{ "id": 3125240, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Watkins", "decision_date": "1981-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 80-193", "first_page": "749", "last_page": "753", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 749" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5472604 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3263824 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0546-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 474, "char_count": 7716, "ocr_confidence": 0.923, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.95887501656537e-08, "percentile": 0.5017093660672881 }, "sha256": "fccfe17a00fd24e8d465be839df42409b77de0e7bd74a9f96fb58bfa3e66bcf3", "simhash": "1:e9228c03429ac1bd", "word_count": 1276 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:05.907180+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, Robert Watkins was convicted of armed robbery, occurring in Joliet, Illinois, on September 15,1978. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2(a).) He was sentenced to the penitentiary for 18 years. This is his appeal.\nThe facts unfold as follows: On September 15, 1978, at three o\u2019clock in the afternoon, Sophie Hanson was working alone at the Iverson Florist Shop. A man entered and conversed with Mrs. Hanson for 10 minutes about flowers for a funeral. Indicating that he was unable to decide, he left, saying he would return. Later, Mary Gramera, the delivery girl, returned to Iverson\u2019s. At about five o\u2019clock, the store closed for business. Shortly thereafter, when Miss Gramera was about to leave, she met two men at the rear door. One, the man who talked with Mrs. Hanson earlier, insisted on making a purchase. Mrs. Hanson recognized him and both men were allowed entry.\nMrs. Hanson went to the front of the store followed by the prospective customer, whom she later identified as Robert Watkins. Mary Gramera stayed in the back room with the other man, who was Larry Cowans. There was no conversation between the latter two persons. On leaving the back room, Mrs. Hanson was grabbed by Robert Watkins, and she felt a \u201chard object\u201d by her neck. She was threatened. Mr. Watkins relieved the store\u2019s register, cash box, and Mrs. Hanson of money. Next, he forced both employees to go into the basement. The men exited. The entire episode lasted 10 minutes. The police arrived shortly thereafter.\nIn its case-in-chief, the State presented three occurrence witnesses: Larry Cowans, Sophie Hanson, and Mary Gramera. Cowans was an accomplice to the crime. He shared in the robbery\u2019s proceeds. He testified that on September 15,1978, after drinking beer most of the day, he went for a ride with \u201cJames Watkins.\u201d They ended up at Iverson\u2019s. On October 5, 1978, Cowans identified Watkins as the robber in the photographic show-up. He also identified him in court.\nMary Gramera and Sophie Hanson both identified Robert Watkins in court as the robber. Previously, both had identified him at a photographic show-up on September 21, 1978. Mrs. Hanson testified she never saw a weapon in Watkins\u2019 hand. Mary Gramera stated that when Watkins was in the front room of the store she noticed a metal object in his hand. On cross-examination she said that before entering the basement, at the top of the stairwell, she stood face-to-face with Mr. Watkins, who had a knife pointed at her. She said the blade looked tarnished. Then, the following exchange occurred:\n\u201cQ. It could have been plastic, could it not have been?\nMr. Reich [State\u2019s Attorney]: Objection.\nThe Court: Objection sustained.\nMr. Goldstein [Defendant\u2019s Attorney]: Could you describe the difference between a plastic and what you observed that day?\nMr. Reich: Objection.\nMr. Goldstein: I am trying to find out what he had in his hand, Judge.\nMr. Reich: Judge, if Mr. Goldstein wants to state where he\u2019s getting it [sic] I\u2019d appreciate it, before there is a ruling on the objection. The Court: The objection is sustained.\u201d\nAfter Mary Gramera testified, the State presented one other witness before resting. Watkins\u2019 case followed, and the matter then proceeded to a jury instructions conference and closing argument. During the State\u2019s closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the composition of the knife was totally unimportant. The prosecutor stated:\n\u201cIt doesn\u2019t matter what the blade was made out of. It doesn\u2019t matter if it was metal. It doesn\u2019t matter if it was plastic. It doesn\u2019t matter if it was marshmallow, because the case law is clear \u201d *\nDefense counsel objected to the prosecutor\u2019s arguing his interpretation of case law to the jury. The trial judge made no ruling on this objection, and the prosecutor attempted to continue with this line of argument. Again defense counsel objected and requested a ruling on his objection. The trial judge refrained from ruling specifically on the objection but instructed the prosecutor to reserve for rebuttal any arguments he would choose to make on this issue.\nDuring closing statements, defense counsel argued to the jury that the testimony concerning the alleged weapon greatly conflicted.\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge of armed robbery. The armed robbery statute provides that a person violates its provision when committing a robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2(a).) Thus, for the State to prove armed robbery, it must establish all the elements of the offense of robbery and that the perpetrator was armed with a dangerous weapon. Proof of all these factors must be beyond doubt. Nowhere in the armed robbery statute is dangerous weapon defined. In analyzing whether an object is dangerous, two views have emerged, one subjective and one objective. The first and subjective approach argues that armed robbery happens when the robber intends to create in the victim the belief and apprehension that the robber had a dangerous weapon and the victim in fact so believed. According to this view, the objective dangerousness of the weapon is immaterial. (People v. Chapman (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 546.) This is an incorrect interpretation of the law. The second and correct approach is an objective test which requires that the weapon employed in the robbery be actually dangerous in the setting it is used.\nOur supreme court has thoroughly discussed this subject in the recent case of People v. Skelton (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 58. The issue in Skelton was whether a particular plastic toy revolver used in an armed robbery was a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the armed robbery statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2(a).) The court held it was not. It observed, however, that many objects could be dangerous weapons if used in a manner for which they were not designed. For instance, a gun, although unloaded, would be a dangerous weapon since it could be used as a bludgeon. In reaching its conclusion, the court affirmed the proposition that the issue of whether an instrumentality is a dangerous weapon is for the trier of fact.\nIn the instant case, the trial court improperly limited the inquiry into the nature and composition of the weapon. The error was compounded during closing argument, when the court declined to sustain the defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s improper and incorrect statement of the law. The effect of these rulings was to remove from the jury\u2019s consideration the objective consideration of whether the object in Watkins\u2019 hand during the robbery was, in fact, dangerous. Dual errors on this subject were committed. The factual inquiry was improperly restricted, and the jury was misled as to the law.\nSince this case must be reversed and remanded, we wish to note, in passing, that dangerous weapons for purposes of the armed robbery statute are not limited to dangerous weapons as defined in the separate armed violence statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 33A \u2014 2). This argument advanced by the defendant is erroneous.\nFor the reasons stated, however, the above cause is reversed and remanded for trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nBARRY and STOUDER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE HEIPLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Tom Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Edward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Rita F. Kennedy, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 80-193\nOpinion filed March 27, 1981.\nRobert Agostinelli and Tom Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nEdward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Rita F. Kennedy, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0749-01", "first_page_order": 771, "last_page_order": 775 }