{ "id": 5533340, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID HILLER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hiller", "decision_date": "1980-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 78-7", "first_page": "322", "last_page": "327", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 322" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 1054", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5610498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/1046-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 1372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3311590 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0936-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392468 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 1070", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3329914 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3353665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 1339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3262523 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5306717 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812613 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3327478 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 N.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2706862 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2797146 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 A.L.R.3d 717", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405143 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0461-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 632, "char_count": 13133, "ocr_confidence": 0.9, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0915490762930361e-07, "percentile": 0.5657408984075906 }, "sha256": "ce854e9eb0fbf6189751d3e5941ee6029ac930c66a648c2209db417bb6bdf54a", "simhash": "1:166ab800342941c1", "word_count": 2077 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:53.928123+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID HILLER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Miss PRESIDING JUSTICE McGILLICUDDY delivered\nthe opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial the defendant, David Hiller, was convicted of the offense of rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 1) and sentenced to a term of four years to four years and a day. On appeal the defendant contends (1) that the acquittal of a co-defendant raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt and (2) that the court\u2019s restriction of his cross-examination of a witness denied him a fair trial.\nAt trial the complainant testified that in June of 1974, when she was 19 years of age, she moved into the apartment of Thomas and Maureen Hendrickson at the invitation of Maureen. It was agreed that the complainant would sleep on the sofa bed in the living room of the one-bedroom apartment.\nThe complainant soon discovered that Thomas Hendrickson\u2019s boss, Eugene Gretchokoff, also resided in the apartment and slept on the sofa bed. Subsequently, the complainant and Gretchokoff had sexual relations several times. The last time the couple had intercourse was on June 29, 1974, and Gretchokoff moved out of the apartment on July 2, 1974.\nOn July 3, 1974, the complainant returned from work at approximately 5:30 p.m. Maureen was in the apartment and subsequently Thomas Hendrickson, her husband, Steve McKinney and the defendant arrived. At the complainant\u2019s request, McKinney drove her to her parents\u2019 home to pick up some clothes. They stopped at a restaurant before returning to the apartment at approximately 11:30 p.m. When they returned Thomas Hendrickson and the defendant were drinking beer and Maureen and her step-daughter were sleeping in the bedroom. The complainant took a shower and retired for the evening.\nSubsequently, the complainant was awakened by the tearing of her clothes. She saw Hendrickson, McKinney and the defendant naked in front of her. The complainant testified that each man forcibly had intercourse with her, while the others held her down. She stated that during the attack Maureen was in the kitchen talking on the telephone.\nThe complainant did not leave the apartment until 11 a.m. the following morning. When she left Thomas Hendrickson picked up a camper\u2019s knife from the table and warned her not to say anything.\nThe complainant further testified that she went to her grandfather\u2019s home and telephoned Gretchokoff. After she told him that she had been raped, Gretchokoff called the police. Two police officers met the complainant and her grandfather at the Hendricksons\u2019 apartment. The complainant told the officers that she had a disagreement with her friend and that she wanted to get her clothes out of the apartment. After the complainant retrieved her clothes from the apartment, her grandfather convinced her to inform the officers about the rape.\nThe officers took the complainant to Holy Cross Hospital where she was given a physical examination. Vaginal smears taken from the complainant indicated the presence of sperm.\nConflicting testimony was offered concerning the presence of bruises on the complainant\u2019s body on July 4. Her grandfather testified that her throat, arms and wrists were beginning to bruise, while Gretchokoff testified that when he saw the complainant later that afternoon there was a bruise below her left eye. Investigator Harry Kunz, of the Chicago Police Department, who interviewed the complainant at the hospital, observed bruises on her neck, arms, wrist and leg. However, neither patrolman Donald Fatime, who accompanied the complainant into the Hendricksons\u2019 apartment, nor Dr. Kenneth Wilcox, who examined her at the hospital, found any evidence of bruises.\nThe defendant denied the complainant\u2019s accusation of rape. He admitted that he, his wife and children visited the Hendricksons\u2019 apartment on the evening of July 3. However, he testified that he and his family left the apartment around 8 p.m., and that he did not return that evening. The co-defendant, Thomas Hendrickson, did not testify.\nThe State presented Maureen Hendrickson, who was divorced from Thomas Hendrickson at the time of trial, as a rebuttal witness. The State advised the court that Maureen believed that Hendrickson would testify also. She was instructed not to give any testimony which pertained to her former husband.\nMaureen testified that the only men in her apartment that evening were Hendrickson, McKinney and the defendant. While two men restrained the complainant, the defendant had intercourse with her. Maureen also stated that McKinney and a third man had intercourse with the complainant. When she attempted to interfere with the attack, Maureen was struck by Hendrickson.\nMaureen admitted that the State originally had charged her with unlawful restraint in connection with the incident. She also stated that during the attack, she spoke to the defendant\u2019s wife on the telephone and described to her the activities of the three men.\nThe defendant\u2019s attorney attempted to examine Maureen concerning her current relationship with her former husband. His questions concerning a recent fight between them were objected to by Hendrickson\u2019s attorney and sustained by the trial court. In addition, the court refused to allow the defendant to pursue Maureen\u2019s statement that she was \u201cin fear of her life\u201d at the time of the incident because her answer pertained to her former husband.\nKaren Hiller, the defendant\u2019s former wife, testified in surrebuttal. She stated that she did not receive a telephone call from Maureen Hendrickson between 12 and 2 a.m. on July 4, and that she was at home in bed with the defendant at the time.\nAt the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found Thomas Hendrickson not guilty and the defendant, David Hiller, guilty of rape.\nThe defendant argues that because there was no difference in the evidence which resulted in his conviction and the acquittal of the co-defendant, the acquittal of Hendrickson raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The State responds that the evidence differs in that Maureen testified that she witnessed the defendant\u2019s attack of the complainant and that her testimony contradicted the defendant\u2019s alibi.\nThe defendant replies that although Maureen was prohibited from testifying that Hendrickson had sexual intercourse with the complainant, this fact is the substance of her testimony. Maureen stated that Hendrickson, McKinney and the defendant were the only men present in the apartment that evening and that three men had sexual intercourse with the complainant. She further testified that Hendrickson struck her when she attempted to interfere. Therefore, the defendant concludes that there was no difference in the evidence presented against the two defendants.\nIt is a general principle of law that the failure to convict a co-defendant does not raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the other defendant unless the evidence presented against both parties is identical in all respects. (People v. Stock (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 461, 309 N.E.2d 19. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 717 (1968).) However, the fact that a complaining witness had a better opportunity to identify one of the defendants (People v. Phoenix (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 310, 336 N.E.2d 515; People v. Taylor (1974), 25 Ill. App. 3d 396, 323 N.E.2d 388) or that the identification was corroborated by other evidence (People v. Bradshaw (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 76, 382 N.E.2d 432) will support inconsistent verdicts.\nIn the instant case the complainant\u2019s testimony against both defendants was identical. She positively stated that both defendants forcibly had intercourse with her. One cannot distinguish the complainant\u2019s ability to identify the two d\u00e9fendants since she knew both men previously.\nHowever, the evidence presented against both defendants was not identical in all respects. Hendrickson did not testify, while the defendant did. The defendant denied raping the complainant and offered an alibi.\nAs a rebuttal witness, Maureen contradicted his testimony by asserting that she witnessed the defendant raping the complainant.\nRebuttal evidence is admissible where it explains, repels, contradicts or disproves the evidence of the defendant, even if the evidence also would have been admissible as part of the State\u2019s case in chief. (People v. Waller (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 381, 367 N.E.2d 1283.) Maureen\u2019s testimony was, therefore, competent evidence to contradict the defendant\u2019s denial of participation in the rape.\nAlthough we might agree with the defendant that the substance of Maureen\u2019s testimony was that Hendrickson also raped the complainant, her testimony was not competent evidence against Hendrickson. Because Hendrickson did not testify at trial, there was no evidence for Maureen to rebut. When defendants are tried jointly, evidence competent against one of them is admissible when the trial judge limits the evidence to the particular party implicated by it. People v. Hoover (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 799, 342 N.E.2d 795.\nThe testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for rape where that testimony is clear and convincing. Otherwise, the victim\u2019s testimony must be corroborated. People v. Olejniczak (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 112, 390 N.E.2d 1339; People v. Graham (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 377 N.E.2d 179.\nIn reviewing the evidence against Hendrickson, the trial court apparently determined that the complainant\u2019s testimony alone was not clear and convincing. However, in reviewing the evidence against the defendant, the court also considered Maureen\u2019s corroborating testimony. Because the evidence against the two defendants was not identical in all respects, Hendrickson\u2019s acquittal does not raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant.\nThe defendant also argues that the court\u2019s restriction of his cross-examination of Maureen denied him his constitutional right to confront his accuser. The scope of cross-examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge whose restrictions will not be reversed except in a case of a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Jefferson (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 200, 380 N.E.2d 1070.\nThe defendant first objects to the court\u2019s refusal to permit Maureen to explain why she was in fear of her life on the night of the alleged rape. He contends that this refusal prevented him from inquiring into the details of the incident. We disagree.\nThe court refused to allow Maureen to explain her statement because she indicated that the answer involved Hendrickson, who had not testified. Such a refusal did not prohibit the defense from questioning Maureen concerning the defendant\u2019s involvement in the rape or Maureen\u2019s ability to witness the defendant\u2019s actions. Moreover, the record reveals that the defendant\u2019s attorney did vigorously cross-examine Maureen concerning her testimony. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s restriction constituted an abuse of discretion.\nThe defendant also alleges that the court erred when it refused to allow his attorney to question Maureen concerning a recent fight with Hendrickson. It is the defendant\u2019s contention that such testimony would have revealed the extent of her hostility toward Hendrickson which could have influenced her testimony.\nAlthough the scope of cross-examination is generally within the trial court\u2019s discretion, the widest latitude should be allowed the defendant on cross-examination to demonstrate the bias of a witness. (People v. Barr (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 50, 280 N.E.2d 708; People v. Mason (1963), 288 Ill. 2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 835.) A witness\u2019 interest in the outcome of a case, or a witness\u2019 hostility toward a defendant, is relevant to establish bias, because such feeling of hostility can influence the manner in which the witness testifies. (People v. Mullinax (1979), 67 Ill. App. 3d 936, 384 N.E.2d 1372.) To be admissible, however, the evidence showing bias must be direct and positive, not remote or uncertain. People v. Lenard (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 398 N.E.2d 1054.\nWe believe that the trial court was fully aware of the possible bias of the witness. Maureen testified that she and Hendrickson had obtained a divorce and that he struck her on the night of the incident. Such testimony strongly suggested the possibility of Maureen\u2019s hostility toward her former husband. However, Maureen testified as a rebuttal witness against the defendant, not against Hendrickson. No evidence suggested that Maureen possessed any feelings of hostility toward the defendant. Evidence concerning a possible fight between the witness and Hendrickson was too remote to show the bias of the witness toward the defendant and, thus, was inadmissible. People v. Lenard.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcNAMARA and RIZZI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Miss PRESIDING JUSTICE McGILLICUDDY delivered" } ], "attorneys": [ "Burton Sapoznick and Robert P. Sheridan, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Pamela L. Gray, and Thomas B\u00facaro, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID HILLER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 78-7\nOpinion filed December 31, 1980.\nBurton Sapoznick and Robert P. Sheridan, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Pamela L. Gray, and Thomas B\u00facaro, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0322-01", "first_page_order": 344, "last_page_order": 349 }