{ "id": 3161269, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES NICKOLS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Nickols", "decision_date": "1980-11-26", "docket_number": "No. 80-84", "first_page": "480", "last_page": "484", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 480" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405202 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 F.2d 232", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 474677 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/492/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 N.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2808250 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 1006", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2522748 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1008" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/1006-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909854 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857846 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927114 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0485-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 485, "char_count": 7230, "ocr_confidence": 0.901, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.37780156294826456 }, "sha256": "1391eb7ec6d27315d0d873cd7573feda46803f6008ab89a8bd0aeb9ae28a4922", "simhash": "1:8baf98a78ac68c76", "word_count": 1201 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:32.356040+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES NICKOLS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Charles Nickols was charged with attempt (burglary) and criminal damage to property under $150. Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Warren County, he was convicted of both offenses. This appeal is from those convictions and the trial court\u2019s imposition of an order of restitution and sentence of six years in the Department of Corrections.\nThe offenses at bar arose from an alleged attempt to break into Grier Hall, a women\u2019s residence at Monmouth College, on October 16, 1979. Officer Ronald Kilby identified defendant as the man he saw attempting to enter the building through a window at approximately 3 a.m. that morning. The attempt (burglary) charge arose from defendant\u2019s partial entry through the window, the breakage of which represented the criminal damage. Defendant\u2019s defense was one of mistaken identification.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial as a result of an unauthorized communication with a juror; (2) the criminal damage conviction must be reversed as it arose from the same act as the attempt (burglary) conviction; and (3) this cause must be remanded as the trial court failed to specify the reasons for its sentencing determination.\nDefendant\u2019s initial contention that his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury was denied and that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial therefor is based upon a conversation which occurred between the bailiff and a juror during a recess in the trial. After being informed of the conversation by defense counsel, the trial court conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury. Each of the parties to the conversation testified.\nThe bailiff stated that he asked the juror if he knew that defendant was a brother of George and Melvin Nickols but did not remember stating that the Nickols brothers had been convicted of felonies or incarcerated. He also admitted stating that Sonny Taylor was in Stateville but denied mentioning that defendant was once a co-defendant of Taylor. While disclosing that jurors were in the vicinity of the conversation and that he speaks loudly due to a hearing impediment, the bailiff noted the entire dialogue lasted only 1 to Vi minutes.\nThe juror testified that he remembered \u201cMelvin Nickols was mentioned, just a mention\u201d and that he presumed the reference was to defendant\u2019s father. When asked to whom the bailiff was referring when Stateville was mentioned, the juror stated that he could not recall as he \u201cwasn\u2019t paying much attention, I am sorry to say.\u201d He added that he remembered no other jurors in the vicinity of the conversation, which he stated covered other topics and labeled as \u201cstrictly mundane.\u201d When asked if he had occasion to form any thoughts about defendant as a result of the conversation, the juror responded in the negative.\nThe court itself then questioned the juror for the purpose of determining any possible prejudice on his part:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Painter, was there anything that occurred that would change your position at all in regard to acting as a juror in this case?\nA. No.\nTHE COURT: You understand that what we are concerned about is any reference made in your presence that would by inference or relationship or association with any other person cast any doubt on the integrity of this defendant in any manner, and want that ascertained from you, so that the outcome will be determined only on the evidence.\nA. I don\u2019t think anything was made of anything that might conflict in that respect. The only thing that was mentioned was the relationship. What that had bearing on, I don\u2019t have any idea.\nTHE COURT: Would any such relationship that was mentioned cause you any difficulty in being a juror, having heard that?\nA. No.\nTHE COURT: Would it change your consideration of this defendant\u2019s conduct in any manner?\nA. No.\nTHE COURT: Do you think you will be able to separate anything you might have heard and put that out of your mind, and decide this case on the facts in evidence?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nThe standard of review in this situation is well-established:\n\u201cThe settled rule is that before a jury verdict will be set aside because of any unauthorized communication with the jury, it is necessary for the defendant to show prejudice. People ex rel. Walker v. Pate, 53 Ill. 2d 485, 505 (1973); People v. Mills, 40 Ill. 2d 4, 13-15 (1968). See also People v. Tobe, 49 Ill. 2d 538, 542-44 (1971); People v. Callahan, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1008 (1974).\u201d (People v. Simms (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 703, 707, 348 N.E.2d 478, 481.)\nDefendant urges the adoption of a contrary rule establishing such communications as presumptively prejudicial, citing United States ex rel. Tobe v. Bensinger (7th Cir. 1974), 492 F.2d 232, in support of his proposition. This is not the rule in Illinois, and in view of the Illinois precedents we decline to depart from them.\nAlthough the bailiff\u2019s action in communicating with the juror was unquestionably imprudent, we do not find that defendant was thereby prejudiced, nor that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding to deny the motion for a mistrial.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that his conviction of criminal damage to property must be reversed as this offense arose from the same physical act as his attempt (burglary) conviction.\nA defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses which arise from a single act. (See, e.g., People v. Lilly (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 493, 495-96, 309 N.E.2d 1, 2.) In the case at bar, defendant\u2019s breakage of the dormitory window was a substantial step toward the commission of a burglary and therefore a basis of the attempt charge. We accordingly vacate defendant\u2019s conviction for the lesser offense of criminal damage to property.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that the trial court inadequately specified the reasons for its sentencing determination in violation of section 5 \u2014 4\u2014l(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20141(c)), which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn imposing a sentence for a felony, the trial judge shall specify on the record the particular evidence, information, factors * * * or other reasons that led to his sentencing determination. * * *\u201d\nThe record reflects that the trial court sentenced the defendant to an extended term sentence as a result of similar felony convictions in 1975 and 1977. As the statute requires the court to specify the reasons that led to its decision, we find its mandate satisfied.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Warren County is affirmed as to the conviction of attempt (burglary) and reversed as to the conviction of criminal damage to property.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\nSTENGEL and BARRY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and G. Joseph Weller, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Fred R. Odendahl, State\u2019s Attorney, of Monmouth (John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES NICKOLS, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 80-84\nOpinion filed November 26, 1980.\nRobert Agostinelli and G. Joseph Weller, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nFred R. Odendahl, State\u2019s Attorney, of Monmouth (John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0480-01", "first_page_order": 502, "last_page_order": 506 }