{ "id": 3137263, "name": "In re E. S., a Minor.-(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. E. S., Respondent-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. E. S.", "decision_date": "1981-02-13", "docket_number": "No. 79-651", "first_page": "171", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 171" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "512 P.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10550451 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/512/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 P.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Wash. 2d 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1095221 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/71/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 A.2d 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8080930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/230/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ariz. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz. App.", "case_ids": [ 1250915 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz-app/21/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3318936 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5291053 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/66/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. App. 3d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2856337 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/12/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394435 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5258728 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/344/0290-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 536, "char_count": 8615, "ocr_confidence": 0.915, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.23338323920923e-07, "percentile": 0.6062032960222777 }, "sha256": "d57ee1f67c3e5530a2ad24c994864c10c0f82284e2a38b73a0275e7cea0fe300", "simhash": "1:3f2a0a288ccebc52", "word_count": 1469 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:48.439822+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LINDBERG and VAN DEUSEN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "In re E. S., a Minor.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. E. S., Respondent-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this appeal we consider a matter of first impression in Illinois: whether a fenced-in area may be construed to be included in the term \u201cbuilding\u201d within the meaning of the burglary statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1.) We hold that it may not, and vacate the orders revoking the minor\u2019s probation and committing him to the Department of Corrections.\nThe minor was adjudicated a delinquent and ward of the court on July 10,1978, after a hearing on a petition for adjudication charging him with a robbery on May 23,1978. Four petitions to revoke probation were subsequently filed. The dispositions of the first two petitions are unknown; there was a no-probable-cause finding as to the third petition; the fourth petition resulted in revocation of the minor\u2019s probation, and he was sentenced to the Department of Corrections.\nThe minor raised two issues on appeal. The first issue regarding the definiteness of his term of probation was waived by his appellate counsel during oral argument before this court. The second issue raised is the subject of this opinion.\nThe record disclosed that the fourth petition for revocation of probation charged the minor failed to comply with the terms of his probation in that on June 13, 1979, he knowingly and without authority entered the property of the Dundee Avenue Auto Body Shop in Elgin with the intent to commit a theft therein. At the hearing on the petition, the State\u2019s evidence showed the minor was apprehended at approximately 11:15 p.m. on June 13, 1979, in the lot of the Dundee Avenue Auto Body Shop in Elgin. The shop had been closed sometime between 5 and 8 p.m. earlier that evening. The minor was observed in one of the cars on the lot when an officer responding to a \u201cburglary in progress\u201d call at that location saw a beam from a flashlight and saw the minor duck down inside the car. The lot was at the front of the shop, which was itself set back from the street about 60 feet. A 10-foot-high fence with a large sliding gate at the front enclosed the lot and abutted the shop building on its north and south sides. A car compass, apparently broken off from a bracket, was discovered on the minor\u2019s person following a pat-down search. Three cars on the lot appeared to have been ransacked, i.e., the contents of the glove compartments had been strewn around inside the cars. The cars on the lot were not owned by the auto body shop, but were apparently on the lot because they were to be repaired at the shop.\n\u201cA building has been defined to be \u2018a fabric or edifice constructed for use or convenience; as a house, a church, a shop. It must be permanent and designed for the habitation of men or animals, or the shelter of property.\u2019 (2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, \u2014 1st ed. \u2014 p. 601).\u201d\nA partially built toolshed comprised of a roof and one wall and which was used to store property was found to be a structure designed for the shelter of property and, thus, a building People v. Gillespie (1931), 344 Ill. 290, 294. As stated therein:\n\u201cA building, within this act, has been defined as a fabric, structure or edifice, such as a house, church, shop or the like, designed for the habitation of men or animals or for the shelter of property; a structure.\u201d\nCases subsequent to Bruen and Gillespie have found the following edifices constituted a \u201cbuilding\u201d: a car wash with wash stalls open at each end, concrete walls on two sides, a concrete floor, and a roof (People v. Blair (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 371); a telephone booth (People v. Embry (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 332; People v. Borneman (1966), 66 Ill. App. 2d 251); and a tent (People v. Netznik (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 72). It is evident that the common elements in all of these cases were a roof and at least one wall that would provide some shelter from the elements for persons or property.\nThe minor notes that in the jurisdictions that have considered a fenced lot to be a potential subject of a burglary, each had a statute that was explicitly more inclusive than Illinois had. For instance, unlawful entry was prohibited to (1) an \u201cenclosed commercial yard used for storing equipment or supplies\u201d (State v. Patterson (1973), 21 Ariz. App. 136, 516 P.2d 1231); (2) an \u201cinclosure\u201d (Jenkins v. State (Del. 1967), 230 A.2d 262, 275); (3) a building \u201cor other structure\u201d (State v. Roadhs (1967), 71 Wash. 2d 705, 430 P.2d 586); and (4) any building or any part of a building \u201cor other structure or erection.\u201d Stanley v. State (Okla. 1973), 512 P.2d 829.\nThe minor urges that since Illinois does not grade its burglary statute and has only one degree of burglary, any expansion in the interpretation of the offense to include the entry into a fenced yard would be unwarranted and would surely invite unnecessarily severe and arbitrary results. The minor points out that in the four jurisdictions noted above whose statutes more explicitly prohibit entry into a fenced area, in no instance was the offense prosecuted as first-degree burglary.\nFinally, the minor notes that affording the term \u201cbuilding\u201d in the burglary statute its commonly understood meaning and applying the precedent of the prior Illinois cases in the instant cause would not result in a prosecution-proof offense. It would likely necessitate, however, an alternate avenue of prosecution such as theft or burglary of the automobile.\nThe State argues that the fenced lot in the case at bar was an integral part of the body shop and should be construed to be a part of a \u201cbuilding\u201d within the meaning of the burglary statute. The State contends that the cases construing the term \u201cbuilding\u201d simply require that the structure be designed for the shelter of property, and that the structure need not be roofed. The State posits that the fence in the case at bar abutted the building and its physical dimensions indicate it was meant to protect the vehicles entrusted to the body shop from damage or theft. Because the fenced-in lot was essential to the operation of the body shop, it served as an extension of the shop. Conceding that a fenced lot standing alone might not be susceptible to being burglarized within the meaning of the statute, the State nevertheless urges that the lot in this case should be held to be a part of the body shop building and that revocation of the minor\u2019s probation should be affirmed.\nWe are persuaded by the minor\u2019s argument that the fenced-in lot is not encompassed within the meaning of the word \u201cbuilding,\u201d and we vacate the revocation of the probation and commitment orders. Our decision is based primarily on the judicial construction heretofore afforded by Illinois courts to the term \u201cbuilding\u201d within the meaning of the burglary statute. We find further support in the ordinary meaning of the terms \u201cbuilding\u201d and \u201cshelter.\u201d A building \u201cis anything that is built with walls and a roof \u00b0 (Webster\u2019s Second College Edition New World Dictionary 185 (1972).) A shelter is \u201csomething that covers, protects, or defends; * * * shelter implies the protection of something that covers, as a roof or other structure that shields one from the elements, danger, etc.\u201d Webster\u2019s Second College Edition New World Dictionary 1312 (1972).\nAlthough the Illinois cases do not specifically require protection from the elements as such, nor specifically require a roof, we think the essence of the cases is that the area prohibited from entry must be of a nature that would reasonably fall within the commonly accepted meaning of the terms \u201cbuilding\u201d or \u201cshelter\u201d which is used to protect either persons or property or both. We do not believe that the fenced-in lot in the instant cause reasonably falls within the meaning of either of these terms, despite its peculiarly and arguably integral relation to the body shop under the facts of this case. We are disinclined to invite by a contrary finding any future potential extension and/or mutation of the burglary statute to include ordinary fenced areas. Were such extensions appropriate, the appropriate forum would be the legislature and not the courts.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is vacated.\nJudgment vacated.\nLINDBERG and VAN DEUSEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Robinson, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Gene Armentrout, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko and Barbara A. Preiner, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re E. S., a Minor.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. E. S., Respondent-Appellant.)\nSecond District\nNo. 79-651\nOpinion filed February 13, 1981.\nMary Robinson, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nGene Armentrout, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko and Barbara A. Preiner, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0171-01", "first_page_order": 193, "last_page_order": 196 }