{ "id": 5540214, "name": "HARRY LEVINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TIME, INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Levinson v. Time, Inc.", "decision_date": "1980-10-06", "docket_number": "No. 79-2096", "first_page": "338", "last_page": "343", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 338" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5602520 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3232777 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 862", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3203640 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0862-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3196022 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 984", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3172670 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 1084", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5609004 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1087" }, { "page": "1086-88" }, { "page": "1086-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2972262 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 1243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3228000 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" }, { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 S. Ct. 148", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 L. Ed. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 877", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450688, 451277, 450895, 450932, 450777, 450363 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0877-03", "/us/371/0877-02", "/us/371/0877-04", "/us/371/0877-06", "/us/371/0877-05", "/us/371/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2800594 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3290808 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-57" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 1185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2602151 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/59/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1588356 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/115/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3417234 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" }, { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070566 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490191 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0108-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 784, "char_count": 14531, "ocr_confidence": 0.889, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.072554700669512e-08, "percentile": 0.4668119647130006 }, "sha256": "ed0ea69423d72b4f5e353726b2ba4b2b3d6910cffc5dd5dfd15deaad387e9d27", "simhash": "1:e2b81d806b35b771", "word_count": 2383 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:16:28.821099+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HARRY LEVINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TIME, INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nHarry Levinson (plaintiff) brought this action for libel against Time, Inc. (Time), National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (NBC), Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), David S. Jackson, Robert S. Walsh, and David Nelson (defendants). Jackson is the author of the allegedly libelous article which appeared in Time magazine. CBS and NBC are licensees of Chicago television stations. Walsh and Nelson respectively are station managers thereof. Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint for legal insufficiency. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 45.) The trial court entered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff has appealed.\nIn this situation, the well-pleaded allegations of the second amended complaint must be taken as true. (Johnston v. City of Bloomington (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 108, 111, 395 N.E.2d 549.) Also facts contained in exhibits appended to the second amended complaint, \u201cwhich constitute part of the complaint\u201d are similarly accepted as true. (Soules v. General Motors Corp. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 282, 284, 402 N.E.2d 599.) The following is a summary of the important facts.\nPlaintiff has \u201clong conducted\u201d a gem and jewelry business locally, nationally and world-wide. Plaintiff has \u201cextensively advised and been consulted in\u201d his field. He is not now and was never a \u201cpublic officer or public figure.\u201d\nOn July 30, 1978, Time issued a press release summarizing an article slated by it for early publication, which contained allegedly libelous statements concerning plaintiff. Time also released the complete text of the article. The substance of the release and text was then aired on television in two broadcasts by CBS and three broadcasts by NBC. The article later appeared in Time magazine. The statements concerning plaintiff were \u201cfalse, malicious, libelous, slanderous, and defamatory.\u201d They brought plaintiff into disrepute \u201cand plaintiff\u2019s reputation, both as a citizen and as a jeweler, was thereby injured as was his standing in the community and in his business activities.\u201d All of this material appears from exhibits appended to plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint.\nAll five broadcasts reported plaintiff\u2019s jewelry store was robbed of more than $1 million worth of goods. Plaintiff\u2019s \u201cfriend\u201d was Tony \u201cBig Tuna\u201d Accardo, a mob boss. According to the broadcasts, Accardo ordered the gang that robbed plaintiff to return the goods. The gang took the goods to Accardo\u2019s house. Deciding they had been shortchanged, some of the gang members later broke into Accardo\u2019s house and recovered the goods. Six men, believed to be a part of the burglary gang, were found assassinated.\nIn addition, one of the CBS broadcasts stated:\n\u201cTime magazine is reporting tonight that Chicago police think they have a link between Tony \u2018Big Tuna\u2019 Accardo and jewelry store owner Harry Levinson \u2014 a link that could have led to the death of six burglars. * * *. Police said that Levinson was not cooperative in their investigation. The reason, according to Time is that Levinson had a friend on the other side of the enforcement business * * *. A police informant told Time that Levinson complained to \u2018Big Tuna\u2019 who was sympathetic 0 \u00b0\nThe other CBS broadcast stated:\n\u201cThere are new reports tonight tying a million-dollar jewelry heist and the owner of the store that was robbed in with a major crime syndicate figure and the murders of six thieves. Time magazine has published a story linking mob boss Tony Accardo and jewelry store owner Harry Levinson. When Levinson\u2019s near north jewelry store was robbed 0 * e, police said that Levinson was not particularly helpful. One detective said, \u2018He\u2019s the most uncooperative victim I\u2019ve ever seen.\u2019 Time magazine\u2019s article says the reason Levinson was of so little help was that he had a friend on the inside \u00b0 0 Levinson complained to Big Tuna. The article said Accardo sympathized * \u00b0\nOne of the NBC broadcasts reported, \u201cIt seems Mafia boss Anthony \u2018Big Tuna\u2019 Accardo was a friend of the owner of the store that was robbed.\u201d The other two broadcasts stated, \u201cthe owner of Levinson\u2019s asked his friend, Anthony \u2018Big Tuna\u2019 Accardo, for help in recovering his goods.\u201d Plaintiff alleged various photographs of plaintiff and his jewelry store accompanied these reports on television.\nThe article appearing in Time stated:\n\u201c[T]he gang 0 0 0 stole more than $1 million worth of jewelry, silver and furs.\nAfter the police discovered the burglary, the store\u2019s owner, Harry Levinson did little to help their investigation. Griped a detective on the case: \u2018He was the most uncooperative victim I\u2019ve ever seen.\u2019 But Levinson happened to be acquainted with a prominent figure in a different sort of enforcement business, Big Tuna. Levinson complained, according to a police informant, about his misfortune. For reasons of his own, Big Tuna sympathized. An order soon went out from River Forest: return the swag. The gang reluctantly obeyed * \u00b0\nThe article was accompanied by a photograph of plaintiff\u2019s jewelry store which included two captions: \u201cLevinson\u2019s jewelry store in Chicago, where the bloody tale began\u201d and a portion of a statement ascribed to a police officer, \u201c \u2018He was the most uncooperative victim I\u2019ve ever seen.\u2019 \u201d\nIn this court plaintiff contends the broadcasts and the article constitute libel per se and application of the innocent construction rule here is neither possible nor proper.\nAll libels may be classified as per se or per quod. The former category is excellently described in Bruck v. Cincotta (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 260, 264, 371 N.E.2d 874, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 602:\n\u201cA writing, to be libellous per se, must contain a false statement which imputes to the plaintiff any of the following offensive categories: (1) the commission of a crime; (2) the infection with a loathesome disease; (3) the unfitness or want of integrity in performing the duties of an office or employment; or (4) words which adversely reflect on a particular party\u2019s abilities in his business, trade or profession. Bontkowski v. Chicago Sun-Times [and Field Enterprises, Inc. (1969), 115 Ill. App. 2d 229, 252 N.E.2d 689]; Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp. (1965), 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 207 N.E.2d 482.\u201d\nIn Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp. (1965), 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 341, libel (and slander) per quod are defined:\n\u201cIf the false words, by their plain, ordinary meaning, and without resort to innuendo, impute anything within the first four offensive categories, the slander is one per se requiring no allegation or proof of special damages. If, however, a construction of the words is necessary to demonstrate injurious meaning, the slander cannot be per se, for a defamation can never be per se if the words themselves are capable of innocent construction. [Citations.]\u201d\nIt is apparent from an analysis of the second amended complaint that the first three categories of libel per se are not pertinent here. But, plaintiff urges strongly the second amended complaint amply alleges a violation of the fourth category above set out. In this regard we must note the disparity in language between Bruck and Whitby. Whitby uses the phrase \u201cprejudicing a particular party in his profession or trade\u201d (59 111. App. 2d 337, 340), in the fourth category. Bruck uses the words \u201cadversely reflect on a particular party\u2019s abilities in his business\u201d (56 111. App. 3d 260, 264). As a practical matter, we do not see a wide discrepancy between these two definitions. We note that Bruck cites Whitby in this regard. If there is any actual difference between them, we prefer to accept the definition stated by our most able colleagues in Bruck, some 13 years later than Whitby. We find Bruck quoted and the definition \u201clack of ability in his business\u201d used to define the fourth category in Makis v. Area Publications Corp. (1979), 77 111. App. 3d 452, 456, 395 N.E.2d 1185.\nIn our opinion, even assuming a difference in the meaning of the language thus used, if we apply the Bruck and Makis definition, we must necessarily conclude we are not dealing with libel per se so that the second amended complaint states no cause of action. Conversely, if we apply the Whitby language, we are constrained to arrive at the same result. \u201cIn determining whether the challenged language falls within one or more of these recognized categories,\u201d of libel per se the courts follow the \u201crule of innocent construction.\u201d Makis, 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 456-57.\nThus, the next and indispensable step is a determination as to whether the language in all of the publications before us is actionable after application of the innocent construction rule. In John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert, denied (1962), 371 U.S. 877, 9 L. Ed. 2d 114, 83 S. Ct. 148, the supreme court defined the innocent-construction rule:\n\u201cThat rule holds that the article is to be read as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words allegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.\u201d\n\u201cThe meaning of the statement must be gathered from the context of the language of the publication, stripped of innuendo.\u201d (Galvin v. Gallagher (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 927, 930, 401 N.E.2d 1243; Makis, 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 457.) \u201cWhether language is susceptible of an innocent construction in a libel action is a question of law for the court, * \u00b0 *.\u201d Brack, 56 111. App. 3d 260, 265.\nInvoking this rule, we find nothing in the publications before us which is not susceptible of an innocent construction. To begin with, much of plaintiff\u2019s argument is based upon selection of isolated words or phrases. This is contrary to the rule which requires that \u201cthe article is to be read as a whole.\u201d (John, 24 Ill. 2d 437,442.) Characterizing plaintiff as an acquaintance or friend of a \u201cmob boss\u201d does not itself defame plaintiff. The fact that plaintiff may have \u201ccomplained\u201d to or \u201casked for help\u201d from a \u201cmob boss\u201d similarly does not necessarily defame plaintiff. Friendship and acquaintance in such a situation may well exist without mutual culpability. Plaintiff contends these statements associate him with criminal alliances and organized crime. However, the requirement that we consider all of the publications as a whole and employ the \u201cnatural and obvious meaning\u201d of words prohibits a construction such as that espoused by plaintiff. (John, 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442.) Although plaintiff contends reports of his \u201cuncooperative\u201d behavior suggest immoral motives or actions, no such exegesis is possible since the statements must be read \u201cstripped of innuendo.\u201d (Galvin, 81 Ill. App. 3d 927, 930.) Common sense and understanding tell us that a great number of people may be uncooperative with the police for a great variety of innocent reasons. The same analysis applies to the words \u201clink\u201d or \u201ctying\u201d between plaintiff and Accardo.\nWe have carefully and painstakingly examined each and all of the publications referred to in the second amended complaint. The above comments are typical of those portions of the material which have been singled out by plaintiff as being libelous per se. It is our considered opinion that each and every one of these arguments by plaintiff\u2019s able counsel are completely rebutted by application of the rule of innocent construction. Furthermore, as above shown, the proper legal approach to this problem is not the examination of selected words or phrases. The problem is a construction of each of these publications as a whole, and in this situation we are required, and it is our duty, to consider that, \u201cthe article is to be read as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning\u201d so that \u201cwords allegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.\u201d (John, 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442, and the many authorities there cited.) We must necessarily conclude the second amended complaint states no cause of action.\nPlaintiff contends Troman v. Wood (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292, makes application of the innocent construction rule a question of fact rather than one of law. In that case the court concluded as a \u201cpreliminary determination\u201d (62 Ill. 2d 184, 189), that the reference to the plaintiff by name in a newspaper article and inclusion therein of a picture of a house identified as hers could not be innocently construed as a reference to anyone other than the plaintiff. The court specifically stated this \u201cpreliminary determination \u00b0 * * is a question of law * * (62 Ill. 2d 184,189.) Whether the article in Troman was in fact understood by readers to refer to plaintiff then became a question for the jury. This same distinction is pointed out in Vee See Construction Co., Inc. v. Jensen & Halstead (1979) , 79 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1087, 399 N.E.2d 278. But \u201c[wjhether language is susceptible of an innocent construction \u00b0 * 0 is a question of law for the court * \u201c Bruck, 56 Ill. App. 3d 260, 265. Plaintiff also contends Troman limited application o\u00ed John, 24 Ill. 2d 437, only to situations in which the identity of the plaintiff is involved. We do not agree. The innocent construction rule of John is fully applicable here. See Vee See Construction Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1086-88.\nWe will add that attempts to eliminate the innocent-construction rule have been consistently rejected by the courts of Illinois for many years in the past. Some of the pertinent authorities in this regard, cited without further elucidation, are Kakuris v. Klein (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 597, 410 N.E.2d 984; Altman v. Amoco Oil Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 104,107, 406 N.E.2d 142; Bravo Realty, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (1980) , 84 Ill. App. 3d 862, 865, 406 N.E.2d 61; Adreani v. Hansen (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 726, 728, 400 N.E.2d 679; Vee See Construction Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 1084,1086-87; Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 67, 70-71, 397 N.E.2d 41; and Makis, 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 457.\nFor these reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMcGLOON and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Louis G. Davidson, John B. Davidson, and Sydney R. Marovitz, all of Chicago, for appellant.", "Reuben & Proctor, of Chicago (Don H. Reuben, Lawrence Gunnels, and Samuel Fifer, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HARRY LEVINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TIME, INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 79-2096\nOpinion filed October 6, 1980.\nLouis G. Davidson, John B. Davidson, and Sydney R. Marovitz, all of Chicago, for appellant.\nReuben & Proctor, of Chicago (Don H. Reuben, Lawrence Gunnels, and Samuel Fifer, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0338-01", "first_page_order": 360, "last_page_order": 365 }