{ "id": 5535025, "name": "STATE FARM ILLINOIS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL HAYES, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Illinois Federal Credit Union v. Hayes", "decision_date": "1981-01-23", "docket_number": "No. 16564", "first_page": "1127", "last_page": "1129", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 1127" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2524695 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3268559 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3193509 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0805-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 340, "char_count": 5427, "ocr_confidence": 0.913, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.842769504962468e-08, "percentile": 0.30395131144711524 }, "sha256": "9dd421795eb609a062fd3f7c20ffd084b94926467b196fd039c7f2dc83eaea89", "simhash": "1:e1064af6085ccb56", "word_count": 907 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:53.928123+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE FARM ILLINOIS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL HAYES, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, State Farm Illinois Federal Credit Union, appeals an order of the circuit court of McLean County entered on August 19, 1980, granting defendant, Michael Hayes\u2019, second amended petition to set aside a default judgment in the sum of $3,094.86 entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in that court on August 20,1979. The order granting the petition set the cause for hearing on its merits on a subsequent date. We nevertheless have jurisdiction on appeal by virtue of Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) (73 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(3)), making appealable, without any specific finding, orders granting or denying relief requested in petitions under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 72). The second amended petition here was brought under that section.\nOn February 19, 1980, defendant\u2019s original petition under section 72 was filed. On April 15, 1980, plaintiff presented a motion to dismiss that petition and a hearing was held on that date. At the conclusion of the hearing the court entered an order which stated: \u201cThe court being fully advised, petition denied.\u201d On May 19, 1980, defendant filed a motion which made certain factual allegations and requested permission to file an amended petition under section 72. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike which was heard on June 10, 1980. The motion to strike was allowed and defendant\u2019s motion was stricken. The second amended petition which gave rise to the order appealed was then filed on June 30, 1980.\nPlaintiff asserts that as a final ruling had been made on the defendant\u2019s original section 72 petition and no appeal was taken therefrom within 30 days, a subsequent petition upon the same grounds was barred. It also maintains that, in any event, the trial court should not have responded to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the second amended petition by granting the prayer of the petition but should, at most, have set the petition for hearing on its merits.\nDefendant claims that the ruling on his first section 72 petition was not appealable and even if it was, the second petition was upon different grounds of which he had become advised only after the filing of the original section 72 petition.\nAlthough the trial court\u2019s ruling on the original section 72 petition was made pursuant to plaintiff\u2019s motion to dismiss, the order stated, \u201cpetition denied,\u201d thus indicating a final adjudication of the request for the relief sought by the petition. The order was appealable under Rule 304(b)(3) and became res judicata as to matters raised or that could have been raised when no appeal was timely taken. In re Marriage of Kirk (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 805, 407 N.E.2d 562; Illinois Marine Towing Corp. v. Black (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 909, 393 N.E.2d 707; Werth Industries, Inc. v. Mid-America Management Co. (1973), 16 Ill. App. 3d 688, 306 N.E.2d 510.\nThe most disputed issue is whether the second amended petition set forth grounds for relief that were not and could not with due diligence have been alleged in the original petition.\nThe suit was brought for breach of a revolving credit plan agreement. The total judgment consisted of an award of $2,319.86 as the amount defendant was in default and $775 for attorney\u2019s fees. The substance of defendant\u2019s original petition was: (1) He was hospitalized at the time judgment was entered and made a phone call to the circuit clerk\u2019s office on that day to tell personnel there why he had not appeared but was informed by a person in that office that nothing could be done for him; (2) after falling behind in his payments, he had surrendered to plaintiff two automobiles secured by the agreement; and (3) plaintiff sold the automobiles without giving defendant the notice required by section 9 \u2014 504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 26, par. 9 \u2014 504(3)). The substance of any new matter contained in the second amended petition is the allegation that at the time of the filing of the original petition defendant did not know that plaintiff had known of defendant\u2019s correct address but nevertheless sent the notice required by section 9 \u2014 504(3) to an incorrect address. The second amended petition did not say that defendant did not have this information at the time of the ruling upon the original petition, nor did it state that defendant could not have acquired this information by that time by the exercise of due diligence.\nWe deem the second amended petition to have been insufficient to allege any new grounds for relief that could not have been known with reasonable diligence at the time of the hearing on the original petition. Accordingly, we need not pass upon whether the court erred in not granting plaintiff an evidentiary hearing on the second amended petition.\nWe reverse the order of the circuit court and remand to that court with directions that an order be entered allowing, in bar of action, plaintiff\u2019s motion to dismiss defendant\u2019s second amended petition.\nReversed and remanded.\nCRAVEN and MILLS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "George L. Chesley, of Bloomington (DePew, Grimes, Chesley & Wilson, of counsel), for appellant.", "John R. Porter, Jr., of Bloomington (Prairie State Legal Services, Inc., of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM ILLINOIS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL HAYES, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 16564\nOpinion filed January 23, 1981.\nGeorge L. Chesley, of Bloomington (DePew, Grimes, Chesley & Wilson, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohn R. Porter, Jr., of Bloomington (Prairie State Legal Services, Inc., of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1127-01", "first_page_order": 1149, "last_page_order": 1151 }