{ "id": 3181719, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PERNELL WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1980-08-22", "docket_number": "No. 79-478", "first_page": "860", "last_page": "865", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 860" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984250 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2841485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 1087", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3290842 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.E.2d 1208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2812901 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440812 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5408181 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937034 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3360300 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3354877 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0198-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 553, "char_count": 11730, "ocr_confidence": 0.894, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3111778305334942e-07, "percentile": 0.7884816836811721 }, "sha256": "abd03e5f9f443ce57bd0b81e99986cdd11299b4c5b2ab4463e6d7007a31ad8c8", "simhash": "1:da8be8417ba029ed", "word_count": 1953 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:36.886143+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PERNELL WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Pemell Williams, was charged with robbery on July 31, 1978. On defendant\u2019s motion, two psychiatrists were ordered to examine defendant to determine his fitness to stand trial. A fitness hearing was held on March 16,1978, after which the defendant was found fit to stand trial. On April 24, 1979, following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of robbery. On appeal, defendant\u2019s sole contention is that the trial court erred in finding him fit to stand trial.\nAt the time of the proceeding below, fitness for trial or sentencing was governed by section 5- \u2014 2\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141), which provides in part:\n\u201c(a) For the purposes of this Section a defendant is unfit to stand trial or be sentenced if, because of a mental or physical condition, he is unable:\n(1) to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; or\n(2) to assist in his defense.\u201d\nIf a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s fitness is raised, the court is to order a fitness hearing. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141(b).) In this case, after defendant raised the issue of fitness, the trial court did order such a hearing.\nAt defendant\u2019s fitness hearing, testimony was given by the two psychiatrists appointed by the court to examine defendant. Both had interviewed and examined defendant on previous occasions relating to defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial for other offenses. On January 25, 1979, both examined defendant in relation to his fitness for trial on this robbery charge. Dr. Hamaan, called on behalf of the State, testified that he had found defendant unfit to stand trial in 1976, and had again found him unfit to stand trial in January of 1978, but fit in September of 1978. Dr. Hamaan testified that during his examination of defendant on January 25, 1979, defendant claimed to be acutely depressed, had told him of a suicide attempt and had indicated that if sent to prison he would probably attempt to kill himself. He stated that defendant claimed difficulty in remembering things (including dates on which he had failed to appear in court). At hearing examinations, defendant had described certain hallucinatory episodes, but at the January 25 examination defendant was no longer experiencing hallucinations; he was, however, bothered by a \u201cbuzzing\u201d in his head. Based on defendant\u2019s stated objective of becoming a bus driver, Dr. Hamaan\u2019s opinion was that defendant exhibited \u201cpoor judgment.\u201d Dr. Hamaan\u2019s diagnosis was that defendant suffered from a \u201clong standing, chronic, schizoid reaction,\u201d which was exhibited by defendant\u2019s tendency toward fantasy and daydreaming. He concluded that defendant was capable of understanding the nature and purpose of the court proceedings, at least superficially. However, Dr. Hamaan did \u201cquestion\u201d whether, because of the memory defect, defendant could be of adequate assistance in his defense. In addition, Dr. Hamaan indicated that defendant\u2019s fitness could vary from month to month; he stated that medication should be used to treat defendant\u2019s condition, as it had been in the past.\nDr. Graybill, called as a witness for the defense, had seen defendant on five prior occasions; in September of 1978, he had found defendant fit to stand trial, but had indicated that defendant would be \u201cin and out\u201d of psychosis. With regard to the January 25,1979, examination of defendant, Dr. Graybill testified that defendant apparently no longer experienced hallucinations but that defendant was hearing a buzzing in his head. He indicated that defendant\u2019s memory of past events was impaired, but that his recent memory (two months) was \u201cpretty good.\u201d He indicated that he felt defendant lacked judgment and was unrealistic in his desire to become a bus driver. He observed that at the examination defendant was aware of where he was and was responsive. Dr. Graybill indicated that defendant had a general idea of who court personnel were and that he knew the name of his attorney, although not that of the judge. Dr. Graybill\u2019s testimony is conflicting, however, as to defendant\u2019s answer when asked if he could understand court procedure. At one point in the testimony, Dr. Graybill purports to quote the defendant as saying, \u201cI understand all of that stuff they are talking about in court\u201d; at a later point in the testimony, Dr. Graybill stated that the answer was \u201cI don\u2019t understand all of that stuff they are talking about in court.\u201d He testified that defendant\u2019s ability to assist his attorney would \u201cvary.\u201d Dr. Graybill concluded that defendant was unfit to stand trial because he was \u201cin and out of psychosis\u201d; he felt that defendant should be treated with medication.\nThe court concluded from the testimony and a psychiatric report submitted to the court that the doctors\u2019 opinions were \u201cguarded\u201d and \u201cimprecise\u201d and \u201cin the nature of a psychiatric guess\u201d as to defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial, i.e., to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to cooperate with his counsel. Thus, having viewed defendant, and using \u201ccommon sense,\u201d the court determined that defendant was \u201cin one of those areas where\u201d he was fit to stand trial; the court did acknowledge that it was possible defendant could slip back to an \u201carea\u201d of unfitness, but that on that date, March 16, 1979, defendant was fit to stand trial.\nOnce the issue of a defendant\u2019s competency has been raised, due process requires that the State prove the fitness of the defendant to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Thompson (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 198, 376 N.E.2d 442; People v. Hancock (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 596, 375 N.E.2d 909.) In this case, as defendant points out, the only witnesses who testified at the fitness hearing concluded that defendant was unfit to stand trial. However, the State contends that the witnesses\u2019 opinions were not binding on the trial court and that the court\u2019s finding of fitness is supported by the judge\u2019s personal observations of defendant\u2019s behavior.\nThe State cites People v. Skorusa (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 577, 304 N.E.2d 630, and People v. Fontaine (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 450, 328 N.E.2d 685, for the proposition that a court is entitled to take into consideration its personal observations of a defendant in determining his fitness to stand trial. However, those two cases dealt with situations in which the trial court was considering whether or not a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s fitness had been raised so that a fitness hearing should be held pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20141(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141(b)). Such a determination is ordinarily within the discretion of the trial court (People v. Skorusa), and expert opinion may or may not be available to aid the court in deciding if such a bona fide doubt exists. In this case, once defendant raised the issue of fitness, the court did order a fitness hearing at which expert witnesses testified. Even if the court could consider its own observations of defendant in addition to the expert testimony, Skorusa and Fontaine do not hold that the trial court\u2019s observations alone can support a finding of fitness contrary to expert opinion; in both cases the court\u2019s observation of the defendant was only one factor in reaching its determination that the defendant was fit to stand trial.\nIn order for the court below to have determined that this defendant was fit to stand trial, the court must have rejected the conclusions of the expert witnesses. The State suggests that rejection of these conclusions was proper in that the factual bases for the opinions did not conclusively establish that defendant was unfit as defined in section 5 \u2014 2\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141).\nThe record indicates that neither psychiatric opinion clearly indicated that defendant could not understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; one witness stated that the defendant indeed could understand them, at least superficially. The opinions that defendant was unfit appear to have been based primarily on the defendant\u2019s memory defects and psychotic symptoms as they related to his ability to assist in his defense. In People v. Bilyew (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 294, 383 N.E.2d 212, the supreme court pointed out that the credibility and weight to be given psychiatric testimony is for the trier of fact; the trial judge is to analyze and evaluate the factual bases for experts\u2019 opinions rather than to rely on the ultimate opinions themselves. Indeed, it is clear that the trial judge is not obliged as a matter of law to accept opinions of psychiatrists. (People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208.) Further, the conclusions of experts are only as valid as the bases or reasons for them. (People v. Walker (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 227, 395 N.E.2d 1087.) However, although courts have properly rejected psychiatric testimony as to a defendant\u2019s unfitness, and have found a defendant fit to stand trial, such determinations of fitness were made after a court has heard conflicting testimony; we have found no cases in which a trial court has been permitted to reject conclusions of experts who agreed that a defendant was unfit to stand trial.\nIt is clear from the record and testimony in this case that defendant did have mental deficiencies and that he had previously been found unfit to stand trial. Both expert witnesses testified that defendant\u2019s condition rendered him so incompetent as to be unable to assist in his defense. We are aware that prior adjudications of unfitness do not necessarily raise even a doubt as to a defendant\u2019s current condition (People v. Thompson (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 684, 278 N.E.2d 1), and that a person may be found fit to stand trial although on other subjects his mind may be unsound. (People v. Lang (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 311, 391 N.E.2d 350.) However, in this case, the only testimony at the fitness hearing did indicate that this defendant at the time of the hearing was not fit to stand trial; such a conclusion should not be rejected by a trial court without other testimony or evidence that defendant was in fact fit. Defendant did not testify at the hearing or at trial. The trial judge\u2019s personal observation of defendant regarding his fitness for trial in this case consisted of brief exchanges of casual conversation; the record does not disclose any other behavior of defendant which might have indicated that defendant was either fit or unfit. We find that the trial court\u2019s rejection of the expert witnesses\u2019 conclusions was not warranted solely on the basis of the court\u2019s opinion as derived from such brief exposure to the defendant or from the court\u2019s \u201ccommon sense\u201d interpretation of the witnesses\u2019 psychiatric opinions.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court\u2019s finding of fitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that therefore the order finding defendant fit to stand trial must be vacated. The judgment below is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new fitness hearing and such further proceedings as authorized by law.\nReversed and remanded.\nUNVERZAGT and VAN DEUSEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE WOODWARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Robinson and Kyle Wesendorf, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Daniel D. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko, Martin N. Ashley, and Raymond Buckley, Jr., all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PERNELL WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 79-478\nOpinion filed August 22, 1980.\nMary Robinson and Kyle Wesendorf, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDaniel D. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko, Martin N. Ashley, and Raymond Buckley, Jr., all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0860-01", "first_page_order": 882, "last_page_order": 887 }