{ "id": 3174735, "name": "GREENBAUM & BROWNE, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD L. BRAUN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Greenbaum & Browne, Ltd. v. Braun", "decision_date": "1980-08-26", "docket_number": "No. 79-1163", "first_page": "210", "last_page": "216", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 210" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "26 N.E. 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2991452 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/136/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 N.E. 1005", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3175778 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/172/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 N.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3387413 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/314/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 N.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 Ill. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2583860 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/365/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2488498 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5210374 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/331/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 N.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 2d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5177185 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/15/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5377621 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 963", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074424 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.E. 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5470759 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/149/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 658, "char_count": 14762, "ocr_confidence": 0.888, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.9705269516937414e-07, "percentile": 0.904627065130052 }, "sha256": "a0e20fac900588f962f19d189ccdbd83e73a5dfcc97f051fdf75e821ae00b024", "simhash": "1:8fea5f165e2b5989", "word_count": 2366 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:06.826169+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GREENBAUM & BROWNE, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD L. BRAUN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff-appellee, Greenbaum & Browne, Ltd., an Illinois professional corporation whose shareholders are licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois, brought an action to recover the sum of $14,192.64 allegedly due from defendant-appellant, Richard L. Braun, for legal services rendered. The circuit court of Cook County entered judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $14,192.64. Defendant appeals contending that the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motion to reduce the amount of the judgment.\nFor the reasons hereinafter set forth we reverse in part and affirm in part.\nDuring a meeting at plaintiff\u2019s office in December 1974, attorneys Greenbaum and Browne discussed with defendant an outstanding balance of $8,264.61 for legal services rendered by plaintiff to Kaplan & Braun, Inc., a corporation with which defendant is allegedly associated. At this meeting attorney Greenbaum advised defendant that because Kaplan & Braun, Inc., had encountered serious financial difficulti\u00e9s, plaintiff would be unable to render further legal services to Kaplan & Braun, Inc., or to defendant individually unless defendant (1) agreed to be personally liable for the outstanding account of $8,264.61 for the services rendered to Kaplan & Braun, Inc., and (2) agreed to be personally liable for all future services rendered on behalf of defendant individually or on behalf of any of the various entities with which defendant was associated. Attorneys Greenbaum and Browne testified that defendant so agreed. However, defendant testified that he had informed attorneys Greenbaum and Browne that \u201che did not feel responsible for the debts of the corporation,\u201d nor was he \u201cin a position to pay those debts.\u201d Defendant further testified that he had requested that plaintiff continue to represent him in \u201cpersonal matters\u201d for which he \u201cwould attempt to pay a reasonable fee.\u201d\nSubsequent to the December 1974 meeting plaintiff rendered legal services to defendant individually, to Kaplan & Braun, Inc., and to an entity referred to as \u201cBralen.\u201d Plaintiff periodically sent statements to defendant requesting payment for these services, for the services rendered to Kaplan & Braun, Inc., prior to December 1974 ($8,264.61), and for services rendered to an entity referred to as Lake Zurich Associates.\nDefendant testified that during a meeting at plaintiff\u2019s office in either May or June 1976 he again informed attorneys Greenbaum and Browne that he did not feel personally obligated for the fees for services rendered to Kaplan & Braun, Inc. Defendant further testified that attorney Browne threatened to file a lawsuit against defendant and \u201cattach\u201d his house.\nThe jury, after hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, found in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $14,192.64. The trial court entered judgment on the jury\u2019s verdict and denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motion to reduce the amount of the judgment.\nI.\nThe law in Illinois, at least since 1893, when our supreme court decided Rolfe v. Rich (1893), 149 Ill. 436, 35 N.E. 352, has placed special obligations upon an attorney by virtue of the relationship between attorney and client. These obligations, generally referred to as the fiduciary duty of the attorney, permeate all phases of the relationship, including the contract for payments. In Rolfe the court opined at page 437:\n\u201cWhile the law is, that dealings between attorney and client, resulting in advantage to the former, will be closely scrutinized, and the attorney be required to show the utmost good faith and fairness, and that the client dealt with full knowledge of his rights, it does not prohibit all dealings between them, or declare all contracts made by the attorney with the client ipso facto void, or voidable at the instance of the client.\u201d\nSee also In re Kutner (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 157, 162, 399 N.E.2d 963.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in not reducing the amount of the judgment by the sum of $8,264.61, that is, the amount of the fees previously billed by plaintiff to Kaplan & Braun, Inc., for services rendered to Kaplan & Braun, Inc., prior to December 1974. In support of his contention defendant argues that plaintiff failed to prove the fairness and reasonableness of these fees. Plaintiff maintains that it proved a novation whereby Kaplan & Braun, Inc.\u2019s debt to plaintiff was not extinguished and in its stead was substituted defendant\u2019s promise to pay the fees. In support of its contention plaintiff argues that \u201c [t]he prior obligation, and its underpinnings, are not subject to review or question.\u201d\nNovation may be broadly defined as a substitution of a new contract or obligation for an existing one which is thereby extinguished. More specifically, it is the substitution by mutual agreement of one debtor or of one creditor for another, whereby the existing debt is extinguished. (Faith v. Martoccio (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1003-04, 316 N.E.2d 164; Printing Machine Maintenance, Inc. v. Carton Products Co. (1957), 15 Ill. App. 2d 543, 552, 147 N.E.2d 443.) The essential elements of a novation are (1) a previous, valid obligation; (2) a subsequent agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) the validity of the new contract. (Kiefer v. Reis (1928), 331 Ill. 38, 43; Faith, at 1003-04.) The party seeking to prove the novation has the burden of proof and must establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. (Faith, at 1004.) Thus, to prove a novation plaintiff has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a previous, valid obligation.\nIf an attorney renders professional services, he has the right to be compensated for such services. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 13, par. 1; Neville v. Davinroy (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 706, 710, 355 N.E.2d 86.) Where an attorney and client enter into an express contract for representation, the express contract will control the compensation due the attorney. (Neville, at 710.) Where an express contract is not entered into, there is generally an implied promise to pay a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by the attorney pursuant to the theory of quantum meruit. In Illinois a plaintiff may recover under quantum meruit on a claim made pursuant to an express contract without amendment of the pleadings, where plaintiff fails to establish the express contract but does show in fact that services were rendered. Moreen v. Estate of Carlson (1937), 365 Ill. 482, 493, 6 N.E.2d 871; Neville, at 710.\nIn the case at bar, the only evidence presented by plaintiff concerning the existence of a valid previous obligation, i.e., the fees due from Kaplan & Braun, Inc., was a copy of the statement of account.\nAs between an attorney and client, mere allegations of a stated account, when strictly construed, are not sufficient to allege a liability of the client to the attorney on account of fees. (Woods v. First National Bank (1942), 314 Ill. App. 340, 345, 41 N.E.2d 235.) The burden is upon the attorney to show, in the first instance, that any agreement he has made with his client is fair, just and reasonable. (Woods, at 345.) Thus, we conclude that plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a valid, previous obligation of Kaplan & Braun, Inc., pursuant to an account-stated theory.\nNor can we conclude that plaintiff proved the existence of a valid, previous obligation of Kaplan & Braun, Inc. pursuant to a theory of quantum meruit. Quantum meruit literally means \u201cas much as he deserved.\u201d An attorney recovering thereunder is entitled to receive the reasonable worth or value of his services as shown by the evidence. (People\u2019s Casualty Claim Adjustment Co. v. Darrow (1898), 172 Ill. 62, 64, 49 N.E. 1005; Neville, at 711.) The factors to be considered in determining the reasonable value of the services are: the skill and standing of the attorney employed; the nature of the cause and the novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue; the amount and importance of the subject matter; the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the cause; the time and labor required; the usual and customary charge in the community; and the benefits resulting to the client. (Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Wallace (1891), 136 Ill. 87, 93, 26 N.E. 493; Neville, at 711.) As we previously observed, no evidence was introduced concerning the fees of $8,264.61 allegedly due from Kaplan & Braun, Inc., prior to the alleged novation. It is, therefore, our opinion that the trial court should have reduced the judgment by the amount of $8,264.61.\nII.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to reduce the judgment by an amount of $3,662.13, that is, the \u201cLake Zurich Associates\u201d fee. In support of his contention, defendant argues that there was no evidence adduced concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the fee, nor any evidence adduced to prove that plaintiff performed services which would form the basis for the fee. Plaintiff maintains that the sum of $3,662.13 was a cash advance made by plaintiff on behalf of defendant, and as such there was no necessity to prove the fairness or reasonableness of the amount.\nExhibit 1 reveals that on January 9, 1976, a statement was sent to defendant, a portion of which read as follows:\n\u201cAs per many previous statements rendered\nRe: Lake Zurich Associates....................$3,662.13\u201d\nThis exhibit contains five statements of account sent to defendant prior to the January 9, 1976 statement: December 4, 1975; October 7, 1975; September 8, 1975; July 10, 1975; and February 13, 1975. None of these statements refers to the Lake Zurich Associates fee. Attorney Browne testified at trial that:\n\u201cThe $3662.00 charged to Lake Zurich as a fee was paid. We paid it ourselves. The fee was paid. I paid it myself and that\u2019s cash advanced that he owed me $3600.00.\u201d\nExhibit 3, consisting of 21 time cards of plaintiff, reveals that only four of those cards refer to Lake Zurich Associates and document a total of IJ2 hours expended. During closing argument plaintiff\u2019s attorney agreed with defendant\u2019s counsel that the $3,662.13 was not a loan. Instead, plaintiff\u2019s attorney argued that it was cash advanced. Defendant\u2019s counsel argued in response:\n\u201cMy position is that they testified that the fee was paid. He says a cash advance, and, of course, as I said, the only person to whom they could pay it is themselves. There is no one else they could pay it to.\u201d\nWe cannot conclude from the foregoing that plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the $3,662.13 was'\u201ccash advanced.\u201d In so concluding we note plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges, inter alia, that \u201cdefendant engaged the plaintiff to perform legal services for the defendant for which defendant agreed to pay the sum of Fourteen Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-two and 64/100 Dollars ($14,692.64),\u201d and that \u201c[t]he fair and reasonable value of services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant was Fourteen Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-two and 64/100 Dollars ($14,692.64).\u201d Conspicuously absent from plaintiff\u2019s complaint is any allegation of \u201ccash advanced.\u201d Additionally we observe that if the $3,662.13 in fact represents compensation for legal services rendered, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the fairness and reasonableness of the fees. It is, therefore, our opinion that the trial court should have reduced the judgment by the additional amount of $3,662.13.\nIII.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in not reducing the judgment by the further sum of $342.50, that is, the amount of fees for services rendered to Bralen, Ltd., subsequent to December 1974. In support of his contention, defendant argues that \u201cthere is no showing of the obligation of defendant to pay a fee charged to \u2018Bralen\u2019.\u201d Attorneys Browne and Greenbaum testified that during their meeting with defendant in December 1974, defendant had agreed to undertake personal liability for all future services rendered on behalf of the various entities with which defendant was associated. Attorney Greenbaum further testified, without dispute from defendant, that defendant had an \u201cownership interest\u201d in Bralen, Ltd.\nWe conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the jury\u2019s finding that defendant had agreed to be personally liable for the services rendered to Bralen, Ltd. Thus, it is our opinion that the trial court did not err in refusing to reduce the judgment by $342.50.\nIV.\nDefendant finally contends that the court erred in not reducing the amount of the judgment by the further sum of $742.44, that is, the amount of fees for services rendered by plaintiff to Kaplan & Braun, Inc., subsequent to December 1, 1974. In support of this contention defendant argues that even if he agreed to be personally liable for these fees, such agreement was invalid as a result of the \u201cgreat pressure applied\u201d to him by plaintiff. The evidence adduced at trial indicates that attorneys Greenbaum and Browne advised defendant that plaintiff could not continue to represent defendant or any other entities with which he was associated unless he agreed to be personally liable for such representation. Defendant testified that he was \u201cfinancially and emotionally down.\u201d We cannot conclude that this evidence alone establishes \u201cundue influence\u201d or \u201cimpermissible pressure.\u201d Thus, it is our opinion that the trial court did not err in refusing to reduce the judgment by $742.44.\nReversed in part and affirmed in part.\nDOWNING and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.\nPlaintiff\u2019s brief represents that defendant is die majority shareholder in Kaplan & Braun, Inc. However, no evidence was adduced at trial in support of this representation.\nPrior to this meeting, defendant, attorneys Greenbaum and Brown, a bankruptcy attorney and the creditors of Kaplan & Braun, Inc., had assembled to discuss the financial difficulties of Kaplan & Braun, Inc.\nExhibit 1 consists of nine statements periodically sent to defendant commencing on February 13, 1975, and terminating on June 22, 1975.\nDefendant does not argue that plaintiff failed to prove the fairness and reasonableness of these fees.\nDefendant does not argue that plaintiff failed to prove the fairness and reasonableness of these fees.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Simon & McClosky, Ltd., of Chicago (Robert B. Simon and E. Jacob McClosky, of counsel), for appellant.", "Greenbaum & Browne, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard J. Sorman, of counsel), for appellee pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GREENBAUM & BROWNE, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD L. BRAUN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 79-1163\nOpinion filed August 26, 1980.\nRehearing denied October 1, 1980.\nSimon & McClosky, Ltd., of Chicago (Robert B. Simon and E. Jacob McClosky, of counsel), for appellant.\nGreenbaum & Browne, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard J. Sorman, of counsel), for appellee pro se." }, "file_name": "0210-01", "first_page_order": 232, "last_page_order": 238 }