{ "id": 3135770, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIEGFRIED SCHULTZ, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Schultz", "decision_date": "1981-02-25", "docket_number": "No. 79-1469", "first_page": "1071", "last_page": "1077", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 1071" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 1130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3268707 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3389022 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 1096", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3227307 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.Y.S.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 App. Div. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3235042, 3234310 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/36/0380-01", "/ad2d/36/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 So. 2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9787794 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/275/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 A.L.R.3d 537", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 A.2d 1174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.J. Super. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 873702 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/156/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 So. 2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9701504 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/348/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ariz. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 707855 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/119/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S. Ct. 2184", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 L. Ed. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 918", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1666, 1667, 1830, 1607, 1608, 2058, 1803, 1777, 1778, 2166, 1751, 1562, 2206 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0918-11", "/us/431/0918-04", "/us/431/0918-07", "/us/431/0918-05", "/us/431/0918-01", "/us/431/0918-02", "/us/431/0918-03", "/us/431/0918-06", "/us/431/0918-08", "/us/431/0918-12", "/us/431/0918-09", "/us/431/0918-10", "/us/431/0918-13" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435526 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177992 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2460693 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2699602 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 N.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 948", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2791049 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 N.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2629685 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2788498 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3184437 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 1030", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3191619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/1030-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 1513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 L. Ed. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 937", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3106, 3091, 2397 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0937-02", "/us/435/0937-01", "/us/435/0937-03" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811071 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2829348 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 1081", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5605970 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0006-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 739, "char_count": 13507, "ocr_confidence": 0.923, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9943094730105232e-07, "percentile": 0.7421687519233747 }, "sha256": "44bb64c9a18a4ed6c95eae3fed0be983d5e4e72b3449ee091f2b0bf48aa70df3", "simhash": "1:ba0032bd32728f9c", "word_count": 2266 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:48.439822+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RIZZI, P. J., and McNAMARA, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIEGFRIED SCHULTZ, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Miss JUSTICE McGILLICUDDY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt a bench trial, Siegfried Schultz, the defendant, was convicted of robbery and was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. He contends on appeal that this motion to suppress evidence seized during an inventory search of his automobile was improperly denied and that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nPatrick Bulow, the complainant, testified that he was at Chet\u2019s Melody Lounge in Justice, Illinois, on the evening of January 3, 1979. He had cashed an employment check that afternoon and received $443 in small bills. At approximately 8 p.m., he received a telephone call at the lounge from the defendant. Bulow agreed to drive the defendant to the lounge and to give the defendant\u2019s car, which was parked in the lounge\u2019s lot, a \u201cjump.\u201d During the evening, in the defendant\u2019s presence, Bulow paid for several drinks from the money in his wallet.\nThe defendant left the lounge between 11 and 12 o\u2019clock. When Bulow departed between midnight and 12:30 a.m., the defendant left his parked car, began \u201cwrestling\u201d with Bulow and grabbed Bulow\u2019s wallet and threw it. After Bulow recovered the wallet, the defendant took him to a vacant field near the lounge and wrestled him to the ground. The defendant took Bulow\u2019s wallet, removed the money from it and returned the wallet to Bulow\u2019s pocket. When the defendant tried to force Bulow into his car, Bulow escaped and ran back into the lounge. Bulow testified that the scuffle outside the lounge lasted approximately a half hour.\nGeorge Morisette testified that he arrived at Chet\u2019s Lounge at approximately five to 10 minutes before midnight on January 3,1979. He did not see Bulow in the lounge at that time but saw him run into the lounge about 10 or 15 minutes later. Morisette went outside the lounge with several patrons and observed Frank Cundari, another patron, talking to the defendant about money. Cundari asked the defendant if \u201che had it\u201d and the defendant said, \u201cYes, I have it.\u201d Morisette testified that the defendant also admitted to Cundari that he had hit Bulow.\nBetty Valencia testified that she arrived at Chet\u2019s Melody Lounge at 12:10 a.m. on January 4, 1979, and observed Bulow and the defendant inside the lounge. She saw them leave the lounge between 12:20 and 12:30 a.m. and saw Bulow return full of blood at 12:45 a.m. Valencia went outside the lounge and heard the defendant say to Cundari \u201cI have got it.\u201d\nPolice officer Patrick McDonald testified that he was employed by the village of Justice on January 4, 1979. Pursuant to an assignment, he arrived at Chet\u2019s Melody Lounge at 12:38 a.m. Officer McDonald spoke to Bulow, arrested the defendant and placed him in the squad car. In accordance with police policy he called for a truck to tow the defendant\u2019s car, which was parked in the lounge\u2019s lot. The car was not towed as part of the investigation nor at the request of the lot\u2019s owner.\nAt the Justice police station McDonald and the defendant discussed the defendant\u2019s green parka jacket, which had been recovered from the defendant\u2019s car. On the jacket was a wet, reddish-brown substance which appeared to be blood. Inside the pockets was United States currency amounting to $441 in small bills. The wet, reddish-brown substance also appeared on one $5 bill.\nThe defendant objected to the offer of the currency into evidence and asked that it be suppressed because it was recovered when his automobile was improperly seized and searched. The trial court denied this motion to suppress and the evidence was admitted. The State rested, and the defendant did not present any evidence in his defense.\nOn appeal the defendant seeks reversal of his conviction because he was not proved guilty of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, since his conviction was based on evidence that was improbable, unconvincing and contrary to human experience. The defendant relies on discrepancies in testimony as to the times he and Bulow left Chet\u2019s Melody Lounge and how long the alleged robbery lasted. The defendant also argues that his alleged actions \u2014 returning Bulow\u2019s wallet and not fleeing when Bulow ran back into the lounge \u2014 were inconsistent with those of a criminal.\nSlight testimonial discrepancies do not destroy the credibility of a witness but go to the weight of that testimony. (People v. Villalobos (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 6, 396 N.E.2d 1081.) In a case tried without a jury it is the function of the trial judge to determine the weight to be afforded conflicting testimony (People v. Clark (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 216, 195 N.E.2d 631), and the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge unless the evidence is so improbable that it raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 564, 367 N.E.2d 1313, cert. denied (1978), 435 U.S. 937, 55 L. Ed. 2d 533, 98 S. Ct. 1513; People v. Calderon (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 407 N.E.2d 840.\nWe believe the inconsistencies in testimony that were cited by the defendant are not so great as to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. The trial judge\u2019s resolution of the conflicting testimony in favor of the State was proper since the witnesses\u2019 recollections of the time when the robbery occurred were mere estimations and were incidental to the issue of whether the witnesses could place the defendant at the scene of the crime. People v. Lawson (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 376, 407 N.E.2d 899.\nWe also reject the defendant\u2019s argument that his actions during and after the alleged robbery defied common experience. The defendant contends that it is incredible to believe that a person having the criminal intent to commit a robbery would force the victim into a car after taking money from the victim\u2019s wallet, return the empty wallet to the victim during the course of the robbery and then remain at the scene of the crime after the victim has fled. The defendant relies on four cases wherein criminal convictions were reversed due to improbable and unsatisfactory evidence. (People v. Dawson (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 260, 174 N.E.2d 817; People v. Sowers (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 599, 344 N.E.2d 800; People v. Smiley (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 948, 337 N.E.2d 290; People v. Garner (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 728, 312 N.E.2d 678.) We find these cases distinguishable because of the existence of such additional factors as the weak credibility of the victims and/or witnesses (Sowers; Smiley; Garner), a strong and uncontradicted alibi by the defendant (Sowers), and improbable testimony concerning the partial return of the stolen proceeds to the victims (Dawson; Sowers).\nThe defendant cites the reversals in Dawson and Sowers which were based in part on the failure of the alleged robbers to flee. In Sowers, however, the alleged victim testified that the robber fled the scene but only after he had counted up the proceeds of the robbery. In Dawson the evidence showed that the robber made no attempt to leave the scene, but the additional testimony making the robbery unlikely was the fact that the defendant was a police officer who showed his badge and gun and threatened to call the police. Testimony that an alleged criminal did not flee the scene of the crime merely goes to the weight of the evidence establishing guilt. (People v. Neal (1974), 15 Ill. App. 3d 940, 306 N.E.2d 43.) Having reviewed the cases cited by the defendant, we cannot agree that his alleged conduct was similarly contrary to human experience. Therefore, we will not reverse his conviction on this basis.\nThe defendant\u2019s second argument is that the warrantless seizure of his car and subsequent inventory search of his car and jacket were illegal. He contends that the currency discovered as a result of this search was erroneously admitted into evidence and that this error entitles him to a new trial.\nIn support of the search and seizure, the State relies on South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092, and People v. Clark (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 169, 357 N.E.2d 798, cert. denied (1977), 431 U.S. 918, 53 L. Ed. 2d 229, 97 S. Ct. 2184. These cases upheld the practice of conducting an inventory search of an impounded vehicle as a response to the need to protect the owner\u2019s property while it remains in police custody, to protect the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property and to protect the police from potential danger. Inventory searches were viewed as essential to respond to incidents of theft or vandalism. It should be noted however that, unlike the facts in the instant case, the lawfulness of the impoundment of the vehicles was not in issue in either Opperman or Clark. The Clark opinion stated that the defendant did not claim any illegality in this regard (Clark, at 172), and in Opperman the court held that the defendant\u2019s car was lawfully impounded because it was illegally parked for an extended period of time (Opperman, at 375).\nIn determining whether an inventory search is proper and reasonable, the threshold question is whether the prior impoundment was proper since the need and justification for the inventory arises from the impoundment. (See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court (1978), 119 Ariz. 205, 580 P.2d 343; Granville v. State (Fla. App. 1977), 348 So. 2d 641; State v. McDaniel (1978), 156 N.J. Super. 347, 383 A.2d 1174. See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 551-54 (1973).) It is beyond challenge that the police have authority to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience. (See South Dakota v. Opperman.) Justification for impoundment also exists when the owner of property on which the arrestee\u2019s vehicle is parked requests that it be removed. (See State v. Cash (Fla. App. 1973), 275 So. 2d 605.) The fact that the arrestee\u2019s car would be left unattended is not sufficient reason for impounding the arrestee\u2019s vehicle. State v. McDaniel.\nThe State contends that the defendant\u2019s car was lawfully impounded because police officer McDonald was following the Justice Police Department policy to impound all vehicles of arrested persons when the vehicles are not parked on their owners\u2019 properties. However, the existence of a police regulation cannot be used as a predicate to determine the lawfulness or reasonableness of an inventory search of a vehicle. (See People v. Robinson (1971), 36 App. Div. 2d 375, 320 N.Y.S.2d 665.) Were we to hold otherwise, we would be granting the police unlimited authority to violate the property rights of individuals guaranteed and protected by the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.\nThe State also contends that the defendant\u2019s vehicle was impounded by the police for the defendant\u2019s benefit. The State suggests that the defendant\u2019s vehicle was susceptible to theft and vandalism by several of the lounge\u2019s patrons who were friends of Bulow. The record does not support this argument, however, since police officer McDonald testified that the defendant\u2019s vehicle was impounded solely on the basis of the police policy requiring such action.\nThe facts in the instant case show that the defendant\u2019s car was lawfully parked in front of Chet\u2019s Melody Lounge. There had been no request by the proprietor of the lounge nor by the defendant to tow the defendant\u2019s car. In a case factually similar, People v. Valdez (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 25, 400 N.E.2d 1096, the defendant was arrested in a restaurant and his car, which was parked in the restaurant\u2019s lot, was towed and its contents inventoried by the police. The court held that the inventory search was improper because there was no showing that the police had any authority to take custody of the defendant\u2019s car. There was no evidence that any restaurant personnel directed or requested the police to remove the car nor did the defendant consent to the police taking custody. The court relied on People v. Von Hatten (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 338, 367 N.E.2d 556, for the proposition that law enforcement officials have the right or duty to conduct an inventory search only where they have some responsibility for the vehicle or its contents.\nApplying Valdez and Von Hatten to the case at bar, we hold that the defendant\u2019s car was unlawfully impounded and searched and that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence seized as a result of this search. Since there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search might have contributed to the defendant\u2019s conviction, we cannot say that the error committed at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See, e.g., People v. Bascomb (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 392, 392 N.E.2d 1130.) Therefore, the defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed, and a new trial is required.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded for a new trial.\nRIZZI, P. J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.\nIn Clark the defendant's car stalled and was blocking traffic.", "type": "majority", "author": "Miss JUSTICE McGILLICUDDY" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Iris E. Sholder, and Barry S. Pechter, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIEGFRIED SCHULTZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 79-1469\nOpinion filed February 25, 1981.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Iris E. Sholder, and Barry S. Pechter, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1071-01", "first_page_order": 1093, "last_page_order": 1099 }