{ "id": 3174415, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDDIE L. HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Holmes", "decision_date": "1980-09-02", "docket_number": "No. 79-593", "first_page": "140", "last_page": "143", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 140" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428466 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5622319 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0228-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 531, "char_count": 9142, "ocr_confidence": 0.916, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.548627546539126e-08, "percentile": 0.28467624946473713 }, "sha256": "c8ee5a039a082e13f22afa54463eece6aca71bb2f37208e7f1004bb749ee4b4f", "simhash": "1:b8acb82951ff2fcd", "word_count": 1507 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:06.826169+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDDIE L. HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Freddie Holmes, a/k/a John Brown, was charged with rape, deviate sexual assault and attempt armed robbery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 11\u20141, 11\u20143, 8\u20144 and 18\u20142.) After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty on all charges and subsequently sentenced to 21 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe victim testified that on April 1, 1978, at about 10 p.m., she attended a dance at the Woodlawn Organization where she served food. She left alone after 11 p.m. and started walking home to get a strobe light for the dance. When she heard footsteps behind her, she quickened her pace. A man approached her, pointed a gun at her neck and led her into a nearby doorway.\nIn court, she identified defendant as the man who accosted her. She also testified that she had seen him at the dance. Defendant ordered her to hand over her money. When the victim began to cry, defendant struck her in the face. He then took her to a nearby alley and, at gunpoint, placed his penis in her mouth. He then forcibly had vaginal intercourse with her. Later, in another alley, defendant again forcibly had oral intercourse with the victim.\nDefendant told the victim that he intended to take her to an abandoned building. She suggested that they go to her home instead. She later testified that she was afraid and didn\u2019t want to go to an abandoned building. Defendant agreed to accompany her home and instructed her to go inside the apartment to see if her children were sleeping and then open the back door and let him inside. When the victim entered her apartment, she locked the door and telephoned the police. The police arrived soon thereafter. Complainant identified defendant as her assailant at a police lineup the night of the incident.\nOn the second day of trial (after the victim had concluded testifying), the State sought leave to amend its answer to defendant\u2019s discovery motion to include three letters defendant had written and mailed to the victim while in Cook County jail. The Assistant State\u2019s Attorney stated that he first became aware of these letters after the trial commenced. Defense counsel expressed surprise and the court allowed him about four hours to discuss the new evidence with defendant. When court reconvened, the trial judge denied the State\u2019s motion to amend its discovery answer, thereby barring use of the evidence during the State\u2019s case in chief. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial asserting that, had he known of these surprising letters, he would not have advised defendant to waive his right to a jury trial. The court denied this motion.\nThe State continued its case in chief with testimony by investigating police officers. Two Chicago Police Department squad cars arrived at the victim\u2019s home shortly after she called the police. Officer Michael Szymonik observed defendant in the hallway and arrested him. Szymonik searched defendant and found no weapons but did find some marijuana in defendant\u2019s pocket. Officer Thaddeus Macudzinski recovered a small caliber handgun from the floor of the hallway while Szymonik was searching defendant. Macudzinski then interviewed the victim and noticed she had a bruised face and swollen eyes. He took the victim to Billings Hospital.\nDr. J ef f rey Korn testified that he treated the victim at Billings Hospital on the night of the incident. He observed swelling on the left side of her face and performed a pelvic examination during which he took vaginal swabs. Dr. Korn examined a set of swabs and found no evidence of sperm. He sent another set of swabs to the Chicago Police Department. Rodney Black, a microanalyst for the Chicago Police Department Crime Lab, examined a specimen obtained from Dr. Korn and found human sperm present.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf that on April 1, 1978, at about 11:30 p.m., he was at the Woodlawn Organization dance selling marijuana. Defendant contacted complainant and offered to sell her marijuana. She agreed and defendant accompanied her home so she could get money to pay for the marijuana. When they arrived at complainant\u2019s home, she pulled a knife on defendant and tried to take his marijuana. He struck her with his hand. She ran inside her apartment and locked the door. Defendant then sat outside on the landing and rolled some marijuana. Shortly thereafter the police arrived and arrested him. Defendant denied possessing a gun or trying to rob complainant and denied forcing complainant to submit to sexual acts.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified that he did not know complainant before he met her at the dance. Over defense objection, defendant testified that he had called complainant twice from Cook County jail urging her not to appear in court. Over defense counsel\u2019s continuing objection, defendant admitted that he had written letters to complainant from jail asking her not to testify against him. Three of these letters were admitted into evidence. Defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial was denied.\nOn appeal, defendant asserts that he should have been granted a mistrial because defense counsel would not have advised him to waive a jury trial had he known about the inculpatory letters. Counsel believed the evidence would be closely balanced and, because the case hinged on the credibility of complainant and defendant, opted for a bench trial.\nIn the most inculpatory letter, defendant wrote:\n\u201cYou said you wouldn\u2019t lie for me. * * \u00b0 But you could help me out if you came to court and said that you made a mistake and that the guy that did it is on the streets and that you seen him.\u201d\nDefendant relies upon People v. Norris (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 228, 379 N.E.2d 80. There, defendant waived his right to a jury trial because of his counsel\u2019s belief that the evidence was largely circumstantial and, in his view, impeachable. During the trial, however, the court allowed the State to amend its answer to discovery to include two occurrence witnesses who were allowed to testify during the State\u2019s case in chief. One witness testified to seeing defendant pull a gun and the other stated that he saw defendant shoot the deceased. Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.\nOn appeal, defendant argued that in view of the ultimate importance of the occurrence witnesses\u2019 testimony, his jury waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made and that a mistrial should have been granted. In reversing, the appellate court stated that:\n\u201cUnder the peculiar factual situation presented here, we cannot say that defendant\u2019s waiver of a jury trial was knowingly and intelligently made. The fact remains that at the time defendant waived his right to a jury trial, he was unaware of the most damaging evidence against him. The trial court should have granted defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial.\u201d 62 Ill. App. 3d 228, 233, 379 N.E.2d 80, 84.\nNorris is distinguishable, however, because in the instant case the State was not permitted to amend its discovery answer and could not use the letters during its case in chief. The letters were admitted solely for impeachment. The Norris court limited its holding to the \u201cpeculiar factual situation presented\u201d and we cannot say that impeachment use of the letters had the same damaging effect as did the occurrence witness testimony in Norris.\nIn Norris, defendant\u2019s theory of the case was directly affected by the new evidence. This certainly would have influenced his jury waiver decision. In the instant case, although defense counsel was initially surprised by the letters, he was afforded ample opportunity to rectify their contents with his theory of the case. Indeed, the letters were not damaging to the defense theory of the case, only to defendant\u2019s credibility. Thus, although the letters may have influenced whether or not defendant would testify, we find they were of small import to his jury waiver decision.\nTo summarize, defendant asserts that had counsel known that the State possessed damaging evidence that changed a balanced case into a case strongly against defendant, he would not have advised his client to waive his right to a jury trial. Our review of the record convinces us that (1) the letters were not substantively \u201cdamaging\u201d as envisioned by the Norris court but merely affected defendant\u2019s credibility; and (2) the evidence was strongly against defendant irrespective of the letters.\nAccordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice which is necessary to invalidate his knowing and intelligent jury waiver. (See People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 347 N.E.2d 733.) For this reason the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Zaven Peter Tokatlian and James H. Reddy, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr and Pamela L. Gray, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDDIE L. HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 79-593\nOpinion filed September 2, 1980.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Zaven Peter Tokatlian and James H. Reddy, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr and Pamela L. Gray, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0140-01", "first_page_order": 162, "last_page_order": 165 }