereinafter set forth, we reverse.\nOn August 20, 1979, Evelyn Louise Rizer, the respondent\u2019s wife, by the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney, filed, apparently pursuant to section 3 \u2014 701 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 701), a petition for the involuntary admission of respondent to a mental health facility. The petition alleged that the respondent was mentally ill and because of his illness was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. The petition further alleged that respondent was in need of immediate admission to a mental health facility for the prevention of such harm. Pursuant to the petition respondent was taken into custody and detained for examination and evaluation.\nIn support of the petition the State submitted two physicians\u2019 certificates, one executed by a Dr. Chung and the other by a Dr. Mohan. Both Dr. Chung and Dr. Mohan had examined the respondent and had certified him to be subject to involuntary admission to a mental health facility. Both certificates contained the following printed \u201cboilerplate\u201d statement:\n\u201cIf this examination was done for purposes of a first certificate, I personally informed the above-named individual of the purpose of this examination and that he/she did not have to speak to me, and that any statements made might be related in court as to that person\u2019s clinical condition or need for service. Additionally, if the person is asserted to be mentally retarded and dangerous I advised him/her of the right to first speak with an attorney, relative or friend.\u201d\nOn August 23,1979, at the hearing on the petition, Dr. Mohan was the only examining physician who testified. His testimony, however, differed from the statement contained in the certificate executed by him. During re-cross-examination by the respondent\u2019s counsel, Dr. Mohan testified:\n\u201cQ. Doctor, did you tell him that he didn\u2019t have to talk to you?\nA. No, I just introduced myself.\nQ. But did you tell him that he didn\u2019t have to talk to you?\nA. No.\nQ. Did you tell him that any statements he makes will be disclosed at a court hearing on whether he is subject to involuntary admission?\nA. Any statements he makes to me?\nQ. Yes.\nA. I did not tell that.\u201d\nThe respondent moved to strike Dr. Mohan\u2019s testimony on the grounds that Dr. Mohan had failed to give respondent the warnings contained in section 3 \u2014 208 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 208). The trial court denied the motion, stating:\n\u201cThis person was warned of his rights.\nI don\u2019t think it necessary under the law that everybody that talks to this man has to warn him of his rights.\u201d\nThe respondent contends that Dr. Mohan\u2019s testimony should have been stricken because Dr. Mohan failed to comply with the provisions of section 3 \u2014 208. The State maintains that Dr. Mohan\u2019s testimony was admissible because the respondent, prior to his examination by Dr. Mohan, presumptively had been notified of his rights by Dr. Chung.\nSection 3 \u2014 208 provides:\n\u201cExaminations for certification \u2014 Statement of Rights\nWhenever a petition has been executed pursuant to Section 3\u2014 507,3 \u2014 601 or 3 \u2014 701, and prior to this examination for the purpose of certification of a person 12 or over, the person conducting this examination shall inform the person being examined in a simple comprehensible manner of the purpose of the examination; that he does not have to talk to the examiner; and that any statements he makes may be disclosed at a court hearing on the issue of whether he is subject to involuntary admission. If the person being examined has not been so informed, the examiner shall not be permitted to testify at any subsequent court hearing concerning the respondent\u2019s admission.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.)\nWhen legislation is drafted by a commission which also writes notes or comments explaining the intended purposes of the proposed draft, it is common practice for the courts to refer to the commission\u2019s comments when construing the legislation, since the thinking thus expressed is a valuable guide to legislative intent. (Ketchmark v. Lynch (1969), 107 Ill. App. 2d 36, 41, 246 N.E.2d 133.) Although section 3 \u2014 208, as enacted, differs slightly from the proposed draft submitted by the Governor\u2019s \u2022 Commission for the Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois (Nov. 1976) (hereinafter referred to as the Commission), the Commission\u2019s comments are nonetheless a valuable guide.\nThe Commission at page 38 summarized section 3 \u2014 208 as follows:\n\u201cSummary. Extends the privilege against self-incrimination to persons 12 or over undergoing certification examinations. The person conducting an examination of the respondent cannot testify at a subsequent court hearing unless he informed the respondent of the purpose of the examination, that the respondent is not obligated to speak to him, and that he may subsequently disclose in court any statements made.\u201d\nIn addition the Commission commented at page 38:\n\u201cMany examiners in the private sector inform respondents of the purpose of the mental examination and that their verbal participation is not required. Experience in the public and private sectors has shown that application of the privilege against self-incrimination does not seriously impair the State\u2019s ability to achieve the valid objectives of civil commitment. It should be stressed that this section will not nullify the legality of a certificate executed by an examiner who has not given the required warning, but only prevents his testifying in court.\u201d\nThe State emphasizes that the proposed draft required the warnings be given prior to \u201cany examination for the purpose of certification\u201d whereas section 3 \u2014 208 as enacted requires that the warnings be given prior to \u201cthis examination for the purpose of certification.\u201d The State argues that the use of the term \u201cthis examination\u201d in place of the term \u201cany examination\u201d is a strong indication that only the first of the two required examinations was to be affected by section 3 \u2014 208. This suggested construction is supported by neither legislative intent nor logic. Had the legislature intended that only the first examination be governed by section 3 \u2014 208, the statute could easily have been amended to read \u201cthe first examination.\u201d\nWhenever a petition has been executed pursuant to section 3 \u2014 701, the person alleged to be subject to involuntary admission \u201cshall be examined separately by a physician, or clinical psychologist, or qualified examiner and by a psychiatrist.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 703.) Two separate examinations are obviously required. In our opinion it is to each of these separate examinations that the \u201cthis examination\u201d language refers. Moreover, section 3 \u2014 208 provides, that \u201cthe person conducting this examination shall inform the person being examined in a simple comprehensible manner of the purpose of the examination; that he does not have to talk to the examiner; and that any statements he makes may be disclosed at a court hearing on the issue of whether he is subject to involuntary admission. If the person being examined has not been so informed, the examiner shall not be permitted to testify at any subsequent court hearing concerning the respondent\u2019s admission.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thus we cannot logically conclude that section 3 \u2014 208 requires only the first of the two examiners to give the statutory warnings.\nThe State also argues that requiring both examiners to give the statutory warnings would unduly interfere with the therapist-patient relationship. The Commission responded to this argument in their comment to section 3 \u2014 208 at page 38:\n\u201cThese disclosure requirements apply solely to instances where the immediate purpose of the examination is certification; they do not apply to the traditional therapist-patient relationship nor do they preclude the therapist\u2019s testimony if the disclosure is made when the issue of involuntary admission becomes apparent.\u201d\nIn the case at bar, Dr. Mohan was merely the respondent\u2019s examiner, not the respondent\u2019s therapist. As such no traditional therapist-patient relationship existed.\nThe psychiatric examination is highly intrusive. It seeks to obtain information concerning an individual\u2019s inner-most thought processes and emotions and to elicit accounts of personal conduct. Such a significant intrusion justifies the warnings required by section 3 \u2014 208.\nFor the foregoing reasons we conclude that the testimony of Dr. Mohan should have been stricken.\nSection 3 \u2014 807 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 807) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cNo respondent may be found subject to involuntary admission unless at least one psychiatrist or clinical psychologist who has examined him testifies in person at the hearing * \u201d\nBecause the testimony of Dr. Mohan should have been stricken and because no other psychiatrist or clinical psychologist who had examined the respondent testified at the hearing, the respondent was improperly found subject to involuntary admission.\nReversed.\nSTAMOS and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.\nSection 3 \u2014 101 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 101) provides:\n\u201cThe State\u2019s Attorneys of the several counties shall represent the people of the State of Illinois in court proceedings under this Chapter in their respective counties, shall attend such proceedings either in person or by assistant, and shall ensure that petitions, reports and orders are properly prepared. Nothing herein contained shall prevent any party from being represented by his own counsel.\u201d\nThe record reflects that Dr. Chung examined the respondent on August 20,1979, and that Dr. Mohan examined the respondent on August 22, 1979.\nThe proposed draft provided that:\n\u201cWhenever procedures for emergency or involuntary admission have begun, including whenever a petition has been executed, and prior to any examination for the purpose of certification of a person 12 or over, the person conducting the examination shall inform the person being examined in a simple comprehensible manner of the purpose of the examination; that he does not have to talk to the examiner; and that any statements he makes may be disclosed at a court hearing on the issue of whether he is subject to involuntary admission. If the person being examined has not been so informed, the examiner shall not be permitted to testify at any subsequent court hearing concerning the respondent\u2019s admission.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Governor\u2019s Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois, Report, part One, at 38 (1976).\nSection 3 \u2014 701 provides:\n\u201c(a) Any person 18 years of age or older may execute a petition asserting that another person is subject to involuntary admission. The petition shall be prepared pursuant to paragraph (b) of Section 3 \u2014 601 and shall be filed with the court in the county where the respondent resides or is present.\n(b) The court may inquire of the petitioner whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the facts stated in the petition are true and whether the respondent is subject to involuntary admission. The inquiry may proceed without notice to the respondent if the petitioner alleges that an emergency exists such that immediate hospitalization is necessary.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 701.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE PERLIN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (John E. Horn, Judith A. Stewart, and Mary T. Woodward, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Paul P. Biebel, Jr., and Mark R. Davis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re ARDEN RIZER.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ARDEN RIZER, Respondent-Appellant.)\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 79-2328\nOpinion filed August 19, 1980.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (John E. Horn, Judith A. Stewart, and Mary T. Woodward, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Paul P. Biebel, Jr., and Mark R. Davis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0795-01",
  "first_page_order": 817,
  "last_page_order": 822
}