{
  "id": 3136872,
  "name": "THE VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNETTE OLLIVIER, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Village of Mundelein v. Ollivier",
  "decision_date": "1981-02-10",
  "docket_number": "No. 80-147",
  "first_page": "324",
  "last_page": "327",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 324"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 19",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5440951
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      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "79 C 4280",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Cow.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:48.439822+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNETTE OLLIVIER, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE VAN DEUSEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Annette Ollivier, was found guilty of failing to display a city vehicle sticker in violation of the Mundelein Village Code and fined $15 plus costs.\nOn appeal, she first contends that Mundelein Ordinance 1.24.040 violates section 1 \u2014 2\u20149 of the Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 1 \u2014 2\u20149) in that the village of Mundelein was without authority to issue a \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d with the command to appear at the police station to plead guilty or to post bond and set a court date in lieu of a summons or complaint.\nWe do not reach the question of the validity of Mundelein Ordinance 1.24.040 because our examination of the ticket entitled \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d, which is in question in this case, discloses that it is just that, a notice, and no more.\nOn October 5, 1979, a village police officer placed a ticket entitled \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation,\u201d on the windshield of defendant\u2019s automobile as it was parked behind an apartment complex in the village of Mundelein. The ticket cited defendant with \u201cFailure to Display Valid Vehicle Tag\u201d but failed to identify the section of the village code allegedly violated. It also indicated that the amount of the violation was $25 and that it was to be paid within 10 days from the date of issuance, and it provided a place for the defendant to plead guilty to the violation named above and to waive trial and court hearing. It also contained the following language:\n\u201cBEFORE DUE DATE \u2014YOU MAY\u2014\n1. Mail or pay in person the amount specified at the Mundelein Police Department, 200 N. Seymour Ave., Mundelein, Ill 60060.\n2. Appear in person at the Mundelein Police Department and request a court date.\u201d\nAnother notice, entitled \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation Second Notice,\u201d was furnished to the defendant. This notice was almost identical to the first except that it stated that the violation had to be paid before October 26,1979, and added the following language to the above quoted section:\n\u201cFailure to comply may result in a warrant being issued for your arrest.\u201d\nContrary to the defendant\u2019s assertions, the \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d does not command the defendant to do anything. Rather, it advised her of actions which she might take and, also, that if she chose to take no action, the village might take court action against her. Such notice of violation is not the commencement of court action for violation of a village ordinance and is not in contravention of the provisions of section 1 \u2014 2\u20149 of the Municipal Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 1 \u2014 2\u20149.\nNothing in section 1 \u2014 2\u20149 of the Municipal Code precludes the village from utilizing procedures for collecting fines and penalties in lieu of court action. Section 1 \u2014 2\u20141 of the Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 1 \u2014 2\u20141) expressly authorizes municipalities to establish any procedures necessary to carry into effect the powers granted to it. Section 8 \u2014 11\u20144 of the Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 8 \u2014 11\u20144) and section 2 \u2014 121 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 2 \u2014 121) authorize municipalities to impose vehicle license fees. The \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d issued in this case has been correctly characterized by the village as an administrative procedure used by many units of local government to collect fines and penalties without resort to judicial process, and we reiterate it is not the commencement of court action for the violation of a municipal ordinance.\nDefendant in this matter chose to plead not guilty in response to the \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d and was thereupon personally served with a nontraffic complaint and notice to appear on January 15, 1980. It was the personal service of the nontraffic complaint and notice to appear which constituted the first court process in this matter, and it was fully in compliance with section 1 \u2014 2\u20149 of the Municipal Code. This document identified the offense of which defendant was charged by name and statutory citation, and a hearing was set for February 5. At the hearing the village presented evidence that the automobile ticketed was, in fact, without a sticker and was registered to defendant at an address within the municipal boundaries of Mundelein. Defendant presented no evidence but moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the proceedings were conducted in violation of certain State and local laws. The trial judge properly denied the motion and found the defendant guilty.\nIn her reply brief, the defendant contends that the village is estopped from denying that formal court action commenced with the issuance of the \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d since that issue had been resolved in a Federal court action between the same parties. That issue was not resolved in the Federal court action. In Ollivier v. Arthur Glitz, Officer Baranowski, John Doe, and the Village of Mundelein (No. 79 C 4280, N.D. Ill. 1980) (mem.), the defendant and her husband filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief contending that notices of ordinance violations which charged them with failure to display valid vehicle tags had been issued after unconstitutional searches of their property, resulting in a deprivation of their rights guaranteed by the fourth and eighth amendments to the United States Constitution, and requesting that the court declare the ordinances unconstitutional. The Federal court noted that notice of ordinance violations had been issued and that the notice itself stated that plaintiffs might pay the fine or request a court date. Since the plaintiffs had not yet paid their fines, the Federal court reasoned that State court proceedings would be available to them in which they could assert their claims. Thereupon, the Federal court dismissed the defendant\u2019s complaint.\nThe doctrine of estoppel by verdict applies only when the same issue has been adjudicated in a former suit between the same parties. (Consolidated Distilled Products, Inc. v. Allphin (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 19, 26.) It is evident from our review of the Federal court\u2019s decision in question that it did not adjudicate any issue pending between the parties in this matter. Rather, the Federal court abstained from exercising its jurisdiction on the grounds that plaintiffs (defendant here) could raise their constitutional issues in a State court proceeding. Defendant did not raise, or attempt to raise, any constitutional issues before the trial court in this cause nor have they raised such issues on appeal. The contention that the village is estopped from denying that formal court action commenced in this case with the issuance of the \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d is without merit.\nDefendant also contends that the conviction must be reversed because the \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d failed to specify the section of the village code allegedly violated. Defendant correctly points out that sections 1.24.040 and 1.24.050 of the Mundelein Village Code require that the offense be identified by statutory citation and that the \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d in this case did not comply with those provisions. This defect, however, does not in any way impair the validity of the judgment rendered by the circuit court, since the complaint and summons identified the offense both by name and citation. As indicated earlier, the \u201cNotice of Ordinance Violation\u201d is not the initiation of court process; court process was initiated by the personal service of the nontraffic complaint and notice to appear.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nNASH and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE VAN DEUSEN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Charles L. Ollivier, of Lake Bluff, for appellant.",
      "William G. Rosing and Stephen G. Applehans, both of Rosing, Carlson & Magee, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNETTE OLLIVIER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 80-147\nOpinion filed February 10, 1981.\nRehearing denied March 20, 1981.\nCharles L. Ollivier, of Lake Bluff, for appellant.\nWilliam G. Rosing and Stephen G. Applehans, both of Rosing, Carlson & Magee, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0324-01",
  "first_page_order": 346,
  "last_page_order": 349
}