{
  "id": 2845978,
  "name": "Susan Cumbo, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earle Cumbo, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cumbo v. Cumbo",
  "decision_date": "1973-01-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 56724",
  "first_page": "1056",
  "last_page": "1058",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 4992,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:41:33.026395+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Susan Cumbo, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earle Cumbo, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PER CURIAM:\nSusan Cumbo filed a complaint for divorce against Earle Cumbo and substituted service was had by service on Earle\u2019s 13-year-old brother, Gregory, who was at Earle Gumbo\u2019s residence on a two day visit from Jacksonville, Florida, where he resided with his parents. After a default judgment had been entered against him, defendant appeared specially to quash service of summons on the ground that Gregory was not a \u201cperson of the family\u201d of Earle Cumbo within the meaning of Chapter 110, sec. 13.2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and he brought this appeal.\nThe question involved in this appeal is whether the \u201cmember of the family\u201d relationship contemplated by the statute necessarily involves some notion of permanence as to the residence at the defendant\u2019s usual place of abode by the said \u201cmember of the family.\u201d\nSection 13.2 of the Civil Practice Act provides for substituted service as follows:\n\u201cSec. 13.2\nExcept as otherwise expressly provided, service of summons upon an individual defendant shall be made * * * (2) by leaving a copy at his usual place of abode, with some person of the family, of the age of 10 years or upwards, and informing that person of the contents thereof, provided the officer or other person making service shall also send a copy of the summons in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed to the defendant at his usual place of abode.\u201d\nPlaintiff relies principally on Anchor Finance Corp. v. Miller (1956), 8 Ill.App.2d 326, 132 N.E.2d 81, when substituted service on defendant\u2019s sister in defendant\u2019s apartment was held valid. There, the sister and the defendant were held to be members of one family. The court found the following \u201cadmitted facts\u201d: that \u201cthe family lived in adjoining apartments in the same building\u201d and the sister \u201cspent considerable time\u201d in the defendant\u2019s apartment where summons was served; and quoted from 72 C.J.S. Process, Sec. 48 (p. 1060) that \u201csuch statutes presuppose that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and defendant that notice wiU reach defendant.\u201d\nIn Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Smith (1961), 29 Ill.App.2d 35, 172 N.E.2d 429, the Second Dist. Appellate Court held that where the defendant resided in a rented room in a private residence, he was a member of the family of his landlord and service of the summons on Mrs. Keough, the landlord\u2019s wife was service on a \u201cperson of the family,\u201d defining \u201cfamily\u201d as: \u201cA coUective body of persons who live in one house, and under one head or manager; a household including parents, children and servants, and, as the case may be, lodgers or boarders.\u201d 29 Ill.App.2d 35 at 41. The court added (page 43):\n\u201cThe defendant was not a mere temporaiy guest in the Keough home, but on the contrary, the evidence shows conclusively that he was a permanent resident in the Keough home and had been for some four or five years, and we believe that for the purpose of substituted service of summons the defendant was a member of the Keough family as contemplated by Section 13.2 of the Civil Practice Act.\u201d\nIn Sanchez v. Randall (1961), 31 Ill.App.2d 41, 175 N.E.2d 645, service upon a person, Mrs. Kellogg, who rented a bedroom in defendant\u2019s apartment, was held valid, the court stating, inter alia (at p. 49): \u201cShe was not a temporary guest for she for all intents and purposes permanently resided in the home of the defendant\u201d and held (page 50) that \u201cMrs. Kellogg could properly be considered as a member of the family of the defendant.\u201d\nBoth in Hines Lumber Co. and in Sanchez, the negative inference is clear that a temporary guest in the defendant\u2019s usual place of abode is not a member of the family within the meaning of the statute. We do not think that, under the circumstances of this case, the fact that this temporary guest was related by blood to the defendant is enough to make him a member of the family for the purposes of the statute.\nFrom these cases, then it is apparent that the notion of a permanent relationship is essential to the idea of a \u201cfamily\u201d within the meaning of Section 13.2 of the Civil Practice Act. Permanent residence in the home of the person sought to be served \u2014 or some rough equivalent as was present in Anchor Finance Corp. v. Miller, supra\u2014 is a requirement. Although Gregory Gumbo is related by blood to the defendant here, for the purpose of substituted service he was not a member of defendant\u2019s family at the time summons was served upon him.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to quash the service of summons and the default judgment be vacated and set aside.\nReversed and remanded with directions.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PER CURIAM:"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Martin Tiersky, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Michael E. Reed, of Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Susan Cumbo, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earle Cumbo, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 56724;\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nJanuary 30, 1973.\nMartin Tiersky, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMichael E. Reed, of Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1056-01",
  "first_page_order": 1078,
  "last_page_order": 1080
}